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Abstract 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a turbulent period in East Asia. Aggressive 
imperial powers challenged the traditional regional order, changing the relationships between the 
nations in the region and ushering in a period of imperialism and intense international rivalry. The 
subject of this study is Korean neutralisation attempts in this period, initiated by Koreans as well as 
by international actors, in an effort to fully understand how Korea endeavoured to preserve its 
sovereignty and how major powers pursued their interests in the Far East. Arguing that previous 
scholarship has dealt with Korean neutralisation in a too piecemeal fashion, this study utilises 
previously overlooked diplomatic documents, examines influencing factors previously disregarded, 
and covers a longer time period (1882-1907) than prior scholarship to provide a comprehensive and 
multilateral analysis of Korean neutralisation. Whereas previous scholarship has downplayed the 
historical significance of these attempts, based on such comprehensive analysis, this study argues 
that Korean neutralisation was possible on at least one discrete occasion. To facilitate a better 
understanding of the factors that influenced these neutralisation attempts, the study introduces 
examples of successful neutralisation in Europe and compares these with the Korean case. The 
structure of the study is chronological, describing attempts within the context of domestic and 
regional historical developments, focusing on the time periods surrounding major domestic and 
international events such as the Imo Mutiny, 1882, the Gapsin Coup, 1884, the British occupation 
of Port Hamilton (Geomundo), 1885-87, the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95, and the Russo-Japanese 
War, 1904-1905. Although comparisons with successful European cases show that a lack of 
essential requirements made all Korean neutralisation attempts discussed in this study infeasible, 
this study re-evaluates their historical significance and illustrates that neutralisation can only be 
realised through the candidate’s own will and strength combined with international respect and 
support. 
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Chapter I. Introduction  
· Aims  
The late nineteenth century saw an aggressive expansion of Western major power imperialism 
into East Asia. Benefiting from the economic and technological advancements derived from the 
Industrial Revolution, Western powers flexed their military and diplomatic muscles to carve out 
spheres of influence in weaker East Asian countries and then obtain valuable concessions there. 
Struggling to survive in this period of imperialism, Korea, on the one hand, maintained traditional 
relations with China, but on the other, concluded unequal treaties with Japan and Western powers 
pressuring Korea to open its doors. Regretfully, however, the rivalries for hegemony among the 
nations bordering Korea, which culminated in two wars, the Sino-Japanese War (1.8.1894-
17.4.1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (8.2.1904-5.9.1905), resulted in Korea’s loss of 
sovereignty as the country was unable to read and navigate the contemporary currents.  
During this transition period, Korea became an object of major maritime and continental 
powers’ interest for the geostrategic reason that it could act as a bridgehead into the Asian continent 
and the Pacific for them. With Korea’s future imperilled, many options were considered and put 
forward, some by Korea alone, some by foreign countries, and others as joint efforts between Korea 
and outside parties. Such options included for Korea remaining a vassal state of China, declaring 
itself independent, transforming Korea into a neutralised state, attempting a Russian-led 
partitioning, and becoming a protectorate of Japan. Among these options, the main concern of this 
study is Korean neutralisation, which, although it has received both domestic and international 
attention for many years, still has not been studied in detail. Though Korea was initially 
uninterested in neutralisation, it reluctantly advocated such a course after being completely 
excluded from the Sino-British negotiations on the Geomundo Incident (15.4.1885-27.2.1887). 
Korean neutralisation eventually failed, but it is worth re-examining to understand its significance 
in Far Eastern diplomatic history and to broaden the historical understanding of neutralisation as a 
policy tool, one that is still discussed as a possible solution in certain parts of the world today. 
Therein lie the primary aims of this study.  
· Review of Previous Studies 
Up until now, most scholars who have studied Korean neutralisation in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries treated it as a minor issue in Korean diplomatic history, assuming that neutralisation 
 9 
was not an official government policy, but rather a temporary measure to save Korea from foreign 
interference or threats. Most studies have also downplayed the importance of Korean neutralisation 
in East Asian geopolitics, and research conducted in Korea and Japan, which analyse neutralisation 
more meticulously, focus mainly on individual neutralisation proposals and therefore fail to give a 
fuller picture of the larger historical significance of these efforts.    
The study of these efforts by Korean scholars began in earnest in the 1980s, focusing on 
individual neutralisation proposals. Kim Wuhyeon1 employs vital British and German documents to 
scrutinise Paul G. von Möllendorff’s proposal and how the British government approached the 
Geomundo issue. Gu Daeyeol 2 scrutinises Korean diplomat Yi Haneung’s multi-dimensional 
neutralisation proposal. His article provides a useful context for understanding Britain’s Korean 
policy and intimating how his Western-style education helped him devise a complex plan reflecting 
Western powers’ interests.  
Conversely, two scholars in the field of politics cover a wide range of time frame when 
dealing with Korean neutralisation in their doctoral dissertations. Gang Gwangsik’s dissertation3 
encompasses the period from the late Joseon to the 1980s of modern Korea. This study contains a 
comprehensive interpretation of neutralisation-related theories and examples of neutral states 
guaranteed by major states. Within the theoretical context of neutralisation, some important 
neutralisation proposals suggested officially or privately during late Joseon and modern Korea are 
discussed, thus demonstrating the durability of neutralisation in modern Korean history.  
Yu Myeongcheol4 should be credited for including the internal and external causes of the 
failure of Korean neutralisation and analysing neutralisation proposals based on key events (late 
Joseon) and for three time periods—the post-1945, the post-1960s, and the post-1970s (modern 
Korea). By discussing the internal and external requirements of Korean neutralisation, Yu shows 
                                                 
1 Kim Wuhyeon, “P. G. von Moellendoreupeu ui Joseon jungniphwa gusang [P. G. von Mollendorff’s Plan of the 
Neutralisation of Joseon]”, Pyeonghwa yeongu 8 (1983): 47-151. 
2 Gu Daeyeol, “Yi Haneung gwa Han-Yeong gwangye: geu ui Hanbando jungniphwaan eul jungsim euro [Yi Haneung 
and Anglo-Korean Relations: Focusing on His Neutralisation Proposal]”, Seonggok nonchong 16 (1985): 493-527. 
3  Gang Gwangsik, “Gukje cheje ui seryeok gwalli bangan euroseo jungniphwa e gwanhan yeongu: Hanbando ui 
jeokyong ganeungseong mosaek gwaui gwallyeon eseo [A Study of Neutralisation as a Means of Power Management in 
the International System: With Respect to the Feasibility of Korean Neutralisation]” (PhD diss., Gyeonghui University, 
1987). 
4 Yu Myeongcheol, “Hanguk jungniphwaron yeongu [A Study of Korean Neutralisation Discourses]” (PhD diss., 
Gyeongbuk University, 1989). 
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how the development of this complicated issue was shaped by various internal and external forces 
over time.  
Despite these merits, Kim fails to use Russian sources to check for responses to Möllendorff’s 
proposal. Gu’s study does not tackle other factors that undercut neutralisation efforts, only focusing 
on Britain’s Korean policy. Furthermore, the long time span makes it impossible for Gang to delve 
into Korean neutralisation attempts more deeply and at times, he does not provide relevant primary 
sources for some of the important proposals discussed. Yu’s study suffers from the omission of 
many neutralisation proposals as well as crucial factors affecting them, such as the pro-
neutralisation faction and international agreements. Moreover, compared to Gang, Yu devotes scant 
space to illustrating the theoretical nature of neutralisation, which undermines his dissertation’s 
value as political science research. 
In the 1990s, Korean historians adopted a more active interest in Korean neutralisation. Gwon 
Yeongbae5 surveys the debates and specific conditions surrounding key neutralisation proposals 
both within Korea and from abroad from late Joseon to the Korean Empire. He carefully stresses 
that Korean neutralisation proposals coincided with rising tensions between major powers. Seo 
Yeonghui,6 by expanding her scope of analysis to include Gojong, convincingly shows how Korean 
neutralisation was perceived among governing circles in Korea and how the incessant factional 
quarrels amongst the political establishment undermined it even as they struggled to contend with 
the fierce Russo-Japanese rivalry.  
Pak Huiho's dissertation,7 based mainly on Japanese and Anglo-American sources, is the most 
comprehensive study addressing neutralisation proposals covering the period from late Joseon to the 
Korean Empire (1882-1904). Pak first methodically evaluates the internal and external causes of 
Korean neutralisation’s failures and then uncovers several factors affecting Korean neutralisation 
domestically and abroad, making his study an ideal example of historiography. Seok Hwajeong’s 
                                                 
5  Gwon Yeongbae, “Hanmal Joseon e daehan jungniphwa nonui wa geu seonggyeok [The Discourses of Korean 
Neutralisation in Late Joseon and Its Nature]”, Yoksa gyoyuk nonjip 17 (1992): 25-68. 
6 Seo Yeonghui, “ReoIl jeonjaenggi Daehan Jeguk jipgwon seryeog ui siguk daeung [The Korean Empire Governing 
Group’s Response to the Situation During the Russo-Japanese War]”, Yeoksa wa hyeonsil 25 (1997): 177-217. 
7 Pak Huiho, “Gu Hanmal Hanbando jungniphwaron yeongu [A Study on the Proposals for Neutralisation of the Korean 
Peninsula During the Period from 1882 to 1904]” (PhD diss., Dongguk University, 1997).   
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meticulous study8 of the Russian czar and officials’ stances towards Manchuria illustrates the 
background of why Russia would support Korean neutralisation. To preserve its sphere of influence 
in Manchuria, Russia considered neutralisation of the Korean peninsula an inevitable corollary, 
though it became a thorny issue during Russo-Japanese negotiations. 
However, Gwon’s study neglects the vital roles that France and Russia played in Korean 
neutralisation. Even though her research stresses the harmful impacts of Korean political factions on 
neutralisation, Seo fails to fully address the role of Russia and the close link between it and the pro-
Russia faction in Korea. Pak’s research, on the other hand, despite being the most comprehensive, 
still overlooks a number of crucial factors: the roles played by communication, foreign advisers, 
international agreements, and foreign loans, omission of the neutralisation proposals attempted 
between 1905 and 1907, and an inability to pinpoint the failures of some neutralisation proposals 
due to a limited use of Russian and French resources. Seok also overlooks a third power’s views on 
Russian neutralisation policy, though Russia allied with France, on which Gojong depended to 
advance Korean neutralisation. 
In the twenty-first century, the research on Korean neutralisation has shown a new trend of 
studying both neutralisation proposals and their historical backgrounds. Gang Changseok9 vividly 
portrays how the neutralisation proposals put forward by major powers from late Joseon to the 
Korean Empire were designed to thwart Japanese control of Korea. To strengthen his arguments, he 
incorporates the geopolitical situation, Japan’s Korean policy, and Korea’s diplomatic relations with 
the outside world into his work. Eom Chanho10 specifically focuses on the issue of Korean 
neutralisation during the Geomundo Incident, recognising that this was a pivotal moment for the 
direction of Korean neutralisation. Though he uses limited primary sources, he still manages to 
highlight Korean perspectives on neutralisation discourse during the Geomundo fiasco.  
                                                 
8 Seok Hwajeong, “Reosia ui Hanbando jungniphwa jeongchaek—Witte ui dae Manju jeongchaek gwa gwallyeonhayeo 
[Russia’s Neutralisation Policy on the Korean Peninsula—In Connection with Witte’s Manchurian Policy]”, Jungso 
yeongu 83 (1999): 161-187. 
9 Gang Changseok, “Gu Hanmal jungniphwaron e daehan yeongu [A Study of Neutralisation Discourses in Late 
Joseon]”, Busan sahak 33 (2002): 55-89. 
10 Eom Chanho, “Geomundo sageon gwa Joseon ui jungniphwaron [The Geomundo Incident and Neutralisation 
Discourses of Joseon]”, Gangwon sahak 17/18 (2002): 237-258. 
11 Hyeon Gwangho, Daehan Jegug ui daeoe jeongchaek [The External Policy of the Korean Empire] (Seoul: 
Sinseowon, 2002], 77-126. 
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Hyeon Gwangho’s research monograph11 presents a comprehensive account of the formation 
and activities of pro-neutralisation forces in Korea by examining previously neglected proposals 
such as that by Jeon Byeonghun and demonstrates how major events such as the Boxer Uprising 
affected Korean neutralisation attempts. Yi Hangjun’s well-organised survey12 of prominent 
Russian neutralisation proponents, such as Sergei Witte, stands out since Witte was a major figure 
in Russia’s Far Eastern foreign policy. Kim Hyeonsuk13 uses previously ignored personal 
documents of American adviser William Franklin Sands to provide a detailed analysis of his 
rationale for Korean neutralisation amidst the growing rapprochement between Britain and Japan.  
Nonetheless, Gang neglects the vital roles that France and Russia played in Korean 
neutralisation. Eom overlooks the connection between the Geomundo Incident and the Anglo-
Russian rivalry in Afghanistan, thereby failing to place it within the wider context of imperialistic 
competition. Furthermore, over-utilising Anglo-American and Japanese sources leads Hyeon to 
devote too little space to revealing the role of France and Russia in Korea’s neutralisation, despite 
their lively interest in Korean affairs. Yi also does not factor in American and British officials’ 
views on Russo-Japanese negotiations and their impacts on Korean neutralisation, even though both 
the U.S and Britain tacitly recognised Japan’s influence over Korea. Besides, Kim pretermits 
Gojong’s growing distance from the U.S. owing to Russia’s emergence as Korea’s patron, thus 
undermining her meticulously analysed study. 
Japanese scholar Obinata Sumio14 comments on the Japanese-led neutralisation proposals, 
while keeping in mind the geopolitical changes that shaped them. Ōsawa Hiroaki’s research15 links 
                                                 
12 Yi Hangjun, “YeongIl dongmaeng gwa jejeong Reosia ui geukdong jeongchaek: 1902 nyeon Ilbon ui daeReo 
hyeopsangan gwa Hanguk jungniphwa bangan eul jungsim euro [The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Imperial Russia’s 
Far East Policy—Focusing on Japan’s Negotiating Plan Towards Russia in 1902 and the Joseon Neutralisation Plan]”, 
Sarim 31 (2008): 349-371. 
13 Kim Hyeonsuk, “Daehan Jegukgi gungnaebu gomungwan Saenjeu (W. F. Sands) ui gaehyeokron gwa jungniphwaan 
ui seonggyeok [The Royal Adviser W. F. Sands’ Reformist Ideas and the Nature of Neutralisation Proposal in the  
Korean Empire Era]”, Yeoksa wa damnon 51 (2008): 69-103. 
14 Obinata Sumio, “CheongIl jeonjaeng jeonhu Ilbon jeongchi eseoui Dongasia jilseo gusang [The Concepts about East  
Asian Order of Japanese Politics Before and After the Sino-Japanese War]”, in CheongIl jeonjaenggi Han∙ Jung∙Il 
samgug ui sangho jeollyak [The Interactional Strategies Among Korea, China and Japan During the Sino-Japanese 
War], Wang Hyeonjong et al. (Seoul: Dongbuga yeoksa jaedan, 2009), 110-247. 
15 Ōsawa Hiroaki, “CheongIl jeongjaeng ijeon ui Ilbon ui Joseon jeongchaek [Japan’s Joseon Policy Before the Sino-
Japanese War]”, Dongbuga 7 (1998): 75-93 
16 Omura Shūjū, “ReoIl jeonjaeng gwa Joseon ui jungniphwaron [The Russo-Japanese War and Joseon’s Neutralisation 
Discourse]”, in Hanguk geundae jeongchisa yeongu [A Study on the Political History of Early Modern Korea], ed. 
Yang Sanghyeon (Seoul: Sagyejeol, 1985), 337-366. 
 13 
permanent neutralisation with Korea’s internal reform and shows an understanding of the impact of 
the Japanese navy on Japanese foreign policy. Omura Shūjū,16 who believed there was neither a 
pro-Japanese nor pro-Russian faction in Korea in regards to neutralisation, scrutinises Korean 
sources. Moriyama Shigenori17 traces the origins of official Korean neutralisation policy back to the 
Boxer Uprising and rightly stresses the important roles of Japan and Russia in Korean 
neutralisation. 
Yet for all their merits, these studies are marred by incompleteness. Obinata fails to include 
Korean reactions to Japanese initiatives. Osawa’s research suffers from a lack of information on key 
Japanese political opinion makers regarding neutralisation, while Omura’s study overlooks the 
significance of Russo-Japanese agreements. Moriyama disregards Russian approval of Korean 
neutralisation, despite the importance of the Russian stance in Japan’s Korean policy. Above all, 
none of them directly deals with Korea’s responses to Japanese infringement of Korean sovereignty. 
Additionally, their studies neglect Korea’s pro-active efforts, for example, its diplomatic 
diversification efforts. Besides, though Japanese scholars are good in presenting the historical 
background surrounding neutralisation proposals, they still disregard important external factors, 
such as major power rivalries, international agreements, and foreign loans that affected Korean 
neutralisation proposals. A more comprehensive approach that overcomes the above limitations 
would have given a more balanced account of Japan-originated Korean neutralisation discourses.  
Meanwhile, several academic studies on diplomatic history with broader scopes further a 
more astute comprehension of the Korean neutralisation issue. Ian Nish, exploring the strategic and 
political aspects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, notes that both Britain and Japan desired the 
balance of power in the Far East to protect China's sovereign rights, but neither defended it due to 
their selfish interests. In the same vein, Korean independence was no longer recognised after the 
Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance, a victim of its collision with Japanese ambition.18 In his research 
about Chinese policy towards Japan prior to the Sino-Japanese War, Dai Dongyang, accepting the 
basic premise that China adopted an active stance in its foreign policies but a passive one in its 
                                                 
17 Moriyama Shigenori, Geundae IlHan gwangyesa yeongu [A Study of Modern Korea-Japan Relations], trans. Kim 
Semin (Seoul: Hyeoneomsa, 1994), 159-194. 
18 Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 (London: The Athlone 
Press, 1966). 
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military affairs, contends that, desperate to avoid war with Japan, China continued to adjust its 
Japan policy by offering numerous concessions to Japan.19 Kim Gijeong approaches the issue of 
Korea’s early twentieth century relations with the U.S. from a theoretical perspective, and in his 
world-system based analysis, Korea's struggle for survival is portrayed as a peripheral issue in an 
international system dominated by core states such as the U.S.20 Kim Munja, having combed 
Japanese military files, confirms it was the Japanese army that assassinated Queen Min, who had 
taken a pro-Russian stance to oppose Japan and was an impediment to Japanese securement of 
Korean telegraph lines.21 
Acknowledging the power of words in international relations, Alexis Dudden looks beyond 
the common perception that Japan’s military might trumped Korean independence. She instead 
analyses how Japan successfully employed international law to annex Korea with international 
consent, making Korea’s protest to major powers at the Hague Peace Conference futile.22 Andrew 
Malozemoff’s research on Russian Far Eastern policy provides a convincing picture of the situation 
in the Far East and in Korea. Disputing the claims that Russia was mainly responsible for Korea’s 
suffering from the Russo-Japanese War, Malozemoff blames Japan instead because Manchuria was 
the core of Russian Far Eastern policy. Nevertheless, Korea still retained a significant value for 
Russia, as his in-depth investigation of the Russian court’s debates surrounding Russia’s 
concessions on the Yalu River shows.23 George A. Lensen focuses on the multi-faceted major 
power rivalries surrounding Korea,24 Gordon V. Kiernan enquires into the impact of Britain’s 
                                                 
19 Dai Dongyang, “Gabo JungIl jeonjaeng gigan Cheong jeongbu ui daeIl jeongchaek [The Qing Government’s  
Policy Toward Japan During the Gabo Sino-Japanese War]”, in CheongIl jeonjaenggi Han∙ Jung∙ Il samgug ui sangho 
jeollyak [The Interactional Strategies Among Korea, China and Japan During the Sino-Japanese War], Wang 
Hyeonjong et al. (Seoul: Dongbuga yeoksa jaedan, 2009), 249-352. 
20 Kim Gijeong, Migug ui Dongasia gaeib ui yeoksajeok wonhyeong gwa 20segi cho Han-Mi gwangye yeongu [The 
Historical Prototype of the U.S. Intervention in East Asia and a Study of Korea-U.S. Relations in the Early 20th 
Century] (Seoul: Munhak gwa jiseongsa, 2003).  
21 Kim Munja, Myeongseong hwanghu sihae wa Ilbonin [The Assassination of the Joseon Queen and the Japanese], 
trans. Kim Seungil (Seoul: Taehaksa, 2010), 405. 
22 Alexis Dudden, Japan’s Colonisation of Korea: Discourse and Power (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005). 
23 Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern policy 1881-1904, with special emphasis on the causes of the Russo- 
Japanese War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958). 
24 George Alexander Lensen, Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884-1889, 2 vol. 
(Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1982). 
25 V. Gordon Kiernan, British Diplomacy in China, 1880 to 1885 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939). 
26 Kim Keyhiuk, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).   
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relations with China on Korea,25 and Kim Keyhiuk sketches out Korea’s turbulent transition from 
the tributary system to the treaty system.26 
To sum up, previous studies on Korean neutralisation partly shed light on key neutralisation 
proposals, theoretically, chronologically, and geopolitically, by utilising somewhat underutilised 
primary sources and influencing factors to analyse them. Thus, Korean neutralisation is regarded as 
a game changer that could have potentially upset the geopolitical nature of the Far East. However, 
these studies suffer from some drawbacks; they neither comprehensively identify vital factors that 
affected Korean neutralisation nor sufficiently diversify the use of primary sources to enable a 
balanced analysis of Korean neutralisation.          
While acknowledging the values of previous research, this dissertation takes the position that 
what is needed now for a more comprehensive understanding of Korean neutralisation attempts and 
the significance of Korean neutralisation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is an in-
depth study that, while focused on Joseon, covers a longer time period (1882-1907), that 
additionally takes into account hitherto unexplored factors that affected Korean neutralisation 
attempts and that utilises multinational primary documents for maintaining a balanced perspective.  
  · Research Questions 
Though there have been some studies on Korean neutralisation, it still has not received the 
scholarly attention it deserves for two main reasons: the excuse that comparatively few primary 
sources are available for research and the preconceived idea that Korean neutralisation was destined 
to fail since major powers adopted a largely lukewarm attitude, a finding that the aforementioned 
studies have reached over the years. To escape these well-worn ruts and approach Korean 
neutralisation anew, the following research questions will be considered:  
 What were the internal and external factors that affected Korean neutralisation attempts, 
who proposed Korean neutralisation, when, why, how, and where was it proposed, and why 
did it not materialise?  
 What conditions/factors enabled the successful neutralisation of states in Europe and why 
was this not possible in the Korean case?  
 How did Korean attempts for neutralisation differ from cases of neutralisation in Europe? 
· Methodology  
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In an attempt to produce a study that in a dynamic and interactive manner provides an 
analysis of both more factors and a longer time period, this study will in detail discuss the 
neutralisation proposals chronologically to demonstrate how the interest in Korean neutralisation 
changed over time and to determine whether any proposal was plausible, by minutely investigating 
the various factors that influenced each proposal and its outcome. This study will attempt to answer 
the above research questions in the following manner:  
 A survey of European neutrality, examining the backgrounds and factors behind its success, 
and of Korea’s neutralisation attempts, to enable a comparison of European and Korean 
neutrality.  
 A more multi-faceted scrutiny of neutralisation efforts through additional exploration of the 
internal and external factors affecting neutralisation attempts, such as communications and 
infrastructure, diplomatic capacity, international agreements, and foreign loans.  
 Departure from the heavy dependence on American, British, and Japanese sources, by using 
unpublished French documents and underutilised German and Russian sources to provide 
relatively unknown details that furnish a more balanced reading of Korean neutralisation 
diplomacy.  
 The division of neutralisation proposals into five periods to reflect the impacts of major 
events on neutralisation, covering from just after the Imo Mutiny to shortly after the Second 
Hague Peace Conference, to observe how Korea, as the subject and object of such proposals, 
was involved.  
 An appropriate analysis of newly revealed neutralisation proposals, while highlighting 
proposals that are considered more important than others.  
· Sources 
With the exception of the Gojong sillok 高宗實錄 (Veritable Records of Gojong), Yi 
Beomjin’s report from Russia, and Gojong’s personal letter to the Italian king, no official Korean 
government documents deal directly with neutralisation. This lack of official sources that deal 
explicitly with the issue of neutralisation makes it difficult to get a picture of the various responses 
towards neutralisation among Korean officialdom. This study will try to overcome this weakness by 
paying attention to the impact of political factions on neutralisation. Ilseongnok 日省錄 (Records of 
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Daily Reflections) and diplomatic documents collected in Gu Hanguk oegyo munseo 
舊韓國外交文書 (Old Korean Diplomatic Documents) address neutralisation indirectly by 
reporting on issues such as Korean military reforms and bilateral relations. These sources, however, 
fail to relate the dynamics of Far Eastern geopolitics, and this study will try to fill this gap with an 
analysis of major power rivalries. Materials on relations between China and Korea and compiled 
documents on Qing foreign relations are used to look into Sino-Korean relations and Korea’s efforts 
to adjust to the Western-oriented treaty system, though they inevitably have a pro-China bias and 
are imbued with a Sino-centric mindset. Inevitably, these documents disregard Japanese and 
Western opposition to Chinese policy in Korea. That, however, can be chronicled by investigating 
the transformed international system. 
Japan offers many primary sources on Korean neutralisation, such as the Japanese Foreign 
Office’s diplomatic documents related to neutralisation proposals and selected documents compiled 
by Itō Hirobumi, Kim Jeongmyeong, and Ōyama Azusa that focus on Korea’s relations with Japan 
and the Japanese establishment’s thoughts on Korean neutralisation. These documents do not fairly 
tackle other countries’ perceptions of Japan’s relations with Korea and other major powers, and thus 
ignore the suspicions such powers held towards Japan’s motives in Korea. The survey of Japan-
originated proposals that were opposed by major powers provided by this study will reveal these 
reactions. Russia, another major influence on Korean neutralisation, holds some diplomatic and 
government documents valuable for exploring Korean economy, foreign policy, military, and 
politics, sourced from the Russian National and State Naval Archives. In particular, they mention 
the origins and backgrounds of neutralisation proposals from Russian officials and the Russian 
newspaper Moskovskiye Vedomosti. Russian documents describe Korea’s thorny problems with 
major powers, albeit from a Russian angle, and thus become overly critical of Japan’s schemes in 
the Far East while camouflaging Russia’s ulterior motives in Korea. Consequently, Russia is 
portrayed as a disinterested player in Korea, which can be disproved by examining the post-Boxer 
Uprising Russian proposals.  
Unlike the documents from the above three countries, those from the U.S., Britain, France, 
Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany take a relatively more neutral view. The U.S. possesses 
diplomatic documents pertaining to U.S. diplomats and officials’ reports and analyses of Korean 
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neutralisation, such as U.S. State Department documents compiled by Scott S. Burnett, George M. 
McCune, and David Jules, and dispatches from U.S. ministers in Korea. The role of Britain in 
mediating between major power disputes over Korea can be traced through its Foreign Office files, 
trade reports, and diplomatic documents collected by G. P. Gooch, Ian Nish, and Pak Ilgeun.27 
Despite their merits, U.S. and British documents often downplayed Korea’s commitment to 
independence, devoting too much space to the Sino-Japanese and later Russo-Japanese competitions 
surrounding Korea while depicting it as merely a dependent variable. Efforts for institutional 
reforms that affected Korea’s diplomatic capacity challenge such perceptions.  
Both published and unpublished French diplomatic documents are crucial for a more balanced 
comprehension of the impact of internal factors, such as communications, political factions, and 
military reforms, on neutralisation. In particular, the unpublished diplomatic documents supply vital 
details on French diplomats’ analyses of Korea’s position under Chinese domination and later 
regarding the open hostility between Russia and Japan. These sources lay bare France’s role in 
Korea’s wartime neutrality declaration. However, by not demonstrating its full support for Korean 
neutrality, they underestimate France’s involvement in Korean affairs. Scrutiny of France’s role in 
Korean military reforms and its loan negotiations with Korea will show instead its positive impact 
on Korean neutralisation.  
Austro-Hungarian documents reveal the intricacies of major power competitions surrounding 
the Korean peninsula. Even if only one Italian source is used in this study, the Italian’s king’s letter 
to Gojong is testament to the importance of major power support for Korean neutralisation. German 
diplomatic documents show how Germany played a marginal but nonetheless meaningful role in 
Korea’s modernisation and neutralisation. These documents validate Japanese and Western 
neutralisation proposals and include German perspectives on the Russo-Japanese rivalry over Korea. 
Austro-Hungarian, Italian, and German sources, however, neglect the Korean role in Far Eastern 
                                                 
27 G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, ed., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1894-1914 IV (London: H. M. 
Stationary Office, 1926-1938); Ian Nish, ed., “Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, and North East-Asia, 1875-1888”, in British 
Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, ed. Kenneth Bourne, 
and D. Cameron Watt (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1989-1994); Pak Ilgeun, ed., Anglo-
American Materials Relating to Korea 1866-1886 (Seoul: Shinmundang, 1982); Anglo-American and Chinese 
Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1887-1897 (Busan: Institute of Chinese Studies, Busan National University, 
1984).  
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diplomacy, while overemphasising major powers’ roles in Korean foreign policy. Such views can 
be shown to be false by using under-examined sources such as Gojong’s letters.  
Personal documents both within and outside Korea also deal with neutralisation, though they 
do not necessarily mirror the formal stances of proponents’ home governments; in Korea, Kim 
Yunsik, Yu Giljun, and Kim Okgyun’s personal documents flesh out their roles in neutralisation. In 
Japan, Konoe Atsumaro and Inoue Kagorō’s records are devoted to Japanese reactions to Korean 
neutralisation proposals and the tense Korea-Japan relations that dominated Korean foreign policy. 
In China, Kang Youwei’s manuscript introduces a Belgian-style neutralisation for Korea. In the 
West, Paul G. von Möllendorff left writings that epitomise his Russia-led Korean neutralisation 
proposal, and Owen Nickerson Denny’s documents describe his neutralisation proposal. In 
particular, the Allen Papers, Allen Diary, Sands Papers, and Sands’ Undiplomatic Memories further 
widen the scope of study into Korean neutralisation. The insights on Korean economy, politics, and 
foreign policy of Horace Newton Allen, author of the Papers and Diary, are especially perceptive. 
The latter two works depict Sands’ futile attempts to push for Korea’s permanent neutrality and the 
harmful impact of concession diplomacy on Korean independence. Finally, the Mutel Diary, the 
personal record of Seoul-based French Bishop Mutel, includes extensive entries about foreign 
diplomats’ activities and their interactions with Korean officials. Though it is difficult to gauge 
whether these authors represented the majority view of their countries, cross-checking diplomatic 
documents validates their findings.     
Newspapers supply a batch of neutralisation proposals that are unavailable in government and 
personal documents. The Japanese newspapers Tokyo yokohama mainichi shimbun 東京横浜
每日新聞 (Tokyo Yokohama Daily), Yūbin hōchi shimbun 郵便報知新聞 (Postal News), Japan 
Daily, and Yomiuri shimbun 読売新聞 (The Daily Yomiuri) formulated their own versions of 
Korean neutralisation, each representing Japan’s strategic anxieties surrounding Korea. The Russian 
newspaper Moskovskiye Vedomosti and the Tianjin-based English-run newspaper Chinese Times 
also linked Korea’s fate with neutralisation. In addition, many newspapers reported on other 
neutralisation proposals: the Kobe Chronicle on the proposals from British and American 
ambassadors in St. Petersburg, the Chinese newspaper Shēn bào 申報 (Shanghai News) on 
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European governments’ wartime neutrality of Korea, the Japanese newspaper Ōsaka mainichi 
shimbun 大阪每日新聞 (Osaka Daily) on Ernest Bethell's proffer, the Korean newspaper Daehan 
maeil sinbo 大韓每日申報 (Korea Daily News) on Yi Sangseol’s contention, and the New York 
Times and the Dutch newspaper Het Vader Land on Yi Wijong’s assertion. Nevertheless, as do 
most government documents, Japan and Russia-based newspapers attempt to tie national interests to 
Korean neutralisation and depict Korea as a helpless actor in the international system. Detailing 
Korea’s neutralisation diplomacy at critical moments can ameliorate this tendency.        
· Structure  
This study is organised into eight chapters. After Chapter I's introduction, Chapter II will 
briefly survey general neutralisation theory, give an overview of neutralisation attempts in the 
imperial age, examine the background and contributing factors behind successful cases of 
neutralisation in Europe, and give an overview of neutralisation attempts in Korea to compare with 
the European cases. Chapters III-VII will chronologically scrutinise all neutralisation attempts, 
discussing them within the context of Korea’s internal and external factors caused by the rivalries 
between continental and maritime powers. Chapter VIII will review Korean neutralisation by 
comparing it with European neutrality and probing its historical significance as a lesson for future 
neutralisation candidates and conclude with an epilogue. 
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Chapter II. Neutralisation Theory and Application 
· General Neutralisation Theory 
Neutralisation refers to an international status designed to enable stakeholder countries to 
grant neutrality to countries, territories, and waterways through agreement. Such neutralised 
countries are armed only for self-defence and are exempt from any treaties that might infringe upon 
their neutrality.1 Consequently, neutralised countries can maintain political independence and 
contribute to regional stabilisation. Neutrality was conceived in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries and codified in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries into international law through 
judicial rulings and international conventions which established rights and duties for countries 
choosing to refrain from participating and fighting in a war. 
To adopt neutralisation, a candidate country must be located in an area suitable for 
neutralisation and meet subjective, objective, and international requirements.2 The subjective 
requirement, the most vital for neutralisation, necessitates that the country’s leaders and people 
support neutralisation. Furthermore, a neutralised country must independently demonstrate its 
political, economic, and diplomatic abilities and its willingness to fulfil domestic and international 
rights and duties. Objective requirement denotes a country's geographical position, which must 
contain strategic assets that could increase national and neighbouring countries’ interests. Overall, a 
newly established country, a divided but independent country, a country subject to intervention or 
potentially subject to intervention from a neighbouring major power, or a country that could serve 
as a bridge linking one major power to another, could opt for neutralisation.3 
          Though fulfilling the subjective requirement might be enough to effectuate the customary 
neutralisation of a country, permanent neutralisation requires an international guarantee through an 
agreement between a candidate country and the neighbouring countries which will act as 
guarantors. A permanently neutralised country must also possess a military strong enough to protect 
itself.4 A neutral country is furthermore required to abide by international expectations. If a neutral 
                                                 
1 Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, and Oran R. Yeong, Neutralisation and World Politics (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1968), 11. 
2 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 366. 
3 Gang Jongil and Yi Jaebong, Hanbando ui yeongse jungnipwha tongil eun ganeunghanga [Is a Permanently 
Neutralised Unification of the Korean Peninsula Possible?] (Seoul: Deulnyeok, 2001), 237. 
4 Roderick Ogley, The Treaty and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1970), 10. 
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country violates its duties, such as by giving assistance or providing any advantages to warring 
countries, neutrality will no longer be valid. The principle of neutrality is also linked to maintaining 
the status quo, passively and flexibly.5 
Apart from the above requirements, a neutralisation candidate’s internal and external factors 
must be additionally considered; the ruler’s decision-making style, ruling class cohesion, control of 
communications and concessions, and role of foreign advisers (in the case of Korea) could 
influence neutralisation internally. As a candidate’s geopolitical position was a factor highly 
regarded by guarantors, its neutralisation was also affected by external factors–the international 
system, foreign powers’ perceptions, major power rivalries, foreign loans, and international 
agreements. 
             Banned from becoming involved in armed conflicts, neutral countries, by sustaining the status 
quo, allow larger powers to maintain the prevailing balance of power, the even distribution of 
power, and equal allocation of major powers’ influence. Balance of power can be categorised as 
either the policy of Britain that held a largely non-interventionist stance in Europe from the 
sixteenth to early twentieth century or the European state system (1648-1789) and (1815-1914). Its 
principle originates from Italian scholar Francesco Guicciardini’s History of Italy (1573). First 
mentioned at the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), balance of power became a fundamental prerequisite for 
peace.6 From the Congress of Vienna (1815), it emerged as a mainstay of foreign relations, with 
Britain and Russia the two main axes. After the Beijing Treaty (1860), East Asia encountered the 
Western principle of balance of power. W. A. P. Martin, the translator of Henry Wheaton’s book on 
international law, thought that balance of power might be similar to the East Asian iijei 以夷制夷 
(using one barbarian to check another).7 
Neutralism, together with neutralisation, is a legitimate policy option for weaker countries 
seeking to protect their territory and sovereignty and defend themselves from conflicts between 
larger powers. In selecting neutrality as a security guarantee, such countries must pledge not to join 
any type of political bloc.8 Neutrality is divided into customary and permanent. In customary 
                                                 
5 Gang and Yi, 235. 
6 Evans and Newnham, 42-43. 
7 Kim Yonggu, Manguk gongbeop [International Law] (Seoul: Sohwa, 2008), 149 
8 Evans and Newnham, 36 
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neutrality, a country remains neutral during wartime, neither directly taking sides nor indirectly 
abetting warring countries. At war’s end, neutrality can be terminated. The position of neutrality 
can become more obvious during hot wars. Nevertheless, due to the existence of psychological 
warfare and cold wars, the status of neutrality can be more ambivalent, because such conflicts make 
it more difficult to differentiate between belligerents and non-belligerents. 
Under permanent neutrality, a neutral country and other relevant countries agree on one-off 
rights and duties through treaties. While customary neutrality is only applied during wartime, 
permanent neutrality exists during both peacetime and wartime, its status guaranteed by agreements 
between a subject country and the surrounding major powers.9 The relations accorded to a neutral 
country and the countries acting as its guarantors shape the legal status of permanent neutrality. 
Collective agreements and treaties are needed to grant permanent neutrality, but this is not an 
absolute requirement. (Whereas permanent neutrality is only applied to countries, neutralisation can 
be applied to a territory where a possible conflict between major powers could occur.) Permanent 
neutrality was widely used as a method of conflict management under the balance of power system 
in the nineteenth century. Switzerland was the first example, but the case of Belgium might be more 
applicable. Belgium’s neutrality and independence were established in the 1830s, when Britain was 
keen on giving Belgium the status of a buffer state.10 
· Overview of Neutralisation Attempts in the Age of Imperialism 
           In the age of imperialism, when Western powers competed with each other to extend their 
influence through colonisation, efforts to apply neutralisation were widespread. From the early 
nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, Western imperial powers attempted neutralisation around 
the globe (Diagram 1). Basically, major powers singled out for neutralisation areas whose size and 
location made them prone to potential conflict to frustrate the territorial ambitions of expansionist 
powers, preserve their respective commercial interests, and maximise their influence over strategic 
areas without excessive economic and military costs. Among several attempts at neutralisation 
during this period, the success of neutralisation in Switzerland and Belgium and the role of Bulgaria 
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as a buffer state are already well-known in academic circles, but Korea’s neutralisation attempts 
failed to replicate these successes. 
As for other neutralisation attempts, the major powers opportunistically trained their sights on 
contested areas which they viewed as strategically valuable. Each neutralisation objective was the 
by-product of Western powers’ desires to outstrip potential competitors by cementing geostrategic 
and commercial footholds in selected locations around the world. To begin with, the Polish city of 
Krakow (1815) gained neutrality after the Treaty of Vienna with the consent of major powers.11 
Britain and the U.S., to protect their commercial interests and reduce unnecessary tension between 
them, agreed to neutralise the Great Lakes (1817).12 Other U.S. interests led to a bilateral treaty with 
Columbia to neutralise the Isthmus of Panama (1846),13 and the U.S. concluded another treaty with 
Britain to neutralise the Nicaragua Canal (1850).14 Furthermore, through a series of treaties, 
European powers neutralised the Black Sea (1856),15 Aland Islands (1856),16 Ionian Islands 
(14.11.1863),17 Corfu, Paxo and their dependencies (29.3.1864),18 and Luxembourg (1867).19 Some 
Americans, to preserve U.S. commercial interests, proposed neutralisation of Hawaii (188120 and 
5.189521). The neutralisations of the Congo Basin (1885) and the Samoan Islands (7.1889) were 
also suggested to prevent any one colonial power from dominating Central Africa or the southern 
Pacific Ocean.22 Owing to the Suez Canal’s strategic and commercial value, it was neutralised 
through a multilateral treaty (29.10.1889) with Britain in a leading role,23 but Honduras was 
                                                 
11 George G. Wilson, “Philippine Neutralisation”, The American Journal of International Law 29, No.1 (January 1935): 
82. 
12 Erving Winslow, “Neutralisation”, The American Journal of International Law 2, No.2 (April 1908): 367. 
13 Crammond Kennedy, “Neutralisation and Equal Terms”, The American Journal of International Law 7, No.1 
(January 1913): 30. 
14 John R. Procter, “The Neutralisation of the Nicaragua Canal”, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection (1900): 
4. 
15 Henri La Fontaine et al., “The Neutralisation of States in the Scheme of International Organisation”, Proceedings of 
the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting (1901-1917) 11 (April 26-28, 1917): 138. 
16 Fred Greene, “Neutralisation and Balance of Power”, The American Political Science Review 47, No.4 (December 
1953): 1044.  
17 “Neutralisation of the Ionian Islands”, The American Journal of International Law 3, Vol. 2 (April 1909): 116.  
18 Ibid. 117.   
19 Greene, 1042.  
20 Winslow, 381. 
21 Edward Atkinson, “The Neutralisation of Hawaii”, The Advocate of Peace (1894-1920) 57, No.6 (June 1895): 12-127.  
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23 Procter, 13. 
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neutralised (1907) by a U.S. initiative to forestall European intervention in the Panama Canal.24 
Though the possibility of neutralisation of the Philippines was debated several times in the U.S. 
(1906,25 9.1907,26 2.1908,27 4.1908,28 and 24.3.193429), it did not succeed. Germany, France, and 
Russia approved a partial neutralisation of Norway (1907).30 U.S. Secretary of State Philander 
Chase Knox proposed the neutralisation of the Manchurian railways to ensure equal commercial 
rights for all major powers in China (2.1910).31 Finally, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Russia neutralised Albania (1913), though the action proved to be toothless 
against major power rivalries.32   
· Switzerland, Belgium, and Bulgaria 
To settle conflicts under balance of power, major powers allowed Switzerland and Belgium to 
become permanently neutral countries through international agreements. In the same vein, Bulgaria, 
a buffer state, achieved autonomy. These three European countries, viewed as models for Korean 
neutralisation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, are worth studying to understand 
all the factors that contributed to the international acceptance and domestic success of their 
neutrality or autonomy. A continent away, Gojong looked favourably toward the Belgian and Swiss 
permanent neutrality and sent envoys to both countries, opened diplomatic relations with Belgium, 
hired a Belgian adviser to help prepare for Korean neutrality, and requested the support and advice 
of the Belgian king regarding Korean neutrality.  
<Switzerland> 
Switzerland’s neutrality originated in Switzerland’s defeat at the Battle of Marignano (1515) 
and became its established policy (1647) when the Federal Diet of Switzerland declared that the 
Swiss confederation would regard itself as a neutral state. Swiss neutrality was made permanent at 
the Congress of Vienna (1815) where the great powers (Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and 
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Russia) formally acknowledged and promised to uphold Swiss neutrality.33 Owing to this covenant, 
Switzerland remained relatively safe from the revolutionary wars embroiling neighbouring 
countries (1848-1849) and escaped the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871).  
Background  
A multilingual and multiethnic country, Switzerland needed a foreign policy that incorporated 
the Swiss people’s various cultures, customs, and beliefs. Religious differences between Protestants 
and Roman Catholics were one potential barrier to a unified Swiss foreign policy. Swiss Protestants 
had long held a close affinity with Germany, England, Holland, the Huguenot parts of France, and 
Poland. Alternatively, Swiss Catholics remained on good terms with France, Spain, some states in 
Italy, and the German Catholic territories. These conflicting religious loyalties were one reason 
Switzerland pursued permanent neutrality.  
The emergence of cosmopolitan ideals centred on Switzerland’s economic development, 
coupled with no desire for territorial expansion, contributed to neutrality’s success there in the late 
nineteenth century. Many Swiss thought that the newly established international organisations based 
in Switzerland, such as the Red Cross, confirmed their country’s reputation as an honest broker in 
international affairs,34 and that a non-aligned Switzerland was more than entitled to permanent 
neutrality. 
Without a stable political system such as direct democracy, the general public generally will 
not put sufficient faith in government policies. Permanent neutrality was no different. Swiss 
policymakers instituted a system of referendums to give people their say on laws passed by 
parliament.35 To resolve the dilemma between the needs of individuals and the necessity of having a 
unified foreign policy, federalism was seen as the ideal option. Determined to avoid further political 
mayhem, Swiss leaders approved a new constitution that granted all cantons full autonomy except 
in national defence, international trade, and federal law.36 
Swiss permanent neutrality was recognised as part of international law at the Congress of 
Vienna, secured through intense diplomacy by the Swiss plenipotentiary Pictet de Rougement, who 
capitalised on Switzerland's cooperation during the Napoleonic Wars to win the Congress's 
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approval. This body formally recognised Switzerland's self-declared neutrality,37 the validity of 
which, Switzerland strongly held, could not be questioned by the major powers. When Austria tried 
to replace France as the dominant influence in Swiss foreign policy, Pictet made sure that the 
provision that Swiss neutrality was the common goal of Europe was inserted. 
Switzerland has long prided itself on being a stronghold of free expression. At times, this 
cherished freedom would put Switzerland in a conundrum. Political refugees have urged their Swiss 
hosts to side with democratic forces in the rest of Europe, abandon its neutrality, and support those 
rebelling against abusive governments. Some even demanded the Swiss declare war on royalist 
Europe and attempted to launch armed raids in order to overthrow neighbouring monarchies.38 
Though freedom of expression made Switzerland vulnerable to external agents, its neutrality was 
sustained. 
Although neutral, the Swiss government assigned a high priority to national defence, forming 
a national defence force (1647). Despite this, it was evident that Swiss neutrality depended on major 
powers’ support, of which Britain and Prussia shouldered the main burden of maintaining balance 
of power between Austria and France.39 However, this is not to suggest Switzerland needed the 
assistance of outside powers to defend itself. During the Franco-Prussian War, when 80,000 
retreating French troops crossed into neutralised Switzerland, Prussian troops, aware of 
Switzerland’s military capabilities, did not dare enter Swiss territory to pursue them.40 
Success Factors  
Though Switzerland lacked natural resources, had a small population, and was a late 
participant in industrialisation, by the late nineteenth century it was thriving economically. 
Financially able to fund both domestic prosperity and defence, Switzerland could fend off any 
economic penetration of major powers that might impede its path to permanent neutrality.  
The effective and transparent decision-making process of the Swiss government was another 
asset of Swiss neutrality. Its tradition of local autonomy, coupled with its nascent federalism, 
resulted in flexible and speedy decision-making. Irrespective of internal political differences, when 
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it came to major foreign policy, the federal government could act to counter the schemes of major 
powers. 
 Initially, Swiss politics was comprised of factions that aligned with their favourite countries 
and suffered from foreign domination, including a brief occupation by French troops (1798-1802).41 
Switzerland was also troubled by religious differences but rose above such disadvantages to enact 
electoral reform and minimise political infighting, which in combination with the prevalent 
cosmopolitanism among the Swiss populace helped to realise the country’s permanent neutrality.  
<Belgium> 
After the 1830 revolutions protesting some aspects of the 1814-15 European peace settlement, 
which was seen as biased towards conservative aristocrats and monarchs, many liberals and 
nationalists wanted to replace the old order with one that emphasised the will of the people and 
independent states. Belgian politics was no exception. The Catholic Belgian uprising against the 
domination of the Protestant Dutch paved the way for the affirmation of Belgian independence at 
the London Conference (12.1831). Subsequently, five powers (Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and 
Russia) pledged to guarantee the neutrality of Belgium, and the signing of the Treaty of London 
(4.1839) legalised this arrangement.42 
Background 
Similar to multilingual Switzerland, Belgium was a bilingual society divided into a French-
speaking majority and a significant Flemish-speaking minority. Its economy was saddled with 
numerous problems; as soon as the major powers sanctioned Belgian independence (12.1831), the 
country’s dependence on Rothschild loans began43 due to a simultaneous end of support from its 
colonies, the termination of Dutch economic assistance, the closing of markets in the Netherlands 
and the Dutch East Indies, and hostile Dutch industrialists. Nevertheless, the Belgian economy took 
off in the area of overall investment, especially in the iron and coal industries and in railway 
construction, greatly helping the mining industry's growth. The banking sector also flourished, 
extending large loans to industry and establishing investment trusts to further industrial growth.44 
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Internationalisation of the Belgian economy was an important legacy of Belgian neutrality. 
Belgian entrepreneurs overcame Belgium’s small population and competition with major European 
powers to be successful in overseas markets. In the 1870s and 1880s, the Belgians vigorously 
engaged in the construction of railways and tramways in France, Austria, Germany, and Italy. 
During the 1890s, Belgian manufacturers were involved in steelworks in Russia and even 
constructed Chinese railways.45 Given that both railways and steel constituted crucial components 
in foreign policy during the nineteenth century, neutralised Belgium helped security sensitive 
countries feel relatively assured when engaging the services of its companies. 
Though the new Belgian constitution sought to create a transparent political system, the 
conservative-friendly monarch exercised a strong hand in foreign policy because the main issues of 
concern for Belgian politicians were national unity and defence. Belgium ultimately succeeded in 
maintaining its neutrality owing to its monarch’s strong leadership, though this was also partly a 
consequence of the major powers’ balance of power game.  
Take for instance a proposed customs union with France (1842), which would have led to the 
presence of French customs officials in Belgium. Britain and Prussia, worried about a potential loss 
of influence in Belgium, pressured both countries to scrap the proposed union. Their success in 
having France abandon the proposal46 reflected the degree of interest the major powers had in 
Belgium. Similarly, there was Germany’s botched attempt to persuade Belgium to revise its judicial 
system when Germany found the Belgian press’s opinions on German religious policy 
meddlesome.47 
Had France refused to relinquish its territorial ambitions, and had Britain adopted a hands-off 
approach towards Europe, the perpetual neutrality of Belgium might have been elusive. Instead, 
Britain vigorously backed Belgian neutrality with the threat of war against France during the 
stationing of French troops (1831),48 but the French were fighting against the Dutch in Belgium and 
were honoured for doing so by King Leopold I. When war between France and Prussia grew 
imminent, Belgium’s diplomatic overtures to both countries successfully ensured that neither party 
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would violate the conditions of Belgian neutrality when fighting began.49 Belgium’s neutrality 
would later be violated by Germany during WWI, but the longevity of Belgian neutrality was 
nevertheless remarkable. 
Since Belgium’s neutrality was a product of major power calculations, the country was not 
expected to pursue armed neutrality. Nevertheless, the Belgian government placed significant 
interest in a strong military. Belgium could count on a well-armed and trained force of 100,000 men 
(1839) to defend its territorial integrity and permanent neutrality status. Military specialists viewed 
Belgian armed forces as a respectable fighting force until 1870, but later the quality of its forces 
markedly deteriorated. While other European countries were increasing their military readiness 
through conscription, Belgium’s Defence Law (1902), which entrusted national defence mainly to 
volunteers, led to a weakening of Belgian forces.50 
Success Factors 
The renewed emphasis on legitimacy and treaty rights as the basis of international order in the 
post-1871 system powered a resurgence of conservative European diplomacy.51 Belgium could thus 
rest assured that its permanent neutrality status was safe from major power intrusion. After more 
than two decades of faithfully implementing permanent neutrality (1866), Belgium was rewarded 
when Britain, France, and Prussia met in London and reaffirmed the Treaty of London.52 This 
demonstrated that even lightly armed countries like Belgium could survive geopolitically, as long as 
neighbouring powers valued and practised balance of power and were committed to honouring their 
neutrality. 
Colonial expansion was an important characteristic of neutral Belgium. Under the aegis of 
Leopold II and at the urging of men like Émile Banning, Belgians were persuaded to embrace 
colonialism. Economic benefits and national prestige were on the table, but they were subordinate 
to the recognition of other European powers.53 Yet not even its acquisition of Congo could remake 
Belgium's weak status.  
 The longevity of Belgian neutrality needs to be assessed differently when drawing a 
comparison to a Swiss-style neutrality. Belgium’s experience as an independent state was not long, 
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but it was able to acquire and maintain its neutralisation through external means. Maintaining 
independence, not to mention permanent neutrality, was by no means an easy task. Unlike 
Switzerland, Belgium was unused to such an approach to foreign policy. Whereas Switzerland 
could summon a formidable military to counter any foreign infringement upon its neutrality, 
Belgium depended on foreign acquiescence, especially Britain’s. Still, Belgium’s weak military 
strength could not support its neutrality amidst a shift in the regional balance of power, as 
evidenced by WWI. 
<Bulgaria> 
Bulgaria was regarded by Korean intellectual Yu Giljun as an appropriate model for Korean 
neutrality, but the country was never actually neutral. In the late nineteenth century, as the once 
powerful Ottoman Empire was weakening, Russia emerged as a hegemonic power in the Balkans. 
Exploiting British sympathy with Christians and hostility toward Muslims, Russia deflected the 
Austrian attempt to utilise its alliance with Britain to prevent Russian encroachment. Eventually, 
though Austria was unwilling to consign Bulgaria to the status of Russian vassal, it relented to 
Russian ambitions, and the Treaty of San Stefano was signed (3.3.1878), establishing an 
autonomous Bulgarian state. This was followed by the Treaty of Berlin (7.1878), after which 
Bulgaria’s autonomous status as a buffer state was protected from the Ottoman Empire by major 
powers aiming to check Russian expansion. Finally, Bulgaria declared its official independence 
(1908). 
Background 
For a weak buffer state like Bulgaria, building a healthy economy was a daunting task. But 
Bulgaria’s economic prospects seemed bright at the time of semi-independence. Svishtov served as 
a major point of trade along the Danube, acting as a gateway for European commerce. Bulgarians 
could also point to their expertise in textiles, productive and fiercely independent guilds, and 
agricultural production (especially grain). Few, however, would have predicted that the Bulgarian 
economy would encounter a series of roadblocks. In the late nineteenth century, when the Bulgarian 
government shifted its modernisation efforts into high gear, the introduction of a land tax and the 
reduction of customs and excise taxes decreased government revenues. A Franco-Austrian-German 
consortium loan and a sharp increase in indirect taxation also undermined the Bulgarian economy. 
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The bitter rivalry between conservatives and liberals did nothing to stabilise Bulgaria either. 
Conservatives, representing the wealthy ranks of the guilds and trading communities, held a 
paternalistic view of peasants in Bulgaria. They favoured the formation of a senate to act as a 
restraint against the excessive enthusiasm of the masses and to prevent the prince from pursuing 
policies that might jeopardise Bulgarian autonomy. Liberals, holding egalitarian views, possessed a 
different opinion, seeing peasants as the progressive embodiment of autonomous Bulgaria.54 These 
differences, however, did not deter Bulgaria from achieving its quest for autonomy.  
Despite its fragile status in politics, Bulgaria possessed all the trappings of a self-governing 
country. Overcoming fierce debates and violent confrontations, Bulgarians narrowed their 
differences, such as the dispute over the Bulgarian prince’s rights and duties, in their constitution. 
As the chief diplomat and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the prince could appoint and 
dismiss ministers, name the president, convene and dissolve the national assembly, and attach his 
seal of approval to any legislation before passage.55 
Although it was the Ottoman Empire’s vassal, Bulgaria was never free from Russian political 
intrusion, which forced Bulgaria to tread carefully. When Russia registered its disapproval of 
Ferdinand, Bulgaria's newly elected prince (1888), Bulgaria tried to ignore Russia’s complaint but 
was forced to swallow its pride and assent to Russian involvement in its affairs. Only then could 
Bulgaria pursue modernisation and transform Bulgaria into the “Belgium of the Balkans”.56 
The country’s enfeebled military faced a tough test early on. Bulgaria’s union with Eastern 
Rumelia elicited Russian hostility and gave Serbia a rationale for furthering its own expansion. 
Overjoyed at the prospect of unification, Bulgaria was shocked by Serbia’s sudden invasion. A 
chastened Bulgaria, painfully realising its vulnerability, signed The Constantine Agreement 
(4.1886) to settle the dispute with Serbia, painfully; without major powers’ support, Bulgarian 
foreign policy was destined to fail.57 
The rivalry between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia also factored into Bulgarian 
geopolitics. Bulgaria, as did Romania, functioned as a buffer state for Austria-Hungary, protecting 
Hungary from foreign invasion. Austria-Hungary expected Bulgaria to derail Russia’s intention to 
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appeal to Pan-Slavism to buttress its policy of expansion in the Balkans. Due to its vassal status, 
Bulgaria was barred from attending the Hague Peace Conference (1907) and thus could not present 
its case to the international community.58 Nevertheless, ultimately the principality was able to use 
the favourable geopolitical situation (the preservation of peace in Southeast Europe over territorial 
expansion) and Austria-Hungarian goodwill, rather than Russian cooperation, to gain its 
independence from the Ottoman Empire. Though never given the status of neutrality, Bulgaria 
overcame its geographical weakness and went from a buffer state to a fully independent one in three 
decades.  
Success Factors 
         Ever since its inception as an autonomous buffer state, Bulgaria had to face foreign (primarily 
Russian) intervention in its domestic and foreign policies. Nevertheless, Bulgaria skilfully played its 
cards to expand its hard-won power and was not stymied by its exclusion from the Hague 
Conference. Instead, it utilised its geopolitical situation to its advantage by proclaiming its 
independence and ending its dependency status vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire and Russian 
intervention, demonstrating that it was possible for a buffer state to overcome its geopolitical 
handicaps. Bulgarians were able to skilfully use one vital issue (a railway line takeover) as a means 
to an ultimate goal (independence) and to entice the support of one major power (Austria-Hungary) 
to block opposition from other powers. Furthermore, Bulgaria benefited from Russia's defeat in the 
Russo-Japanese War, which, at least for a time, stopped the Bear cold in its tracks. 
         Bulgarians were divided between the Pan-Slavic pro-Russian party and the expansionist pro-
independence party. The former wanted to align Bulgaria’s foreign policy closely to Russia’s, and 
the latter favoured the incorporation of Eastern Rumelia and other surrounding regions. Such 
division had a debilitating effect on Bulgarian politics until Bulgaria managed to reduce the gulf 
between political factions and agree to a common foreign policy.  
          A late participant in industrialisation, Bulgaria, like other non-industrialised countries, lacked 
capital and technological know-how. At one point, the country became so dependent on external 
loans that its foreign policy was centred on obtaining such loans. For instance, 30% of government 
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revenue went to paying off foreign debt (1901).59 As a part of its solution, the Bulgarian 
government patiently worked to raise tariff rates, set up government monopolies in key areas like 
railways, and shored up domestic industries through various state programmes to minimise major 
power infiltration into the Bulgarian economy, which eventually strengthened Bulgarian 
independence. 
· Neutralisation Attempts in Korea 
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the historical trajectories of the three Far Eastern 
countries were very different. China, a victim of Western imperialism like Korea, declared wartime 
neutrality during the Russo-Japanese War to prevent the conflict from spilling over its borders, but 
its government was never strongly committed to its neutralisation; Western powers’ significant 
interests in China made them easily embrace its wartime neutrality and thus the issue of 
neutralisation went no further except for Knox’s later neutralisation attempt on Manchurian 
railways. As for Japan, neutralisation was unnecessary for protecting itself from external 
aggression. Instead, armed with a strong economy and formidable military, Japan was much courted 
by France, Britain, and the U.S. as an ally. However, Korea, pinned in between major powers 
looking out for their own interests in East Asia, did not have the luxury of waiting for suitors to 
emerge. Thus, Korean neutralisation was reasonably put forward as one way to release itself from 
the rivalry between continental and maritime powers or was suggested according to their needs. 
 Seemingly, Korea had many chances to become a neutral country—some volitional and some 
not of its own making or choice—and to potentially be freed from the volatile and ultimately violent 
machinations of China, Japan, and Russia. However, the Sino-Japanese War collapsed the balance 
of power between China and Japan on the Korean peninsula, which, according to Morton A. 
Kaplan’s balance of power theory, is competitive behaviour in international politics caused by a 
hegemonic conflict to gain control.60 Thus Pak Yeongho warned against assigning too much 
goodwill to balance of power, pointing out the demise of Poland and Turkey. Without the power to 
sustain itself, no country could hope to fully adopt such a concept.61 
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         After the Russo-Japanese War, the balance of power between continental power Russia and 
maritime power Japan was again lost on the Korean peninsula. Now, victorious Japan could, with 
American and British blessings, colonise Korea, effectively ending the prospect of neutralisation. 
Therefore, the result of Korean neutralisation attempts differed sharply from European ones; the 
aforesaid backgrounds and success factors of Switzerland, Belgium, and Bulgaria facilitated 
neutralisation or independence under agreements between major powers. Conversely, the 
breakdown of balance of power between China and Japan or Japan and Russia, and the struggle for 
major powers’ interests made Korean neutralisation impossible. While the breakdown of balance of 
power certainly played a key part, other factors also affected Korean neutralisation attempts. As 
Chapters III-VII chronologically investigate the development of neutralisation attempts for Korea, 
they will explore these factors in relation to historical events and to European neutrality precedents. 
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Chapter III. Neutralisation Attempts from the Post-Imo Mutiny to the Pre-Geomundo 
Incident (1882-1885) 
The Imo Mutiny strengthened China’s position in Korea under the international law system, 
initiating the Sino-Japanese rivalry and causing the Gapsin Coup. Given this situation, this chapter 
explains how Japanese and Westerners came to feel that Korean neutralisation was necessary for 
accomplishing their respective aims in Korea after the Imo Mutiny and around the time of the 
Gapsin Coup.  
· Neutralisation Initiatives After the Imo Mutiny (1882-1885) 
East Asian countries began to be exposed to Western imperialism in the mid-nineteenth 
century. After the Treaty of Nanjing (29.8.1842) following China’s defeat in the Opium War (1840-
1842) opened China to Britain, imperial Western powers compelled Ryukyu and Japan to adopt the 
Western-centric international system through the conclusion of unequal commercial treaties with 
them in the 1850s. These development in turn prompted China to sign the Sino-Japanese Friendship 
and Trade Treaty (13.9.1871) with Japan, which signalled its first acceptance of the international 
treaty system in its relations with the Japanese, stipulating mutual equality and benefits between the 
two countries.1 Interpreted as a Chinese denial of the Sino-centric tributary system, the treaty paved 
the way for East Asian countries to implement a treaty-based international system with each other 
and in particular served as a positive catalyst for Japan to conclude new treaties with neighbouring 
countries.2 
Having established the foundation of a modern state through the Meiji Restoration (3.1.1867), 
Japan contemplated a new direction for its foreign policy. As part of this process, Saigo Takamori, 
one of its leading statesmen, initiated Seikanron 征韓論 (Debate on the Conquest of Korea) in mid-
1873.3 Iwakura Tomomi, Okubo Tomishichi, and Kido Koin, however, questioned Saigo’s plan, 
contending that Japan should focus first on internal affairs.4 While these officials temporarily halted 
a more assertive Korean policy, the political environment began to change in Korea—Gojong’s 
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father Daewongun, who had pursued a policy of seclusion for nearly ten years (1863-1873), was 
forced to step down after Korean official Choe Ikhyeon’s memorial (25.10.1873) attacking the 
Daewongun encouraged Gojong to declare his self-rule (4.11.1873).5 Two months later, Iwakura 
and Okubo shifted their stance and adopted a gunboat diplomacy.  
Before carrying out this strategy, Japan thoroughly investigated the East Asian geopolitical 
situation through diplomacy or by force. When Sōyama Taneomi, a member of the Japanese 
delegation, visited China to ratify the Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty in April 1873, he 
corroborated China’s non-intervention policy in Korea’s external affairs, despite the tributary 
relations between the two countries.6 In March 1874, Japan, wanting to draw Russia’s attention 
away from Korea, dispatched Enomoto Takeshi as a pretext for discussing the Sakhalin issue.7 In 
April, Japan invaded Taiwan in response to the murder of the Ryukyu shipwrecked on Taiwan in 
December 1871,8 seeking as well to test China’s commitment to its vassal state. Locked in disputes 
with Western powers in Xinjiang and other regions and the Muslim rebellion in Central Asia,9 
China could not react forcefully to this action, which gave the Japanese the confidence to extend 
their influence into Ryukyu and later Korea. In November, the Japanese government received the 
information from Enomoto that the Russians would not meddle in Japan-Korea disputes.10 Japan 
eventually signed the Treaty of St. Petersburg with Russia, stipulating that the former would give up 
Sakhalin on the condition that the latter hand over the Kuril Islands to Japan (7.3.1875).11 
Emboldened by China’s weak response and Russia’s disinterest towards Korea, Japan began 
to mount a more aggressive Korean policy; the Japanese survey vessel Unyō ventured close to the 
coast of Ganghwa Island and was fired on by Korean batteries (20.9.1875). Japan responded by 
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sending a flotilla at the end of January 1876 to demand an open treaty with Korea.12 Eager to avoid 
an unnecessary confrontation with Japan, Li Hongzhang, the governor-general of Zhili Province, 
urged the Zongli yamen 總理衙門 (Foreign Affairs Office) to advise Korea to negotiate with 
Japan13 and echoed the sentiment in his personal letter to Yi Yuwon, a chief Korean state councillor. 
Influenced by Li’s recommendation and Yi’s advice for the opening of Korea, Gojong agreed to 
negotiate with Japan,14 thus resulting in the conclusion of the Treaty of Gangwha (27.2.1876).  
While this treaty stipulated Korean independence and accorded it the same status as Japan, it 
contained many unequal clauses: Korea was required to open two ports of trade with Japan, to give 
the latter control over its consular jurisdiction in said ports, and to allow Japanese ships to survey 
the Korean coast at will.15 To top it all, whereas Korea interpreted Article 1 of the treaty as not only 
freeing it from Chinese suzerainty, but also granting it full autonomy in the new international law 
system, Japan regarded it as a device to deter Chinese intervention in Korea, mirroring France’s 
acknowledgement of Vietnam’s independence in the Second Treaty of Saigon (15.3.1874) to deter 
Chinese intrusion.16 The Treaty of Ganghwa prompted Russia to ponder signing a treaty with Korea 
as well to protect its border trade and future commercial interests there, provided that Korea sign 
treaties with other Western powers.17  
As the Sino-Japanese tensions surrounding the Ryukyu kingdom came to a boil in September 
1878, Japan, having settled the Korean issue, decided to annex Ryukyu militarily, and Matsuda 
Michiyuki, the Chief Secretary of Japan’s Interior Ministry, mobilised police and military forces to 
do just that in March 1879. Still locked in a territorial row with Russia over Xinjiang, Li Hongzhang 
could only complain that Japan’s annexation of Ryukyu, China’s vassal and an autonomous state, 
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was an affront to China and ask for a quick end to this action, but Japan rejected his request, 
arguing that Ryukyu was its vassal.18  
After the Treaty of Gangwha, Korea’s foreign policy underwent a significant change. Gojong, 
partly influenced by Huang Zunxian’s essay, Cháoxiǎn cèlüè 朝鮮策略 (A Strategy for Joseon), 
was willing to enter treaty relations with Western powers, despite protests from Confucian-minded 
traditionalists such as Yi Hangno and Choe Ikhyeon.19 Around this time China began to have doubts 
about the traditional tributary system, knowing that Western powers could subjugate militarily weak 
Korea by force. The potential loss of Korea, which was described in terms of “the loss of lips 
[Korea] makes teeth [China] cold [danger] (脣亡齒寒)”,20  could threaten Chinese security and 
prestige. China, as such, intended to use the Zongli yamen to preserve its tributary relationship with 
Korea, while incorporating some elements of Western-devised international law, a start to 
transforming the tributary system. Aside from this formal diplomatic channel, China also opened 
informal diplomatic channels to advise Korea on its relations with the West.21 
However, some political factions in China had different ideas about how to defend Chinese 
interests in Korea. For example, the Purist Party, composed of officials and scholars, was opposed 
to accommodating Western powers’ demands and favoured aggressive actions as Zhang Peilun 
argued (1882).22 Another faction was the treaty-port community, comprised of compradors, 
merchants, and entrepreneurs. Faction members Zheng Guanying and Tang Tingshu convinced Li 
Hongzhnag to consider commerce in dealing with Korea.23 
Whereas China identified the Western-led international system as a threat to the tributary 
system, Japan conversely decided to challenge it in Korea. Extremely troubled by socioeconomic 
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problems and political instability, Korea had limited capability to implement an effective foreign 
policy. Having its eye on Korea since the Meiji Restoration, Japan kept a close watch on its 
neighbours as well, worrying that powers like China and later Russia would impose their agendas 
on Korea. Extremely sceptical about Korea’s ability to preserve its territorial integrity, Japan 
resolved to increase its leverage there. 
Meanwhile, China had adopted a stance of close vigilance towards Japan ever since its 
annexation of Ryukyu, with the Chinese Foreign Affairs Office commenting in August 1879 that in 
the near future Korea would become the target of Japanese expansionism.24 Concerned about 
Korea’s approach to Japan,25 Japanese designs in Korea, and, to a lesser extent, a possible Russian 
incursion there, Li Hongzhang encouraged Korea to enter treaties with Western powers to hold each 
other in check amidst the weakening tributary system.26 The good offices27 of Chinese officials Ma 
Jianzhong and Ding Ruchang bore fruit with a series of treaties, such as the Treaties of Commerce 
and Amity with the U.S. (22.5.1882),28 Britain (6.6.1882), and Germany (30.6.1882).29  
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In negotiating these treaties, Li and Ma insisted on inserting a ‘Chinese suzerainty clause’ to 
exert China’s influence over the Korean government. In addition, since China had been engaged in 
a serious confrontation with the French regarding Chinese suzerainty over Vietnam, they calculated 
that confirming their suzerainty in Korea could work in their favour when negotiating with France, 
although their insistence on it was based in treaty logic.  However, Li and Ma failed to have the 
suzerainty clause included within the treaty itself and could only convince Korea to attach a letter30 
to the text of treaty that acknowledged the special Korea-China relationship.  
However, upon reading the attached letter, British Minister to China Sir Harry Smith Parkes 
questioned the nature of Anglo-Korean relations. Under Western-dominated international law, 
Korea tried to maintain two systems of international relations, which sanctioned the continuation of 
tributary relations between Korea and China, as well as aligning Korea with Japan or Western 
powers, unwittingly gave Korea dependency status, not independence. Parkes thus raised this issue: 
“How are we to recognise this quasi-dependent condition and at the same time to treat Korea as an 
equal…appears to me to be a puzzling problem.”31 Parkes’ misgivings notwithstanding, the Chinese, 
in trying to protect Korea, had instead left it vulnerable; Korea’s treaties with Western powers 
signalled the advent of multilateral imperialism on the peninsula. 
The Imo Mutiny (23.7.1882) represented the conflict between the conservatives and 
progressives within the Korean military. Unhappy with the special treatment and better pay enjoyed 
by the Special Skills Force, an elite army trained by Japanese military officer Horimoto Reizō, 
Korea’s old-style military units, having discovered sand and chaff in their overdue rice stipend, 
snapped. Relying on Daewongun’s private sympathies, soldiers stormed the royal palace, destroyed 
the Japanese legation in Seoul, and killed Horimoto and a number of high-ranking Korean 
                                                 
30 The text of the letter attached to the Treaties of Commerce and Amity with the U.S. reads as follows:  
The Chosen country (Korea) is a dependency of China, but the management of her governmental affairs, home and 
foreign, has always been vested in the sovereign. 
Now, as the Government of the United States and Korea are about to enter into treaty relations, the intercourse between 
the two nations shall be carried on in every respect on terms of equality and courtesy, and the King of Korea clearly 
asserts that all the articles of the treaty shall be acknowledged and carried into effect concerning the laws of 
independent States.  
In the matter of Korea being a dependency of China (in) any question that may arise between them in consequence of 
such dependence the United States shall in no way interfere. 
Lee Yurbok, “Establishment of a Korean Legation in the United States, 1887-1890: A Study of Conflict Between 
Confucian World Order and Modern International Relations”, Illinois Papers in Asian Studies 3 (1983): 11-12. 
31 Cited in Lisa Chung, “Somnolent in Korea: Korean-British Trade at the Turn of the 20th Century”, Unpublished 
Paper, George Washington University, 2005, 5.  
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officials.32 This event marked the turning point of Sino-Korean relations and facilitated China’s 
superior position there. 
China, astonished by the dispatch of Japanese troops to Korea, also sent troops despite its 
tense stand-off with France in Vietnam, rapidly intervening to avoid a repeat of Japan’s military 
intervention in the Ryukyu case.33 Korea’s strategic importance and the settlement of the military 
conflict in Xinjiang with Russia through the Treaty of St. Petersburg (24.2.1881) also led to Chinese 
troops quickly marching into Seoul.34 These forces stabilised the situation by transporting 
Daewongun to China and punishing the plotters of the mutiny. More importantly, China saw this 
intervention as a chance to transform Korea’s status as China’s nominal vassal to a real dependency 
of China.35 
Contemporaneously, Japan was undergoing serious political turmoil due to the civil rights 
movement spearheaded by the opposition parties and groups threatening the stability of the Meiji 
regime. Externally, Japan’s expansionist drive was constrained by China’s growing influence in 
Korea, which was viewed as a “dagger pointed at the heart of Japan”; if Korea remained 
“backward” and “uncivilised”, it would remain weak and become game for foreign predators.36    
Facing these challenges, the Japanese government sought to defuse the civil rights movement by 
shifting national attention to its response to the consequences of the Imo Mutiny.  
After the Imo Mutiny, Japan, believing that the Min clan regime would survive, initially 
adopted a moderate stance, but the collapse of the Min clan regime and the re-installation of the 
Daewongun administration (until he was dispatched to China) prompted it to contemplate a tough 
                                                 
32 Gojong sillok 高宗實錄 (Veritable Records of Gojong), 1882.7.23, http://sillok.history.go.kr. Kim Yonggu also 
underscores how the underlying anti-Japanese sentiment among the populace also affected the mutiny, since people felt 
their living conditions had deteriorated after the Ganghwa Treaty. Kim Yonggu, “Imo gullan gwa gapsin jeongbyeon”, 
10. 
33 Pak Huiho, 32. 
34 This treaty stipulated returning a majority of occupied Xinjiang to China and, in return, Russia receiving reparation of 
9 million roubles from China. Kim Gyeongchang, 246-256. 
35 Eun Jeongtae, “CheongIl jeonjaeng jeonhu Joseon ui daeCheong jeongchaek gwa Jo-Cheong gwangye ui byeonhwa 
[Joseon’s Diplomatic Policy for Qing and the Change for Joseon-Qing Relations Before and After Sino-Japanese 
War]”, in CheongIl jeonjaenggi Han-Jung-Il samgug ui sangho jeollyak [The Interactional Strategies Among Korea, 
China and Japan During the Sino-Japanese War], Wang Hyeonjong et al. (Seoul: Dongbuga yeoksa jaedan, 2009), 88. 
36 Duus, 49. 
37 Pak Huiho, 36. 
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stance.37 After Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru headed to Shimonoseki to supervise Japanese Minister 
to Korea Hanabusa Yoshimoto, who had been involved in implementing the government’s 
countermeasures to the Imo Mutiny in Korea,38 Vice Foreign Minister Yoshida Kiyonari held a 
meeting in Tokyo with Li Shuchang, Chinese Minister to Japan, in which suzerain-vassal relations 
between China and Korea emerged as a major issue. Li noted that since China’s vassal (Korea) had 
violated the Japanese legation, China would dispatch its soldiers as protection for the Japanese 
legation. (When dispatching troops to Korea, China tried to use the Imo Mutiny as an excuse to 
prove that the tributary system was still relevant in the Western-style international order by 
claiming that it had been “obliged to interfere as a father does when his son has gotten into some 
ugly scrape”.39)  
Yoshida, however, insisted that since Japan had already recognised Korea as an independent 
country in the Treaty of Gangwha, China must accept that any further response to the Imo Mutiny 
be based on this treaty and that Korea should be responsible for the protection of the Japanese 
legation.40 As the two countries squabbled and Japan appeared to be losing the argument, both those 
in and out of the Japanese government showed strong interest in what was happening across the sea. 
While China worked to undermine Korean autonomy, several Japanese newspapers and officials, 
seizing on Korea’s recent entry into the international system, adopted a new stratagem (i.e. Korean 
neutralisation) to counter or refute the Sinocentric tributary system that overshadowed Korea’s 
foreign relations.   
To begin with, in September 1882, several Japanese newspapers, representing various 
political affiliations, devoted leaders to the Imo Mutiny, reflecting contemporary Japan’s internal 
political atmosphere and holding Korea responsible for the damages to Japan’s prestige caused by 
                                                 
38 The result of this countermeasure was the Treaty of Jemulpo (1882.8.30). For details of this treaty, see Nihon gaikō 
bunsho 15, No.110, 208, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/mokuji.html. Illustrating Japan’s 
efforts to win the favour of the Korean court, Japanese Minister Takezoe Shinichirō later informed Gojong (1884.11) 
that the Japanese government had decided to forgive Korean indemnity payments to Japan, which were included in the 
treaty, and Takezoe suggested that the money should be used for Korean modernisation projects like the establishment 
of a postal service or reform of the military organisation. Duus, 57. 
39 Nish, ed., Hall to Parkes, 1882.12.11, Vol. 2, 116. For its part, the Korean message of gratitude to China for its 
intervention showed that Korea still adhered to the tributary system, with Gojong addressing himself as a humble 
servant, who had executed the duties of the post to which he was appointed by the Chinese emperor. Kiernan, 101. 
40 Nihon gaikō bunsho 15, No.102-107, 163-166, 
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the incident in Korea. But when China quelled the disturbance with its dispatched troops, the 
newspapers changed their tune to focus on the suzerain-vassal relations between China and Korea 
and eventually took up the issue of how Korean independence could be formally acknowledged.  
The pro-liberal newspaper the Jiyū shimbun not only denied the suzerain-vassal relationship 
between Korea and China,41 but also expressed through the leader entitled “Continental Relations” 
its fear of a Russian invasion of Korea. Believing that China alone could not protect Korea from 
Russia, the Jiyū shimbun argued for its independence, proposing that Japan explain to the Chinese 
the mutual benefits each could reap if Korea were acknowledged as an independent country and 
allowed to enter into treaty relations with Western powers, which would enable the latter to prevent 
the southern expansion of Russia.42 Therefore, according to the Jiyū shimbun, Korea, though it 
remained within the Sino-centric world, could not be considered China’s vassal, and its real 
independence should be secured by an expedient involving the Western major powers.43 
Another Liberal Party-leaning newspaper, the Chōya shimbun, argued that although China 
regarded Korea as its vassal, Japan and the Western powers had already acknowledged its 
independence because Gojong had been exercising his sovereignty by autonomously implementing 
the internal and external affairs of Korea. Furthermore, this newspaper readily overlooked China’s 
previous intervention in the Korean issue, regarding it as a bilateral issue between China and Korea. 
But it also contended that Japan should devise a scheme to guarantee permanent peace,44 which 
could well imply Korean neutralisation. 
Known for its pro-bureaucracy stance, the Tokyo nichi nichi shimbun tried to prove Korea’s 
independent status by questioning its vassal status under the tributary system within the context of 
international law.45 After all, China’s laws and treaties did not apply to Korea, even if the country 
obtained investiture from China and sent tributary envoys there, and, furthermore, Japan and 
Western powers were willing to sign treaties with it.46 Accordingly, even if Korea maintained 
tributary relations with China, because both its internal and external affairs were autonomous, it was 
                                                 
41 Jiyū shimbun 自由新聞 [Freedom Newspaper], 1882.9.2; 1882.9.10. 
42  Ibid., 1882.9.13. 
43 Pak Huiho, 44. 
44 Chōya shimbun 朝野新聞 [Whole Nation Newspaper], 1882.9.7. 
45 Tokyo nichi nichi shimbun 東京日日新聞 [Tokyo Daily], 1882.9.27-30. 
46 Ibid., 1882.9.27; 1882.9.29. 
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neither a semi-independent state nor a Chinese vassal47 but an independent country, a sentiment 
later echoed by Yu Giljun.48 
Two other Japanese newspapers presented concrete ideas regarding Korea’s future status: the 
Tokyo yokohama mainichi shimbun and the Yūbin hōchi shimbun. Determined to clarify the nature 
of Korea-China relations, the pro-constitutional revisionist party newspaper Tokyo yokohama 
mainichi shimbun compared the status of Korea to that of Bulgaria in the international system on 10 
and 17 September 1882, asserting that it could imitate Bulgaria’s example in its quest for 
neutralisation. Since Bulgaria, despite its status as a tributary of Turkey, was invested with the 
rights of internal politics and diplomacy through the Treaty of Berlin (1878), Korea should also be 
accorded the same rights through a joint agreement between China, Britain, and the U.S,49 which 
meant that Korea’s independence could be secured by a compromise among major powers. The 
weakness of this suggestion, however, was that as a part of a Confucian-oriented tributary system, 
Korea’s situation was not truly analogous with the one in Bulgaria, a European state in the 
international system.  
Another pro-constitutional revisionist outlet, the Yūbin hōchi shimbun, highlighted Korea’s 
geostrategic importance in the scramble between East Asian countries and Russia as a rationale for 
China and Japan putting its protection at the centre of their East Asia political strategies.50 Thus, to 
end the confusion surrounding Korea’s status as either Chinese vassal or independent state, this 
newspaper concluded Korea could hold the same position as Switzerland and Belgium. The 
newspaper asserted that its status vis-à-vis China did not matter and would not affect the 
relationships between Korea, China, and Japan51 since Korea could be regarded as an independent 
country under international law thanks to its autonomy in internal and foreign affairs.52 To 
neutralise Korea, the newspaper suggested holding a meeting in Tokyo to have China, Britain, the 
U.S., Germany, and France certify Korea’s position as “an actual independent state under the 
nominal tributary system” (20.9.1882).53 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 1882.9.30.  
48 Kim Yonggu, “Imo gullan gwa gapsin jeongbyeon”, 29. 
49 Tokyo yokohama mainichi shimbun  東京横浜每日新聞 [Tokyo Yokohama Daily], 1882.9.10; 1882.9.17.  
50 Yūbin hōchi shimbun 郵便報知新聞 [Postal News], 1882.9.13. 
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The gist of these two newspapers’ arguments was that without completely refuting its 
tributary relation with China, Korea’s internal and diplomatic independence could still be secured 
by major powers’ support. But given that these newspapers did not adequately consider the 
contemporary Korean situation (i.e. its insufficient self-defence capabilities, no consensus within 
Korea on neutralisation,54 and the dominance of the tributary system within Korea), their schemes 
could not succeed. 
In the same month, Inoue Kowashi (1843-1895), a prominent member of the Daijō-kan 
(Council of State) and later Chief Secretary to the House of Peers, floated his own proposal, which 
seemed far more likely to receive the Japanese government’s attention. Known for his contributions 
to Japanese legal reforms, Inoue also left an important mark in foreign policy. Prior to his proposal, 
he had participated in Sino-Japanese negotiations on Ryukyu and the revision of treaties signed by 
Japan, served alongside Gustave Emile Boissonade and Itō Hirobumi as a member of the 
investigative committee convened by the Japanese government to explore Japan’s relations with 
Korea after the Ganghwa Incident, and composed diplomatic documents for Japanese negotiators 
after the Imo Mutiny and the Gapsin Coup.55 
With this rich diplomatic experience under his belt, Inoue proposed a comprehensive Korean 
neutralisation plan driven by four motivations: First, the current situation of the Korean government 
and people would make independence there impossible at least for several decades and thus Korea 
would inevitably become another Vietnam or Burma if Britain, the U.S., Germany, and especially 
Russia occupied its strategic areas and intervened in its internal affairs.56 Second, if Korea, as a 
geopolitically strategic locus of the East Sea, were invaded like Vietnam and India, it would be 
disastrous not only for China and Japan, but for East Asia. Its protection should thus be the main 
element of any East Asian strategy since Chinese protection was deemed insufficient.57 Third, Japan 
would need to logically respond against the vassal theory of China and develop a credible 
alternative to it. As a suzerain, China constantly intervened in Korea and demanded the latter to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
52 Ibid., 1882.9.14. 
53 Ibid., 1882.9.20. 
54 Pak Huiho, 45. 
55 Ibid, 37. 
56 Kawaoko Nakatani, “Migogunrango no nippon no Chosen chūripka kōsō [Japan’s Conception of Neutralisation After 
the Imo Mutiny]”, Chōsenshi kenkyūkaibon bunshū 32 (1994):  144-145. 
57 Inoue Kowashi bunsho 井上毅文書 [Inoue Kowashi Documents], Microfilm No. A-856. 
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offer apologies to foreign countries, thereby granting opportunity and excuse to these countries, 
which was unreasonable for Korea and unfavourable to Japan.58 Therefore, Japan had to solemnly 
pledge to refute the vassal theory of China.59 Finally, he found Japanese adviser Boissonade’s 
Triple Alliance between China, Japan, and Korea60 unworkable for thwarting Russian aggression 
due to Korea's relative powerlessness and China's unwillingness to cooperate. Therefore, Inoue, 
though affected by Boissonade’s Triple Alliance, devised his neutralisation plan as an alternative 
means to preserving peace in East Asia.61 
In his proposal, after critiquing Boissonade’s Triple Alliance scheme, Inoue directed his 
attention to the international law concepts of autonomy and semi-autonomy to lay out a logical 
basis for Korean neutralisation: while an autonomous country is an independent country that 
possesses equal rights to negotiate with a third country, a semi-autonomous country has 
autonomous rights in its internal affairs, but its foreign affairs are conducted by its suzerain. Since 
Korea had signed treaties with other countries and dispatched ministers to them, it was an 
autonomous, not a semi-autonomous, state. Even the term “vassal,” based on “righteousness” in the 
old tributary system, was incompatible with present international law.62 
The timing of Inoue’s proposal was fortuitous since Korean envoys to Japan Pak Yeongho63 
and Kim Okgyun had already requested Japanese assistance for Korea’s enlightenment and 
independence and, in response, the Japanese government planned to hold a cabinet meeting in late 
October 1882.64 Thus, when Inoue proposed Korean neutralisation (17.9.1882) in his Chōsen 
seiryak 朝鮮政略 (Strategy for Joseon), he had reasons to be optimistic.  
In this written commentary, Inoue Kowashi entertained the hope of transforming Korea into a 
Belgian- or Swiss-style neutral state under the joint guarantee of China, Japan, the U.S., Britain, and 
Germany through a conference. If any one of the five countries failed to abide by this arrangement, 
it would be condemned by the remaining powers, and if any other state violated the pact, the five 
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60 Since the Russian threat to Korea was considered more dangerous than Chinese suzerainty over Korea, Boissonade 
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countries would form an alliance to defend Korean neutrality. Although China was Korea’s superior 
country, the latter was not the dependency but the tributary state of the former, as well as being an 
independent state. As one of Korea’s protectors, China could not intervene in its domestic affairs 
alone without the agreement of the remaining four powers. If the above conditions were achieved, 
the surrounding areas would be stabilised, Korea, as a permanently neutral state, could free itself 
from Chinese suzerainty and China, saving face as Korea’s suzerain, could preserve both its honour 
and benefits.65 However, by excluding Russia as a potential guarantor of Korean neutralisation, this 
proposal served as an extension of Japan’s policy to counter Russia in the Far East,66 and it seemed 
inevitable that Russia would oppose it.  
After justifying his Korean neutralisation plan in Chōsen seiryak, Inoue now contacted 
influential Japanese government figures in order to realise his goal; first, he sent a letter to 
Yamagata Aritomo, who viewed China as a potential adversary and had thus called for the 
strengthening of the Japanese army and navy after the Imo Mutiny, to win support for his proposal 
(23.9.1882). In his letter, he mentioned that it was impossible to predict whether Chinese 
intervention in Korea was temporary or permanent and until this became clear, it might be difficult 
to decide on the direction of Japan’s strategy. The only way for Japan to combat China’s 
intervention in Korea was to put aside petty conflicts over short-term profits there and to construct a 
long-term political strategy; a permanent neutrality along the lines of Belgium and Switzerland 
through joint protection of Korea was Japan’s best alternative. Some days later, Inoue sent his 
Chōsen seiryak to Hanabusa Yoshimoto to get his support. He also sent Chōsen seiryak to Itō 
(9.11.1882) when the Japanese government was discussing the aid requested by Pak Yeongho and 
Kim Okgyun.67 
Inoue’s scrupulous neutralisation plan was designed to stave off Chinese intervention in 
Korea for ultimately promoting Japan’s national interests. With Western powers’ entry into East 
Asia, Japan initially wanted to weaken Korea-China relations (i.e. the vassal-suzerain relationship) 
through the Treaty of Ganghwa by stipulating that Korea was an autonomous and independent state. 
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The deployment of Chinese troops to Korea after the Imo Mutiny, however, served as momentum 
for strengthening the Sino-centric tributary system in Korea, thus tilting the balance in China’s 
favour and forcing Japan to reluctantly accept its superior position there. Under these circumstances, 
Inoue chose Korean neutralisation as the most reasonable strategy to practically refute, though 
nominally acknowledging, the tributary system. Furthermore, by proposing it when he did, he tried 
to take advantage of the resuscitation of the Sino-French conflict over Vietnam and lump it together 
with the resolution of the Ryukyu issue.68 Yet, mindful of Japan’s national interests, he asserted that 
if China demanded the restoration of the Ryukyu king, Japan had no choice but to jettison plans for 
a diplomatic solution and to instead quickly shore up its military to confront China,69 intimating 
duplicity in his proposal. 
Whereas the two Japanese newspapers and Inoue contemplated Korean neutralisation in order 
to counter Chinese control over Korea, Gustave Emile Boissonade (1825-1901) had Russia in mind 
when he devised his neutralisation proposal.70 Credited for introducing the theory of natural law to 
Japan, the French legal scholar served as a legal adviser to the Japanese government from 1873 to 
1895. He assisted with the enactment of Japanese legal codes, accompanied Okubo’s mission to 
China after Japan’s expedition to Taiwan, advised Inoue Kaoru not to hire foreign judges, thus 
benefiting Japan’s treaty revision process, and taught at Japanese schools specialising in law.71 Even 
before his neutralisation initiative, he contributed to Japan’s Korean policy; after the Imo Mutiny 
broke out, he urged Inoue Kowashi to send Japanese troops to protect Japanese residents in Busan 
and Wonsan and to notify countries that concluded treaties with Korea—China, the U.S., and 
Britain—of the occupation of Ganghwa Island and Songdo as collaterals.72                 
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70 Though Russia’s interest in Korea increased after its treaties with Western powers, Boissonade’s concern seemed to 
have been overblown considering that before the Geomundo Incident, Russia was preoccupied with extending its 
influence in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia, and only a few Russians were familiar with China, 
Korea, and Japan. Kim Yonggu, Geomundo wa Beulladiboseutok—19segi Hanbando ui pahaengjeok segyehwa 
gwajeong [Geomundo and Vladivostok—The Crippled Globalisation Process of the Korean Peninsula in the 19th 
Century] (Seoul: Seogang daehakgyo chulpanbu, 2009), 20.  
71 Pak Huiho, 52. 
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Boissonade’s close involvement in Korea differed substantially from France’s indifference 
towards Korea at the time. After unsuccessfully invading Korea to avenge the deaths of French 
Catholic priests killed for proselytising there (Byeongin yangyo 丙寅洋擾 French campaign against 
Korea) in October 1866, France refused to become entangled in Korean affairs. France, engrossed 
in colonising Vietnam and Madagascar, limited its involvement in Korea to protecting the few 
French missionaries there. It was the last Western major power to recognise the kingdom, in May 
1886, choosing to remain on the sidelines until major powers began scrambling for Korean 
concessions after 1895. Nevertheless, considering his prior activities mentioned above, Boissonade 
might have suggested Korean neutralisation in his capacity as an adviser for Japan.    
          Refusing to accept Korea’s subordinate relationship with China and viewing it as an 
independent state,73 he claimed that Russia was undoubtedly the common enemy of China and 
Japan and that if Russia invaded Korea, Japan’s independence would be harmed. If China and Japan 
united, however, Russia would not be able to annex Korea. Furthermore, even if Korea was 
completely subordinated to China, it would not have the same negative ramifications for Japan that 
Russian domination there might. Pointing out that the three countries shared the same religion, 
script, culture, and thought, Boissonade believed the recent incident in Korea (i.e. the Imo Mutiny) 
could facilitate his idea of a Triple Alliance.74  
Boissonade’s take on permanent neutrality was grounded in the issues described above and 
was first set forth in “an opinion about permanent neutrality” (22.9.1882), five days after Inoue 
Kowashi penned Chōsen seiryak. In it, Boissonade explained that Belgium, Switzerland, and 
Luxembourg had achieved permanent neutrality through consensus among various countries and 
could maintain their neutral status even if one country participating in the conference objected. As 
long as the conference did not dissolve, the decision to grant neutrality to the states remained in 
effect, and one state boycotting the conference could not reverse the resolution on neutrality.75  
                                                 
73 Boissonade argued that Japan, having considered Korea independent, had signed the treaty with it and thus did not 
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        To disseminate his thoughts on neutralisation, Boissonade sent another opinion, “A Theory of 
Permanent Neutrality” (恒守局外中立化論) (29.10.1882), composed in the form of a catechism, to 
Inoue Kowashi. First, he asked whether it would be possible to announce neutrality even if Korea 
did not demand or approve it, and if it were announced, which country should make the declaration. 
Second, if Korea did desire neutrality, from which countries should it obtain a neutrality guarantee 
and what would its outcome be? 
        In answer to the first question, he insisted that neutrality could be declared without Korea’s 
consent, and as the most important stakeholders there, China and Russia76 should announce it. 
Although Korea was not subject to the announcement of neutrality, the major powers that 
concluded the treaty would be bound by the announcement, and if any one power invaded Korea, 
the remaining powers would punish the invader. But if Korea signed an offensive and defensive 
alliance with one power, the remaining powers would be unbound from the announcement. For his 
second question, he reasoned that if Korea voluntarily recognised neutrality and called for 
guarantors, China, Russia, and Japan should offer to act since those responding should be the 
powers that most feared other countries’ wrongful actions regarding Korea. However, if Russia did 
not accept neutrality and invaded Korea, as long as Korea stayed neutral, the related powers should 
react either diplomatically or militarily. Considering this possibility, the best option for Korea 
would be to persuade all Western powers, which so far had been unwilling to participate in Korean 
neutrality due to a lack of sizeable interests there, to guarantee Korean neutrality at a conference.77 
He listed Switzerland, Belgium, Serbia,78 and Luxembourg as models and contended that their 
successful neutralisations were heavily indebted to neighbouring countries discovering that 
neutralisation was beneficial to preventing the annexation of said countries by another power.79   
        Though Boissonade meticulously supported his opinion and theory about Korean permanent 
neutrality, his proposal ultimately functioned as a stratagem to contain Russia, even though he 
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valued Korean independence. He considered potential Russian aggression toward Korea more 
dangerous than Chinese suzerainty over Korea, which was a markedly different perspective from 
those of the Japanese newspapers and Inoue Kowashi. On the other hand, by stressing that the 
application of the successes of neutral countries in Europe in Korea would be difficult, he implied 
that there was no consensus among the neighbouring powers over whether Korean neutralisation 
was needed,80 despite first considering a balance of power. 
Whereas Japanese newspapers and the Japanese political elite like Inoue Kowashi or even 
Boissonade championed Korean neutralisation, the Japanese government approached the issue more 
cautiously since China, wanting to exploit the Imo Mutiny, sought to intervene in Korea’s internal 
affairs by concluding the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade Between Chinese and 
Korean Subjects (4.10.1882). Article 1 of the regulations stated that in the event of a dispute 
Chinese commissioner Li and Gojong could consult each other to resolve it. By intimating that 
Gojong was equal to Li, this agreement literally reaffirmed Korea’s status as China’s vassal. Article 
2 granted Chinese unilateral extraterritoriality in Korea without applying it to Koreans in China. 
China also levied a tariff barrier in Korea on Japanese and Western goods; this imposing of 
discriminatory tariff rates provided a pretext for the revision of the existing Anglo-Korean treaty.81  
While the regulations were designed to strengthen China’s suzerainty over Korea82 and to 
secure exclusive commercial privileges there, they reflected other intentions as well. Korea wanted 
to boost its economy and counter Japan by linking with China while Korea’s pro-China faction 
sought to employ Chinese power to resolve domestic issues. China longed for an opportunity to 
exercise its suzerainty over Korea after Japan’s advance into Korea and Western powers’ refusal to 
endorse Chinese suzerainty over Korea.83 Nevertheless, Li Hongzhang worried that this might 
provoke a Japanese response.84 Thus, under Li’s order, Möllendorff (foreign affairs), Ma Jianchang 
(customs), Chen Shutang (commerce), and Ding Ruchang (mining) were dispatched to advise the 
Korean government, and Li appointed Admiral Wu Changqing to secretly monitor all political 
activities there.85 
                                                 
80 Obinata, 131. 
81 For more information on the regulations, see Kim Jongwon, “Jo-Cheong sangmin suryuk muyeok jangjeong ui 
chegyeol gwa geu yeonghyang”, 140-156. China’s tariff barrier in Korea is mentioned in Larsen, 92-93. 
82 Due to the assertion of Zhou Fu, Tianjin Customs Daotai, the regulations excluded the clause of most-favoured-nation 
status and instead stipulated a vassal clause between Korea and China to protect the former from deception or 
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        Under these circumstances, the Japanese government’s Korean policy was bound to be 
constrained. One way to comprehend the contemporary situation is to trace the diplomatic activities 
of the then Japanese Foreign Minister and other practitioners of front-line diplomacy who were 
involved in these issues, which will enable us to judge how Korean neutralisation was handled by at 
least some Japanese government officials.  
        Inoue Kaoru (1836-1915) was the then Japanese Foreign Minister. Having studied in England 
to learn about the Western world during 1863-1864, Inoue was responsible for reorganising 
government finances on modern lines after the Meiji Restoration (1868) as Vice Minister of Finance 
in 1871. In 1876, he was involved in the conclusion of the Treaty of Ganghwa as vice-ambassador 
extraordinary and plenipotentiary and became Japan’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1885.86 
Respected as a genrō,87 Inoue greatly contributed to the field of finance and diplomacy. Given this 
illustrious background, his political influence in the Japanese government was likely to be much 
greater than Inoue Kowashi’s.  
At first, Inoue Kaoru was not a natural supporter of neutralisation. His Korean policy centred 
on advocating Korean independence based on the Ganghwa Treaty and abetting Japan’s active 
expansion into Korea by repudiating Chinese suzerainty over Korea. In late July 1882, when 
Chinese Minister to Japan Li Shuchang brought up Korea’s status as a dependency of China, Inoue 
strongly insisted that Korea was not a dependency.88 His view was also shared by his ministerial 
colleagues; three months later, Minister of the Right Iwakura Tomomi proposed to Chancellor 
                                                                                                                                                                  
humiliation at the hands of other countries. He insisted on such a clause because the Treaty of Saigon had omitted 
defining Vietnam’s status as China’s vassal and thus enabled France to annex Vietnam. Kim Jongwon, “Jo-Cheong 
sangmin suryuk muyeok jangjeong ui chegyeol gwa geu yeonghyang”, 145.  
83 Ibid., 165-168. 
84 Li instructed Chinese advisers Wang Bogong, Tang Shaoyi, and Wu Zhongxian to emphasize that they were 
dispatched to Korea at the explicit request of Gojong. Larsen, 105.  
85 Kim Yunsik, Eeumcheongsa 陰請史 [Diary], 1882.10.7; 10.14; 10.16 (Seoul: Tamgudang, 1971). 
86 For more on his biography see, William G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1972). 
87 Genrō referred to retired elder Japanese statesmen who played pivotal roles in the Meiji Restoration, serving as 
official advisers to successive Japanese emperors in the late 19th to early 20th centuries. Itō Hirobumi, Kuroda 
Kiyotaka, Ōyama Iwao, Inoue Kaoru, Saigō Tsugumichi, Matsukata Masayoshi, Yamagata Aritomo, Katsura Tarō, and 
Saionji Kinmochi were considered genrō. 
88 Obinata, 117. Inoue also confided to British Minister to Japan Parkes that he hoped the Western countries that had 
concluded treaties with Korea could provide moral support to guard it against exterior aggressions, examples of which 
were found in Europe where countries like Belgium depended on major powers’ goodwill to maintain their neutrality. 
Foreign Office: Consulates and Legations, Japan: General Correspondence, FO 46/288, Parkes to Granville, No.128, 
Secret, 1882.9.12, 75-76. 
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Sanjō Sanetomi that to undermine China’s vassal theory Japan should consult with other countries 
to demonstrate international support for Korean independence.89 Yamagata (who was serving as 
Field Marshal) in turn called for Japan to marshal its powers in support of Korean independence, to 
encourage Korean efforts at building sufficient strength to suppress rebellions, and to curry favour 
with Korean officials seeking independence.90  
The sudden outbreak of the Imo Mutiny, however, poured cold water on Inoue’s original 
Korean policy, and in order to resolve this conundrum he sounded out the thoughts of other 
statesmen like Itō Hirobumi by submitting three plans for a Korean strategy to Sanjō: the first, 
recognition of Korean independence through cooperation with related major powers; the second, 
direct discussion of the dependency issue between China and Korea; and the third, aid to Korea’s 
pro-Enlightenment faction to expedite independence.91 The opinions of the genrō were divided. 
Concerned that the second plan could lead to a direct confrontation between China and Japan, 
Iwakura called for the adoption of Inoue's first and third recommendations. But even these measures, 
if quickly implemented, might risk creating friction between China and Japan. To avoid this worst-
case scenario, Iwakura asserted that Korea should be guided slowly, starting with the field of 
culture.92 A more proactive approach came from Itō; he argued that because Korean independence 
was needed urgently, Japan should offer support if Korea desired it and force it to declare its 
independence, asserting that Gojong’s previous statements (i.e. Korea was China’s vassal state) 
should be withdrawn.93  
Taking into account these opinions and acknowledging that only a minority in Korea desired 
Japanese assistance for its independence,94 Inoue concluded that it was impossible for Japan to 
persuade Korea to end its traditional suzerain-vassal relationship with China and declare itself 
independent. Besides, the Japanese government, to initiate Korean independence, would have to 
interfere in Korea’s internal and external affairs and play a leading role in ending the suzerain-
                                                 
89 Nihon gaikō bunsho 15, No.133, 253-254, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/mokuji.html. 
90 Kim Yonggu, ed., Han-Il oegyo migan geukbi saryo chongseo 韓日外交未刊極秘史料叢書 [Historical records 
collection of the unpublished and secret diplomacy between Korea and Japan] 47 (Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 1996), 3-4. 
91 Itō Hirobumi, ed., Hisho ruisan-Chōsen kōshō shiryō jō 秘書類纂-朝鮮交涉史料 上 [Compiled by the Secretary–
Materials on Negotiations with Korea Volume 1] (Tokyo: Hisho ruisan kankōkai, 1933), 251-254. 
92 Pak Huiho, 46. 
93 Itō, ed., “Hisho ruisan-Chōsen kōshō shiryō jō”, 251. 
94 In his letter to Itō (1882.11.17), Inoue Kaoru divulged that according to Kim Okgyun, only Gojong, Pak Yeongho, 
and Kim Okgyun were interested in Korean independence. Kim Yonggu, “Imo gullan gwa gapsin jeongbyeon”, 79. 
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vassal relationship between China and Korea, which would inevitably lead to a head-on collision 
with China. Therefore, he judged the case for direct Japanese action weak and questioned whether 
Korean independence was worth the risks involved. With the U.S. on the verge of ratifying its 
Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Korea, recognising Korean independence, Inoue selected his 
first plan, and the Japanese government accordingly adopted a passive Korean policy after October 
1882. Inoue recognised that China held the upper hand owing to the Regulations for Maritime and 
Overland Trade between Chinese and Korean Subjects and that therefore Japan should pertinently 
set about coaching the Korean government to sign treaties with Western powers and to gradually 
consolidate its position as an independent country95 without openly refuting Chinese suzerainty.  
Inoue concluded that neutralisation was the best answer to Japan’s new aims on the peninsula.  
His first plan, revealed in German Minister to Japan Zedtwitz’s report (1.12.1882) to German 
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, began from the principle of recognising Korea’s independence by 
employing a treaty to make it permanently neutral like Switzerland or Belgium.96 According to 
Zedtwitz, Inoue, in his role as Japanese Foreign Minister, probed the French Minister to Japan, 
Arthur Tricou, about Chinese suzerainty over Korea and whether the European powers were willing 
to guarantee Korean neutralisation and create a “Belgium-style country in East Asia,” but Tricou 
responded evasively. The report does not explain Tricou’s diffidence, but he might have felt that 
Korea, as China’s dependency, could not be considered a truly sovereign state like Belgium. 
Nevertheless, Inoue retained enough interest in Korean neutralisation to have pursued it as his 
passive Korean policy after the Imo Mutiny.97 
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In the same month, another Korean neutralisation effort was attempted under Inoue Kaoru’s 
influence by a front-line diplomatic practitioner, Japanese Minister to China Enomoto Takeaki 
(1836-1908), who as the Navy Minister was a founder of the Imperial Japanese Navy. As a means 
to follow Japan’s passive policy in Korea, Enomoto approached British Minister to China Parkes, 
and U.S. Minister to China John R. Young to sound them out on his neutralisation proposal 
(28.12.1882) via an international conference in Tokyo, where Britain, Germany, Russia, France, the 
U.S., and Japan could discuss Korean issues. Although Enomoto wanted to propose a guarantee of 
Korean independence through permanent neutrality, adding that Parkes had already obtained tacit 
approval from his government for Enomoto’s plan, Young replied that such a proposal had to come 
from the Japanese Minister in Washington instead.98 Despite his unwillingness99 to consent to 
Enomoto’s proposal, Young seemed to have been aware that it could place Japan on an equal 
footing with Western powers while declaring China’s semi-civilised status by excluding it from the 
proposed conference in Tokyo.100 Enomoto’s plan could not have induced Germany either, since 
German Minister to China Max von Brandt shared Young’s opinion and believed that Bismarck 
would agree with him.101  
One of Inoue Kaoru’s subordinates, Tanabe Taichi (1831-1915), an international law expert in 
Japan’s Foreign Office, also tried to realise Korean permanent neutrality as part of Japan’s passive 
policy. During his meeting with Chinese Minister to Japan Li Shuchang, Tanabe brought up a plan 
to neutralise Korea (16.8.1883), suggesting that China, Japan, and the U.S. should provide joint 
protection of it to make it a Swiss- or Belgian-style permanent neutral state.102 Tanabe’s inclusion 
of China as a guarantor of Korean neutralisation showed that not all Japanese officials agreed with 
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Enomoto, who had excluded China. In fact, Tanabe’s conciliatory approach towards China 
resembled Boissonade’s, who also included China as a potential guarantor of Korean neutralisation. 
As seen above, Korean neutralisation attempts by Inoue Kaoru and his diplomats cut no ice 
with China and other major powers. Accordingly, Inoue now sought an authority on Chinese affairs 
who had both diplomatic and political skills and could implement his contradictory and two-sided 
Korean policy artfully (i.e. acknowledge the suzerain–vassal relationships on the one hand and 
make Korea free from it on the other). Takezoe Shinichrō (1841-1917), a Confucian scholar who 
had previously served as the Japanese Consul in Tianjin and the Secretary of the Japanese legation 
in Beijing, seemed an ideal candidate for this job. Inoue anticipated that Takezoe’s friendships with 
Beiyang officials in China and rich experience in negotiating with Chinese officials would ease any 
unnecessary tension with China. Takezoe did not disappoint; upon his arrival in Korea (1.1883), he 
consorted with Möllendorff, Chinese Admiral Wu,103 and his subordinates, dealt with Japan’s 
pending issues and remained vigilant for an opportunity to put forward his neutralisation 
proposal.104  
Unfortunately, the internal affairs of Korea did not work in Takezoe’s favour. Determined to 
maintain the centuries-old suzerain-vassal relationship that governed Korea’s ties with China, the 
pro-China faction favoured the status quo in Korean politics and opposed any geopolitical volatility 
that might challenge stability and their grip on power. In fact, by August 1883, Korean officials like 
Min Taeho, Min Yeongik, and Min Ungsik controlled many government positions related to finance 
and the military.105 The faction cooperated in Yuan Shikai’s scheme to dominate the Korean 
military as well. When Yuan established four Western-style military barracks in Korea (1884), he 
named pro-Chinese officials Han Gyujik, Yun Taejun, Yi Joyeon, and Min Yeongik to serve as 
commanders.106 In contrast, the pro-Enlightenment faction, which counted Kim Okgyun, Pak 
Yeongho, and Seo Gwangbeom as members, was not strong enough to check the pro-China 
faction’s domination in Korean politics. Gojong’s unfortunate tendency to overly rely on a major 
power (i.e. China)107 brought little comfort to Takezoe as well.    
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Notwithstanding these facts, Japan still strived to compensate for its inferior position on the 
Korean peninsula. The opportunity came when China and France fought over control of Vietnam 
(8.1884-4.1885). During the war, while displaying an ambiguous attitude towards the French 
request to form an alliance against China, Japan sought to maintain amicable relations with China to 
resolve the division of Ryukyu.108  
As China’s international status took a hit from the Sino-French War and the ensuing power 
struggle within the Chinese government, Korea, encouraged by the geopolitical change, decided to 
cooperate with Japan.109 This coincided with Japan’s own modification of its Korean policy. 
Takezoe, who returned to Korea after an eleven-month holiday (30.10.1884),110 was eager to exploit 
this change of thinking to test his neutralisation idea. He declared, “I intend to make Korea a 
permanent neutral state. Making Korea become a permanent neutral state like Switzerland and 
Belgium was always anticipated by Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru.”111 
Takezoe finally put his initiative into action during his audience with Gojong (2.11.1884). 
Providing him with an outline of the Sino-French War112 as a pretext for explaining the necessity of 
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Korean neutralisation, Takezoe, contriving to alienate Korea from China, argued that as long as 
China and France did not enter a formal conflict, the neighbouring countries (i.e. Korea/Japan) 
would be unaffected, but if they officially declared war, the relations between France and 
Korea/Japan or China and Korea/Japan would be affected. In such a case, siding with France would 
mean fighting against China or siding with China would mean fighting against France. In either 
case, the Western powers would maintain wartime neutrality to protect their security. Nevertheless, 
if Korea were forced to take sides, it could face severe attack from another country. Therefore, 
Korea should carefully consider what it could do to guarantee its safety. But Gojong responded 
coolly to Takezoe’s recommendation, commenting that he really hoped for peace between China 
and France and thus would not accept wartime neutrality for Korea.113 
Since Gojong’s personal affection for China was indisputable,114 it was very difficult for him 
to adopt any measure that could damage Korea’s traditional relations with China. Gojong also 
sought advice from his high-ranking officials on the issue. The Japan-friendly pro-Enlightenment 
faction members Kim Okgyun, Hong Yeongsik, and Seo Gwangbeom claimed that Korea should 
cut its ties with China and declare its independence. However, pro-China faction members like Min 
Yeongik, Min Taeho, and Han Gyujik, all serving in important government positions at the time,115 
opposed Takezoe’s proposal since Korea did not possess the ability to maintain neutrality and 
should thus rely on China.116 Except for several pro-Enlightenment faction members, the majority 
of the Korean elite claimed that Korea was better off staying loyal to China.117  
As seen above, although their plans never materialised, Inoue Kaoru and his men at the 
Foreign Office repeatedly expressed their desire to neutralise Korea. Reflecting Japan’s relatively 
weakened influence in Korea after the Imo Mutiny, these proposals epitomised Japan’s passive 
Korean policy.118 But these Japanese proponents of neutralisation, although steadfastly committed 
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to it, were not up to the daunting task of winning over foreign sceptics, and unfortunately, Western 
major powers, China, and Korea remained unconvinced. 
In the end, Japan-originated initiatives did not command much attention since they overplayed 
Japanese interests in challenging the Chinese suzerainty over Korea, neither adequately considering 
the balance of power nor properly reflecting Korea’s willingness to remain China’s vassal. In 
addition, the purported Russian threat towards Korea, which might have raised the level of concern, 
had not yet emerged. In contrast, Boissonade’s plan showed more potential value.       
· Neutralisation Proposals Around the Time of the Gapsin Coup (1884-1885) 
In addition to Boissonade, other Western parties expressed their interest in Korean 
neutralisation after mid-1884. While the above Japanese neutralisation initiatives were designed to 
compensate for its weakened position in Korea, the aims of Westerners’ proposals ranged from 
advancing their national interests in the Far East to breaking the cycle of single major power 
dominance in Korea through joint guarantee. Although most of them did not represent the official 
views of their governments, they provided some meaningful insight into Korea’s contemporary 
situation since they came from an influential newspaper, a foreign adviser, and Western diplomats, 
and reflect the geopolitical dynamics surrounding Korea. 
Russia, having seen Britain’s ratification of a treaty with Korea (26.11.1883) and having 
appointed Baron Andrei Nikolaevich Korf as governor of the Priamur region in early 1884, adopted 
a more active Far Eastern policy. In early May 1884, Gojong dispatched Kim Gwanseon to N. G. 
Matiunin, Novokievski-based Southern Ussuri Region Border Administrator, to pass him a letter 
expressing his desire to sign a Korea-Russia Treaty.119 Against this background, the Korean 
government, ignoring Li’s warnings about a potential Russian occupation of Korea, directly 
negotiated with Russian Consul in Tianjin Karl Ivanovich Weber, whom foreign adviser 
Möllendorff had invited. 
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By 1884, the development of capitalism and the emergence of a bourgeoisie in Russia had 
culminated in Siberia and the Far Eastern region becoming financially attractive. But the Russian 
government had not yet been captivated by the regions’ charms, and the expansion of British and 
U.S. influence in East Asia through treaties with Korea rather than economic opportunity prompted 
Russia to enter diplomatic relations with Korea. This led to the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Commerce and Amity (7.7.1884), thereby creating a balance of power among the major powers in 
Korea.120 Russia welcomed this treaty since it feared that Japan might occupy Korea in the event of 
a Sino-French War.121 Moreover, the signing of the treaty marked Russia’s debut on the peninsula’s 
political stage, joining China, Japan, the U.S., and Britain,122 and enabled Korea to utilise a third 
power to counter China, which might have been Gojong’s new strategy to manoeuvre round China.  
However, before the Geomundo Incident occurred (15.4.1885), expansion into Western 
Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia remained Russia’s priorities. Thus, only a few politicians 
and diplomats were dispatched to Northeast Asia and even those posted there were often on holiday, 
leaving unprofessional secretaries to serve as chargé d´affaires in the region. Given that very few 
Russians were familiar with China, Korea, and Japan and that Russian Foreign Minister Giers was 
largely unfamiliar with the Far East, this was not entirely unexpected. Nevertheless, the 
appointment of Karl Weber as Chargé d´affaires to Korea demonstrated the Russian government’s 
acknowledgement of the Korean peninsula as a necessary supplier of commodities for Russians in 
the region; Russia’s newly acquired Maritime Province was located far from the country’s central 
region and suffered from poor transportation. However, a limited presence of Russian military in 
the Far East and its comparatively weaker economy vis-à-vis other Western powers made it 
impossible for Russia to pursue an assertive policy in Korea.123 
Undaunted by their government’s passive stance towards the Far East and Korea, prominent 
Russian newspapers exhorted it to develop Russia’s ties with the Maritime Province and several 
East Asian countries (especially Korea) and demanded the central government devote more interest 
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to the Far East.124 In September 1884, the Russkii Vestnik contrasted Russia’s cautious Korean 
policy with Germany’s success in winning various concessions from Korea, which greatly benefited 
German ships and merchants, notwithstanding Russia’s geographical advantage of being Korea’s 
closest neighbour. It argued that building close ties with Korea could in the same way benefit 
Russia’s industry, trade and to some extent, navigation in the Pacific. The newspaper also suggested 
the pursuit of an alternative to the current strategy that would generate, develop, and maintain the 
relationship between Korea and Russia because although Russia was striving to expand the reach of 
its navy, it had restrained itself for almost two years, taking only the small step of signing a treaty 
with Korea.125  
The Novosti also joined the fray (10.4.1884), commenting that Korea had a large hard-
working population, boasted a geopolitically strategic position, had recently appealed to the 
civilised countries, and had ratified commercial treaties with the U.S., Britain, Germany, and Russia. 
As a result, these countries’ cargo ships freely entered and departed various ports in Korea. Two 
months later, the Novoe Vremya, also stressing the geopolitical position of Korea, argued that 
Russia must not disregard Korea with its population of eight million and should consider which 
country, China or Russia, would have greater influence there. Because Korea directly bordered 
Russian territory along the Pacific, it was very important for it to prevent China from occupying 
Korea. Politically, Korea had to be separated from the Chinese sphere of influence, and the Russian 
government had to assert its right in Korea, utilising its navy stationed along the Pacific. The Novoe 
Vremya further contended that (9.12.1884) if any powers other than Russia occupied a superior 
position in Korea, it would be wrong and harmful for Russia’s interests. Therefore, the Russian flag 
must be run up higher than other countries. Subsequently, the newspaper went on to emphasise how 
Korea occupied a central position among its three neighbouring powers (i.e. China, Japan, and 
Russia) (29.12.1884).126  
Meanwhile, encouraged by Japanese Chargé d’affaires in Seoul Shimamura Hisashi’s promise 
of assistance and Japanese Minister to Korea Takezoe Shinichirō’s critical comments towards the 
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pro-China faction127 and disenchanted by the pro-China faction’s hold over the Korean government, 
the pro-Enlightenment faction instigated the Gapsin Coup (4.12.1884). Li Hongzhang believed that 
the coup was the work of the pro-Japan political faction in Korea and regarded this incident as more 
important than the Sino-French War, arguing that China should dispatch its military to smash 
Japan’s plot to invade Korea.128 Despite the faction’s high hopes, the coup failed, putting Japan in a 
tight spot; Yuan Shikai,129 one of the Chinese officials dispatched by Li to advise Korea, swiftly led 
Chinese and Korean troops in quelling the coup and drove the pro-Enlightenment faction from 
power. France, still at war with China, tried to exploit the Sino-Japanese confrontation during the 
Gapsin Coup to enter into an alliance with Japan,130 but to no avail.  
Given the above factors, Korea, if incorporated into the sphere of the civilised peoples, would 
naturally use its favourable situation and advantages to exert its influence over neighbouring 
countries both commercially and politically. For this reason, if a certain Western power established 
its position in Korea, it would be entirely undesirable as a neighbour to Russia’s territorial waters 
along the Pacific. Thus claimed the Novoe Vremya: Russia, having absolutely no intention to attack 
or return Korea, must actively oppose a Western power invasion of Korea and pursue the increase 
of its influence in Korea, which would hopefully prevent Britain and/or Germany from establishing 
a base of operations in Russia’s backyard.131    
Sharing other Russian newspapers’ concerns about Russia’s passive Korean policy and 
worried about perceived U.S., British, and German expansion into the Korean peninsula, the 
Moskovskiye Vedomosti made a case for Korean neutralisation (29.12.1884) as a way of 
strengthening Russian influence in the country and checking other powers’ expansion into Korea. 
The newspaper complained that Russia was a mere bystander in Korean affairs, despite Korea being 
located on the doorstep of the Ussuri domain and just “two steps” away from Vladivostok. It too 
raised the possible impact of British, Chinese, Japanese, and German warships moored at Korean 
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ports and the prospects of Korea becoming a strategic base for foreign military and commercial 
units poised to invade Russia. Quoting Shanghai newspaper articles calling Korea the key to 
controlling the Sea of Japan, the Moskovskiye Vedomosti stressed the importance of controlling 
Korea. As for Russia, a neutral Korea would have the same significance as a neutral Turkey. 
Therefore, Russia could not afford to ignore it, given that all European powers had been competing 
successfully for the expansion of their colonial policies.132 
Frustrated by the Russian government’s enervated Korean policy, the Moskovskiye Vedomosti 
proposed Korean neutralisation to potentially strengthen Russian influence in Korea and to counter 
other Western powers. Since Russia was already at loggerheads with European powers over 
geoeconomic interests in Central Asia, Europe, and parts of the Far East, Korean neutralisation 
could have been used to facilitate Russian hegemony in the Far East. But as long as the Russian 
foreign ministers stuck to their “wait and see” approach, the newspaper’s entreaties would fall on 
deaf ears and any form of Russian-sponsored Korean neutralisation was bound to fail. In fact, just a 
day before this proposal, Russian Foreign Minister Nikolai Karlovich Giers advocated strict 
Russian neutrality amidst Sino-Japanese tension over Korea.133  
During the early 1880s, Germany was experiencing rapid economic growth owing to the 
Second Industrial Revolution and national unification. Encouraged by this, Bismarck and the 
majority of conservative German politicians assumed that continued economic development would 
bring political and social stability to Germany. It did not take long for their judgement to be called 
into question, however, as Germany faced over-production, a gap between the rich and poor, and 
periodic economic crises.134 Feeling exasperated, a growing number of German elites, including 
Bismarck, looked for alternate measures to solve these problems. As a result, the invigoration of 
trade through colonisation to resolve the country’s economic, political, and social discontents came 
into favour. Even after Germany jumped on the colonisation bandwagon, however, its main focus 
lay in Africa and the Southern Pacific, where many German companies were already operating. In 
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contrast, the German government demonstrated little interest in Northeast Asia, even if it 
maintained trade relations with China and Japan and had signed a treaty with Korea.135                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
This general disinterest towards Northeast Asia did not prevent German diplomats from 
commenting on Korean affairs. German Minister in Tokyo Zedtwitz submitted a report to Bismarck 
about Inoue Kaoru’s neutrality idea, and German Minister to China Brandt, who worried about 
possible Russian intervention into Korea after the joint withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese forces 
from Korea, called for the joint Sino-Japanese protection of Korea as well.136 Despite attempts to 
draw the government’s attention to Korea, these two reports did little to transform Germany’s 
Korea policy due to Bismarck’s scant interest in colonial policy.  
Although Germany itself might have been a minor player in Korea, Paul G. von Möllendorff 
(1847-1901) played a pivotal role in Korean foreign affairs as the first Western adviser.137 Having 
studied law, linguistics, and East Asia studies at the University of Halle, Möllendorff moved to 
China in 1869 to work at Chinese customs and later, as German Vice-Consul in Tianjin, befriended 
Li Hongzhang. In December 1882, with Li’s recommendation,138 he came to Seoul and worked as 
Gojong’s foreign policy adviser and the head of Korean customs until his resignation.139 
Soon after his arrival in Korea, Möllendorff was named Vice-Minister of the Tongni amun, 
which was established in 1882 by Li Hongzhang’s advice as an independent unit to handle 
diplomatic and commercial affairs with Japan and the West. As an adviser, Möllendorff was tasked 
with linking Korea’s foreign policy to China’s140 and thus became closely involved in treaty 
negotiations with Britain, Germany, Russia, and France. In his early days there, Möllendorff, in line 
with Li’s Korean policy, reckoned that Korea was too weak to retain its autonomy independently141 
and earned Gojong’s ire by claiming that the “Korean king [Gojong] was a nominal servant of the 
Chinese emperor.”142 Möllendorff thus aligned himself with pro-China figures such as Kim Yunsik, 
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who wanted Korea to exercise its internal and external affairs autonomously under the protection of 
its suzerain, China. This changed in early 1884 when Möllendorff started to drift from his pro-China 
outlook, based on his presumption that China’s defeat in the Sino-French War exposed a weakness 
that could lead to its withdrawal from Korea.143 During this period the tension over Korea between 
China and Japan began to mount; Möllendorff, knowing that Gojong had taken great pains to secure 
Korean independence and sovereignty144 and now wanted him to counter Chinese and Japanese 
intervention in Korea, had to devise a new strategy to ease Gojong’s anxiety. 
Möllendorff considered sound economic reforms one way to support Korea’s independence 
and ultimately realise its neutralisation. To this end, he attempted to cultivate commercial plants 
like bamboo by employing advanced agricultural technologies, build factories to produce glass, 
matches, and ceramics with modern technologies,145 and with China’s encouragement146 used a loan 
worth 200,000 taels from the China Merchants Steamship Co. and the Kaiping Mines147 to establish 
Western-style customs in Korea—all to no avail.148 
Meanwhile, displeased with China’s growing interference, Gojong turned to the U.S. to free 
Korea from China’s yoke.149 He, however, seemed to have misread U.S. intentions toward Korea as 
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the State Department and Congress remained aloof from Korean affairs.150 In fact, instead of 
actively working to buttress Korea’s national interests, the U.S. merely adopted an ambiguous 
attitude of offering its good offices to Korea while refraining from formally intervening151 and 
staved off a request from Seoul for the dispatch of an American foreign affairs adviser and military 
instructors to Korea.152 These actions by the U.S. inevitably let Gojong down badly, which made 
him sense that by mid-1884 Korea could no longer secure its independence by counting on 
American goodwill alone.153 
         To make matters worse, Japan tried to regain some of its lost prestige in Korea due to the 
failure of the Gapsin Coup through the Treaty of Hanseong (9.1.1885),154 though Yuan’s action 
checked its expansion into Northeast Asia for the next decade.155 Just as had happened following 
the Imo Mutiny, the coup’s failure brought about the emasculation of the pro-Enlightenment faction 
by the Korean government and thus further bolstered China’s suzerainty over Korea, which forced 
Korea to in response seek a rapprochement with Russia.  
Against this backdrop, Möllendorff envisaged neutralisation because he thought that, due to 
the political strength of China and Japan and Korea’s virtual incapacity to stand independent, a third 
country other than China and Japan had to be enticed to protect Korea156: The U.S. was too far away 
and its military strength was inadequate, France was concentrating on its expansion into Indochina 
and maintained cool relations with China after the Sino-French War (1885), Germany was not 
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playing any significant role in international politics, and Britain was rivals with Russia over 
Southwestern Asia and was Japan’s ally.157 In contrast, Russia maintained normal relations with 
China, was hostile to Japan since its eastern boundaries bordered the Pacific, and hoped that Korea, 
located between it and Japan, would become an independent country and function as a buffer 
state.158 All things considered, Russia was ideally suited to be the third country Möllendorff 
sought,159 an understandable decision given Chinese suzerainty over Korea and Japanese ambition 
to challenge the Chinese position in Korea.  
To see how Russia could best act to protect Korea, Möllendorff weighed the unilateral 
protection of Korea by Russia against its joint protection by China, Japan, and Russia. To avoid 
giving preference to Russia, he recommended joint protection, which would treat all involved states 
equally under a strict neutral status. To effectuate this, Korea should conclude treaties with major 
powers in order to guarantee the continued presence of their diplomats, which had enabled Korea to 
regain internal stability even amidst the Sino-Japanese confrontation.160  
In fact, Möllendorff had already attempted to arrange financial support for Korean 
neutralisation; during his August 1884 visit to Beijing, he asked Russian military representative 
Shneur for capital investment from Russia, China, and Japan to transform Korea into a Belgian-
style neutral state. Möllendorff explained that the interests of these three powers were intertwined 
on the Korean peninsula and hoped that their mutual relations could be fulfilled peacefully rather 
than hostilely and that in doing so these countries would guarantee a Korean independence similarly 
to Belgium’s. He added that since other powers would intervene in Korea in case one power 
occupied it militarily, it would be good to have the country open, allowing capital and investment to 
compete freely. Schneur replied to Möllendorff that Japan and China would not agree to this 
suggestion and asked Möllendorff to suggest it to the Russian government directly.161 However, 
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when Shneur disapproved of Japan as a creditor, Möllendorff responded that he would ask Parkes 
for Britain’s unilateral protection or for the joint protection of Korea by various European powers 
that feared a Russian occupation of Korea. Möllendorff then told Russian Rear-Admiral A. E. 
Kroun in September that although Britain promised to protect Korea in exchange for Geomundo, 
Korea desired the joint protection of Britain, Russia, and Japan.162 
Though he made the above overtures in 1884, Möllendorff regarded the year 1885 as the best 
point in time to neutralise Korea because the withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese troops stipulated 
by the Tianjin Convention (18.4.1885)163 had lessened China’s intrusion into Korea’s internal 
affairs and Japan’s sabre-rattling there, creating room for Korea to manoeuvre.164 To bring his 
neutralisation plan to fruition, he observed that it should be Russia-led, provided that Russian 
involvement was proportionate to its interests in Korea. Accordingly, Russia, not Korea, should be 
entrusted with stipulating such a proposal, though approval from the Korean government was a 
precondition.165 
He believed that a Russian-led Korean neutralisation should proceed thusly: First, China and 
Japan would jointly guarantee Korean neutrality and non-aggression and maintain the relations of 
mutual guarantee of Korea vis-à-vis its relations with them. Second, a military defence relationship 
would be formed. Third, a guarantee of the general relationship concerning non-aggression of 
Korean territory would be agreed upon.166 His proposed military defence relationship included the 
invitation of Russian officers and non-commissioned officers to train Korean forces and envisioned 
using Russian power to block Chinese intervention and Japanese ambition.167 The inclusion of a 
                                                 
162 Kim Jongheon, “Syupeiyereu wa Reosia gongsa Bebereu ui Joseonnae oegyo hwaldong [De Speyer and Russian 
Minister to Joseon Waeber’s Diplomatic Activities in Joseon]”, in Sugyo wa gyoseob ui sigi Han-Reo gwangye [The 
Korea Russian Relations in the Period of Establishment and Negotiations of Diplomatic Relations], Hong Ungo et al., 
(Seoul: Seonin, 2008), 151. 
163 This convention encompassed a simultaneous withdrawal of the Japanese and Chinese militaries from Korea, 
training of Korean military by a trainer from a third country, and notification to another signatory if both or one of the 
signatories’ troops were dispatched to Korea in the event of rebellion or a serious incident in Korea. Kim Gyeongchang, 
337. 
164 Kim Wuhyeon, 50. 
165 Pak Huiho, 57. 
166 Möllendorff, 85. 
167 Ibid., 86. After the Gapsin Coup, Möllendorff came to doubt the ability of the Korean military and concluded that 
only when it was reformed under the sponsorship of a foreign power could a more serious conflict between China and 
Japan be avoided. Eugune C. Kim and Kim Hangyo, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876~1910 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967), 61.   
 70 
military defence relationship testifies that Möllendorff acknowledged the importance of Korea’s 
self-defence capabilities to its accomplishing neutralisation.168  
 Möllendorff’s neutralisation plan also caught the attention of German diplomats in the Far 
East. In his report (14.1.1885) to the German government, Herman Budler (1846-1894) mentioned 
that Möllendorff wanted to implement a Belgian-style neutralisation through an international treaty 
with China, Japan, and Russia acting as guarantors of Korean neutralisation. Budler presumed that 
this plan had received the Japanese foreign minister’s blessing and speculated that it would be 
discussed at a future meeting between China and Japan.169 German Minister to China Brandt made a 
similar report (18.2.1885) to Berlin, detailing Möllendorff’s plan of having Russia, Japan, and 
China as guarantors of Korean neutrality, just as major powers have done for Belgium.170 German 
Consul-general in Korea Otto Zembush also mentioned (29.6.1885) that he, having been visited by 
Kim Yunsik, had learned that Korea wanted to pursue a Belgian-style neutrality as outlined by  
Möllendorff.171 
Möllendorff’s neutralisation proposal was aimed at tying Korea closer to Russia and blocking 
China to strengthen Korean independence, using the praiseworthy concept of self-defence. 
Möllendorff’s plan seemed sensible, but did not accurately gauge Korea’s ongoing dependence on 
China. Besides, even if he managed to obtain Japanese consent, it was questionable whether Russia 
would follow suit since it had just entered Korea and was busy consolidating its foothold there.172 
Also, rather than weaken as he predicted, Chinese suzerainty over Korea had strengthened after the 
British occupation of Geomundo. What is more, there was no power that was ready to initiate and 
lead the neutralisation, and there was no balance of power on the Korean peninsula.173 When 
Möllendorff resigned as Korea’s foreign adviser (27.7.1885) due to the rumour of the Russo-Korean 
secret pact surfacing in 1885, his neutralisation plan sank with him.174  
Around the same time as Möllendorff’s proposal, Budler also came up with a more detailed 
neutralisation plan, fearing that in the event of a Sino-Japanese war, Korea’s geopolitical 
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vulnerability would be exposed. Budler’s ties with the Far East were many; he worked as a customs 
officer in the Chinese Imperial Customs (1869-1874), served as an interpreter at the German 
legation in Amoy (1874-1883), and accompanied Yokohama-based German Consul Zappe during 
the Korea-German Treaty negotiations. Subsequently, he was appointed by the German government 
to serve as the vice-consul in Jemulpo (2.4.1884) and began work there (24.6 1884). After Zembsch 
became Consul-general to Korea (14.10.1884), Budler was posted to Seoul as vice-consul and acted 
as a window on German foreign policy in Korea until he was transferred to Swatow as vice-consul 
(27.1.1886).175 
As one of the most energetic foreign diplomats stationed in Korea, the ambitious Budler 
worked hard to acquire German interests there. Thus, the German company Heinrich Constantin 
Edward Meyer & Co. won the exclusive right to purchase and transport machinery to set up the 
telegraph office in Korea, and the company lent a steamship to the Korean government to help 
transport rice paid as taxes from Mokpo to Incheon.176 Besides, he also put Carl Wolter, the head of 
the Korean branch of Edward Meyer & Co and the so-called ‘King of Jemulpo,’ in a position to 
make inroads into Korea’s mining development and commerce.177 His avid desire to maximise 
German economic interests in Korea was matched by his enthusiasm for Korean neutralisation, 
which he proposed to Inoue Kaoru, Kim Yunsik, and Li Hongzhang. At the time, German consuls’ 
duties usually did not go beyond protecting German citizens and securing economic interests for 
Germany, but Budler intervened actively in Korea’s political issues.178 After the Gapsin Coup 
erupted,179 Budler was asked by Gojong to join American and British representatives and the 
Japanese Minister at Jemulpo to find consensus for avoiding war between China and Japan.180 
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Sensing that the coup had opened the way for Germany to obtain ascendancy in Korea as the 
neck-and-neck race between China and Japan advanced, he visited Japanese Foreign Minister Inoue 
Kaoru several times to propose the permanent neutrality of Korea and won his agreement. To 
demonstrate the advantages of neutralisation through historical example, Budler submitted to 
Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yunsik A Written Opinion advising Joseon to remain as a Neutral 
Spectator in the Sino-Japanese Skirmish (7.2.1885), which explained how in Europe, two or three 
weak countries had benefited greatly from major power treaties that protected them and provided 
permanent peace to all parties. During the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, 80,000 French troops 
retreated into Switzerland across its French border. Prussian troops were stopped from invading the 
weaker Switzerland to pursue those troops, because Switzerland had concluded a treaty which 
clearly stated it was not to lend its land, even in case of war. Thus, although it would have been 
strategically practical for the German military to attack the French military by crossing over into 
Switzerland, the German forces ultimately took a longer route to advance rather than violate the 
treaty.181 
To explain the necessity for neutralisation, Budler highlighted Korea’s geopolitical 
vulnerabilityKorea was in China’s backyard and linked along its edges to Russia and Japan. If 
war occurred, he wondered who and what could protect Korea, even if China had 10 million men 
stationed there, and then suggested his neutralisation plan. According to Western example, the 
treaty for neutralisation would compel China, Russia, and Japan to agree to the permanent 
protection of Korea. Accordingly, even if war broke out in the region, Korea would not be used as a 
base for aggression. Korea would have to play its part by dispatching thousands of troops to defend 
its coast and borders, by having troops patrol the whole country, and by trading with countries that 
signed treaties with it. If the above were accomplished, Korea would then be able to enjoy 
permanent protection and the broad benefits of neutrality, and China, with its anxieties assuaged, 
would have no reason to object.182 By lending his weight to a permanently neutral state under joint 
guarantee of China, Russia, and Japan, implementation of self-defence, and friendship and trade 
with major powers, Budler followed in the footsteps of Möllendorff. 
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Simultaneously, Budler sent his proposal to the Korean government and foreign diplomats in 
Korea as well, calling on China, Russia, and Japan to approve neutrality of Korea.183 However, the 
Korean government rejected his proposal, received through Kim Yunsik just before the meeting 
between Itō and Li Hongzhang in Tianjin, which led  Korea to believe that China would not chance 
provoking the suspicions of its neighbours by increasing its military presence in Korea unless it was 
an obvious necessity and that Japan was intent on maintaining peace and thus would commit no 
rash acts.184 Budler revisited Korean neutralisation with the Korean government, informing them 
that Japan favoured his ideas, but his plan received little support, not least because of the sway that 
conservative pro-China officials such as Kim Yunsik held over the Korean bureaucracy.185 Not 
surprisingly, Kim asked Budler to withdraw his proposal since both China and Japan were keen to 
preserve peace.186 
Later in February, after a botched overture to Kim, Budler pitched his Korean neutralisation 
plan to Li in a letter, claiming that spurred on by Inoue Kaoru, Japan favoured neutralisation and 
might propose it in the upcoming Sino-Japanese negotiation.187 Budler insisted that China’s failure 
to diplomatically protect its vassal from a strong neighbouring country could expose Korea to 
aggression and thus force China to take military action on its behalf. He claimed that the current 
Chinese military alone was enough to protect the Korean king and contain internal rebellions in 
Korea. Furthermore, since Japan had no desire to occupy Korean territory and only sought to trade 
with Korea, China did not need to worry about Japan and any Chinese effort to move Japan out of 
Korea could provoke a Japanese invasion of Korea.188 Suspecting that Budler might join hands with 
Japan and worried that his plan was disadvantageous to both China and Korea, Li rejected his 
advice.189  
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  While Möllendorff’s Belgian-style neutrality proposal was designed as a means to link Korea 
with Russia, counter China, and realise Russian-led Korean neutrality under joint guarantee from 
among Russia, China, and Japan, Budler’s Swiss-style plan, judging the contemporary East Asian 
situation objectively, was devised for Korean neutrality under an equal joint guarantee between the 
three countries.190 In effect, he was questioning China’s intention and ability to protect Korea and 
felt that Japan and Russia were on the alert for a chance to seize it.191 Despite its merits—use of a 
Swiss style-neutrality and the formation of self-defence—the timing of his proposal was 
problematic; not only were Kim Yunsik and the Korean government against it, but China was also 
in no mood to accept Korean neutrality, as Li’s stance demonstrated. 
Meanwhile, how did Britain, the leading power, perceive Korea? In the early 1880’s, Korea 
was off most British officials’ radar screens; the British Foreign Office had virtually no Northeast 
Asian, let alone Korean, experts. Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Julian Pauncefote, who had 
some knowledge regarding China, had no time to devote to Northeast Asia, and Foreign Secretary 
Earl of Granville was uninterested despite some debates about Chinese issues in the House of 
Commons.192 However, a handful of Korean experts in the front lines of Britain’s foreign policy 
were the exception. Among them, Ernest Satow, the secretary at the British legation in Tokyo, was 
fluent in Korean, and his reports on Korea were treated as confidential and circulated among a few 
high-ranking officials in the British Foreign Office. The British Consul in Kobe and future Consul-
general to Korea William G. Aston was not only a fluent Korean speaker but also served as a secret 
channel for the signing of the treaty between Britain and Korea.193 Unlike Japan, the U.S., and 
Germany, Britain acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over Korea to deter the southern expansion of 
Russia and advised China on ways to strengthen its suzerainty. Accordingly, when China sounded 
out British opinion on the dispatch of Chinese forces to Korea after the Imo Mutiny, the British 
Minister to China Sir Thomas Francis Wade recommended China send them to decisively suppress 
the mutiny.194  
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But when Korea and Russia concluded the Treaty of Commerce and Amity in 1884 as a by-
product of Russia's strategy to secure an ice-free port and increase inland trade with Korea and of 
Korea’s desire to counter and alleviate Chinese political pressure on it, which apparently increased 
penetration of Russian influence into Korea, Britain wondered whether China’s Korean policy was 
effective in counteracting the increasing Russian influence there. Instead of wagering on the 
tributary system, Britain looked for new ways to guarantee the territorial integrity of Korea against 
Russian infiltration as a joint-withdrawal of Sino-Japanese forces from the Korean peninsula was in 
the cards. 
Britain’s concern notwithstanding, Russia’s “wait and see” policy towards Korea remained 
largely unchanged. However, in either January or February 1885, the contents of Korea’s allegedly 
secret agreement with Russia, which involved the dispatch of Russian military advisers and 
Russia’s protection of Korea in case of a clash between China and Japan in exchange for Russia’s 
leasing of Korea’s Yeongheung Bay (Port Lazarev), became known.195 This alleged agreement 
caused quite an unintentional stir since it was interpreted by major powers such as Britain as 
signifying continental power Russia’s aggressive encroachment into Korea. Maritime powers Japan 
and Britain, in particular, had to change their Korean policies. Japan now viewed Russia as a more 
serious threat than China and began the Tianjin Conference with China,196 exploiting its defeat in 
the Sino-French War.  
As China and Japan were preparing for the Tianjin Conference to resolve the problems of 
post-Gapsin Coup readjustment, British Chargé d’affaires to China Nicholas Roderick O’Conor 
called for the joint protection of Korea by China and Japan in February 1885 to head off the 
expansion of Russian influence onto the Korean peninsula.197 He claimed that China and Japan had 
to protect Korea until it became autonomous and that only after that was achieved could a Swiss- or 
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Belgian-style permanent neutrality be applied.198 Such a recommendation arose from O’Conor’s 
fear that the simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese forces from Korea could trigger 
Russian intervention there.199 Basically, O’Conor hoped that the countries with the greatest 
influence over Korea (China and Japan) could provide it joint protection and to this end, joint 
protection took priority over neutralisation in his proposal, while other Western proposals focused 
on neutralisation.      
O’Conor’s “joint protection first and neutrality later” proposal was presented to Japanese 
Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru through Japanese Minister to China Takeshō, who was on the same 
page as O’Conor concerning neutralisation, but was rejected by Inoue (8.2.1885). Inoue observed 
that though there were many eminent families in Korea trying to seize political power, none had 
sufficient resources to do so and thus desired Chinese or Japanese protection. However, if both 
countries protected Korea jointly, a seed of discontent would be sown among those Korean families 
since, with Chinese and Japanese political strategies poles apart (i.e. Japan wanted Korean 
independence, whereas China desired to continue its suzerainty over Korea), no one could expect 
mutual cooperation between the two countries to last. Hence, Inoue opined that to maintain Korea’s 
peace and secure public order internally, a paramilitary organisation like a military police 
comprised of 4-500 men per unit should be set up and trained under the supervision of officers 
dispatched by countries with minimal interest in Korea, such as Britain, Germany, or the U.S., all of 
which could be achieved within six months.200  
Nonetheless, after the Tianjin Convention was signed, Takeshō, commenting on the 
impracticality of Inoue’s plan for self-defence, retorted that after Chinese and Japanese troops had 
been withdrawn from Korea, they had had to be sent right back to quell Korea’s internal uprisings 
because the Korean military could not (6.5.1884).201 Moreover, considering an intolerable burden of 
hiring foreign instructors to build up a military force of only 500 to 600 men, fostering an elite force 
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of more than 10,000 men to cope with internal uprisings and external invasions would be 
impossible for a cash-strapped Korea.202 
O’Conor’s “joint protection first and neutrality later” proposal reflected his concern that the 
joint withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese troops could lead to Russian intervention, but his 
reasoning appears flawed because the current state of Russo-Korean relations revealed no concrete 
evidence of Russian intervention in Korea and Russia’s Korean policy was centred on maintaining 
the status quo there. Moreover, the overlooking of Inoue’s above assertions and the underestimation 
of China’s commitment to preserving its suzerainty made O’Conor’s proposal impossible.203 
Two months after O’Conor proposed neutralisation, Japan and China, despite Japan’s hawkish 
public sentiment and China’s claim for its suzerainty over Korea, finally concluded the Tianjin 
Convention, which put Japan on an equal footing with China on the Korean peninsula.204 But the 
situation of the Korean peninsula was now no longer a regional issue between China and Japan and 
was thus creating a worldwide confrontation between Britain and Russia. As for Britain, it had been 
contemplating a war with Russia over the Afghanistan border to safeguard India, Britain’s jewel in 
Asia ever since Russia’s annexation of Turkistan in 1865. Coincidently, the allegedly secret 
agreement between Korea and Russia gave a good pretext for Britain’s occupation of Geomundo.205 
All in all, while most Westerners’ proposals were designed based on the balance of power and 
were to a degree recognised internationally, they could be neither regarded as important nor 
acceptable under the political situation in Korea because of its inability to embrace neutralisation, 
the Russian government’s “wait and see” policy, and Chinese dominance there.  
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Chapter IV. Neutralisation Attempts During the Geomundo Incident (1885-1887) 
The British occupation of Geomundo, halting the Sino-Japanese rivalry temporarily, 
inaugurated a new rivalry between Britain and Russia on the Korean peninsula and brought into 
question the Sinocentric tributary system with regard to Korea’s security. Under this situation, the 
historical process of how Korea, China, and Japan developed their interests in Korean neutralisation 
to cope with the Geomundo Incident and how Britain attempted to use it to prevent Russia from 
gaining influence on the Korean peninsula to maintain its hegemony in the Far East will be 
investigated.   
· Neutralisation Trials as Counter-strategies to the British Geomundo Occupation (1885-1886) 
Throughout the nineteenth century, Britain had opposed Russian encroachment into the Near 
East, Central Asia, and the Far East. Yet this did not prevent Russia from expanding into Central 
Asia and Siberia, even annexing the Maritime Province in 1860. Having turned its attention to 
Central Asia, it was only a matter of time before Russia came into conflict with Britain in the region, 
especially over Afghanistan. In November 1884, British and Russian commissioners attempted to 
adjust the disputed boundary between Russia and Afghanistan, but failed to reach an agreement. 
More alarmingly, Russian forces led by General Kanasov drove out Afghans from the disputed 
areas and created the Panjdeh Crisis. In Britain, the parliament voted to approve 11,000,000 pounds, 
and William Ewart Gladstone’s government mobilised the reserves for preparation of a possible 
Anglo-Russian War.1 
 Between 1880 and 1885, avid to tap the markets of China, Britain backed China’s policy in 
Korea. Though the potential value of Korea as an export market for British goods was considered, 
the Chinese market held a much greater interest for Britain, which accordingly accepted the status 
quo on the peninsula. The British government’s policy of marginalising Korea was the main cause 
behind the Korean peninsula remaining on the West’s geopolitical periphery.2 
Russia too, even after entering into diplomatic relations with Korea, preferred the status quo 
on the Korean peninsula, maintaining its “wait and see” policy. Möllendorff’s proposals to Schneur 
and Kroun did not affect the Russian government’s Korean policy in any way, even if he alluded to 
Britain’s possible occupation of Geomundo. After reviewing them, the Russian Foreign Office 
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concluded that it was unclear whether Möllendorff’s ideas were his or had originated with Gojong 
and that they did not possess enough information about the political situation in Korea. They also 
felt that the relationship between Korea and Britain had to be investigated further. Therefore, 
determining that Möllendorff’s schemes could create misunderstanding between Russia and West 
European powers or China and transform Korea’s international environment, the ministry opted not 
to honour his request. Instead, Russian Foreign Minister Giers entrusted the Russian Minister to 
Japan Davydov with full powers to recommend to Gojong that he not lease Geomundo to Britain 
(1.10.1884)3 and then to inform the Japanese government that Russia would cooperate with it to 
guarantee Korea’s international status (8.10.1884).4 
Möllendorff continued to make overtures towards Russia,5 however, and this prompted the 
Russian government to dispatch First Secretary Alexis de Speyer at the Russian legation in Tokyo 
to Korea to investigate precisely what demands and requests Korea had made and to persuade 
Möllendorff that bargaining with major powers was dangerous. During his stay in Korea 
(30.12.1884-6.1.1885), De Speyer learned that Möllendorff’s demands to Russia had indeed come 
from Gojong,  who pleaded for the dispatch of Russian officials to Korea in accordance with the 
treaty. Möllendorff then made another request for Russian protection of Korea; if Russia did not 
want this role, it could suggest another country to offer a Belgian-style guarantee to Korea.6 Giers 
responded by calling for Russia to remain a spectator unless Korea’s status was threatened,7 but 
Russian Emperor Alexander III still hoped that Russia could act as Korea’s protector.8  
In February 1885, at the request for Russian protection of Korea against Japanese threats and 
Chinese suzerainty over Korea from both three Korean officials (Shin Byeongyeo, Kim Gyogam, 
and Baek Rangcheong) and Gwon Dongsu and Kim Yongwon, the Russian government indicated 
its stance; a Russian official delegate would be dispatched to ratify the treaty between Korea and 
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Russia, review the regulations for the overland trade between the two countries, and devise a 
scheme to effectively protect Korea from outside invasions. Additionally, the government directed 
the Russian navy in the Pacific Ocean to monitor the Korean coast.9 In March 1885, Möllendorff 
approached Davydov to explore Russian protection of Korea10 and called for a Russian occupation 
of Geomundo, but received no reply.11  
While Russia vacillated, Britain looked for a way to impede Russia’s progress in the Far East 
and duly occupied Geomundo (15.4.1885-27.2.1887). Britain was not the only major power that had 
recognised the importance of the island. In fact, the U.S. was the first country to show its interest in 
Geomundo. The U.S. Commander of the Asiatic Fleet H. H. Bell advised U.S. Secretary of Navy 
Gideon Welles to use Geomundo as a base to occupy Seoul from in order to ascertain the facts in 
the General Sherman Incident (14.12.1866)12 and ordered Commodore Shufeldt to reconnoitre the 
island. Shufeldt likened Geomundo to Gibraltar, which guards the entrance of the Mediterranean, 
and judged it to be a superb naval base. Since Koreans had held foreign countries in contempt, he 
recommended Bell launch an operation targeting the coast of Korea’s South Sea to give Korea its 
just deserts.13 Thirteen years later, Shufeldt again urged the U.S. Secretary of Navy Richard 
Wigginton Thomson to occupy Geomundo (31.5.1880),14 yet it was Britain where concrete 
discussions on the possible occupation of Geomundo first surfaced (7.1875).15 In particular, the 
Commander of the British fleet in China George Ommanney Willes asked the Korean government 
to stipulate a clause designating Geomundo the moorage of British warships during the process of 
concluding the Anglo-Korean Treaty (6.1882).16 Eventually, Britain aspired to achieve two things 
by occupying Geomundo: first, its presence could secure the strategic sea lanes south of Korea and 
the possibility of a British blockade of the Vladivostok-based Russian fleet could discourage 
Russian adventurism, especially in Afghanistan. Second, Britain hoped to pre-empt a Russian 
occupation of a Korean harbour such as Port Lazareff, near Wonsan.17 
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Meanwhile, deeply embedded in the existing Sinocentric world order, Korean authorities 
thought that Korea’s security should depend on China because the latter would not accept the 
former’s autonomous diplomacy. However, opposed to China’s intensified intervention in domestic 
affairs after the Imo Mutiny, the pro-Enlightenment faction frequently advocated independence and 
clashed with the pro-China faction. After the Gapsin Coup, Gojong too had a tendency to defy 
China while looking to bring Russia over to Korea’s side to preserve its autonomy, making China 
and Japan nervous. However, the sudden occupation of Geomundo by Britain put Korean 
authorities in a dilemma, creating the impression that the Korean peninsula was surrounded by four 
major powers: China, Japan, Russia, and Britain. Although its action had already hurt Korea’s pride, 
Britain treated it lightly and had O’Conor issue a secret memorandum to the Korean court eight 
days after its occupation of Geomundo, explaining the necessity of this measure.18 For this reason, 
Korea had to first adopt a new strategy to protect both Korean territorial integrity and its 
independence: neutralisation of Korea. 
The Korean government’s official stance on neutralisation was first revealed by the then 
Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yunsik (1835-1922). After passing the civil examination in 1874, 
Kim, a product of classical Confucian learning, served in various positions before being sent to 
Tianjin in January 1882 as a royally appointed adviser to oversee a Korean student group studying 
at the Tianjin Arsenal. While staying in China, he also relayed Gojong’s request that the Chinese 
emperor order the negotiation of a treaty with Western countries as a means of circumventing the 
intense opposition within Korea to dealing with Westerners.19 Along with Eo Yunjung, he agreed 
with the dispatch of Chinese forces to Korea after the Imo Mutiny and later signed a treaty with 
Russia as Gojong’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Moreover, as Li Hongzhang 
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pointed out, Kim, holding office as a government minister, maintained close ties with Yuan,20 which 
further cemented his status as a pro-China policy maker. 
However, though Kim was a well-known member of the pro-China faction, he, having 
perceived Korea’s diplomatic isolation, explored the opportunity for Korea to establish formal 
diplomatic relations with the U.S., actively interacting with Chinese officials in Beijing.21 
Accordingly, while he acknowledged Korea’s tributary status vis-à-vis China, he insisted that Korea 
not be a vassal of China22 to maintain its sovereignty. His anti-Russian sentiments23 after the rumour 
of the secret Russo-Korean agreement also drove Kim to consider another stratagem to defend 
Korean autonomy from potential threats. Eventually, the Geomundo Incident forced him to adopt a 
more concrete measure to boost Korean security amidst the fierce Anglo-Russian rivalry. 
Few would have expected then that Kim would emerge as the first Korean advocate of 
neutralisation. Nevertheless, his doubts about the tributary system in regard to China’s role of 
protecting Korea against foreign invasion led him to embrace neutralisation. Even though he had 
rejected Budler’s neutralisation proposal, Kim, asking Zembsch how the Korean government should 
respond to the British occupation of Geomundo, intimated his wish to neutralise Korea (20.5.1885). 
Kim argued that since Korea was too weak to defend itself from attacks by strong neighbouring 
countries, it, in his opinion, would be better off possessing a similar status to Belgium in Europe as 
Möllendorff had once planned.24 Kim’s statements meant that, at least for the time being, he would 
jettison his pro-China stance and adopt an alternate strategy now that the existing tributary system 
had proven to be toothless in protecting Korean territory amidst the simmering tension between 
Britain and Russia. 
Spurred into action, Kim delivered on the same day two official documents to Britain; one 
was a simple document sent to O’Conor, asking Britain not to borrow Geomundo as a temporary 
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residence.25 The other was a strongly worded note sent to British Acting Consul-general William 
Richard Carles, which demonstrated just how determined he was in resolving the Geomundo crisis: 
Of late rumours from the sea have arrived declaring that your government had designs on  
the Island of Komun, or Port Hamilton. This island belongs to Corea, and ought not to be  
taken possession of by any other Power…We cannot understand how, with your  
country’s regard for friendly relations and the principles of international law, it can have  
taken such an unexpected step…a step which is entirely contrary to anything that we had  
looked for, and which has surprised us more than we can express. If your Government  
will, in the interests of friendly relations, change its plans and at once withdraw from this  
island, not only will this country rejoice, but you will secure the respect and applause of  
all nations. Otherwise, self-respect will prevent our Government from remaining silent,  
and will oblige it to appeal to the Treaty Powers for their opinion. This matter is urgent,  
and, therefore…I now write a plain statement of the case, with the request that you will  
favour [me] with an answer at once.26  
     
Kim did not stop there. On the same day, he met with Carles to restate his opposition to the 
British occupation of Geomundo. Illustrating exactly how Korea was viewed by the British, Carles 
claimed that the British presence in Geomundo was only temporary and had been necessitated by 
Korea’s powerlessness to protect the island against seizure by other powers, especially Russia, 
which might occupy it if Britain departed.27 
The next day, Zembsch sent Kim an unofficial letter specifying a solution to the Geomundo 
issue: If Britain occupied Korean territory to defend itself against Russia, Russia and its allies could 
issue separate statements and explore ways of responding to the British action after considering the 
circumstances. In other words, Korea had to first remonstrate with the British government directly 
that the occupation was illegal (under international law). If Britain would not admit its illegality, 
Korea should inform allied countries and seek their cooperation in a compromise with Britain over 
the Geomundo occupation.28 Encouraged by Zembsch’s reply, the Korean government hinted at its 
intention to neutralise itself unofficially. Zembsch reported to Berlin (25.5.1885) that Korea 
intended to neutralise, writing that the British occupation of Geomundo had not only pushed Korea 
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to pursue neutralisation, but had also given it a real opportunity to realise it under the joint 
guarantee of treaty powers. Zembsch could not have stated it any more clearly than in his telegram 
(1.6.1885) to Berlin via Shanghai: “Joseon wants to neutralise itself.”29  
Finally, Korea officially expressed its intention to neutralise, sending documents under 
Foreign Minister Kim Yunsik’s name to the treaty powers in Korea (25.6.1885): 
In the event of conflicts amongst other countries, Joseon has to remain neutral, by neither 
lending its territory to any country nor permitting a temporary occupation of its territory. 
Such actions are not allowed at all under international law. For these reasons, I [Kim 
Yunsik] am sending you [name of a representative of each treaty power in Joseon] this 
document. After reviewing the contents and reporting it to your government, please pass 
the fair judgement of your government on this issue.30 
 
Kim sent a second document to foreign representatives two days later, withdrawing the first 
ones sent on 25 June. The second document was similar, but was changed to:  
In the event of conflicts amongst other countries, Joseon has to remain neutral, by neither 
lending its territory to any country nor permitting a temporary occupation of its territory. 
Such actions are not allowed at all under international law. I am sending all 
representatives of treaty countries in Seoul this document to inform them of the 
Geomundo occupation. After reviewing the contents and reporting them to your 
government, please help them follow entente article 1. Entente 1 stipulated that if any one 
of the treaty signatories were engaged in a conflict with a third country, another treaty 
signatory was obliged to intervene to resolve the conflict and demonstrate its friendship 
upon receiving such a request from any one treaty signatory. Please reply 
sympathetically.31 
 
In reality, the two documents contained no detailed information about neutralisation, and only 
the second document emphasised the duties of the powers mentioned in the treaties, referring to 
Article 1 of an entente signed between Korea and Western powers. Korea was indirectly 
incorporating neutralisation into part of its diplomacy, looking for a logical basis from the entente.32 
Kim was only able to privately consult with Zembsch about neutralisation; conscious of 
Korea’s tributary status, he could not explicitly call for Korean neutralisation. Moreover, aware of 
Li’s past opposition to Budler’s neutralisation plan, the Korean government could do nothing to rile 
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China. For example, if Korea could settle the Geomundo Incident by treaty signatories’ efforts and 
become a Belgian-style neutral state, this would signify that Korea was escaping from Chinese 
protection. Under such circumstances, Korea could only ask for friendly efforts from pact 
members.33 But Britain preferred to settle the Geomundo issue through China (not Korea directly),34 
and other treaty signatories would not discharge their treaty duties and stand against Britain. U.S. 
Chargé d’affaires to Korea Foulk’s response epitomised this tendency; upon receipt of a 
communication from the Korean Foreign Office requesting U.S. mediation to end the British 
occupation of Geomundo, Foulk did not seem to treat Korea’s protest seriously, merely 
commenting that “the Korean government makes no distinction between the temporary and the 
permanent occupation”.35  
Kim’s feeble gambit failed. Peering over his shoulder at China, Kim had taken a roundabout 
route toward a Belgian-style disarmed neutrality under major powers’ consensus only, instead of a 
Swiss-style neutrality which would have required the massive funding of a self-sufficient military.36 
Kim’s idea sounded logical, but given China’s influence over Korea and insufficient Western 
interest,37 his proposal could not be implemented. 
The failure of Kim’s proposal did not deter the Korean government from continuing 
diplomatic activities to resolve the Geomundo crisis; it dispatched letters to request major powers’ 
mediation (7.7.1885).38 However, this effort had been already overshadowed by China’s previous 
interventions, which could bolster its suzerainty over Korea. In fact, between 16 and 30 April 1885, 
Chinese Minister to Britain Zēng Jìzé, together with Li, acquiesced in the British action to gain 
official approval of Chinese suzerainty over Korea from Britain and received the draft of a mutual 
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agreement related to Geomundo from Granville (28.4.1885) as follows: 1) China would not oppose 
the British occupation of Geomundo, agreeing to Britain’s legal occupation of it, 2) Britain would 
pay an annual lease fee for Geomundo to the Korean government every 12 months during its 
occupation, and 3) From the total lease fee, the amount that Korea should pay as tribute to China 
would be directly settled by Britain. However, he suddenly opposed signing it due to stiff 
opposition from the Chinese court (1.5.1885) and the telegram from the Zongli yamen (6.5.1885), 
which mentioned that because of the Russian Government’s possible occupation of “some other 
island or portion of the Kingdom of Corea” and “the possibility of Japan following in the same 
course”, China hoped Britain would not occupy Geomundo.39 Therefore, Li Hongzhang finally 
cautioned against leasing Geomundo to Britain, dispatched Möllendorff and Ding Ruichang to 
Geomundo to evaluate the situation,40 and put out feelers to Britain, Russia, and Japan to explore a 
possible bilateral or multilateral guarantee of Korea’s security and territorial integrity.41 
Notwithstanding O’Conor’s claim that Itō Hirobumi privately preferred to see Port Hamilton 
(i.e. Geomundo) taken by England rather than Russia, for the English occupation would be “for a 
time”, but a Russian one “for good”,42 Japan did not view the British action favourably. Even before 
Korea officially lodged a protest with the British government, Enomoto had agreed with Li that 
China and Japan should join forces to prevent the occupation of Korea by a third country.43 Foreign 
Minister Inoue Kaoru also asked Japanese Minister to Britain Masataka Kawase to call Britain’s 
attention to the following possibilities: If the British presence in Geomundo was lengthy, Russia 
would in turn definitely try to occupy Wonsan, Busan, or Jeju Island and entice other powers to 
follow suit by invoking a most-favoured-nation status clause. This would lead to the division of 
Korea and make peace in East Asia difficult to maintain.44 
The British occupation of Geomundo stretched every nerve of Russian authorities, who 
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perceived it as tantamount to waging war on Russia. The next day (15.4.1885), when the British 
government ordered its navy to occupy Geomundo, Director General of the Russian Navy I. A. 
Shestakov urged Giers to face the British action head on, and the Russian media even called for the 
capture of an ice-free port in Korea.45 Though Giers did not take up these demands, he still 
advocated British withdrawal from Geomundo and instructed Russian Minister to China Sergei I. 
Popov to consult with Li about rebuking Britain’s action (22.8.1885).46 With little interest in Korea, 
the German and U.S. governments had little to say about the Geomundo Incident,47 and the burden 
of responsibility fell on their representatives’ shoulders. German Consul-general Zembsch urged 
Kim Yunsik to state that Korea should not consent to the occupation.48  Despite his intimacy with 
Korean officials, Foulk did not side with Korea but instead alluded that he shared Britain’s view 
that Geomundo was occupied to deter Russian aggression. Carles’ report to Granville mentioned 
that Foulk had reminded Korean officials of the powerlessness of Korea to protect Geomundo 
against Russia and forced them not to denounce the British action in Geomundo.49  
As Russian officials were busy grappling with what Britain’s occupation of Geomundo meant 
for Russia, Britain began to contemplate withdrawal from the island by opening negotiations with 
China. Thus, British Foreign Secretary Marquess of Salisbury cabled O’Conor to enquire whether 
China could prevent Geomundo from being occupied by Russia, France, and Germany if Britain 
were to withdraw.50 All things considered, it now seemed apparent that the Geomundo issue had 
reached a tipping point with Britain seeking an exit strategy. 
Though the allegedly secret agreement between Korea and Russia was a trial balloon that 
never got off the ground,51 it triggered the British occupation of Geomundo and facilitated 
discussions between China and Japan over their concerns for Korea52  by provisionally halting the 
Sino-Japanese rivalry. Li, meeting with Enomoto, tried to direct his attention to the gravity of the 
Geomundo issue by illustrating its proximity to Japan and asked for cooperation in securing 
Britain’s withdrawal from Geomundo. Concerned that Russia might emulate Britain by occupying 
Yeongheung Bay, Ulleung Island or Geojae Island,53 Enomoto eventually concurred that China and 
Japan should work together to prevent the occupation of Korea by Russia.54 
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Against this background, Austrian Minister in Japan Zaluski mentioned to his foreign minister 
that Enomoto’s real mission in Tianjin was not to supervise the withdrawal of Chinese troops from 
Korea but to ask Li to attend a Tokyo conference for neutralising Korea under the joint guarantee of 
major powers (9.8.1885). Zaluski did not think the Chinese government would immediately accept 
Enomoto’s second proposal under Chinese suzerainty over Korea. But since his proposal could 
check Russian expansion into Korea, it opened up the possibility of discussion between China and 
Japan on Korean neutralisation.55 However, considering China’s well-known desire to uphold its 
suzerainty against the Japanese challenge in Korea, Enomoto’s neutralisation proposal had little 
chance of succeeding.  
However, a month after Enomoto’s neutralisation trial, new momentum for negotiations grew 
once the Anglo-Russian dispute over Afghanistan was resolved in September 1885. This prompted 
Li to approach O’Conor (13.10.1885) to end the British presence in Geomundo.56 Eventually, the 
British Foreign Office took up Li’s offer and instructed O’Conor that Britain would withdraw from 
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Geomundo as long as China promised that no other country would occupy it.57  
In the vortex of the Sino-British negotiations about the British withdrawal from Geomundo, 
Yu Giljun (1856-1914) had kept watch against Russia. While Kim Yunsik was the first Korean to 
officially suggest neutralisation, Yu privately approached the issue in a more theoretical way. As 
the first Korean to receive a Western-style education in Japan in 1881, Yu moved to the U.S. two 
years later to continue his education.58 As a result, he became quite familiar with international law, 
Western customs, and the complexities of geopolitics compared to many of his countrymen. Since 
Korea was embroiled in major power rivalries that threatened its stability and autonomy, its foreign 
policy could have benefited from Yu’s expertise. But he could not contribute his talents to the 
Korean government after his return from the U.S. Instead, he became a victim of Yuan’s 
interventionist Korean policy, which deliberately sidelined anti-China faction figures like Yu from 
the political decision-making process. Despite undergoing house arrest in Korea, Yu, having 
observed the international situation in his travels through Japan, the U.S., and Europe and having 
responded to Han Gyuseol’s request about Kim Yunsik’s previous refusal of Budler’s neutralisation 
proposal,59 single-handedly attempted to apply his knowledge of international relations to make a 
case for Korean neutralisation.  
To explain the reasons for Korean neutralisation, Yu, in his Theory of Neutrality (12.1885) 
and other writings, analysed the current state of affairs on the Korean peninsula and in surrounding 
areas: He branded Russia the greatest threat to Korea, claiming that “violent Russians like a tiger or 
a wolf, had already been vigilantly awaiting an opportunity for several years, but they did not make 
a move just because there was no pretext of intervention”.60 Yu continued in the same vein: 
“Russians were also viewed as tyrannical…powerful…people having an eye on a time.”61 He later 
stated, “Though Russian people were especially notorious for their wickedness, pegging them as 
greedy and vicious in the world, their cruelty was rather getting serious steadily.”62 As for other 
countries, Yu wrote: 
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Though Japan will have an intention to invade Joseon, it, sensing its inferior position 
and weaker power compared to China’s, is preoccupied with protecting itself. In reality, 
Japan is causing Joseon more inconvenience than China does, and although it will 
withdraw from Joseon in accordance with the Tianjin Convention, Japan will stand a 
chance of invading Joseon someday. Meanwhile, though some people might say that 
“Joseon deserves U.S. assistance because Joseon is close friends with the U.S.”, the 
U.S.’s location far away in the distance over the ocean, lack of relations with Joseon, 
and the Monroe Doctrine63 that prevented the U.S. from intervening in Asian and 
European affairs, force the U.S. not to support Joseon militarily, but help Joseon 
verbally, even though Joseon is in danger of its security. Thus, the U.S. can only be 
relied on as a commercial partner, instead of a friendly nation to save Joseon in an 
emergency. In contrast, China can be a true Joseon ally in regard to the traditionally 
friendly relations and advantageous geographical conditions between the two 
countries.64 
 
Yu’s comments were based on the following: His perception of Russian as a threat seemed to 
have been influenced by Huang Zunxian’s Cháoxiǎn cèlüè, which urged Korea to remain friendly 
with China, to connect with Japan, and to link with the U.S. to defend itself against Russian 
aggression. The cross-continental Anglo-Russian confrontation culminated in a British action to 
counter Russia in the Far East; Britain justified its Geomundo occupation by claiming that, 
otherwise, Russia would invade the island.65 Over-dependence on the U.S., for example the pro-
U.S. remarks expressed by Yun Chiho and Kim Yunsik, sowed doubt in Yu’s mind about the good 
offices clause that was read as promising automatic U.S. intervention in Korea. Japan’s frivolous 
attitude (i.e. deliberately staying neutral without supporting Korea’s pro-Enlightenment faction 
during the Gapsin Coup), Japanese control of the telegraph line linking Busan and Nagasaki,66 and 
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after the publication of Datsuaron 脫亞論  (Escape from Asia), the apathy (toward Korea) of 
Fukuzawa Yukichi, who had previously wished to spread the virtues of civilisation to Korea, must 
have increased Yu’s suspicions of Japanese intentions. On the other hand, Yu held a favourable 
view of China, whose influence over Korea had reached its peak with the stationing of troops in 
Korea after the Gapsin Coup. China also shared Yu’s concerns that Japan would advance into Korea 
and that Russia would be the primary threat to China.67 
 However, since the geopolitical situation surrounding Korea was becoming ever more 
dangerous, it was too risky to rely on the goodwill of any one major power to protect Korean 
security. Therefore, Yu considered Korean neutralisation under the guarantee of major powers, 
especially one in which China would lead, good policy.68 Since China’s prestige had suffered 
profoundly during the British invasion of Burma and the French invasion of Vietnam despite 
China’s having close relations with neither Burma nor Vietnam, a Russian invasion of Korea would 
do more than merely damage Chinese prestige; it would be, in Chinese parlance, as if the teeth had 
lost their lips. Consequently, China would have to shed Chinese blood to preserve Korea as a means 
of protecting itself. To avoid doing exactly that, China had maintained relations with Korea for four 
thousand years, and, as its suzerain state for several hundred years, had rescued Korea from even 
small rebellions. Yu reasoned that China would do much more if it believed a foreign invasion was 
putting Korea’s existence at stake.69 
Declaring that “prevention is the best solution”, Yu contended that if China dispatched its 
troops to counter a Russian invasion of Korea, the outcome would be unclear. Even if Russian 
troops were pushed back across the Korean border, the loss of Chinese blood and treasure could be 
costly. On the other hand, if Chinese troops were stationed in Korea in preparation against a 
Russian invasion, they could provide Russia a pretext to flex its military might and prompt Japan to 
react rashly, creating unnecessary conflict.70 Faced with such grim scenarios, China, according to 
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Yu, had no choice but to actively back neutralisation for the sake of stability on the Korean 
peninsula.71 
Yu also believed Korea’s internal conditions necessitated it becoming Asia’s neutral state:  
All countries around the world were proclaiming their friendship through treaties, 
pursuing their wealth by expanding commerce, and strengthening their defences by 
enlarging military power. Thus, if the country’s internal affairs were mismanaged, other 
countries would not consider it a state, if its foreign relations were untrustworthy, other 
countries would not enter into friendly relations, and if its military and commerce were 
desolated and could not prosper, such a country would become indigent and weak, unable 
to stand on its own feet.72 
 
Korea’s inability to execute internal reform and make strenuous efforts warranted 
neutralisation as an option for its security. Yu observed that since Korea was not in a position to 
propose neutralisation, the burden should fall on China. Roughly, Korea should request China to 
act as a sponsor for a treaty, then meet with Britain, France, Japan and Russia—countries that had 
stakes in Asia—who would jointly make a treaty in the presence of Korea.73 
Kim Yunsik had proposed a Belgian-style neutralisation for Korea, but in Yu’s opinion, a 
Korea neutralisation should be a compromise between the Belgian- and Bulgarian-style models 
because Korea’s internal and external circumstances and its international political position 
resembled those of both Belgium and Bulgaria: 
Geographically, our country [Korea], being located in the throat of Asia, is like Belgium 
in Europe, and as our country’s international status is regarded as China’s vassal, this 
relationship is like the one between Bulgaria and Turkey. However, whereas Bulgaria did 
not have a right to conclude treaties on an equal footing with others, our country does. 
Although standing as a vassal and obtaining investiture from a foreign country did not 
apply to Belgium, our country was used to having this case. For these reasons, our 
country’s existence makes a precedent of both Belgium and Bulgaria.74 
 
If Korea neutralised, Yu predicted that the international contribution would be high; the treaty 
that neutralised Bulgaria was the by-product of a European powers’ scheme to prevent Russia from 
expanding southwards, and the treaty that neutralised Belgium was to foster the mutual protection 
of European powers. Similarly, Korea, by becoming a neutral Asian state, could check Russia and 
act for the mutual protection of Asian powers.75 Yu also suggested that after 1885, when the 
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competition among China, Japan, Russia, and Britain had reached a peak with a purported secret 
agreement between Korea and Russia, the Tianjin Convention, and the British Geomundo 
occupation, the time and mood for neutralisation were ripe.76 Therefore, Yu asserted optimistically 
that if Korea requested China to step in, it was possible to realise neutrality, the internal and 
external effects of which, he predicted, would be great: 
Korean neutralisation could change the hostile relationship between Korea and Russia to 
a friendly one in which smiling discussions are available by eliminating Russians’ evil 
mind naturally through friendly foreign relations, enable China to permanently settle its 
Eastern worries without using its military, and give our country a reliable long wall 
enabling it to earn benefits permanently.77 
 
In sum, Yu, recognising the vulnerability of Korean security under the traditional tributary 
relationship between Korea and China, championed neutralisation to counter Russia under the 
international system.  
His closely-considered neutralisation plan notwithstanding, Yu’s logic of neutrality and views 
on the forces surrounding Korea gets mixed reviews. For example, Gang Mangil re-evaluates Yu's 
understanding of neutrality, by systematising the degree of Western impact on Yu’s neutrality 
theory and contrasting his proposal for Korean neutralisation with Budler’s initiatives.78 Yi Hojae is 
baffled that Yu’s ambiguously pro-Chinese standpoint led him to propose neutrality without an 
ample understanding of mutual antagonism and balance of power.79 Kim Hakjun wonders whether 
an extreme Russo-phobia had undermined Yu’s case for neutrality.80 Jeong Yonghwa stresses that 
neutralisation represented Korea’s move towards becoming a small country bent on protecting itself 
rather than a nation with aspirations for growth.81 A more plausible explanation would be that Yu 
wanted to direct China’s attention to Korean neutrality by showing that it could counter Russian 
expansion into Northeast Asia. 
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Yet, considering his membership in the pro-Enlightenment faction, Yu’s choice of China as a 
sponsor for Korean neutralisation might appear odd. Nonetheless, after recognising the limits of 
Chinese military power and U.S. involvement against the spectre of Japanese and Russian 
invasions of Korea,82 Yu came to believe that the traditional tributary relations between China and 
Korea could not protect Korean security. In addition, he might have been shocked by the failure of 
the Gapsin Coup and conscious of how dominant Chinese influence was after the Tianjin 
Convention. Accordingly, Yu wanted to establish new relations between the two countries 
according to international law by applying the theory of balance of power.83 Thus, Yu proposed 
Korean neutralisation to transform its tributary relations with China, claiming that since a tributary 
state could independently sign treaties with other countries, dispatch minister-level diplomats 
abroad, and declare war and ceasefires, it could also be a neutral state. Furthermore, that Korea had 
already concluded treaties with major powers testified to its becoming an independent country 
under international law, and thus it could be a neutral state, as Yu insisted that “non-independent 
country can-not enjoy the right of neutralisation”.84 
But Yu’s assertions didn’t logically add up. Since Korea’s traditional tributary relationship 
with China was incompatible with international law, which stressed equality between states, Yu 
attempted to combine elements of the Belgian and Bulgarian neutrality models for his 
neutralisation proposal. But Bulgaria was not recognised as a neutral state by international law, and 
the guarantors of Belgian neutrality were all equal, even though Britain did act as a sponsor. 
Moreover, his plan was bound to face objections from the pro-Chinese faction and raise the ire of 
Gojong and Queen Min, who were seeking rapprochement with Russia to counter China, as well as 
the opposition of Yuan Shikai as Li Hongzhang wanted to transform the traditional tributary 
relationship between Korea and China into a modern dependency.85 For these reasons, Yu could 
not divulge the existence of his writings,86 and thus his proposal was not made public at the time.  
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Meanwhile, the British action in Geomundo had China, as Korea’s suzerain, put its influence 
over the country to the test. Thus, having learned of the British occupation of Geomundo from 
O’Conor, Zēng Jìzé protested to British Foreign Secretary Granville, emphasising that Geomundo 
belonged to Korea, China’s vassal state, and that its occupation was intolerable.87 Increasingly 
fearful of Western challenges to its tributary relations with Korea, China suspected treaties between 
Korea and Western powers of ending old Chinese privileges. Accordingly, Li, using Hong Kong as 
an example, warned Gojong not to lease Geomundo to Britain.88 Besides, even if the British 
occupation was purportedly to counter Russian expansion into Korea, this was deemed unnecessary 
because Yuan, His Imperial Chinese Majesty’s Resident in Seoul, had already been working to 
block rapprochement between Korea and Russia. Chinese Minister to Russia Liu Ruifen begged to 
differ, however. 
In 1886, he wrote to Li that Korea was the only remaining vassal state of China. Emphasising 
Korea's geographical position near the three provinces of Northeast China, Liu tried to draw 
China’s attention to the importance of Korea. Criticising the harmful impact of the dishonest 
political factions in Korea, he noted that these groups were acting as if they were mostly interested 
in self-destruction—taking “poison pills” in Liu's words—or in the demise of Korea. Though 
considering this a difficult disease to cure, he suggested that China first incorporate Korea into its 
new province and then request countries such as Britain, the U.S., and Russia for its joint 
protection, neither allowing anybody to invade nor occupy a single square metre of Korean 
territory.89 
Owing to Liu’s information that he had already found American and Russian ministers willing  
to back Korean neutrality, Li replied favourably to the former’s idea, commenting that the Anglo-
Russian joint protection [without the U.S.] of Korea was well thought out. This was a startling 
admission, considering Li’s non-reaction towards Enomoto’s second proposal. Although Li 
forwarded Liu’s scheme to the Office of Foreign Affairs for its approval, the possibility of the 
Chinese government endorsing it was slim because the Chinese court viewed Korea as its vassal 
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and requesting the protection of a neighbouring country was seen as incompatible with the usual 
system and custom.90 
As the decline of the Ottoman, Persian, and Qing empires in the 1880s created a power 
vacuum in parts of Asia, the two rivals, Britain and Russia, were tempted to exert their influence on 
Asia. A head-on confrontation between these two European countries temporarily brought the Sino-
Japanese rivalry to a standstill, placing the tributary system in question from Korea’s point of view. 
Mindful of this geopolitical shift, the reform-minded intellectual Kang Youwei (1858-1927), 
despite not holding any government post, advocated neutralisation to secure Chinese interests in 
Korea. Kang initially undertook Confucian learning to prepare for civil service examinations but 
eventually adopted an eclectic approach to Confucianism, believing that it negated human 
development and progress. In addition, influenced by Buddhism, Kang saw himself as a new sage 
who could save the Chinese people. His interests were not restricted to Eastern thoughts; after 
visiting Hong Kong and Shanghai, where he was exposed to Western technical urban developments, 
he henceforth immersed himself in readings on physics, electricity, and optics,91 thus demonstrating 
his desire to learn from the Western world. Though not explicitly stated, his experiences in both 
cities and his yearning to protect his countrymen may have induced him to explore a new way to 
shield fragile China from Western powers, while also keeping in mind that the tributary system 
could no longer protect Korea from foreign intrusion.    
Kang’s alternate Korean strategy for China, which included a neutralisation option, was 
divided into three parts: The first, incorporating Korea and placing it under direct Chinese rule, 
would bring it a mid-level benefit. The second strategy, resting on the assumption that China was 
powerless, posited that the best option was for Korea to become a “public sphere” which various 
powers could jointly protect in the Belgian-style. The third, considered the worst strategy, was to 
have Korea remain China’s vassal while allowing it to conduct trade autonomously. Since Korea 
was a small country with a poor people, he claimed that it would take 30 years for a reform-driven 
self-strengthening of Korea to succeed, but repeated incursions there made this unfeasible. Rather 
than feeling ashamed for watching Korea lose its independence, China should request its joint 
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protection for China’s sake.92 However, although Kang was the only Chinese to formally propose 
Korean neutralisation, there was no evidence that the Chinese authorities, let alone other major 
powers, backed his proposal. 
Around the time of Kang’s proposal, another Korean opinion maker, Kim Okgyun (1851-
1894), weighed in with his neutralisation proposal. A scion of an illustrious family, Kim was 
initially schooled in traditional Confucian learning. Although he did not study abroad as Yu Giljun 
did, he was, however, exposed to Western-influenced enlightenment by befriending progressive 
intellectuals like Yu Honggi, Oh Gyeongseok, Yi Dongin, and Pak Gyusu. Kim’s pro-
enlightenment views gained impetus after he visited Japan in June 1883 to negotiate a loan of 
¥3,000,000 with the Japanese government to pursue modernisation in Korea.93 Upon his return, he, 
along with Pak Yeongho and Yu Giljun, played an instrumental role in publishing the government-
run newspaper Hanseong sunbo to enlighten the public and propagate their vision of a wealthy and 
powerful country.94 
Having witnessed China’s extensive intervention in Korea’s internal affairs after the Imo 
Mutiny, Kim, utilising the Sino-French War as an opening to thwart Chinese aims to make Korea  
its vassal, claimed to stand for a fully autonomous and independent Korea established through 
prosperity and a strong military. During the Gapsin Coup, he, as a member of the staunch anti-
China pro-Enlightenment faction, confronted the entrenched pro-China faction, ushering in a new 
era of Japan-inspired modernisation in Korea. Moreover, he adopted an innovative platform to 
abolish the tributary relationship with China and even called for the repatriation of Daewongun, his 
arch-enemy, from China.   
Kim then unrestrainedly stressed independence, criticising Korea’s dependency on China for 
undermining Korea’s efforts to join the Western-led world order as an equal, full-fledged partner. 
Kim added that since Japan was attempting to act as a “Britain of the East”, he wished to build an 
independent, rich, powerful, and modern country by turning Korea into a “France of Asia”.95 He 
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also claimed, “From a geopolitical perspective, if Japan were regarded as the Britain of the East, 
Korea should assume Italy’s role due to the similarities between the two countries in topography, 
area, and population.”96 He then explored cooperation between Korea, China, and Japan to defend 
Asia from Western aggression.97 
Kim’s pet theory was that all Western states were independent and that any country should 
first achieve its independence and only then could it build amicable ties with other countries. This 
drove his efforts to build an independent Korea through national prosperity and defence and to have 
it join the international order. Evidence suggests that Kim was interested in neutralisation from 
early on,98 but until the Gapsin Coup, he never publicly mentioned it. When Kim met Japanese 
Minister to Korea Takezoe (9.11.1884), he did not use the word “neutralisation” even though he 
informed Takezoe that he had used the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland as examples to 
convince Gojong why Korean independence was needed.99 
After the Gapsin Coup failure, though the Tianjin Convention produced a balance of power 
between China and Japan on the Korean peninsula, China still enjoyed its suzerainty there, which 
enabled Kim to think that only China had the power and prestige to guarantee Korean 
independence, not opposing its dispatch of advisers to Korea.100 But witnessing that the Geomundo 
Incident led to a British and Russian confrontation, Kim changed his anti-China sentiment, 
believing that China could not protect Korea from Britain’s Geomundo occupation, and urged 
Gojong to cultivate amicable relations with the West, reform Korean politics, boost commerce, and 
build an army capable of protecting Korea from foreign invasion.101 Kim’s transformation from an 
anti-China stance to a more conciliatory attitude towards China shows that late Joseon Korea was a 
period of great turmoil which required new political approaches to cultivating self-reliance. 
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Kim, from his exile in Japan, abandoned his hostility towards China and proposed Korean 
neutralisation in July 1886 by major powers’ consensus under China’s leadership to Li Hongzhang 
through A Letter to Li Hongzhang 與李鴻章書:  
Why doesn’t your Excellency honour his majesty the Emperor of Great Qing by placing 
him as the hegemonic protagonist of the world, communicate public opinions to Western 
major powers, build Joseon as a neutral state by continuously banding together with them, 
and thereby make Joseon completely safe? 102 
 
His idea in the above offer was to make Korea a secure region by neutralising it through 
diplomatic compromise between major powers under the leadership of China, which had 
influence within the Korean government. If Korea could become a neutral country, its ripple 
effect, he insisted, would be beneficial for China: 
If your Excellency’s seasoned methods continuously facilitate a close friendship between 
China and Joseon and pursue a strategy in East Asia by truly concluding a mutually close 
pact, this would not only be beneficial to Joseon, but perhaps prove to be a boon for your 
honourable country [China] as well.103 
 
The complex rivalries among China, Japan, Russia, and Britain, and China’s extensive 
intervention in internal Korean affairs had placed Korea between a rock and a hard place. Kim, 
feeling the necessity of a bold and lasting measure to protect Korean independence,104 mapped out 
a Korean neutralisation using the balance of power between major powers. Nevertheless, 
considering his widely-acknowledged anti-China stance, Kim’s call for China to assume a 
leadership role in it was quite striking, even more so than Yu’s, and it showed that Kim was shrewd 
enough to grasp geopolitical realities. At any rate, considering China’s devotion to upholding the 
traditional tributary system,105 it was highly unlikely that China would accede to Kim’s call for 
neutralising Korea. 
As Britain and China were planning their exit strategy for the Geomundo issue, the high-
handedness of Chinese resident Yuan,106 the return of Daewongun to Korea, and slow progress on 
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negotiations surrounding Geomundo compelled some members of the Min clan to revisit Korean 
policy towards China. After Weber began his assignment as Russian chargé d’affaires in Seoul 
(21.10.1885), pro-Russia Min clan members requested he have Russian warships dispatched to 
Korea to facilitate its independence. Weber responded by demanding an official document bearing 
the royal seal and Juksan magistrate Jo Jundu and other Korean officials passed on a secret 
document containing the stamp and seal of State Councillor Shim Suntaek, thus concluding the 
second Russo-Korean pact (13.8.1886).107 Incensed at this decision, Yuan recommended Li force 
Gojong to abdicate and place Daewongun in charge of Korean affairs,108 but when Weber denied 
the existence of the pact, Li ordered Yuan not to pursue the matter further.109 
After Möllendorff was summoned back to Tianjin for his role in the aborted Russo-Korean 
secret agreement, Li recommended that Owen N. Denny (1838-1900) fill his shoes. Denny studied 
law at Willamette University and later served as a judge in Wasco and Portland from 1862 to 1874. 
His diplomatic career actually began in 1874 when he was appointed U.S. consul in Tianjin. There, 
he built up a rapport with Li, and this helped him secure his position as Korea’s foreign adviser 
from May 1886 to February 1890, where he, contrary to Li’s wishes, became famous for his anti-
China crusade.110 
During Denny’s tenure, Korea was exposed to an unprecedented level of Chinese interference 
in its affairs, interference which went beyond the traditional suzerain-vassal relationship. Above all, 
that China considered Korea as a sacrificial lamb to further its journey toward becoming a late 
imperial power shows at a glance what set the tone for any relations between them. For this reason, 
it was imperative for Gojong and like-minded Korean officials to fully mobilise national strengths 
to deter China, which could not but affect Denny’s activities within Korea.111       
Before arriving in Korea, he was instructed to report to Li on his work and the situation there 
and to receive assistance and specific work guidelines from China. Under the guise of 
reinvigorating its relationship with Korea, the Chinese government sought to maintain its traditional 
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tributary system by utilising Denny’s diplomatic expertise.112 Though content with Denny’s legal 
and diplomatic experiences, Gojong was unhappy that Li appointed Denny without properly 
consulting him, prompting Gojong to express his displeasure.113 He also worried that Denny might 
use his rich knowledge of Western law to link Korea with China under terms of international law.114 
Thus, Gojong sought to restrain Denny’s rights and monitor his activities after assigning him to the 
Naemubu 內務府 (Interior Ministry), which was founded in 1885, and implemented external 
policies directly.115 The efforts of Gojong and anti-China forces within the Korean government, 
however, failed when Li, concerned that such restrictions on Denny might reduce the Chinese 
influence in Korea, intervened.116 Unrelenting on the matter, Gojong and anti-China forces 
contemplated a strategy to drive a wedge between Denny and Yuan Shikai and turn the former pro-
Korea, and if this did not materialise, to fire Denny and ask the U.S. government to send another 
adviser to safeguard Korean autonomy.117   
While this idea was put to the test, Denny was feeling the heat from China, and the British 
occupation of Geomundo threatened to escalate the existing Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia. With its 
sore lack of military, economic, and diplomatic strengths, the Korean government could not resolve 
the Geomundo issue on its own. While it could have appealed to treaty powers to exercise their 
good offices to intervene on its behalf, Britain tied Korea’s hands by negotiating with China. It was 
in this context that Denny was tasked by Gojong to resolve the Geomundo problem.118 
After discovering what he considered to be secret documents belonging to Weber, Denny 
warned Li that Russia could use Geomundo as an excuse to occupy Yeonghung port119 and called 
for a rapid response from China. To facilitate the withdrawal of British forces from Geomundo, 
Denny urged China to inform Britain that it would guarantee the territorial integrity of Korea from 
intrusion by any country. Only decisive Chinese action in the Geomundo crisis could keep Korea 
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under China’s shadow and bolster its position in Korea, he added.120 Denny's diplomatic 
manoeuvring in concert with Li had just begun. 
Setting the furore over the second Russo-Korean pact aside, China soon had to sit down at the 
negotiating table with Russia after Li received Chinese official Wu Changqing’s telegram 
(27.8.1886) stating that Russia would not occupy Geomundo in the event of British withdrawal.121 
Meanwhile, acting under Gojong’s instructions, Denny met with Li in Tianjin to resolve the 
Geomundo issue as Korea's principal (3.9.1886). Then, Li met with Russian Chargé d’affaires to 
China Ladyzhensky for a more in-depth discussion on Geomundo (25.9.1886).122 After a series of 
talks (29.9.1886 and 6.10.1886), Li was able to obtain Ladyzhensky’s agreement that Russia would 
not seek any Korean territory (7.10.1886).123 Finally, Li informed the Zongli yamen of his intention 
to send a document requesting British withdrawal from Geomundo now that Russia had promised 
not to seize Korean territory (27.10.1886).124   
Reflecting the fact that Britain had already expressed its desire to withdraw as long as the 
island did not fall into enemy hands, Denny now asserted that major powers should be ready to 
guarantee Korea’s territorial sovereignty. The three alternatives he put forward for effectuating 
British withdrawal were (14.11.1886): first, all countries that signed treaties with Korea should 
guarantee Korean territory; second, the three countries that had the most interest in Korea—Britain, 
China, and Russia—should support territorial integrity; and third, China and Russia needed to 
provide a guarantee of Korea’s territory.125 The first alternative was suitable for producing a 
demilitarised Korean neutralisation, the second was ideal for reducing the international tension 
surrounding Korea and preserving its territory, and the third would realistically fulfil Britain’s 
prerequisite for withdrawal from Geomundo.  
The first alternative, which resembled Möllendorff’s Belgian-style neutrality, could be 
realised without the creation of a strong military. But Li, determined to strengthen Chinese 
suzerainty over Korea, settled on the third alternative as a resolution to the occupation. That choice, 
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and the fact that Britain had decided Geomundo was unsuitable for a naval base and was already 
contemplating withdrawal,126 put an end to Denny’s neutralisation plan. 
To sum up, the above neutralisation proposals were suggested as counterstrategies to the 
British Geomundo occupation. Among them, two proposals stood out: While Kim Yunsik’s plan, 
though suggested somewhat ambiguously due to Chinese suzerainty over Korea, was the first 
Korea-originated proposal officially sponsored by its government, Yu Giljun’s theory-centred 
proposal was well-thought-out, carefully crafted to be compatible with the tributary system between 
China and Korea.  
   · A Neutralisation Trial as the British Exit Strategy From Geomundo (1886) 
As mentioned above, Britain justified its occupation of Geomundo to pre-empt Russia’s 
southern expansion, including Russia’s possible occupation of a Korean harbour like Port Lazareff 
(Heungnam). A memorandum by Sir Edward Hertslet, a Foreign Office librarian, drove home the 
point, mentioning that Russia had had its eye on Lazareff, which one British visitor had already 
described as “one of the finest harbours in the world”,127 as a basis of operations against China since 
the early-1880s. In fact, the British occupation had little do with alleged Russian designs on 
Lazareff; First Lord of Admiralty Earl of Northbrook thought Geomundo could serve as “a base for 
the blockade of the Russian forces in the Pacific, Port Hamilton [Geomundo] being advantageously 
situated for the command of the Corean channel”.128 The Royal Commission on the Defence of 
British Possessions also endorsed a British occupation of Geomundo, saying that this could 
reinforce the British position vis-à-vis Russia and protect British trade north of Hong Kong.129 The 
threat of a blockade in the Far East would keep Russia from advancing into Afghanistan. The idea, 
in the metaphor of Lord Curzon, was to “make the dog drop his bone by squeezing his throat”.130 
Faced with the British occupation of Geomundo, the Russian government protested the action 
through its legation in London in May 1885, declaring it would not look on idly and alerting the 
Chinese government that if the British decision went unchallenged, Russia would occupy other 
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Korean ports.131 With regard to this matter, Russian Minister in Beijing Papov’s secret telegram 
(21.9.1885) to the Russian Foreign Office defined China’s position; Li, who had never agreed to the 
British occupation of Geomundo, duly considered the protection of Korea, China’s vassal, the duty 
of China and believed fully that Britain would leave Geomundo as long as Russia guaranteed not to 
occupy it. However, another Russian report (5.11.1885) said that it was astonishing that China, as 
the biggest stakeholder on the peninsula, had not protested at that time, raising the possibility of a 
secret deal between China and Britain over the island.132 Therefore, the Russian government, though 
never putting such plans into action, seriously contemplated occupying Wonsan and Ulsan Bays to 
counter the British strategy.133 
Unlike Russia, Japan did not launch a formal protest to denounce the British action in 
Geomundo, but nevertheless felt insecure due to the potential ramifications of such a manoeuvre. 
Japanese Foreign Minister Inoue, for instance, told British Minister to Japan Plunkett that the 
occupation of Geomundo could tempt Russia to follow suit by seizing another Korean territory.134 
On the other hand, French Minister to Japan Sienkiewicz reported to his foreign minister that Inoue 
had come to think that the British move was “an excellent means of keeping Russia in check and of 
protecting Korea”. O’Conor also touched on Itō Hirobumi’s comment about Britain’s occupation of 
Geomundo.135 Yet, on balance, Japan still remained concerned about the British action and Plunkett 
surmised that Japan’s mere acknowledgement of the British occupation of Geomundo could be 
misconstrued by Russia as Japanese approval.136 Russian Minister to Japan Davydov reported on an 
anxious Inoue, who thought that Japan would eventually suffer from the British action;137 the latter 
even feared that Russia or another power might seize the Goto Islands.138 
In his dispatch to Granville, Plunkett had questioned whether Japan really opposed the British 
presence in Geomundo and actually thought China was to blame for it.139 Unbeknownst to him, 
Inoue did try to bolster China’s opposition to the British move. Masataka was instructed by Inoue to 
impress upon a Chinese minister, who consoled himself that occupation of Geomundo was 
temporary, that “temporary” could mean ninety-nine years.140 At this point, Sienkiewicz learned 
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from Davydov that Britain had indeed tried to draw Japan into an understanding with it regarding 
Korea, but had received an unfavourable reply. Although the latter predicted that Japan would 
remain strictly neutral in the event of war between Britain and Russia over Afghanistan, the former 
still questioned how absolute Japan’s neutrality would be; it had indirectly contributed to Britain’s 
occupation of Geomundo by allowing hundreds of Japanese workers to build the fortifications of 
the port on the island and would favour Britain in case of an Anglo-Russian war.141 
Perhaps encouraged by the lack of formal protest from China and Japan, British Prime 
Minister Salisbury might have felt confident in expressing his views as to the retention of 
Geomundo and its importance to Britain.142 Yet China now began to shift its stance towards the 
issue in consideration of the possible occupation of other Korean islands by countries such as Japan 
and Russia.143 China further complained that the British occupation of Geomundo brought about 
rapprochement between Korea and Russia and indicated that only if Britain could guarantee the 
integrity of Korea would the Chinese government recognise the former’s possession of 
Geomundo.144 
Japan and Russia also went the way of China. Through its envoy Admiral Enomoto, the 
Japanese government tried to entice Li into jointly opposing the British occupation of Geomundo.145 
In Russia, the Novoe Vremya cried foul about the British presence on Geomudo, believing that it 
challenged Russian interests in the Pacific. The newspaper even claimed that the Russian 
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Majesty’s Government, Part I, 1885: FO 405/35, No.217, Confidential, O’Conor to Granville, 1885.5.9, 31.   
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annexation of Quelpart (Jeju) Island would be “the simplest and most natural answer to the 
occupation of Port Hamilton by England”.146 Coupled with the Seoul-based Russian agent’s 
purported threat to settle account with the Korean government once it agreed to the British 
occupation of Geomundo,147 this article showed just how serious the British action was viewed in St. 
Petersburg. 
Meanwhile, China’s anxiety over the continued British presence in Geomundo grew. Though 
Yuan apparently thought there was no need to press for an immediate settlement,148 Chinese 
ministers in the Zongli yamen informed O’Conor that Russia would take another Korean island if 
Britain held onto Geomundo.149 “Harassed and worried” by a possible Russian occupation of a 
Korean port, Li also pressed for British withdrawal from Geomundo in return for Russia assurance 
that it would not seize the island.150 Popov urged the Chinese government several times to obtain a 
British withdrawal from Geomundo, prompting China to ask Britain whether the latter’s occupation 
of Geomundo was really a temporary measure.151 
Coincidentally, the newly inaugurated Liberal government in London proved to be more 
pragmatic than its Conservative predecessor. Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone stated that 
based on the sound basis of law and economy, British foreign policy had to be pursued on the 
condition of peace. He also added that within the structure of European cooperation, unnecessary 
intervention had to be avoided and that the equality of all races had to be recognised.152 
Against this backdrop, influential British statesman the Earl of Rosebery (1847-1929)153 
initiated a diplomatic offensive to prepare for Britain’s withdrawal from Geomundo, putting 
                                                 
146 Ibid., Sir E. Thornton to Salisbury, No.161, 1885.8.21, 112. 
147 Ibid., O’Conor to Salisbury, No.187, 1885.7.22, 132. 
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153 A Liberal imperialist, Archibald Philip Primerose, fifth earl of Rosebery, was named as Secretary of State for 
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forward a formal proposal (14.4.1886) for Korean neutralisation after Salisbury responded to Li’s 
query on Geomundo that the British navy would withdraw, provided that China could guarantee it 
would not be occupied by other countries154:  
Her Majesty’s Government have no desire to prolong the occupation of Port Hamilton in 
opposition to the wishes of the Chinese Government…If the Chinese Government are 
prepared to guarantee that no such occupation shall take place, one of the chief objects 
which Her Majesty’s Government had in view in taking possession of Port Hamilton 
would be accomplished. Should the Chinese Government be unwilling to undertake such 
a responsibility, Her Majesty’s Government would suggest that China should propose to 
Russia and to the other Powers interested to enter into an international arrangement 
guaranteeing the integrity of Corea. If this proposal is accepted, Her Majesty’s 
Government would be ready to become parties to the arrangement, and to retire at once 
from Port Hamilton on the understanding that it should be recognized as forming part of 
the guaranteed territory of Corea.155 
 
Rosebery’s intervention could not have been better timed; just a day after he called for an 
international guarantee of Korea, an official at the Russian Naval Ministry advised Giers that the 
government should file a protest with Britain requesting it close a military base in such close 
proximity to Russia’s Pacific fleet. Russian Governor-General in the Amur region A. N. Korf also 
commented (18.4.1886) that if Geomundo was annexed by Britain, Russia would be completely 
isolated militarily in the East Sea.156 Undoubtedly, the British presence in Geomundo was 
provoking a strong Russian reaction, and to placate the latter’s concern about its intentions in 
Korea, Britain had to concoct a scheme to secure Korea’s territorial integrity.         
Rosebery again asked O’Conor about the Chinese government’s thoughts on obtaining an 
international guarantee for Korea including Geomundo,157 revealing his sincere desire to realise his 
proposal. Coincidentally, similar thoughts were being expressed both inside and outside Britain; as 
British Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs James Bryce remarked, for Britain, the invasion 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and possessed “many deficiencies of temper and manner”, he commanded an absolute authority at the Foreign Office. 
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Gyeonghuidae nonmunjip 4 (April 1965): 302.  
155 Further Correspondence Respecting the Temporary Occupation of Port Hamilton By Her Majesty’s Government 
Part II, 1886: FO 405/36, Inclosure in No.23, Sir P. Currie to Sir H. MacCartney, 1886.4.14, 15-16. 
156 Pak Jonghyo, ed., 213. 
157 Further Correspondence Respecting the Temporary Occupation of Port Hamilton By Her Majesty’s Government 
Part II, 1886: FO 405/36, No.113, Rosebery to O’Conor, 1886.4.30, 17.  
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or occupation of Korea by any country would be equivalent to the conquest of Belgium by an 
external power.158 Moreover, The Times article touching on Li’s plan for a tripartite joint protection 
of Korea by Japan, Britain, and China159 might have attracted Rosebery’s interest. 
Rosebery’s proposal fit hand in glove with the British government’s formal Far Eastern policy. 
In addition to allowing Britain to pursue its strategy of maintaining the balance of power by 
countering Russia’s southward expansion in this region, this plan gave cause for Britain to justify its 
navy’s activities in Geomundo.160 Unfortunately for Rosebery, China did not reply to his proposal, 
showing its indifference towards a Korean neutralisation that could threaten its suzerainty.161 As 
mentioned above, China also might have felt little need to accept Rosebery’s proposal since Li was 
trying to obtain Ladyzhensky’s pledge that Russia would not seek any part of Korean territory.   
As China and Russia reached a consensus over Geomundo, Britain’s Admiralty was now 
calling for withdrawal from the island, claiming that due to its weakness in the Siberian region, 
Russia would not have the capacity to occupy a Korean port for several decades.162 About a month 
later, British Minister to China Sir John Walsham received a document from the Zongli yamen 
asking for Britain’s swift withdrawal from Geomundo.163 He then advised Foreign Secretary Earl of 
Iddesleigh that 5 November 1886 would be a suitable date for Britain to pull out from 
Geomundo,164 upon which Iddesleigh instructed Walsham to inform the Zongli yamen that Britain 
would withdraw from Geomundo.165 Finally, Britain vacated Geomundo (27.2.1887), ending a 
nearly two-year long British presence there.166 Accordingly, Rosebery’s proposal petered out. 
Its failure notwithstanding, Rosebery’s proposal was a golden opportunity to realise Korean 
neutralisation because, backed by a hegemon, it deserves being considered the most realistic 
proposal proffered if only Britain had followed through with it prior to the decision to withdraw 
from Geomundo. Within the context of the intense Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia, Britain was 
anxious to counter Russian expansion into the Far East, knowing that the Russians were 
preoccupied with gaining access to an ice-free port. The advice from the Admiralty to Rosebery 
gave him another reason to seek an exit strategy for Britain.167 His plan should have appealed to 
                                                 
158 Itō, ed., “Hisho ruisan-Chōsen kōshō shiryō tsū”, 176. 
159 See the The Times’ article (1886.6.27); Itō, ed., “Hisho ruisan-Chōsen kōshō shiryō jō”, 688. 
160 Seo Jungseok, 302. 
161 During the 1880s, Li Hongzhang was determined to maintain and enhance Chinese suzerainty over Korea, while 
promoting multilateral imperialism there. Larsen, 176. 
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Russia, which suspected that the British occupation was a means to frustrate the country’s Pacific 
interests, as evidenced by the Novoe Vremya’s article and warnings from Russian diplomats in 
Seoul and Beijing. Considering that the Russian government maintained its “wait and see” policy in 
Korea, it might have favoured Rosebery’s proposal.  
As for Japan, it tacitly admitted the British proposal was an excellent means to contain Russia 
and protect Korea, as seen in Inoue’s thoughts. Thus, had it been tactically implemented, this 
proposal could have shielded Japan from perceived Russian threats.168 That Enomoto also suggested 
Korean neutralisation to China to prevent Russian occupation of a Korean territory further increased 
Japan’s support for the British-initiated plan. Judging from the Chinese government’s concern about 
a Russian countermove to the British seizure of Geomundo, the growing rapprochement between 
Korea and Russia, Li Hongzhang’s attempt to jointly protect Korea, and that within China Kang 
Youwei was suggesting that Korea be neutralised, China, if Rosebery had pursued his proposal 
more vigorously, would have embraced Korean neutralisation.169 Furthermore, if major powers 
would accept Chinese suzerainty over Korea by mutual agreement, similar to the one between 
Bulgaria and Turkey (as Yu Giljun argued), China might have supported Rosebery’s proposal more 
positively.     
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Korea had no reason to reject Rosebery’s idea, considering that Kim Yunsik’s neutralisation 
gambit testified to Korea’s doubts about the effectiveness of the Sino-centric tributary system in 
safeguarding its territorial integrity. Kim’s repeated protests to British diplomats to obtain their 
country’s withdrawal from Geomundo170 also showed, that in a bid to resolve the issue quickly, the 
Korean government would have welcomed Rosebery’s plan. In a way, Yu Giljun’s neutralisation 
assertion to counter Russia might also have helped to win agreement with Rosebery’s proposal.  
As it turned out, this proposal would have profound ramifications for Korea. Specifically, the 
proposal was suggested as a British exit strategy from the Geomundo Incident and thus closely 
presaged the changes in the Far East after the British withdrawal. As for China, now that the chance 
to achieve neutralisation with the blessing of the pre-eminent major power had perished in Korea, it 
was able to bolster its suzerainty there. Having dispatched Yuan as a resident to Korea, Li directed 
the transformation of the Sino-centric tributary system, which increased Chinese interference in 
Korea to an unprecedented level.171 Britain acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over Korea as a 
means to deter Russia’s southern expansion. 
Stung by the sudden British action in Geomundo, Russia’s drive to expand its influence over 
Korea stalled for nearly a decade, just as the Crimean War (1853-1856) checked the Russian 
expansion into the Mediterranean for almost twenty years.172 Within this context, a special 
committee convened by Grand Duke Mikhailovoch during 1886-1887 concluded that seizing a 
Korean port would weaken Russian defences in the Far East.173 Thus, Russia chose to continue its 
“wait and see” policy in Korea, as Giers’ letter to Shestakov made clear.174 Another Russian report 
(8.5.1888) by General Baron Korf, Russian Governor-General of the Priamur region, and Ivan. A. 
Zinovief, director of Asia in the Russian Foreign Ministry, detailed a similar Korean policy: 
Russia’s non-occupation of Korea to preserve current peaceful relations with China, Britain, and 
Japan, Russia’s worry about China’s new Korean policy of trying to transform Korea to Chinese 
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province, and Russia’s appropriate action against China’s possible occupation of Korea.175 Russia’s 
policy to make light of Korea, however, would change in 1891 after it decided to construct the TSR, 
which meant that Russia emphasised its army rather than its navy in its Northeast Asian policy. 
Forced to take a cautious stance after the British occupation of Geomundo and concerned 
about Russian intentions in Korea, Japan, while increasing its military build-up, remained a wary 
spectator until Britain withdrew from the island. Once Britain pulled out, however, Japanese 
renewed its engagement in Korea and moved to strengthen its military through the conscription 
system adopted in 1889. In December 1890, Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo included the 
Korean peninsula as a part of Japan’s essential “line of advantage” for its security.176 
After Britain’s withdrawal from Geomundo, the dynamics of the geopolitical situation 
surrounding the Korean peninsula basically ended the Anglo-Russian rivalry. However, Japan’s 
reinvigorated interest in Korea was bound to collide with China’s desire to retain its suzerainty 
there, restarting in the Sino-Japanese rivalry, one that ended in the Sino-Japanese War. After this 
war, victorious Japan’s increased intervention in Korea’s domestic affairs forced the Korean 
government to reach out to Russia, initiating the Russo-Japanese rivalry, which culminated in the 
Russo-Japanese War. While many neutralisation proposals would follow, none of them could touch 
Rosebery’s proposal when it came to the possibility of success. Consequently, the breakdown of 
balance of power during and after the two wars paved the way for Korea to become Japan’s 
protectorate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
176 Duus, 64. 
 
 112 
Chapter V. Neutralisation Attempts from the Post-Geomundo Incident to the Pre-Korean 
Empire Era (1887-1897) 
While the British withdrawal from Geomundo mainly ended the Anglo-Russian rivalry on the 
Korean peninsula, the renascent Sino-Japanese rivalry led the two countries into war, thereby 
drawing Korea into Japan’s embrace and commencing the Russo-Japanese rivalry. This chapter 
illustrates how the Korean or Far Eastern policies of China, Britain, Russia, and Japan respectively 
prompted attempts to neutralise Korea to protect its independence and to further their individual 
aims before and after the Sino-Japanese War.   
· Neutralisation Proposals Before and During the Sino-Japanese War (1889-1894) 
The withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese troops from Korea according to the Tianjin 
Convention, the suspension of the Sino-Japanese rivalry due to Britain’s Geomundo occupation, 
Yuan’s arrival in Korea to take control of its domestic affairs, and China’s leadership role in the 
resolution of the Geomundo Incident resulted in strengthening Chinese suzerainty over Korea. Thus, 
although it seemed like peace had been restored on the Korean peninsula, Chinese interference in 
Korea’s internal affairs reached its zenith. Moreover, this situation became entrenched due to the 
different interests major powers had in exploiting the dynamics surrounding Korea. 
Russia established its Korean policy via a conference between Korf and Zinovief (26.4.1886); 
it decided not to annex Korea, leaving it in Chinese hands, due to Korea’s geographically and 
commercially marginal status and Russia’s financial inability to develop Korean resources and 
support the stationing of 15,000 Russian troops in the Maritime Province to protect the Korean 
coastline.1 Besides, to facilitate the British withdrawal from Geomundo, Russia promised in the Li-
Ladyzhensky oral agreement in October 1886 not to occupy any part of Korea nor attempt to 
change its political status, in effect accepting Chinese suzerainty there. Russia was, in reality, 
buying time until it could complete the TSR2 and use it as military transport to employ its army in 
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Japan and Korea in the 19th century (New York: Macmillan Company, 1922), 482-483. 
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place of its toothless navy; blocked by the British Geomundo occupation and the Japanese blockade 
of the Tsushima Strait, Russia was denied access to the Pacific Ocean. Chinese influence trumped 
Russian in Korea since, despite Gojong’s pro-Russia sentiments, the pro-China faction strongly 
dominated Korean institutions until the Sino-Japanese War.  
Though the Tianjin Convention enabled Japan to restore its position in Korea, its inferior 
position vis-à-vis China forced it to refrain from directly challenging China on the Korean peninsula 
until the Sino-Japanese War. Moreover, pro-China Korean officials had coerced their government 
into depending on China financially by working for Chinese interests on behalf of Yuan.3 Unhappy 
with this development, Japan thus shifted its role of checking China onto Russia and agreed with 
efforts for Korean independence spearheaded by U.S. diplomats (i.e. Foulk and Denny) in Korea. In 
addition, Japan competed with other major powers over Korean concessions, revised its unequal 
treaties with Western powers, and strengthened its armed forces.4  
Ever since the 1882 Treaty with the U.S., Gojong and his adherents viewed the good offices 
clause not only as a legal commitment but also as a moral one to defend Korean independence. But 
the U.S. maintained strict neutrality in Korean affairs due to its limited commercial interests there 
and the sheer distance between it and Korea, leaving it a non-factor in checking Chinese suzerainty 
over Korea. Britain accepted Chinese suzerainty over Korea since Korean independence could 
transform the country into a Russian dependency. Its acquiescence also discouraged any Chinese 
intervention in British-run Burma.5   
The major powers’ decision to yield to China severely undermined Korea’s sovereignty. In 
particular, Chinese Resident Yuan Shikai6 took a greater role in directing Korea’s internal affairs. 
For example, in foreign policy matters, he used the Overland Trade Convention between Korea and 
Russia (20.8.1888), which stemmed from Russia’s desire for an alternate trade route in the Far East, 
as a pretext to question whether Korea and Russia might conclude a secret pact in which Russia 
promised to protect Korea in return for some form of concession and then asked Gojong to fire 
Denny and Min Yeongik (3.11.1888). After 1885, Yuan attempted to take control of Korea’s 
foreign trade to increase China’s commercial influence there.7 
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To keep Korea under its thumb without having to assume direct responsibility for 
guaranteeing its security, China welcomed potential rivals onto the peninsula as junior partners, a 
move that might stave off Korea’s annexation by a third power since “in the 1880’s, the world stood 
on the brink of a wave of ‘beat-them-to-it’ acquisitions of territory”.8 This strategy led to Britain 
appointing a consul-general who was subordinate to the British minister in Beijing, giving the 
impression that it supported Chinese suzerainty over Korea. Similarly, France (commissaire) and 
Germany (consul) sent non-minister-level representatives to Seoul, though they reported directly to 
Paris and Berlin. Japan and the U.S., in contrast, were represented by ministers. The Japanese 
government, though, also dispatched a charge d’affaires and ambassador plenipotentiary as suited 
the situation, and had a minister resident serving in Seoul.9  
If the major powers would not come to Korea, Korea would go to them, or so Denny and 
Foulk advised. As U.S. Secretary of State Thomas Francis Bayard put it, “The reciprocal sending 
and receiving of diplomatic and consular officers is provided for in the treaty between the United 
States and Corea. No act of national sovereignty is more express and decided than this.”10 Gojong 
thus, informed by Denny and Foulk that stationing Korean ministers in the West would create a 
balance of power in Korea,11 authorised the dispatch of Pak Jeongyang12 as Korean minister to 
establish a Korean legation in the U.S (18.8.1887). But before this diplomatic link could be 
established, Gojong unfortunately encountered stiff resistance from Yuan.13 Even after Pak arrived 
in Washington, the Chinese government told him to abide by the three protocols,14 as if to prove 
that Korea was a Chinese vassal.   
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 115 
Irrespective of China’s continued interference, some Westerners still paid close attention to 
Korean affairs. French Commissaire Collin de Plancy epitomised this, frequently reporting on 
Korean foreign policy matters related to Korean sovereignty, including a Korean neutralisation 
proposal from the Chinese Times. De Plancy reported his meeting with Min Yeonghwan to French 
Foreign Minister Eugène Spuller (23.2.1889). Quoting an article about the imminent landing of 
Chinese troops in Korea from the Shanghai newspaper Shēn bào to update De Plancy and inquiring 
of him about its possible repercussions, Min wondered whether France would intervene to protect 
Korea. De Plancy implied that France would try to find peaceful means to assist Korea in 
coordination with other major powers.   
Stressing that Korea looked to French support for its security due to never having concluded 
its secret treaty with Russia, Min asked De Plancy to provide European examples of major powers 
guaranteeing a weak country’s security. De Plancy listed Belgium and Switzerland as examples of a 
weak country’s neutrality being buttressed by consent among several major powers, but did not 
think their success was transferable to Korea as no major powers had any substantial interest in the 
Korean border issue nor could easily intervene in the Sino-Korean issue due to its special 
situation.15 
Despite downplaying the possibility of Korean neutralisation, De Plancy did not abandon his 
interest in it, as his report (3.4.1889) to Spuller about the Chinese Times article (6.3.1889) on 
Korean politics and commerce attested to. Although a nervous Gojong had been counting on major 
powers’ support to protect Korea’s fragile sovereignty, this was not well received by the Chinese 
Times, which lampooned his clumsy efforts to reach out to foreign powers like Russia, thus 
weakening the credibility of Korea’s foreign policy.16 The article also condemned Seoul as a place 
full of plots, corruption, despotism, and mean savagery.17 It then went on to enumerate Korea’s 
many problems, including accumulated foreign debt, no reliable currency, a wasteful and inefficient 
government, an incompetent political class, and a fragile economy.18 The Russian intellectual Garin 
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Mikhailovskii’s verdict was equally harsh: “They call the Koreans cowards…the Koreans are 
incapable of fighting…like swans, they can only sing their songs and tales.”19  
With so little going for it, Korea, according to an article in the Chinese Times, should place 
itself under the influence of Russia, China, Japan, and Britain, and become a neutral territory. This 
proposal by the Chinese Times thus reflected Korea’s tendency to depend on major powers, which 
perceived Korea negatively. These major powers, possessing colonies or commercial and political 
interests in the Far East, should acknowledge the strategic importance of Korea and appreciate the 
necessity to preserve peace and the territorial integrity of Korea.20  
Distinct from previously mentioned Western neutralisation proposals, this proposal did not 
represent any specific country’s viewpoint. Notwithstanding this fact, the newspaper’s rationale for 
Korean neutrality—peace and the territorial integrity of Korea—was similar to other Western 
neutralisation proposals. One snag was that although De Plancy included this article as part of his 
report to Spuller, De Plancy himself refused to endorse Korean neutrality. He might have reckoned 
that Korea did not have sufficient capacity to withstand challenges to its neutrality due to strong 
Chinese influence over Korea, not to mention Korea’s weak economy; contemporary British trade 
reports described how Korea was saddled with wasteful government spending, a high level of 
government debt,21 a lack of enterprising spirit, irregular taxation, and uncompetitive domestic 
industries.22                  
Though not representing the British government in an official capacity, Chesney Duncan, a 
former employee at Korean customs and a member of the China branch of the Royal Asiatic 
Society, shared the views expressed by well-known British officials such as Archibald Rose 
Colquhoun, commissioner in Upper Burma. In his lecture delivered at the Royal United Service 
Institution (12.1885), Colquhoun remarked:  
                                                 
19 German Kim and Ross King, “The Northern Regions of Korea as Portrayed in Russian Sources, 1860-1913”, in The 
Northern Regions of Korea: History, Identity, and Culture, ed., Sun Joo Kim (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2010), 287. 
20 Peurangseu oemubu munseo 3, Joseon (2) 1889, 79-80. 
21 Danguk daehakgyo dongyanghak yeonguso, ed., Gaehwagi daeoe mingan munhwa gyoryu chongseo VII: Gaehwagi 
Hanguk gwallyeon Gumi muyeok bogoseo jaryojip [External Exchange Series VII of Civilian Culture in the Time of 
Enlightenment: Korea-related Western Trade Report Sourcebook in the Time of Enlightenment] (Seoul: JNC, 2006), 
81-82. 
22 Ibid., 94-95. 
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The question of supremacy in Asia must be shortly decided in favour of one or another of 
the Powers, Russia, or Britain…The factors which could always be reckoned on with 
certainty was the irresistible, but not unnatural, ambition of Russia.23 
 
Duncan wholeheartedly endorsed the observation that Russia was the chief rival of Britain in 
the Far East. While the Russian newspaper Novosti’s article (25.11.1888) covered Korean attempts 
to seek Russia’s protection in 1884 and 1885 and considered how Russia would enjoy no special 
advantage by taking such a step,24 he dismissed this view. To Duncan, “Corea has been, and still is, 
the chief aim of Russian ambition in the Far East region of Asia.”25  
For this reason, he indicated that Britain had to remain vigilant for Russian encroachment in 
the Far East. Although Russia could not endanger British commerce in European waters, it desired a 
seaboard and ports from which to cripple the commerce of Britain, Germany, China, and Japan in 
eastern seas. To resist further Russian expansion and protect peace in the Far East, Duncan insisted 
on Britain, China, and Japan maintaining a cordial understanding with a common policy protecting 
their interests since these three countries had a sharp awareness of Russian ambitions and policy 
through their past dealings with it. Accordingly, the three countries, holding Korea’s strategic 
location, harbours, waterways, and coal beds in high regard, would welcome Korea becoming a 
neutral zone in order to maintain peace in the Far East irrespective of the Eastern Triple Alliance. 
Currently, Duncan thought the Russo-Korean Overland Trade Convention covering Gyeongheung 
County, which lay 30 miles northeast of the Korean frontier (i.e. the Tumen River), engendered 
Russia’s virtual dominance in Korea. This convention clearly encroached upon a country within the 
British sphere of influence and was also a “distinct thrust at Chinese prestige in the capital of this 
peninsula”, as well as a matter of concern for other major powers opposed to Russian predominance 
in the North Pacific.26 Based on these observations, in his essay “Commercial and Political 
Conditions of Corea”, which the Chinese Times published (16.3.1889), Duncan insisted: 
That a policy of strict neutrality should be forced upon Corea, and Russia should be 
called upon to relinquish all privileges granted under the Overland Trade Convention 
                                                 
23 Chesney Duncan, Corea and the Powers: A Review of the Far Eastern Question (Seoul: Gyeongin munhwasa, 2001), 
220. 
24 Ibid., 224. 
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(1888), i.e., Russia should be invited to respect a publicly declared policy of strict 
neutrality.27 
 
Furthermore, criticising the common perception that Korea had to rely on the goodwill of 
major powers to survive, Duncan asserted that Korea itself could never expect to achieve real peace 
or prosperity without strict neutrality. As long as such a peace was guaranteed, Korea would be able 
to utilise it to discover and enjoy the full fruits of civilisation by withering away conservatism, 
corruption, and injustice. The Korean people could then greet a new and honourable dawn in their 
long history.28 
Unlike the Chinese Times’ proposal, Duncan’s plan for the strict neutrality of Korea was not 
devised with Korea’s good in mind. Under the atmosphere of the Anglo-Russian rivalry, to maintain 
the balance of power and stability in the Far East and to prevent Russia from challenging Britain’s 
position as the dominant power in the region, he sought a permanent mechanism for British 
interests. To his credit, Duncan’s advice that Korea could no longer depend on major powers’ 
protection was sound since it was evident that no neighbouring power was willing to sacrifice its 
Far Eastern strategy to guarantee Korean independence. 
However, considering Chinese steadfastness to preserve suzerainty over Korea, it was 
difficult for Korea to unilaterally adopt neutralisation. In fact, Duncan himself recognised this by 
touching on the alleged memorial from Li Hongzhang to Gojong in May 1884, addressing potential 
advantages and disadvantages that may arise from commercial transactions on the border area 
between Korea and Russia.29 The North China Herald commented that the memorial showed “how 
thoroughly Li Hongzhang was determined to keep up China’s control over Corea”,30 an opinion 
which Duncan also seemed to have shared, saying “I cannot omit this document, for it has an 
important bearing upon the question at issue.”31  
                                                 
27 Ibid., 228. 
28 Gang Jongil, 213. 
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30 Ibid., 231-232.  
31 Ibid., 228. 
 119 
Ultimately, his proposal fell far short of the mark because he did not mention Korea’s 
vulnerable economy and feeble military strength,32 let alone Britain’s recognition of Chinese 
suzerainty over Korea, which could undercut Korean neutralisation. Ironically, despite his strong 
reservation about the adverse impact of a closer attachment between Korea and Russia, Duncan 
held a rather benign view of Chinese influence over Korea, even if this could potentially jeopardise 
the country’s already fragile autonomy: 
Providing Corea is allowed to follow, henceforth, a policy of strict Neutrality, its integrity 
may be preserved. Without neutrality it will soon fall into the hands of one of the Great 
Powers—possibly Russia. Of all the Powers, however, doubtless China has the best right 
to convert it into a province of her Empire. This is a destiny which would certainly be 
more acceptable to the world than the absorption of the peninsula by Russia.33 
 
Meanwhile, although China’s strong suzerainty over Korea, in a way, might have helped East 
Asia remain peaceful, Japan and China had been building up their military forces, which heralded 
the Sino-Japanese War. A stronger than ever Chinese power in Korea forced Japan to apparently 
give up its interference in Korea’s domestic affairs, but Japanese both in and out of government had 
been pointing out the necessity of intervention in Korea from Datsuaron (1885) onward, which 
became an indirect cause of the Sino-Japanese War. The direct cause of the war was the ascension 
of Yamagata Aritomo (1.1888), a powerful backer of the military in Meiji Japan, whose first cabinet 
(12.24.1889-6.5.1891) went on increasing Japanese military might, moving Japan to throw off its 
apathy toward Korea and take a firm stance against Russia. A more powerful Japan was now ready 
for war and challenged Chinese suzerainty over the Korean rice ban issue in order to provoke one.34  
While Korean neutralisation became a bone of contention in certain Western circles, it was in 
Japan that Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922) revived interest on this issue in an official capacity. Like 
Inoue Kaoru and later Itō Hirobumi, the two other high-ranking Japanese advocates of Korean 
neutralisation, Yamagata was often referred to as genrō, though unlike them, his contributions lied 
                                                 
32 Despite the post-Gapsin Coup reforms, Korean officials such as Yi Donhwa disapproved of the new military 
command system instituted by the Korean government (Gyujanggak, ed., Seungjeongwon ilgi 承政院日記 [The Diaries 
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primarily in the military arena. Deeply impressed by Prussia’s success in Europe, Yamagata was in 
favour of adopting a Prussian strategy, advocating military expansion domestically and maintaining 
a hard-line policy abroad. Appointed war minister, he laid the foundation of the fledgling Japanese 
army, instituted Japan’s national defence strategy against perceived threats from Russia and went on 
to become the fourth Prime Minister in 1889.35 Ironically, to put the brakes on external challenges 
to Japanese interests in Korea, his hard-line foreign policy entailed the neutralisation of Korea. 
Yamagata's neutralisation plan coincided with the Russian construction of the TSR as well. 
As early as January 1888, asserting that British and Russian interests differed and that the elements 
for conflict and discord between them were many, he predicted that the time for confrontation 
would approach as cross-continental transportation became a reality. Construction of the Canadian 
Pacific Railway would shorten the powerful British navy’s Eastern sea route, and the Siberian 
railway would quicken Russian military movement into the East. As a result, Britain and Russia 
were bound to clash in Asia, and in the next few years a “great upheaval” would occur in East Asia. 
Korea would then not only be the scene of an Anglo-Russian collision but an “element of conflict” 
between China and Japan as well. Japan’s strategy should transform Korea into an “autonomous 
and independent” country, completely separate from China, and ensure that no major European 
power would seize Korea in the scramble for control of East Asia. For this, an increase in military 
expenditure was the utmost priority for Japan.36 
Yamagata further mentioned that although Japan acknowledged Korean independence based 
on the conditions of the Treaty of Gangwha and had concluded the Tianjin Convention with China, 
Korea’s independence was in jeopardy due to the construction of the TSR. The more China was 
ready to oppose this development, the less he expected that China would maintain the Tianjin 
Convention. In these circumstances, Yamagata’s concern was whether Japan’s long-term strategy 
should be to merely maintain the Tianjin Convention or to take the further step of helping Korea 
gain permanent neutrality status under joint protection in the international system.37  
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Fearful of the detrimental impact of the TSR, Yamagata tried his luck at testing neutralisation 
as a temporary measure, taking into account Inoue Kowashi and Boissonade’s proposals.38 
Yamagata, having already received Inoue Kowashi’s Chōsen seiryak, which outlined a Belgian- and 
Swiss-style neutrality proposal, was advised by Inoue to approach China to neutralise Korea based 
on international law. Against the background of the exigent Sino-French relations surrounding 
Vietnam and the restoration of the Ryukyu king between May and July 1883, he incorporated 
Boissonade’s neutralisation ideas in his Gaikō seiryakron 外交政略論 (A Diplomatic Strategy).39 
Yamagata insisted in Gaikō seiryakron that since it was impossible for Japan to stop Korea 
from becoming a Chinese vassal, Japan should acknowledge the substantial influence that China 
had obtained in Korea. He wrote that Japan should accept the consolidation of Chinese domination 
over Korea as fact, using the idiosyncratic thought that Japan was ready to forsake its control over 
Korea. In return, he sought permanent neutrality of Korea under the joint protection of China and 
Japan.40 To neutralise Korea, he argued that irrespective of the request of a candidate country to be 
neutralised, stakeholder countries should bring up neutralisation, adopting Boissonade’s 
methodology, and also mentioned the duties of signatory countries involved in neutralisation.41  
Yamagata’s plan for Korean permanent neutrality seemed similar to those of Switzerland, 
Belgium, Serbia, and Luxembourg (as did Boissonade’s). This type of neutrality meant that if a 
country requested neutrality, another country would promise not to invade the neutral country to 
deter the occupation of the neutral country by a third country. This would benefit a neighbouring 
country, irrespective of the third power’s opposition. He argued that Korea’s neutrality was not only 
relevant to China but indirectly related to British and German interests, and that Britain especially 
considered Korea an “area of conflict” for the “cordon of interest” in East Asia. Yamagata had been 
exposed to the “cordon of sovereignty” and “cordon of interest” concepts in his meeting with 
German intellectual Lorenz von Stein at Vienna in 1888. Since Yamagata regarded Korea as 
Japan’s “cordon of interest” and thought that it would be dangerous for Japan if its neighbour was 
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occupied by another power, Korea had to be neutralised.42 This also coincided with his call for more 
naval power and the creation of seven divisions to protect Japan’s “line of advantage”.43 
Having contemplated the applicability of the concept of “line of advantage” for Japan’s 
foreign policy, Yamagata in March 1890 formally proposed the permanent neutralisation of Korea 
through an international agreement that promised to protect it from foreign domination and to stop 
other countries from encroaching on Japanese interests. Yamagata insisted that Japan should try to 
persuade Britain and Germany, both of which had interests in Korea, to mediate a joint Sino-
Japanese protectorate over Korea, creating a balance of power in East Asia and reducing the 
likelihood of conflict. This would result in an independent Korea under the tutelage of a joint Sino-
Japanese protectorate.44 If this were accomplished, permanent neutrality in Korea could be 
guaranteed through cooperation among Britain, Germany, Japan, and China. As for Russia, it was 
not considered as a possible guarantor since Yamagata devised his plan as a bulwark against it. 
Peculiarly, the U.S was excluded from the list of guarantors, despite it having been named in 
previous Japanese proposals.45 
   Like other Japan-originated neutralisation proposals, Yamagata’s neutralisation proposal 
was a by-product of the comparatively weak Japanese influence in Korea, though his plan also used 
the balance of power to counter Russian expansion into East Asia by involving Britain and 
Germany.46 Predictably, his proposal was unable to win support from China and Britain since 
Chinese suzerainty was at its peak and had British support, let alone from Germany, whose Far 
Eastern interests were minimal. Considering Yamagata’s support for Japan’s military build-up, his 
concern about Chinese intervention in Korea, and the possible negative repercussions of the TSR, 
this proposal should be interpreted mainly as a temporary measure to buy Japan time to ready itself 
for the Sino-Japanese War, and in the long run, a possible Russo-Japanese confrontation.47 
By the late 1880s, threatened by China’s dogged persistence to consolidate its suzerainty over 
Korea, Gojong increasingly leaned towards the U.S. as it was the only major power that seemed to 
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have no territorial ambitions in Korea. Gojong thus tried to entice the U.S. government to become 
more involved by granting valuable concessions to U.S. businesses and accepting U.S. capital. 
When Allen advised him to grant the rights to the Unnam gold mine (1887), hoping to resolve 
Korea’s foreign debts and shield Korea from further Chinese intervention, Gojong acceded to 
Allen’s recommendation in exchange for a $2 million U.S. loan.48 The proposed mining concession 
and loan did not materialise though, due to Chinese pressure.49 Under Gojong’s instruction, Denny 
also sought loans from U.S. financiers50 but to no avail because of the “persistent and unscrupulous 
efforts” of Chinese officials and American underestimation of Korea’s natural resources.51 His 
efforts to strengthen the security relationship between Korea and the U.S. failed to make any 
headway either; after Gojong requested the dispatch of U.S. military advisers, just three were sent to 
Korea in 1888.52 
If these failures were not sufficient enough to highlight U.S. disinterest towards Korea, Acting 
U.S. Secretary of State William F. Wharton declared that although Korea would be recognised as a 
sovereign state in accordance with the 1882 Treaty, the U.S. would not “interfere to raise any 
questions” regarding the relations between China and Korea (25.4.1890).53 Moreover, while Gojong 
might have hoped that increasing trade with the U.S. could lessen Korea’s dependence on trade with 
China, as the 1890 British report on Korea’s trade noted, the American share of total Korean 
imports was just 3%, four times smaller than that of China.54 On all counts, the geopolitical 
environment did not seem conducive to U.S. involvement in Korea. Nonetheless, Korean 
neutralisation attempts relying on the U.S. were put forward in Korea. 
In a country dominated by the yangban,55 Kim Gajin (1846-1922) was an outsider, coming 
from the seoeol (descendants of concubines), a social class long barred from serving in high-level 
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government posts in Korea.56 Benefiting from Korea’s opening of diplomatic relations with the 
West, Kim was able to work in the newly established Foreign Office in 1883 and, after passing the 
civil examination in 1886,57 acted as a liaison between Denny and Gojong.58 Gradually climbing 
the bureaucratic ladder, he served as a minister in Japan and subsequently became the president of 
the Foreign Office. As a member of the anti-China faction keen on averting further Chinese 
intrusion into Korean sovereignty, Kim, as Korea’s Minister to Japan, collaborated with Min 
Yeongik to have Yuan sent back to China (1889) and began to establish a sea route between Korea 
and Japan to protect Korea from China’s greed for economic concessions.59 In effect, Kim counted 
on Japan to weaken the Chinese grip of suzerainty over Korean foreign policy amidst the fierce 
Sino-Japanese rivalry. When the opportunity arose for him to put his desire into action, however, 
he ended up making an unorthodox choice that reflected the fast-changing nature of international 
relations.  
After assuming the presidency of the Foreign Office, Kim came to identify the predominant 
Sino-centric tributary system and Russia’s territorial ambitions in Korea as threats to Korean 
independence and suggested neutralisation to Allen, the secretary at the U.S. legation in Korea, in 
November 1890. Kim told Allen that the U.S. was Korea’s only true friend and called for a U.S.-
led Swiss-style permanent neutrality60 for which the U.S. could work to convince France, Italy, 
Germany, and Japan to sign an agreement before China, Russia, and Britain could also be 
included.61 Unfortunately, Allen was unable to back this proposal because U.S. interests in Korea 
were much smaller than those in China and Japan, and the U.S. adhered to a non-interventionist 
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policy in Korea.62 With the exception of Gojong’s wartime neutrality proposal (8.5.1903) before 
the Russo-Japanese War (discussed later), Kim’s plan was the sole Korean initiative that looked for 
Italy’s assistance as a guarantor in Korea’s neutrality, notwithstanding its marginal influence on the 
Korean peninsula. Yet Gojong again floated a Swiss-style permanent neutrality proposal under the 
guarantee of major powers (3.6.1891), thus demonstrating increasing enthusiasm for neutrality 
among court circles.  Unfortunately, China adamantly opposed it, although Britain, Japan, Russia, 
and the U.S. were interested in the scheme.63 
By this time, Russia had decided it needed to adjust to the changed geopolitical situation in 
East Asia. Reconsidering its regional defence strategy due to the British Navy’s pressure in East 
Asia after Geomundo Incident and Japan’s increased military strength in the late 1880’s, it opted to 
depend on its army instead of navy. Thus in 1886, Russia started to discuss the construction of the 
TSR as a means of support for Russia’s new defence strategy there. Once the construction of the 
TSR, conceived by Russian Emperor Alexander III (31.5.1891), began, it caused significant 
economic, military, and political ramifications in the Far East. The Russian government attached 
much importance to the railway since it would ease its expansion into the Pacific, a worrisome 
prospect for both Britain, which also had Russia’s southern expansion to keep an eye on, and 
Japan.64 Furthermore, the completion of the TSR could facilitate transport of goods from Russia’s 
heartland to the Far East, thereby increasing the country’s influence in the region. In response to 
this Russian policy, Japanese policymakers strove to build amicable relations with Western powers 
to protect its cordon of interest.65 Therefore, as British Minister to Japan Hugh Fraser mentioned, 
Japan had to settle its issues with China before the completion of the TSR.66 War now seemed 
imminent in the Far East.  
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At this juncture, dark clouds began to form over Korea, which, on the one hand, had been 
reluctantly acknowledging the reinforced Chinese suzerainty over it after the Geomundo Incident, 
but on the other, had been struggling to overcome Chinese violation of its sovereignty and security. 
Nevertheless, Gojong and his officials might never have imagined that what had begun as a purely 
domestic issue—the Donghak Uprising—could end up exposing Korea’s strategic dilemma. 
Frustrated by high-handedness and unfair taxes imposed by local officials, farmers led by Jeon 
Bongjun and Kim Gaenam rose up against them in Gobu County, Jeolla Province, in February 
1894. Two months later, this became a full-fledged revolt after Yi Yongtae, an inspector sent by the 
central government to resolve the situation, added fuel to the fire by solely blaming the Donghak 
movement for the recent troubles.67 Still, as French Commissaire Lefèvre’s report intimated, the 
goals of the Donghak forces seemed quite modest,68 and although their demands for reforms later 
became much more radical,69 they had reasons to be angry.70       
The Korean government, however, continued to suppress this movement instead of 
addressing the underlying issues. The Korean army was unable to tackle the rebellion on its own 
and lost Jeonju Castle to Donghak forces (27.4.1894).71 Prodded by Min Yeongjun and other pro-
China officials and keen to preserve his royal authority,72 Gojong requested military assistance 
from China to suppress the Donghak forces (4.6.1894). China readily acceded to Gojong’s request 
for military assistance and also sent a diplomatic note to the Japanese government (6.6.1894), 
explaining that its dispatch of troops to Korea was undertaken in accordance with the suzerain-
vassal relationship between China and Korea.73 This compelled Japan to question whether Korea 
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was an independent state or a Chinese vassal74 and, as Lefèvre pointed out, unintentionally forced it 
to contemplate a measure that could threaten Korea’s security.75 Despite having reservations about 
China’s decision, Japan decided to invoke the Tianjin Convention and also send forces to the 
Korean peninsula to safeguard Japanese interests there.76 
Immediately after the Korean government called for Chinese military assistance, Yu and his 
comrades weighed how to protect Korea, believing that the dispatch of Chinese troops to the 
Korean peninsula would be matched by Japan and even Russia. Fearing especially the dispatch of 
Russian troops to Korea, Yu and his comrades contemplated plans in June 1894 to either make 
Korea a neutral state or have major powers protect it jointly. Should Korea decide to adopt 
neutrality, China would be expected to act as a sponsor, with Britain as an additional participant.77  
Despite their best intentions, Yu and his comrades’ neutralisation proposal was destined to 
fail. Their apparent nonchalance over possible Japanese actions that could threaten Korea, 
something which was already evident to a neutral observer like the French commissaire, 
demonstrated that unlike Yu’s first proposal, it was devised without properly weighing the Sino-
Japanese rivalry in Korea. Like his earlier plan, this proposal focused more on the Russian threat to 
Korean independence than on Japan’s possible domination of Korea.78 Yu was not alone in this, as 
Kim Gajin’s scheme also stemmed from his concern about Russia and not Japan. Above all, Yu 
clearly underestimated the transformed tributary system and failed to consider possible opposition 
from pro-China sympathisers and Gojong, who were keen to rely on China to preserve their own 
interests. 
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Four days after the Korean government appealed for Chinese military intervention, about 
2,800 Chinese troops were sent to Asan and Japan dispatched nearly 8,000 troops to Incheon 
(10.6.1894), though the area was free from Donghak activities. Furthermore, although the Donghak 
forces led by Jeon Bongjun voluntarily withdrew from Jeonju Castle the next day, the Japanese 
government turned down Yuan and the Korean government’s offer of joint-withdrawal of Sino-
Japanese forces, claiming that Japanese forces had to remain in Korea to supervise the 
implementation of internal reforms.79 Lefèvre questioned whether the presence of Japanese forces 
in Korea was really needed, however, now that the end of the Donghak armed activities meant the 
country was at peace.80 Though he did not advocate withdrawal of Japanese forces from Korea, 
Japanese Minister to Korea Ōtori Keisuke telegrammed Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu to stop 
the further dispatch of Japanese forces, saying that “under the present situation in 京城 [Seoul] I am 
afraid (of) there is no plausible reason for the entry of so many troops”.81 This implied that, like 
Lefèvre, Ōtori wanted to de-escalate the situation in Korea.82 
Undeterred by Japan’s refusal to take up his offer, Yuan, during his meeting with Ōtori 
(17.6.1894), again brought up the joint withdrawal of their troops from Korea. When they failed to 
reach a consensus, Yuan asked other representatives in Seoul to break their deadlock. Thus, Weber 
and a commissioner at the French legation in Seoul jointly asked Ōtori to withdraw Japanese troops, 
drawing on the Tianjin Convention.83 Two days later, Weber also joined U.S, British, and French 
representatives to protest to Ōtori about the Japanese military’s occupation of the international 
settlement, arguing that this area should be free of military activities.84 Sensing that Western 
diplomats disapproved of the Japanese military action in Korea, Ōtori invited Russian and French 
diplomats in Seoul to the Japanese legation (23.6.1894) to detect their true intentions and persuade 
them to accept Japan’s stance towards Korea, but to no avail.85 
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As the tug-of-war between regional rivals China and Japan stretched ever tighter, Western 
diplomats in Korea had to decide where they stood. Therefore, British Vice-Consul in Seoul Harry 
S. Fox and his counterpart in Incheon William H. Wilkinson suggested the wartime neutrality of the 
Incheon port to other foreign representatives in Korea in July 1894. At this critical juncture, Britain 
took the lead because of its dominant economic position in China. In 1894, Britain’s share of major 
powers’ trade with China was 64%, and 85% of all cargo ships handling export and import 
commodities were British.86 Thus, British vice-consuls sought to designate the whole of Incheon 
port a neutral area on the grounds that it was the gateway to Seoul and an international settlement 
where various powers had profound interests. In addition, they simultaneously sought to hinder the 
landing of Japanese forces at Incheon and to disapprove of the Japanese expansion through military 
activities, including the transportation of military supplies and foodstuffs, so as to avert the calamity 
of a Sino-Japanese war that seemed likely to break out in the near future.87 
With British diplomats’ active backing, the proposal of wartime neutrality of the Incheon port 
was explored at a meeting of major power representatives at the Korean Foreign Office (7.7.1894). 
In this meeting, a refusal to provide lodging to Japanese troops in various countries’ settlements was 
discussed as the majority of Incheon-based Japanese forces were staying at Japanese civilian homes 
within the concessions of various countries, which were located outside a Japanese settlement. In 
addition, a declaration of the entire Incheon port as a neutral area to stop the landing of Japanese 
forces was considered.88  
Ōtori did not mince words in responding to these ideas. He said that unless major powers 
agreed that the landing and embarkation of Japan’s troops and military commodities should not 
meet with any checks and accepted that Japanese forces could be stationed within the international 
settlement to protect the Japanese there, Japan could not consent to these demands. Apart from 
these conditions, he added the proviso that unless forces from Korea or foreign countries attacked 
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Japanese forces or harmed Japanese residents, Korea-based Japanese forces would not threaten the 
various countries’ settlements.89     
Consequently, although foreign representatives reached a consensus to refuse accommodation 
to Japanese troops in their settlements, they could not decide on the wartime neutrality issue at the 
first meeting (10.7.1894).90 Unfortunately, because the second meeting coincided with the “Meeting 
of the Pavilion of the Elders” between Korea and Japan,91 no decision was reached. Held at the 
Korean Foreign Office, the third meeting (16.7.1894), which barred Yuan from attending because 
his diplomatic rank was not ministerial level,92 received a mixed reception from other powers.93  
The U.S. representative gave the cold shoulder to this suggestion, refusing to side with either 
China or Japan and opposing a collective action such as wartime neutrality of the Incheon port. This 
could be attributed to the stance taken by U.S. Minister to Britain Thomas Francis Bayard, who 
declared that even if the U.S. agreed to strict neutrality, it would not participate in a treaty, alliance 
or any similar agreement.94 In contrast, the German representative seemed more open to the 
suggested wartime neutrality of Incheon, informing other participants through Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Potentiary for Germany Baron Felix von Gudschmid that the German government had 
already indicated its willingness to observe wartime neutrality.95 France was also ready to go along 
with this plan, having been urged to observe wartime neutrality against the coming Sino-Japanese 
War by British Foreign Secretary Earl of Kimberley.96 But despite encouraging signs from 
Germany and France, Weber, the Russian representative, strongly opposed the plan, consequently 
extinguishing any chance to realise it.97 
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Russia’s refusal to endorse wartime neutrality of Incheon port was the most unexpected 
reaction, one that even Japan regretted it had no leisure to investigate.98 Though Weber gave no 
reason for his veto, his visit (14.7.1894) to the Japanese legation in Seoul could offer a glimpse into 
his views. Weber, having met with Ōtori, covertly told Japanese Secretary Sugimura Fukashi that 
Japan could ill afford to ignore the strength of the Chinese military and therefore emphasized that 
Japan should not delay entering into war with China lest China further strengthen its forces. Weber 
even claimed that China was camouflaging its intentions by acting as if it only wanted peace while 
secretly rushing to boost its military spending.99 Weber’s reaction must have disappointed the 
Korean government and Yuan as they had expected him to provide them assistance; instead of 
siding with them, Weber was in effect calling on Japan to enter war with China.100 
This proposal, though it failed, makes it possible to respectively evaluate Russia and Britain’s 
contemporary strategies regarding China; having witnessed Japan’s rapid military build-up, they 
viewed China’s defeat as a distinct possibility and began thinking ahead. From a geopolitical 
perspective, as China’s neighbour, Russia judged that China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War 
would facilitate Russian advancement into China. In contrast, Britain worried that China’s defeat 
would affect Britain’s trade advantages, directly damaging its stores in Incheon port101 and 
loosening its tight grip on markets in China. This analysis is supported by strong evidence from 
after the war, such as Russia’s leading role in the Triple Intervention and Britain’s comparative 
decrease in leverage after determination of major powers’ respective spheres of influence in 
China.102 
Meanwhile, even after Yamagata’s botched neutralisation plan, Japan kept a watchful eye on 
its rival China in Korea. This of course did not mean that China and Japan were bound to clash over 
Korea. As late as mid-June 1894, less than two months before the Sino-Japanese War, Japanese 
Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi recommended that the Japanese cabinet cooperate with China for 
reforms in Korea. For this, Itō suggested that Japan and China should send several dozen 
commissioners to overhaul the Korean central government after suppressing the Donghak rebels in 
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Korea. The Japanese cabinet backed his proposal, but Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu 
(1844-1897)103 doubted whether China would accept Itō’s idea. Thus the cabinet chose to adopt two 
provisos based on Mutsu’s recommendation: Japan would not withdraw its troops from Korea until 
negotiations with China had reached some conclusion, and if China refused to back a joint reform 
effort, Japan alone would compel the Korean government to pursue administrative reform. When 
China objected to these provisions, Japan, in the words of Itō, had “no policy but to go to war”.104 
The conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (16.7.1894), 
which abolished extraterritoriality in Japan, allowed the Japanese government to focus more 
attention on preparation for war with China.105 Ōtori asked for an immediate withdrawal of Chinese 
troops from Asan to President of the Korean Office Jo Byeongjik (20.7.1894), and this was 
followed by an ultimatum two days later, which threatened that Ōtori would take appropriate steps 
unless Jo gave him a positive answer.106 Yuan’s offer of joint withdrawal of Sino-Japanese forces 
from Korea, and Britain’s mediation efforts,107 could do little under such circumstances. Having 
received no reply from Jo, Japanese forces stormed the royal palace in Seoul108 to establish a pro-
Japan administration under Daewongun’s leadership (23.7.1894).109 Knowing that he would oppose 
Japanese-driven reforms, the Japanese legation favoured setting up a special deliberative council to 
speed up change and leave him as the nominal head of the new government. The Gunguk gimucheo 
(Military Deliberative Council) was thus established to discuss and draft new laws and regulations 
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on official appointments, administrative procedures, tax and fiscal regulations, school and military 
systems, and matters related to industry and commerce (27.7.1894).110 
Mutsu also instructed Ōtori to push for the inclusion of Japanese advisers within the new 
government111 to consolidate its position there in readiness for the transformation of Korea into 
Japan’s protectorate. His government having successfully swayed the Korean government to side 
with Japan, Emperor Meiji was able to proclaim an edict which declared Japan’s intention to wage 
war on China. With the pieces in place, China and Japan engaged in a formal conflict when the 
Japanese navy attacked its Chinese counterpart. Soon afterwards, Japan informed Western powers 
about the onset of war with China and formally declared war (1.8.1894).112 Despite these measures, 
in the early days of the Sino-Japanese War Japan could not adopt a firm Korean policy due to 
Japan’s relations with major powers and the unforeseeable consequences of war.113 
In these circumstances, Mutsu submitted his long-term or fundamental remedy for Korea 
comprised of four sections with his explanation of the advantages and disadvantages of each, to the 
Japanese cabinet (17.8.1894). He had originally expected to consult with the cabinet after the war, 
but he settled the plans for Korea in advance due to their interconnectedness to Japan’s current 
diplomatic and military measures on the Korean peninsula. The first section of his plan called for 
the autonomy of Korea and the treatment of it as an independent state. Japan would neither 
intervene in Korea nor tolerate other countries doing so and would entrust Korea with its own 
destiny. This would follow Japanese statements made at the war's start. However, considering the 
current situation in Korea, the momentum for internal reforms would eventually peter out, 
necessitating Japan make the costly decision to send a military force there to stabilise matters. This 
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could also give China an excuse to interfere in Korean affairs, potentially triggering another Sino-
Japanese War. 
The second section was the unilateral protection of Korea by Japan. This plan would involve 
Japan’s recognising Korea as an independent state in name only and have Japan “support” Korean 
independence both directly and indirectly. Such actions, however, could attract criticism and 
resentment from other countries and cause “countless conflicts”. Even if Japan could treat Korea as 
its protectorate, Mutsu worried that if countries like China and Russia, which had vested interests in 
Korea, would intervene to undermine Korea’s independence, Japan alone could not defend its 
neighbour. 
The joint protection of Korea by China and Japan was the third section. If Korea could not 
maintain its own independence and Japan could not take responsibility for Korea’s protection, 
China and Japan could guarantee Korea’s safety. However, Mutsu foresaw that China would not be 
able to relinquish a “consciously subordinate issue (i.e. Korea)” and that Japan would find it 
difficult to tolerate China possessing a more “superior perception” towards Korea than Japan. This 
would certainly lead to confrontation between China and Japan. Even if the Chinese government 
did not raise the issue of a subordinate relationship and joined Japan in sending commissioners or 
representatives to support Korea’s state affairs and in stationing troops there, differing interests and 
any lack of caution on the part of politicians could still foment trouble between the two nations.  
The final section of his plan was to transform Korea into a “world’s neutral state”. He 
envisioned Japan making a case for Korean neutrality to Western powers and China, aimed at 
having Korea placed in the same position as Belgium and Switzerland. However, unlike in Europe, 
since China and Japan possessed the greatest interests in Korea, the prestige and benefit that could 
come out of the Sino-Japanese War need not be handed over to European powers. Otherwise, the 
Japanese public would undoubtedly be dissatisfied with this move. If the Japanese government did 
not recoup the costs of dispatching a large military force to Korea,114 it would be unable to avoid 
public criticism. 
Though the final option, which would transform Korea into a “world’s neutral state”, just as 
Kim Okgyun’s proposal would, was from Mutsu’s viewpoint the best for solving the Korean issue, 
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it had to yield to Japanese public opinion, which revealed Japan’s intention of launching the Sino-
Japanese War. On the contrary, Mutsu personally admitted that some opinions favoured moderate 
reforms in Korea to allow it to save face as a small but independent state and so that Japan could 
guarantee Korea as a neutral state in the future if Japan experienced problems with China or Russia. 
In addition, though Mutsu admitted it was very rash, another of his opinions called for Japan to now 
assemble a major power conference to form a neutral Korea guaranteed by major powers, similar to 
Belgium and Switzerland in Europe.115 Mutsu’s idea was to first neutralise Korea by basically and 
rashly ignoring Chinese suzerainty over Korea and to later make it a protectorate of Japan.116 Thus, 
Itō's cabinet did not take up Mutsu’s neutralisation, but instead opted for his second option, under 
which Japan would provide the unilateral protection of Korea until the end of the Sino-Japanese 
War.117 Accordingly, Mutsu asked Ōtori to conclude a tentatively joint clause with Korea 
(20.8.1894) to intervene in its internal affairs and a Japan-Korea military pact (26.8.1894).118 
· Neutralisation Proposals From the Post-Sino-Japanese War to Gojong’s Stay at the Russian 
Legation (1895-1896)    
When the war was over, Japan had emerged victorious, thereby ending Chinese suzerainty 
over Korea. As a result, the Treaty of Shimonoseki (18.4.1895) forced the vanquished China to 
admit Korea’s independence. Korea now became a hotbed of pro-Japan faction activity, and under 
the shelter of Japan,119 the Deliberative Council under the leadership of Premier Kim Hongjip 
executed reforms ranging from reorganisation of the central government to the establishment of a 
royal guard staffed by Japanese-trained non-commissioned officers.120 Through the said treaty, 
Japan acquired the Liaodong peninsula, Taiwan, and Penghu Islands from China, reparation of two 
hundred million taels, and a most-favoured-nation status there like that of Western major powers. 
Its victory enabled Japan to emerge as a new imperialistic empire121 and served as momentum to 
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relegate China and Korea to semi-colonies ripe for plunder. China became the target of 
segmentation, concessions, leased territories, open ports, and unequal treaties by major powers. 
While the post-war Shimonoseki Treaty seemed to have enabled Japan to join the ranks of 
Western powers as a new imperialistic power, one treaty condition–China’s cession of the Liaodong 
peninsula to Japan–caught Western powers, which were preparing for the partitioning of China, by 
surprise, especially Russia, which had been expecting to advance into Manchuria. Anxious to 
protect their interests in China, Western powers did not leave the field to Japan alone and instead 
entered the lists. Concerned that the Japanese acquisition of Port Arthur might worsen the relations 
between China and Japan and incessantly threaten peace in East Asia, the Russian government sent 
a note to various Western powers about forcing Japan to give up Port Arthur (8.4.1895). While 
France and Germany, determined not to lose out in contests among major powers for a possible 
carve-up of China and to draw Russia’s attention from Europe, backed the proposed move,122 
Britain, more worried about the southern encroachment of Russia than Japan’s advancement into 
continental Asia,123 rebuffed the Russian offer.  
Unfazed by Britain’s rejection, three European representatives in Tokyo, Russian Minister M. 
A. Hitrovo, French Minister Jules Harmand, and German Minister Baron Felix von Gudschmid, 
launched the Triple Intervention (23.4.1895) to check Japanese ambitions in the Far East, claiming 
that the Japanese concession in Liaodong threatened Beijing and rendered Korean independence 
meaningless.124 Japan was forced to accede to Western demands, receiving thirty million taels of 
indemnity from China in return for giving up the Liaodong peninsula, demonstrating that Japan, 
despite its military victory, still had to bend to Western powers’ wishes.125 Toeing Western powers’ 
line, Japan now saw Russia as its new rival in Korea. Sensing that Japan was in defence mode, 
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Gojong126 and his like-minded officials hedged their bets by befriending Russia. Accordingly, the 
pro-Russia faction emerged as a powerful political force in Korea, challenging the hitherto 
dominant pro-Japan faction. 
While Korean politics was undergoing extensive transformation, the Russo-Japanese rivalry 
over the peninsula further intensified, thwarting the Korean government’s efforts to maintain a pro-
Russia stance. Such ambivalence did little to soothe Japanese concerns about the increasing 
influence of Russia in Korea. Queen Min, whose patronage of the Min clan signified her hostility to 
Japan and friendliness to Russia, especially became a liability for the Japanese government. 
Concurrently, Seoul was rife with rumours of plots against the moderate Korean cabinet headed by 
Kim Hongjip. 
Against this background, it was not hard to imagine that despite winning the war, Japan would 
fear Russia might eat away at Japan’s post-war gains in Korea. Interestingly, at least some in the 
U.S. seemed to have sympathised with this view, demonstrating that not all major powers were on 
the same page with Russia: 
The majority of Americans believe that Japan has entered upon a righteous war, that it 
would be unfair to rob her of the fruits of her victories, and that the lesson which China is 
now receiving will in the end be beneficial to the Chinese and the whole world.127 
   
Determined not to lose its hard-won influence in Korea, the Japanese government replaced 
Japanese Minister to Korea Inoue Kaoru with the more hard-lined Miura Gorō. Although Itō still 
expected Miura to adhere to the low-posture policy outlined in the cabinet resolution, Miura had his 
own agenda, revealing to Japanese reporters that “the post of Japanese Minister is one of great 
difficulty, but I believe it is a fit place to try my own theory of diplomatic methods”. 128 Fearing that 
the return of the Min faction backed by Queen Min, who had a deep antipathy to Japan but turned in 
favour of Russia, augured ill for Japanese influence in Korea, Miura opted for a more 
confrontational approach towards Korea.  
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Anxious to preserve Japanese influence on the Korean peninsula, Miura collaborated with 
Okamoto Ryūnosuke, a Japanese legation staff member, and Japanese military attaché Kusunose to 
plan a coup to oust the Min clan from power. Miura also asked Adachi Kenzō and Kunitomo 
Shigeaki, two Japanese patriotic society activists, to mobilise help for an attack on the Korean 
palace. This culminated in the assassination of Queen Min (8.10.1895) by civilian Japanese toughs 
(sōshi).129 Aside from her anti-Japan stance, she was also seen as the highest hurdle to Japan’s 
attempt to establish a virtual monopoly over Korea’s telegraph lines.130 Her death would have 
facilitated the Japanese government’s scheme for a continuing military presence to control Korean 
telegraph lines since the Sino-Japanese War had made it clear that Japan required access to these 
lines for effective military operations.131 However, Queen Min’s close ties with Russia would have 
complicated Japan’s strategy132 because she could have utilised Russia’s military might to block a 
Japanese takeover of Korean telegraph lines. Rather than preventing Korea’s drift toward Russia, 
this incident added to Korea’s political confusion, increasing Russian influence in Korea and 
arousing Western powers’ hostility toward Japan, which put Japan’s position at risk.  
Austrian Minister to Japan Condenhove’s report (18.10.1895) to the Austrian Foreign 
Minister shed light on the political instability after the assassination of Queen Min, which posed a 
dilemma for Japanese policy makers. Although Condenhove received no reports about the 
assassination from the Korean legation in Tokyo, he claimed that this “riot” showed Daewongun’s 
notorious reputation as the former regent of Korea and that there were lingering suspicions about 
Japan’s role in the assassination of the queen.133 Regardless of the report’s veracity, the death of 
Queen Min could not be easily dismissed. An article published by the Japan Daily (14.10.1895) 
illustrated this vividly. According to the newspaper, Japan was uninterested in annexing Korea and 
that to dispel foreign powers’ fears regarding Japan’s previously botched attempts to dominate 
Korea, Japan should work to reform Korea along Western lines. To ensure this end, it suggested 
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that the wisest course Japan could take was to invite Germany, Russia, and France to intervene so 
that the Japanese quest to reform Korea could proceed smoothly.134 
The Japan Daily further asserted that until it was ready to challenge Western pressure, Japan 
had no choice but to either seek Western powers’ cooperation for the neutralisation of Korea or 
convince them to entrust the task of civilising Korea to Japan. Though under such a plan Japan 
could not acquire any valuable acquisitions in Korea, it had to pay heed to the possibility that 
Russian could occupy Korea to protect itself. Korea seemed fated to become either a conflict zone 
or a neutral area.135 Whereas previous neutralisation proposals from Japan took Korea’s tributary 
relations with China into account, this plan was devised under the strong influence of the Western-
centric treaty system and did not specify countries that could act as guarantors for Korean 
neutrality. While the Japan Daily was consumed with defending Japan’s awkward position at that 
time and published more than a few opinions on how that should be done, there was no indication 
that this neutralisation proposal was seriously considered. 
One way or another, the Japanese government had to readjust its Korean policy to extricate it 
from foreign hostility caused by the assassination of Queen Min. This led to the dismissal of Miura 
and the appointment of Komura Jutarō as his replacement as the voices in Japan calling for a review 
of the government’s Korean policy grew louder. Reacting to the stormy political atmosphere 
produced by the incident, Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi (1841-1909)136 suggested that Japan should 
adopt a non-interventionist stance towards Korea.137 He argued that to preserve its future status in 
Korea, what Japan needed most was to eliminate any traces of its intrusion in Korea and to ensure 
that its actions would not prompt a related power to criticise Japan for ignoring Korean 
independence. Consequently, the Japanese government declared to major powers that Japanese 
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soldiers were in Korea only to guard a telegraph line there, and provided that stability was restored 
to the Korean peninsula, all Japanese forces stationed there would be withdrawn and pledged not to 
interfere in Korean affairs.138 
Itō’s call for a non-interventionist policy also shaped his two separate plans for a new 
Japanese policy in Korea (21.10.1895). The first plan raised three countermeasures for the fallout 
from the assassination of Queen Min: first, the prevention of Russian and U.S. intervention by 
informing them that Miura’s speech did not represent the Japanese government’s intentions. Second, 
Korea’s permanent neutrality had to be suggested by Japan, Russia, Britain, France, the U.S., and 
Germany. Although this countermeasure could pose the question whether all the Japanese efforts in 
Korea had come to naught, it could prevent major powers, especially Russia, from violating the 
Korean border during wartime. Third, though giving Russia an opportunity to intervene in Korea 
might create a dust-up similar to Anglo-French relations in Egypt, Japan could employ amicable 
negotiations as a delaying tactic to give its military time to catch its breath from the just-ended 
Sino-Japanese War and replenish itself before immediately marching off to a Russo-Japanese 
war.139 The countermeasures of the second plan recommended Korea’s permanent neutrality, 
Japanese control of Korea, and the partitioning of Korea by Russia, Japan, and Britain.140 
The current geopolitical situation was quite different from when Itō had made his 
recommendations in June 1894. Therefore, though he was much concerned about maintaining 
Japanese dominance over Korea, Itō thought that it was imperative for Japan to first resolve its 
diplomatic impasse and escape from the restraint of major powers. As it turned out, Itō’s 
neutralisation proposal did not materialise due to increased Russian clout over Korea after the 
assassination of Queen Min, which reached its apex after Gojong escaped to the Russian legation in 
Seoul and the inauguration of a pro-Russia cabinet in Korea after the fall of the pro-Japan Kim 
Hongjip cabinet in February 1896.141 
         Meanwhile, returning to the Sino-Japanese War, though the conflict was still at an early stage, 
a Japanese victory seemed assured, which compelled the British government, worrying about 
Chinese defeat, to attempt to mediate the war in fear of directly damaging British interests in China. 
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Britain suggested to the U.S., French, German, Russian, and Italian governments the joint mediation 
of a Sino-Japanese reconciliation, to be negotiated with the Chinese and Japanese governments 
(6.10.1894). The British-sponsored terms of settlement involved the joint guarantee of Korean 
independence by major powers and the payment of reparations to Japan by China.142 In effect, 
Britain tried to play the role of regional balancer, as in the previous cases of the British Geomundo 
occupation and the Incheon port. 
Much to Britain’s dismay, there was no appetite for its initiative. Li Hongzhang was opposed 
to the British proposal because of the inclusion of reparations. Major powers also reacted negatively. 
Russia could not endorse joint intervention due to the illnesses of Czar Alexander III and Foreign 
Minister Giers. Germany worried that any diplomatic negotiations unaccompanied by concrete 
action could rile Japanese sensibilities. The U.S. reacted indifferently as President Grover 
Cleveland and Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham did not think Japan’s victory would harm U.S. 
interests. Besides, constrained by its tradition of non-intervention in foreign affairs, the U.S. 
government had to reject joint intervention with European powers.143 
In Japan, having considered Foreign Minister Mutsu’s three proposals (discussed earlier), the 
Japanese government opposed the proposed British mediation and settled on the following 
measures: Chinese recognition of Korean independence and cession of the Liaodong peninsula to 
Japan, Chinese reparation payments to Japan, and the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty modelled 
after the treaties between China and Western powers.144 China, however, did not rule out the 
possible mediation of Western powers. Despite his early reservations about the British 
government’s proposal, Li, believing that Russia’s interests in the Far East would not allow the 
Japanese rule of Korea, ended up meeting Russian Minister to China Cassini and arguing that 
Russia should not turn a blind eye to the occupation of Korea by another country. Cassini, however, 
responded cautiously, telling Li that Russia would only intervene when Japan actually tried to 
occupy Korea, and so for the moment would remain neutral. Cassini also opined to Li, who had 
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asked for advice on the possible terms of settlement, that it was inevitable for China to be on the 
losing end.145 
Though its 1894 mediation had failed due to Japan’s three demands and the major powers’ 
negative responses, Britain continued to pay close attention to Far Eastern affairs as British Foreign 
Secretary Earl of Kimberley’s letter to British Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir William Vernon 
Harcourt shows: 
There can be no doubt of the importance of the cession of Liaotung Peninsula and the 
adjoining territory on the mainland…Whether it is expedient to interfere in any way is 
another. I have no wish to interfere but the whole question requires the most careful and 
immediate consideration.146 
 
Harcourt shared Kimberley’s concern, and his letter in response portended Britain’s refusal to 
join France, Germany, and Russia in intervening to check Japanese expansion on the Asian 
mainland: 
I have a very strong opinion against our interference with the Japanese terms of peace. 
We have no direct interest in the question…I am quite as much as entering upon active 
operations in concert with Russia in this matter as I am against going into partnership 
with the Triple Alliance. The true strength of our position is absolute neutrality.147 
      
As mentioned earlier, though Britain chose not to participate in the Triple Intervention, it still 
kept tabs on the situation in Korea. At this critical juncture, the assassination of Queen Min further 
worsened already strong anti-Japanese sentiment within Korea and strengthened support for Russia, 
which came to be seen as a reliable ally for Gojong. This view reached an apex during his exile at 
the Russian legation (11.2.1896-20.2.1897), which enabled him to replace a pro-Japan cabinet with 
an anti-Japanese (pro-U.S./Russian) one and to exercise more direct control over government affairs, 
doling out various concessions to major powers to create a balance of power, albeit under the 
influence of Russia.148 Astonished by Russia’s sudden primacy in Korea, Japan devoted all its 
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energy to making preparations for war with Russia, increasing its defence spending. For its part, 
after Gojong took refuge in the Russian legation to counter Japanese expansion into Korea, the 
British government suspected that Korea had fallen under Russian influence149 and called for 
neutralisation of Korea to counter this situation (1.5.1896). This began with a telegram to Japanese 
Foreign Minister Munemitsu delivered through the British legation in Japan:  
There is a possibility that the present position of affairs in Corea may lead to Russia  
declaring it a protectorate. It is possible that the King of Corea may declare himself a  
vassal of China.150 Would Japan be disposed to agree to a declaration of neutrality of 
Corea or a guarantee of independence of that Country by the Powers. Under these 
circumstances if Count Mutsu wishes to see Sir Ernest he will come back at once.151 
 
Before sending his reply to London, Mutsu asked the British government to expound on its 
proposal through various channels including Japanese Minister to Britain Katō Takaaki and British 
Minister to Japan Ernest Satow. Mutsu wanted to know whether the British government was really 
ready to play a leading role to fulfil Korean neutrality, whether Britain had attempted to negotiate 
with other powers or would work with another country to fulfil Korean neutrality, to what extent 
Britain had obtained or would obtain permission from other powers on this issue, and what Britain 
knew about Russia’s intentions regarding neutrality.152 
The British government had mixed reactions. Its first response came from Satow (4.5.1896). 
Satow didn’t reply directly to Mutsu’s query, instead reassuring him that given the wording of the 
diplomatic instructions Britain would undeniably play a leading role in Korean neutralisation, 
insisting that the Russo-Japanese negotiations surrounding Korea would impede Japan from 
entering new negotiations with another country.153 Around this time, both the Under Secretary and 
Assistant Under Secretary from the British Foreign Office jumped into the fray, telling Katō that 
with Japanese consent Britain would strive to bring about Korean neutrality and that Britain had 
already informed Germany and the U.S. of negotiations for Korean neutrality. Britain’s only worry 
was that Russia might oppose the proposal. The Under Secretary was in particular concerned about 
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Russo-Japanese negotiations based on information from a newspaper article about Yamagata being 
dispatched to Moscow for attending the coronation of Czar Nicholas II.154 
The British Foreign Secretary chipped in, telling Katō that Britain did not expect Japan to 
assume a leadership role in facilitating Korean neutrality and just wanted to know whether Japan 
was willing to participate in a Korean neutrality project (13.5.1896). Furthermore, though Korea’s 
recent instability required its neutralisation, minimal British interests on the Korean peninsula vis-à-
vis Russia, China, and Japan made it inappropriate for Britain to act as a proponent of Korean 
neutrality. Britain was thus content to follow the lead of other powers and actively cooperate within 
the scope of their leadership. The best alternative would be negotiations among major powers 
including Germany, to which the Foreign Minister expected no Russian objections. Russia had 
promised to stay out of Korea in return for Britain’s withdrawal from Geomundo; moreover, until 
the TSR was completed, Russia could only with great difficulty invade Korea.155 
Rebutting the British Foreign Secretary’s analysis, Katō insisted that Russia’s assurances 
applied only to China and were now non-binding due to the decline of China’s international status, 
which revealed Japan’s lingering concern about Russian ambitions in Korea. The Foreign Secretary, 
disagreeing with Katō, argued that since Russia did not currently have the naval capability to invade 
Korea, it could not simply disregard its earlier agreement. Even if rumours about the Russian 
acquisition of the construction rights for the TSR were true, the railway’s expansion could be solely 
for commercial purposes, and even if Japanese fears had a solid foundation, since Russia needed 
only China’s approval to continue with the TSR, no other country, even if it wanted to, could 
prevent its construction. Besides, as a territorial nation-state with a gigantic landmass stretched 
across Europe and Asia, it was natural for Russia to seek a coastal passage. On the same day, the 
British Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs met with Katō again, disgruntled that Japan still did not 
seem to understand the pros and cons of Korean neutralisation and was preoccupied with Russo-
Japanese negotiations.156 
As described above, Britain’s tireless efforts to draw Japan’s interest to Korean neutrality had 
much to do with Gojong’s flight to the Russian legation. Witnessing a situation that seemed to be 
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benefiting Russia enormously, Britain worried that Korea might end up a Russian protectorate, 
which reflected its government’s lingering concern about Russian designs in Korea, demonstrating 
that the Korean geopolitical situation remained largely unchanged since Rosebery’s ambitious 
proposal.  Britain also judged that Yamagata’s trip to Moscow could act to accelerate Russo-
Japanese negotiations and that it could not stand idly by while the dynamics in East Asia moved 
against it. Thus, Britain wanted to block Russo-Japanese negotiations and ensure that Korea did not 
lean toward any country by making it a neutral country under guarantee of major powers including 
Japan. Mutsu reassured Satow that no Russo-Japanese negotiations had taken place; in fact, a 
Japanese anti-government newspaper had merely disseminated falsehoods by commenting on 
Yamagata’s trip to Russia. Mutsu said that Yamagata’s trip was a separate consultation to resolve 
an imminent Korean issue (i.e. assassination of Queen Min) that the two countries could leave 
unsettled no longer and that since Japan and Russia had to refrain from direct action regarding 
Korea, especially considering Gojong’s use of the Russian legation as his sanctuary, it might be 
more natural for Britain to lead in the realisation of Korean neutralisation.157 
But the British government’s neutralisation attempts had reached an impasse. With Gojong 
staying at the Russian legation, it was practically impossible for the Korean government to embrace 
any kind of proposal to neutralise Korea. More to the point, within the context of the Russo-
Japanese rivalry, it would be rash for a third power (Britain) having no significant concessions in 
Korea to suggest neutralisation. Though Britain might put forward such an idea to prevent Korea 
from falling into either the Japanese or Russian camp and to maintain the status quo in the Far East, 
its success was inconceivable without support from those two countries. Henceforth, Britain had to 
change its Far Eastern policy to align itself with Japan, e.g. the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.158  
Meanwhile, Gojong, feeling besieged by Japanese attempts to dominate Korean affairs, 
reached out to Russia to counterbalance Japan, sending a secret letter through Yi Beomjin to the 
newly appointed Russian Chargé d’affaires to Korea De Speyer and his predecessor Weber 
clamouring for Russian assistance and pleading with them not to ignore his wishes.159 De Speyer 
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responded favourably, judging that Russian assistance could restore political stability in Korea.160 
This communication facilitated Gojong’s escape to the Russian legation, but it was not all roses for 
Korean independence.  
In April 1896, Min Yeonghwan visited Russia as a special envoy to Russian Emperor 
Nicholas II’s coronation (26.5.1896) and passed on Gojong’s request to Russia. To Gojong’s 
disappointment, Min failed to win Russian assent for the dispatch and maintenance of Russian 
forces to protect Gojong after his return to the palace, a loan worth three million yen to repay a 
Japanese bond, the construction of a telegraph line between Korea and Russia, and the dispatch of 
financial and military advisers. Instead, he only managed to obtain 13 military instructors and an 
ambiguous response from Russia concerning the Korean government’s demands (2.7.1896).161 
Russian rejection of the Korean overture should be understood within the context of Russia 
and Japan’s previous decision to reduce the tensions between them.162 For Russia, Manchuria had a 
central place in its East Asian policy, and Japan was in a tight spot in Korea after the assassination 
of Queen Min and Gojong’s escape to the Russian legation in Seoul. Then, Japanese politician 
Saionji Kimochi passed on a memorandum to Russian Minister to Japan Hitrov to initiate 
negotiations with Russia (24.2.1896). Saionji’s offer was taken up by the Russian government and 
formal negotiations began when both Japanese and Russian ministers in Seoul were given 
instructions from their respective governments (3.3.1896). After Japanese Minister to Korea 
Komura Jūtaro recommended the first draft of his proposal to Russia (22.3.1896) and Weber 
presented his own plan to Japan (6.4.1896), both governments managed to bridge their differences 
to sign the Weber-Komura Memorandum (14.5.1896). This implied Manchuria, not Korea, was the 
main focus of Russia’s Far Eastern policy until the completion of the TSR due to the impossibility 
of Russia attaining strategic predominance in Korea. Japan had no reason to reject Russia’s olive 
branch, which freed Japan from its awkward position in Korea as mentioned above. Korea’s 
sovereignty, however, was severely infringed upon when Russia consented to a Japanese military 
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police presence in Korea (to guard the telegraph line between Seoul and Busan) while reserving its 
right to station an equal number of troops there to protect its legation and consulates, just as Japan 
did so to protect its settlements.163 Nevertheless, this memorandum was interpreted as signalling 
Russia’s political primacy in Korea by acknowledging the legality of the Korean cabinet formed at 
the Russian legation in Seoul and giving Russian troops the same access to Korea as Japanese 
troops in case of emergency.164 
With the coronation of Nicholas II as momentum, Russia actively led the contemporary 
geopolitical situation. Russian Foreign Minister Lobanov, on the one hand, concluded the Secret 
Treaty of Alliance (3.6.1896)165 with Li to maintain Russian primacy in Manchuria by engaging 
with China to counter Japan. On the other, he again discussed the Korean issue with Japan in the 
quest to wholly seize control of the peninsula,166 thus signing the Lobanov-Yamagata Protocol 
(9.6.1896), which expanded upon the Weber-Komura Memorandum and paved the way for Japan 
and Russia to enjoy equal dominance over Korea, creating a balance of power between them in 
Korea. Both countries agreed to support Korea only after reaching a consensus,167 back Korea’s 
efforts to build up its military forces,168 allow Russia to build a telegraph line linking Seoul to the 
Russian border,169 and leave open the possibility of further negotiations to iron out any remaining 
differences over Korea.170 This protocol thus seemed to provide plausible grounds for Korea 
neutralisation under balance of power because neither Japan nor Russia was willing to settle for a 
one-sided supremacy there. Korea, however, was left sitting on the sidelines of the diplomatic tug of 
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war between Japan and Russia.  
Moreover, this protocol also stipulated the following secret clauses: The decision over 
possible occupation areas for the two countries’ troops in Korea and the reconfirmation of the 
Komura-Weber Memorandum (i.e. Gojong in the Russian legation could be protected by Russian 
troops until a reliable Korean palace guard was formed.),171 which enabled Russia to hold a 
dominant position in Korea. Accordingly, Russia, not wanting to clash with Japan, gave minimal 
support to Korea in regard to Min Yeonghwan’s assistance request and attempted to strengthen its 
influence on the Korean government.172 However, Japan, begrudging the rapprochement between 
Korea and Russia, exposed the secret clauses of the said protocol to alienate Korea from Russia in 
February 1897,173 but Russia still retained a competitive advantage in Korea, interfering in internal 
affairs there. 
Ultimately, having reached a compromise through these agreements, Russia could now focus 
on Manchuria and Japan could free itself of its political responsibility for the assassination of Queen 
Min in Korea. As Korea’s two neighbours were busy striking a deal while keeping the Korean 
government in the dark, Korean neutralisation was brought up in the heart of the Russian Empire. 
On 9 and 11 June 1896, the Kobe Chronicle reported on a dẻmarche by British and American 
ambassadors in St. Petersburg, who had allegedly asked both Russia and Japan to safeguard Korea’s 
neutrality174 to uphold the balance of power in the Far East. Neither Japan nor Russia, however, was 
willing to accept Korean neutrality, and the two ambassadors’ proposal was unsuccessful.  
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Chapter VI. Neutralisation Attempts in the First Half of the Korean Empire Era (1897-1903) 
Russian occupation of Manchuria during the Boxer Uprising intensified the Russo-Japanese 
rivalry, thereby causing the demarcation disputes with Japan over Korea and Manchuria and 
pushing Korea into a corner. This chapter describes how, under these circumstances, the tensions on 
the Korean peninsula drove Korea to pursue neutral diplomacy as its survival strategy, renders why 
Korean neutralisation was contemplated as part of Japan’s Asian strategy before and during the 
Boxer Uprising, and concludes with how the Russian occupation of Manchuria forced it to adopt 
Korean neutralisation as its Far Eastern policy.  
· Neutralisation Strategies Around the Time of the First Half of the Boxer Uprising (1899-
1900) 
After returning to the palace from the Russian legation (20.2.1897), Gojong changed his 
country’s name from Joseon to the Korean Empire and reascended the throne to demonstrate its 
status as an independent country (12.10.1897). The Korean Empire’s two central missions were to 
prevent foreign intervention in its internal affairs and to engage in comprehensive reforms to build 
up strengths sufficient to withstand major power invasions. Owing to the conclusions of the Weber-
Komura Memorandum and Lobanov-Yamagata Protocol,1 which established a balance of power on 
the peninsula, the Korean government had the time and breathing room to accomplish said missions. 
The first step was to allocate a significant portion of the budget to national defence to boost national 
power.2 Nevertheless, as Korea was still too weak to pursue an effective foreign policy without 
major powers’ cooperation,3 it also resorted to utilising concessions and loan agreements to 
leverage major powers’ differing interests in the Far East, as well as recruiting advisers from 
various countries to maintain a balance of power. 
Separately, to free Korea from harmful foreign influence and to enact social and political 
reforms for assisting Korean independence, the Independence Club, a progressive-minded civic 
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2 Already in 1896, defence constituted 21.38% of government expenditures (the total government expenditure was 
4,809,410 won and military spending accounted for 1,028,401 won). Ilseongnok 日省錄 (Records of Daily Reflections), 
1896.11.15, http://e-kyujanggak.snu.ac.kr/sub_index.jsp?ID=ILS. Except in 1902, Korea’s military expenditures 
increased annually thereafter (Table 1). 
3 By the early 1890s, there was already a yawning gap between Korean military strength and major powers’, which 
forced the Korean government to make a significant effort to upgrade its military forces (Table 2).  
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group, was founded (2.7.1896). Its goals were easier said than done, however, since the Korean 
Empire was plagued by Gojong’s frequent cabinet reshuffles, which were prompted by pressure 
from major powers intent on making Korean ministers their pawns, thereby inducing the club to 
advocate neutrality diplomacy. Setting these constraints aside, the geopolitical background was 
ideal for the club to achieve its aims owing to the balance of power established by the conclusion of 
the Lobanov-Yamagata Protocol. This helped the Korean government execute autonomous 
diplomacy.  
Though the club often criticised government officials for their close alignments with major 
powers, its own track record was far from perfect due to its infatuation with Japan. The club could 
not discern Japan's hidden ambition in the Treaty of Shimonoseki—putting Korea under Japanese 
influence as a pretext to making Korea independent—but instead revered Japan as the first civilised 
East Asian country, one that had fully absorbed Western products of civilisation. The club displayed 
its blatant pro-Japanese sentiment through the club’s newspaper Independent, where, for example, it 
praised the rank of the Japanese representative in Korea being raised from minister to minister 
plenipotentiary.4 Considering Japan the most enlightened Asian nation, possessing both prosperity 
and a strong military, the club managed to overlook the increased penetration of Japanese influence 
in Korea. 
The club’s views on Russia were not so sanguine. Russia’s signing of the secret Treaty of 
Alliance with Li Hongzhang (3.6.1896) and Russian Foreign Minister Lobanov’s pledge of support 
in response to Min Yeongwhan’s assistance request seemed to signify the beginning of its southern 
expansion into China and Korea. For this reason, Chinese Prince Kong and the Zongli yamen 
suspected Russia’s motives for signing the secret treaty, resulting in the delay of the construction of 
the Chinese Eastern Railway5 and a temporary hold on the Russian advance into China.  Korea, a 
strategic location with ice-free ports, thus popped back up on Russia’s screen. After the summer of 
1896, Russian Finance Minister Witte attempted a new strategic policy: extending Russian capital 
to influence Korea’s military and finances and placing Russian personnel, such as Colonel Putiata,6 
                                                 
4 Dongnip sinmun [The Independent], 1896.4.18, http://www.kinds.or.kr/. 
5 Kim Hyeonsuk, “Daehan Jegukgi takjibu gomun Alekseyepeu ui jaejeong jeongchaek gwa chinReo hwaldong [The 
Financial Policy and Pro-Russian Activities of Russian Financial Adviser Alexeiev in the Korean Empire Period]”, 
Hanguk geunhyeondaesa yeongu 47 (Winter 2008): 83. 
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D. Pokotiloff, and Karl Alexeiev, in the Korean government as advisers. Among them, Alexeiev’s 
role as Korea’s Finance Ministry adviser was vital; he introduced a reporting system to account for 
all revenues and cut unnecessary expenditures,7 ended the connection between Korea and Chinese 
customs,8 and terminated the usage of gakinbuen 刻印付円, a Japanese-produced silver currency.9 
Witte also wished to link Jinnampo or Mokpo with the stalled Chinese Eastern Railway and use one 
of the ports for military purposes.10 
As these events unfolded, the club’s outlook on Russia fluctuated radically as it sensed the 
intimidation implicit in the Russian strategy, a growing anxiety shared by many Koreans. During 
Gojong’s flight to the Russian legation, the club viewed Russia favourably, denying it was a threat 
to Korea and welcomed its involvement in Korea, citing three diplomatic benefits gained from Min 
Yeonghwan’s trip to St. Petersburg and supporting its military instructors training Korean soldiers 
to suppress internal rebellions.11 The Independent even disputed the Japanese media’s criticisms of 
Korea’s pro-Russia policy by detailing the background of Gojong’s flight to the Russian legation.12 
The Independent also quoted the Russian newspaper Novosti’s comment that Russia did not infringe 
on Korea’s rights and supported its independence.13 Seo Jaepil, a prominent member of the 
Independence Club, went so far as to hope that Russian officers could boost discipline in the 
Korean army.14 After Gojong returned to his palace, the club, however, criticised the Korean 
                                                                                                                                                                  
6 Putiata brought three officers and ten non-commissioned officers with him when he arrived in Korea with Min 
Yeonghwan (1896.10.20). 
7 Kim Hyeonsuk, “Daehan Jegukgi takjibu gomun Alekseyepeu ui jaejeong jeongchaek gwa chinReo hwaldong”, 95. 
8 Ibid., 99. 
9 Ibid., 98. 
10 Ibid., 84. 
11 Dongnip sinmun, 1896.10.24, http://www.kinds.or.kr. 
12 Ibid., 1896.11.5, http://www.kinds.or.kr. 
13 Tikhonov, 71. 
14 Vipan Chandra, Imperialism, Resistance, and Reform in Late Nineteenth-Century Korea: Enlightenment and the 
Independence Club (Berkeley: University of California Press, Institute of East Asian Studies, and Center for Korean 
Studies, 1988), 153. 
15 Dongnip sinmun, 1897.11.18, http://www.kinds.or.kr. Seo also opposed his appointment on the grounds that it 
threatened Korean independence. Chandra, 159. 
16 Dongnip sinmun, 1896.7.2, http://www.kinds.or.kr/. 
17 Ibid., 1897.12.23, http://www.kinds.or.kr/. 
18 Hanguk gyohoesa yeonguso, ed., 1897.4.2, 156-159. 
19 Kim Jongheon et al., ed., Reosia munseo beonyeokjip I: geundae Han-Reo gwangye yeongu [Translated Russian 
Documents Collection I: A Study of Early Modern Russo-Korean Relations] (Seoul: Seonin, 2008), 69.  
20 Gojong might have reckoned that this important concession could help provide American support for Korean 
neutralisation. Sure enough, three years after the transfer of this concession, he appealed to Minister Allen for a U.S. 
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government’s decision to appoint Alexeiev to supervise Korean finances, arguing that this was 
equivalent to surrendering the right of an independent state,15 signalling the club’s growing 
displeasure with Russia.  
Conversely, the U.S. and Britain were regarded as friendly powers by the club, which praised 
the government’s granting of the Gyeongin Railway concession to the American businessman 
James R. Morse as beneficial for the Korean people16 and commended the British parliamentary 
debates between the Foreign Secretary and MPs in London on the Russian occupation of 
Manchuria. The club newspaper later claimed that since Britain’s primary concern in the Korean 
Empire lay in trade, Britain could advance Korean independence and secure its territorial rights and 
internal rule,17 to which it perceived Russia as a threat. 
Another threat to Korean independence was the mad scramble for concessions among major 
powers (Table 6). On the surface, this was not necessarily harmful to Korean interests; De Plancy 
advised Gojong to grant foreign powers mining and railroad concessions that could draw their 
capital to Korea and swing their attention to Korean independence.18 By 1898, foreign 
representatives in Seoul had succeeded in acquiring valuable concessions in Korea. While the 
American Morse obtained the railroad concession linking Seoul to Incheon (29.3.1896) (Diagram 4), 
the railroad construction rights stretching from Seoul to Pyeongyang were given to the French 
(1896) (Diagram 5), a coal mine was awarded to a German firm, and a gold mine in the north 
(4.1896) and lumber concession along the shores of the Yalu and Tumen rivers (9.1896) ended up 
in Russian hands.19 The Unsan gold mine (4.1896), in line with the Korean government’s pro-U.S. 
policy,20 was assigned to Morse while the Danghyeon gold mine (4.1897) concession went to a 
German, Carl Wolter. In addition, Japan acquired the Gyeongbu (8.9.1898) and Gyeongin (1899) 
railroads rights, which it had strategic interests in (Diagram 4).21 
In a way, such concessions helped to maintain Korea’s independence by holding major 
powers in check, but they also aggravated tensions among them, especially between Russia and 
Japan. Through the Independent, the Independent Club asserted that Japan and Russia had already 
                                                                                                                                                                  
guarantee of Korean independence and territorial integrity. Scott S. Burnett, ed., Korean-American Relations: 
Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, Volume III, No.284, 1900.10.2 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 69-70.   
21 Seong Hwangyong, 275-278. 
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received much in the way of concessions from Korea. It concluded that in light of Japan’s frantic 
efforts to reinforce its troops in Korea, Korea’s diplomatic bias toward Russia would be detrimental, 
leaving it caught unprotected between the two in case of a possible Russo-Japanese War.22 Korea 
should thus do all it could to avoid raising the ire of either country, and to that end, adopt 
diplomatic policies which were neutral in intent without bias towards Japan or Russia.23 The club 
asserted the necessity of modernising the military to support such diplomatic efforts since only a 
self-reliant defence could prevent foreign invasions. As Russia, to counter Japan, interfered more 
and more in Korea’s domestic affairs, the club held a Manmin gongdonghoe (people's joint 
association) (9.2.1898) and criticised Russia’s meddling, exposing the heretofore secret Russo-
Korean bank and insisting on the dismissal of the Russian finance adviser and military instructors. 
Coincidentally, Russia, worrying about possible Anglo-Japanese cooperation to counter its southern 
expansion,24 decided to recall its adviser and instructors, shut down the Russo-Korean bank, and 
replace its minister to Korea (12.4.1898).  
About two months later, Russia sought to maintain the status quo on the Korean peninsula by 
heading off military friction with Britain and Japan while switching its focus from Korea to 
Manchuria. Accordingly, Russia, led by Foreign Minister Muraviev’s desire to soothe Japan’s 
displeasure at its advance into Manchuria (i.e. acquirement of the Chinese Eastern Railway 
construction rights and lease of Port Arthur),25 concluded the Rosen-Nishi Protocol (25.4.1898) 
with Japan, occasioning a temporary respite from their bitter rivalry over Korea. The Japanese 
government in turn urged the Russian government to respect Japan’s right to uphold Korean 
sovereignty and independence in exchange for Japan’s recognition of Manchuria as Russia’s sphere 
of influence.26 However, there was another side to this protocol, one that undermined Korean 
neutralisation; though both sides recognised Korean independence and vowed not to intervene in its 
internal affairs, Korea was still unable to shake itself free from Russian and Japanese influence 
owing to the advantages the protocol condoned. But Japan made full use of the opportunity to re-
advance into Korea after acquiring Russia’s confirmation of its economic primacy in Korea.27 
                                                 
22 Dongnip sinmun, 1897.1.14, http://www.kinds.or.kr.  
23 Ibid., 1897.5.25, http://www.kinds.or.kr/. 
24 Choe Munhyeong, 285. 
25 Song Geumyeong, 283. 
26 Ibid., 285. 
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Although the Independence Club practised a selective vigilance over major powers (witness 
its change of heart towards Russia), it deserved to be credited for illuminating the importance of a 
balanced diplomacy, which it believed could best be served by seeking neutrality. The club’s 
support for neutrality diplomacy was greatly influenced by the Jeongdong Club, an informal 
organisation composed of pro-Western reformers in Korea, U.S. Minister to Korea John M. B. Sill, 
missionaries, the French representative De Plancy, and American advisers Dye and Charles W. Le 
Gendre. The club’s links to the multinational members of the Jeongdong Club and their close 
association with the major powers equipped it to critique the Korean Empire’s foreign policy as, for 
example, when it sharply criticised the government for inviting a Russian adviser to manage its 
finances (18.11.1897).28 
The Independence Club may not have won the government’s support for its neutrality 
diplomacy, but not all was lost because a call for a more prudent foreign policy was soon to be 
heard at the court. A former head of the Royal Secretariat, Hong Jongwu, who was unhappy about 
Gojong’s tendency to shift Korean allegiance from one major power to another willy-nilly, was one 
such voice. As the first Korean to study in France, he was familiar with Western imperialism and its 
ramifications for a weak country. Deftly grasping Russia’s strategic importance, he closely 
monitored how major powers handled Korean independence and how Russia maintained cordial 
relations with Korea. Though Russia had offered Gojong a safe haven at its legation, it withdrew its 
forces from Korea in March 1898. Yet despite Japan’s assassination of Queen Min, Japanese forces 
remained in Korea, which daily increased Koreans’ doubts about Japan’s intentions and provided a 
reason for Russia to potentially invade Korea. Hong thus insisted that the State Council should 
contact all foreign ministries and consuls to request the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. 
He also advised that Korea contract with foreign countries to conscientiously abide by international 
law, earning it the right to independence while strengthening itself internally as it accommodated 
itself to international diplomatic methods.29  
                                                                                                                                                                  
27 Seong Hwangyong, 274. 
28 Dongnip sinmun, 1897.11.18, quoted in Choe Deoksu, Daehan Jeguk gwa gukje hwangyeong: sangho insig ui 
chungdol gwa jeophap [The Korean Empire and the International Environment: The Clash and Join of the Mutual 
Perception] (Seoul: Seonin, 2005), 81.  
29 Gojong sillok, 1898.4.16, http://sillok.history.go.kr. 
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Another case which drew on international law was presented by Jeon Byeonghun (1857-
1927).30 Jeon, a former government official, in his memorial to Gojong (1.1.1899) referred to the 
Gongbeop pyeollam 公法便覽 (Handbook of International Law) to prove acknowledged cases for 
independence such as Belgium and Switzerland. He contended that Korea could emulate these 
examples by forwarding official documents to friendly countries and receiving their recognition 
within two or three years, thus preventing external aggression. Jeon’s memorial was highly praised 
by Gojong, who considered it appropriate.31 Basically, Jeon was arguing that Korea should adhere 
to international law to fulfil Korean neutralisation.32 
By referring to the countries that Gojong, who had a tendency to vacillate,33 was familiar 
with—Belgium and Switzerland—Jeon had little difficulty in capturing the monarch’s sympathy for 
his proposal. Like Hong, Jeon did not explicitly mention neutralisation, but his proposal touched on 
the experiences of neutral nations and included a suggestion to obtain consent from friendly powers 
through diplomatic documents. Since neutrality required a binding agreement accompanied by 
major powers’ consensus, Jeon’s memorial closely resembled a typical neutralisation proposal. The 
Achilles’ heel of his plan was that as a former government official and a non-faction member, he 
might not be able to muster enough support from Korea’s faction-ridden bureaucracy, let alone 
predatory major powers. 
In spring 1899, before Allen left for his vacation in the U.S. he had an audience with Gojong. 
At that time, Gojong, overly dependent on U.S. goodwill, asked Allen whether the U.S. could, as it 
had for China, guarantee the territorial integrity of Korea. Gojong’s request was based on a 
newspaper report quoting U.S. Minister to China Edwin H. Conger’s assertion that the U.S. “would 
maintain the integrity of China”. Though Allen strongly expressed his disbelief in the veracity of 
the statement and was personally uncommitted to Korean independence, he agreed to speak to U.S. 
                                                 
30 Schooled in traditional Confucian learning, Jeon served as a royal inspector in 1892 and, after the Korean Empire was 
established, worked in various positions in the central government. In 1898, he submitted a book detailing reformation 
of Korean politics to Gojong. Yun Changdae, Jeongsin cheolhak tongpyeon—Jeon Byeonghun seonsaeng ui saengae 
wa jeongsin eul jungsim euro [A Collected Edition of Mental Philosophy—Focusing on the Life and Spirit of Jeon 
Byeonghun] (Seoul: Uri chulpansa, 2004), 31.   
31 Gojong sillok, 1899.1.1, http://sillok.history.go.kr. 
32 Hyeon Gwangho, “Daehan Jegug ui daeoe jeongchaek”, 44. 
33 Gojong had situationally been approaching the U.S., Russia, Japan, France, and Belgium to protect Korean 
independence and realise its neutralisation and later contacted Italy too.   
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President William McKinley about this subject on Gojong’s behalf.34 Allen thus went to Lake 
Champlain to officially submit Gojong’s formal request for Korean neutralisation to Hay and 
McKinley, but McKinley instructed Allen to “make a negative reply in a suitable form”.35 
Concerned about decreased Korean dependence on the U.S. and hindrance to his country’s 
protection and acquisition of concessions in Korea, Allen delivered his government’s reply to 
Gojong vaguely.36 Nonetheless, in compliance with Allen’s request (21.10.1899),37 the Korean 
government, maintaining its pro-U.S. stance, appointed Sands as an adviser in the Imperial 
Household Department in an effort to strengthen the emperor’s power. 
It was no surprise that the U.S. gave the cold shoulder to Korean neutralisation plan. 
Unbeknownst to Gojong, the U.S. was already leaning towards Japan as Theodore Roosevelt, the 
Governor of New York at that time, told his friend German Ambassador to the U.S. Hermann Speck 
von Sternberg: “I should like to see Japan have Korea. She will be a check upon Russia, and she 
deserves it for what she has done.”38 While Korea might have found this a bitter pill to swallow, it 
merely reaffirmed Roosevelt’s long-held hope that Japan would become stronger to deter Russia in 
East Asia.39 Meanwhile, after Allen’s audience with him in 1899, Gojong began to turn away from 
his almost total affection towards the U.S. as it would not offer good offices to Korea, choosing 
instead to adhere to its “non-intervention” principle.40 
Allen failed to convince his government to back Korean neutrality, but by this time, the ever-
cautious Gojong, despite his early positive perception of Russia, began to suspect the true motives 
behind Russian policy in Korea. Not only did Gojong fear the repercussions of the Russian 
occupation of Manchuria, he also had to, according to newspaper reports in Seoul, cope with 
constant Russo-Japanese military movements around Korea since Japanese Minister Hayashi had 
                                                 
34 Burnett, ed., Allen to Secretary of State. No.284, 1900.10.2, 70. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Despatches from the United States Ministers to Korea, 1883-1905, M134, Allen to Secretary of State, 1900.10.2. 
37 Goryeo daehakgyo, ed., Gu Hanguk oegyo munseo 11: Mian 舊韓國外交文書: 美案 [Old Korean Diplomatic 
Documents: Pertaining to the U.S.] 2, No.2070-2071 (Seoul: Goryeo daehakgyo, 1967), 661-662. 
38 Elting E. Morrison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 
1394. Considering McKinley’s previous rejection of Allen’s proposal, the U.S. government seemed to agree with 
Roosevelt’s pessimistic view of Korea. 
39 Choe Jeongsu, “Rujeubelteu ui daeHan jeongchaek sulip, 1897-1903—ReoIlgan ui sereok gyunhyeong gwa 
gwallyeonhayeo [The Establishment of Roosevelt’s Korean Policy, 1897-1903—With Reference to Balance of Power 
Between Russia and Japan]”, Hanseong sahak (1995): 106.  
40 Son Jeongsuk, “JuHan Miguk gongsa Allen ui oegyo hwaldong (1897~1905) [The Diplomatic Activities of U.S. 
Minister to Korea Horace Allen (1897~1905)]”, Ihwa sahak yeongu 31 (2004): 133. 
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threatened to launch an all-out war against Russia. To complete this unfortunate turn of events, the 
regional environment was not developing in Korea’s favour. The Russian acquisition of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway concession through the secret Treaty of Alliance provided a reason for major 
powers’ competition for concessions (i.e. lease territories, railways, and spheres of influence) in 
China. The race for concessions reduced China to a semi-colony status, thereby prompting U.S. 
Secretary of State John Hay’s “Open Door” policy (6.9.1899). Under this policy, all countries 
would agree not to deny others access to their spheres of influence, but in the absence of sanctions 
to enforce such a policy, it was difficult to dispel the growing fear among some Chinese that their 
country would be “carved up like a melon”.41 Eventually, this policy became one of the main causes 
behind the Boxer Uprising (2.11.1899-7.9.1901). 
Taking the lay of the land and finding on it a tractor pull between Japan and Russia, Gojong 
hand-picked Sands (1874-1946)42 in October 1899 despite facing pressure from these two powers; 
while Japanese Minister Hayashi had requested that Gojong appoint a Japanese national as his 
adviser, his Russian counterpart Stein declared that this was unacceptable unless a Russian was 
appointed to serve in a similar position.43 Unlike his appointments of Denny and Möllendorff, 
whom the Korean government had failed to re-appoint as an adviser in an effort to promote 
neutralisation,44 Sands was neither obliged to report to the U.S. government nor to consult with any 
other major power before implementing Korean foreign policy. Nonetheless, Sands’ diplomacy 
with major powers was still dominated by Japanese and Russian ambitions in Korea since they 
refused to compromise.  
Recognising how Korea’s vulnerable geographical position endangered its sovereignty, Kim 
Hyeonsuk contends that Sands considered Japan Korea’s top threat since Japan believed not only 
                                                 
41 Spence, 222. Hay’s Open Door policy was proclaimed twice in the “Hay Open Door Notes”; the first note was 
delivered to major powers (1899.9.6-11.21), and the second one was circulated (1900.7.3). Seong Hwangyong, 301-
303. 
42 Having been educated in Austria and obtained his PhD in law from Georgetown University, Sands started his 
diplomatic career as the second secretary at the U.S. legation in Tokyo and continued as the first secretary at the U.S. 
legation in Seoul (1898). He then worked as Gojong’s adviser at the Imperial Household Department (1899.11-1904.1). 
Kim Hyeonsuk, “Hanguk geundae seoyangin gomungwan yeongu (1882~1904)”, 166. 
43 Peurangseu oemubu munseo 9: Daehan Jeguk II · 1899-1901, 42. 
44 ChuKan Nihon koshikan kiroku 14, 1899.9.15; 9.23, http://db.history.go.kr/. Min Yeongseon was said to have 
consulted with Min Yeongik about inviting Möllendorff as a government adviser, an offer Möllendorff rejected, citing 
the frequent changes in Korean politics. Hwangseong sinmun 皇城新聞 (Capital Gazette), 1900.5.12, 
http://www.koreanhistory.or.kr/.   
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that Korea was indispensable for its economic development and was a desirable spot for an 
increasing number of Japanese to migrate to, but more importantly, that it was an ideal future base 
for Japanese domination over Continental Asia.45 Sands also added that the Japanese government 
had been meticulous in pursuing a consistent policy without error. He found Japanese Minister 
Hayashi to be cold and shrewd, a career diplomat who pushed for the annexation of Korea from the 
belief that only by following such a path could Japan survive.46 Though he perceived Russia as less 
of a threat than Japan, Sands also worried that Russia was in the process of becoming not only a 
major European power but also the strongest power in Asia. With Russia looking for an ice-free 
port in Korea, the peninsula was vulnerable to Russian invasion.47 Still, Sands regarded Russia as a 
possible diplomatic counterpart, while viewing Japan in a negative light for its many schemes and 
threats.48 
Taking these factors into account, Sands, wishing to stop any further encroachment of Russo-
Japanese influence into Korea, presented his first neutralisation proposal to Gojong in January 
1900.49 Modelled after a Swiss- or Belgian-style permanent neutrality under the joint guarantee of 
major powers, his plan called for the signing of a neutralisation agreement between Korea and 
Western powers and the usage of those powers’ good offices to include Russia and Japan as parties 
to the pact. The major powers could expect to receive two things in return. First, they could secure 
the status quo and an open door policy in Asia through peace on the Korean peninsula. Second, by 
throwing their weight behind Korean reform efforts, major powers could implement and lead 
reform programmes in Korea through a consultative body.50 
Responsibility fell on Korea’s shoulders as well because bold administrative, educational, and 
economic reforms were needed to overcome the country’s economic vulnerability.51 Basically, to 
gain major powers’ confidence in its ability to sustain neutralisation, Korea had to demonstrate that 
it was both politically and economically stable. Sands’ reasoning rang in perfect harmony with the 
                                                 
45 Kim Hyeonsuk, “Hanguk geundae seoyangin gomungwan yeongu (1882~1904)”, 176. 
46 William Franklin Sands, Undiplomatic Memories, (Seoul: Gyeongin publishing, 1975), 210-213. 
47 Ibid., 56-57. 
48 Sands Papers, Box 3, Folder 7, Doc.48, 1900.5.14.  
49 Sands, “Undiplomatic Memories”, 225. 
50 Sands Papers, Box 3, Folder 2, Doc.3, 1904.1.12.  
51 The Korean economy was reeling from low tax revenues, Japanese domination over Korea’s commerce, agriculture, 
marine transportation, and foreign trade, and an over-reliance on foreign loans. Pak Huiho, 209-210.  
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view of foreign diplomats in Korea. Pavloff listed the guarantee of non-aggression by a foreign 
power and the respect of foreigners’ rights in Korea as prerequisites for neutralisation. Allen noted 
that Korean neutralisation would be difficult to achieve because neither national order nor the 
conditions for maintaining independence were in place.52 However, Sands often talked to Gojong at 
length about his plan, finally prevailing upon him to support it. The emperor then directed Sands to 
make neutralisation his main responsibility.53 Thus, Sands was at the forefront of Korean 
neutralisation policy from early 1900 to December 1902 and placed the reform agenda at its 
centre.54  
To advance his policy, Sands cooperated with pro-U.S. faction partisans such as Gang 
Seokho, Min Sangho, Min Yeonghwan, and Min Yeonggi and also counted on support from 
powerful figures in the court, foreigners based in Korea, and foreign advisers who worked for the 
Korean government.55 While Min Sangho, Gang Seokho, and Yi Junyong were instrumental in 
Sands’ appointment,56 Min Yeonghwan, worrying about the absence of a reform advocate within 
the Korea government, stressed that Korea had to approach the U.S., which had no territorial 
ambition. Thus, he worked with fellow pro-U.S. officials Yi Hakgyun and Hyeon Sanggeon to 
acquire U.S. loans to launch reform programmes, including the establishment of a commercial 
bank.57 Min advised staying always on the alert for any Japanese or Russian aggression,58 a 
recommendation that Sands happened to share.  
Sands’ first proposal was a somewhat well-timed initiative for Korean neutralisation. The 
Lobanov-Yamagata and Rosen-Nishi protocols allowed Korea a chance to evade Japanese and 
Russian encroachment and to build relations with a third power like France, which was willing to 
extend loans59 and supply arms to Korea. Having established foreign legations in several major 
European capitals,60 Korea, supported by its ambitious military programme, could now make a case 
for its readiness for neutralisation to European diplomats. By this time, the Korean government had 
resumed running the Mugwan hakgyo 武官學校 (Military Officers School) to train officers,61 
                                                 
52 Pak Nobyeok, HanReo gyeongje gwangye 20nyeon [The Russo-Korean Economic Relations for 20 Years] (Seoul: 
Hanul, 1994), 113-114.  
53 Sands, “Undiplomatic Memories”, 225. 
54 Kim Hyeonsuk, “Hanguk geundae seoyangin gomungwan yeongu (1882~1904)”, 178. 
55 Sands, “Undiplomatic Memories”, 120-121. 
56 Yun Chiho, Yun Chiho ilgi 5, 1900.12.14, 251. 
 160 
circulating military texts incorporating advanced military training methods from France and 
Germany,62 and had already established the Wonsubu 元帥部 (supreme command) to reconfigure 
all Korean military-related bodies.63 
Moreover, as French diplomat Dubail aptly intuited, Korea could take comfort from the 
protocols by persuading surrounding powers to neutralise it for a regional balance of power. 
According to him, the lack of clear consensus between Japan and Russia on Korea forced Japan to 
reluctantly postpone the annexation of Korea so it could exist as a relatively independent country 
like Turkey until the changed interests of neighbouring powers created a new regional order.64 
Sands’ proposal, however, was problematic65; he might have overlooked the potential loss of 
sovereignty resulting from major powers playing an instrumental role in Korean reforms. 
Meanwhile, having witnessed the decline of its prestige in Korea due to Russia’s aggressive 
involvement in Korean affairs since 1896, Japan treated the Boxer Uprising as an opportunity to 
advance its interests in Korea by forming a military alliance with it that placed the Korean military 
under its control.66 However, Japan’s idea was not easily implemented since France by this time 
                                                                                                                                                                  
57 Allen, Vol. 6-2, 1900.4.28, 647. Along with Yi Yunyong, Min also ended up collaborating with Sands to borrow 10 
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developed an active Korean policy as its Far Eastern policy, anticipating the status quo there, which 
was in line with the Korean government’s neutrality policy.67 France, strategically aligned with 
Russia in its Far Eastern policy,68 for instance the Triple Intervention, since the Franco-Russian 
alliance (17.8.1892), was useful to Russia’s efforts to resist Japanese encroachment on Korean 
sovereignty.  
In the spring of 1900, Russia, willing to avoid possible Japanese dominance in Korea by 
strengthening its military footprint there, expressed its interest in leasing Masanpo69 and obtained 
the approval of Gojong, who sought to use this deal as an opportunity to purge the pro-Japan faction 
within Korea.70 Russia could also count on the pro-Russia faction, such as Gojong’s favourite 
Imperial Concubine Lady Eom and her supporters like Min Gyeongsik, Nam Myeongsun, and Yi 
Gyeongsik, whose desire to oust pro-Japan Korean cabinet ministers was known even to Japan.71 
While Russia seemed to be making up ground in Korea, Japan did not remain an idle 
spectator. Sakatani Yoshio, head of the budget bureau in Japan’s Ministry of Finance, and Matsuo 
Shigeyoshi, head of the ministry’s finance bureau, called on Finance Minister Matsutaka Masayoshi 
to appoint as manager of the Seoul branch of the Japanese Dai-Ichi Bank the Japanese 
government’s financial representative in Korea and to direct him to buy gold ore and expand the 
circulation of Japanese convertible notes in March 1900.72 Two months later, Japan contemplated 
taking control of currency reform supervision and loans negotiations for the Korean government as 
other means to expand its influence over Korea.73 Considering that the pro-Japan faction had 
borrowed 5 million yen from Japan in the past, which sowed the seed of Korea’s financial 
dependency,74 these plans did not seem far-fetched. 
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By May 1900, though the Boxer Uprising, insisting upon 扶淸滅洋 (“support the Qing, 
destroy the foreigners”), had spread to several regions, it backfired, resulting in even greater foreign 
intervention in China. Though the eight allied nations’ troops advanced toward Beijing to protect 
foreign residents’ lives and properties and suppress the Boxer Uprising (19.6.1900) and easily took 
possession of Beijing (14.8.1900), the Boxer Protocol (7.9.1901) between China and allied nations 
was forged with difficulty due to several pending issues, such as the punishment of the main 
culprits behind the Boxer Uprising, reparations disputes, and Russian domination of Manchuria. In 
particular, Russia’s occupation of Manchuria from June to October 1900 under the pretext75 of the 
Boxer Uprising put the major powers into motion. To retain control of Manchuria, Russia forced 
China to first ratify the Alexeiev-Tseng Agreement (26.11.1900) and to later replace it with a 
twelve-article treaty in February 1901,76 but such moves were met with stiff opposition from Britain, 
Japan, the U.S. and Germany, thereby resulting in, in fairly short order, the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance and the Russo-Japanese War.77 
The expansion of the Boxers’ influence left Korea facing an acute dilemma. The Korean 
government informed foreign representatives in Seoul that Korea would not sympathise with the 
Boxer Uprising,78 while Gojong hosted a meeting with foreign representatives to sound out major 
powers’ Korean policies in relation to it.79 Gojong worried that if a Boxer Uprising-like rebellion 
were to erupt in Korea, major powers might send forces to repress it, thus opening the way for the 
partitioning of Korea, upsetting the balance of power on the Korean peninsula and thereby 
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shattering Korea’s hard-earned peace; this might be a scenario that could jeopardise Korea’s 
neutralisation prospects. Sure enough, Russian Minister to Korea Alexandr Ivanovich Pavloff, 
likening the Russian military to a tiger and the Japanese forces to that of a monkey, warned Gojong 
that if Korea were to rely on Japan, it would only lead to national ruin (13.6.1900). In July, when 
news that the remnants of the Boxers were about to raid the northern part of Korea reached Gojong, 
the emperor feared that it was a prelude to a Russian attack on Korea,80 a fear exacerbated by 
Pavloff’s request for permission that Russian forces be allowed to enter Korea.81  
The dispatch of Russian forces to Manchuria was not only part of the ripple effect from the 
Boxer Uprising, but also a long-awaited opportunity for the Russian government to implement its 
Korean policy. The going, however, wasn’t all downhill for a diplomatic corps saddled with 
inefficiency and incompetence. All Russian policies required the emperor’s stamp of approval, 
which ensured that its foreign policy was largely shaped by Emperor Nicholas II’s favourites. In 
early July 1900, Russian Finance Minister Sergei Witte, one such favourite, requested the emperor’s 
approval to send Russian forces to Manchuria for securing the Chinese Eastern railway and 
suppressing the Boxers. At the same time, Witte also had to be ready to send troops to northern 
Korea in case a Boxer incursion there led to Japan dispatching troops to the area to restore order.82 
At this critical juncture, the Russian czar issued an edict ordering his officials to prepare the 
grounds for friendly negotiations with Japan in case the Boxers reached Korea. Russian Foreign 
Minister Vladmir Nikolaevitch Lamsdorff followed up on these instructions by ordering Izvolsky 
(15.7.1900) to inform Japan of the need to send Russian forces to the north of the peninsula to 
protect Russian territory. Lamsdorff also insisted that reaching an agreement with Japan by 
designating respective spheres was Russia’s best course of action. On the same day, he instructed 
Pavloff to acquire Gojong’s approval for Russian troops to cross the Korean border in case of 
emergency.83 Therefore, four days later, Izvolsky suggested, basing his proposal on the Lobanov-
Yamagata Protocol, the partitioning of Korea as well as the stationing of troops to protect the new 
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borders to Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō, Prime Minister Yamagata, and Itō (23.7.1900).84 Pavloff in 
turn proposed to Hayashi that a conference be held in Tokyo to finalise an agreement between the 
two nations that would place the defence of the north under Russian command and that would give 
leave for Japan’s forces to land at Incheon and lay claim to its sphere on the peninsula.85 
The necessity of a new agreement for the partitioning of spheres of influence in Korea was 
also being considered by Japan due to the dispatch of Russian troops to Manchuria and the action of 
the Boxers in proximity to northern Korea.86  In particular, Japanese genrō responded positively to 
the Russian overture,87 citing that if Japan took full control of Korea it could be the cause of open 
war with Russia and that Japan was unprepared financially and militarily to take on Russia. Prime 
Minister Yamagata later insisted that the spheres of influence be drawn along the Daedong River 
and the Wonsan Bay (20.8.1900).88 But Aoki and a line-up of foreign ministers opposed the 
partitioning of the Korean peninsula into spheres of influence (21.7.1900),89 and both Japanese 
Minister to Russia Komura (22.7.1900)90 and Hayashi (23.7.1900)91 submitted reports to Aoki 
recommending that Korea be exchanged for Manchuria on the condition that Japan control Korea 
completely.  
          Around this time, rumours were circulating within Korea that Japan and Russia had reached 
an agreement on the partitioning of Korea and that both powers were going to send forces to Korea. 
The Hwangseong sinmun revealed that Russia offered some type of deal to Japan92 but that Japan 
rejected Russia’s suggestion for the partitioning of Korea.93 Unlike the genrō’s passive stance, the 
Japanese government’s rejection of Russia’s suggestion might have been profoundly affected by the 
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Japanese Army and Navy; hard-liners within the Japanese military persisted in pushing for making 
Korea a protectorate of Japan by force or for considering the division of Korea into three parts (two 
northern provinces to Russia, three southern provinces to Japan, and three central provinces to 
Korea) (4.7.1900).94 Other hard-liners pressed the Japanese government to decline the Russian 
suggestions and colonise Korea by dispatching Japanese troops to Korea or concluding the Korean-
Japanese Military Alliance, as Konoe Atsumaro had recommended.95 Finally, Aoki requested that 
“Manchuria be Russian sphere of influence and Korea be Japanese sphere of influence” to 
Lamsdorff via Komura, rejecting Russia’s suggestion (29.7.1900).96  
          Aoki pursued his plan to exchange Manchuria for Korea in secret negotiations with Germany 
and the U.S. in August and September 1900, where he obtained their reassurances that they would 
not object to Korea being drawn into the Japanese sphere of influence and that they would retain an 
amicable neutrality in the event of a Russo-Japanese clash.97 Encouraged, Aoki sought to 
compensate Russia for its loss of influence in Korea by acknowledging Manchuria as Russia’s. For 
this reason, he later went on to reject Jo Byeongsik’s neutralisation proposal (see later), pushing 
him to have Korea rely on Japan, and was in turn bitterly rebuffed by Jo.98 
Nevertheless, the Korean neutralisation issue was brought to the fore again around this time 
by some Japanese university figures, who subsequently threw their weight behind the Russo-
Japanese joint rule of Korea. French Minister Jules Harmand, without deeply delving into the 
neutralisation proposal, reported to Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé that these proponents 
desired to have it debated at a conference involving major powers.99 The Japanese newspaper 
Yomiuri shimbun joined the debate by devoting an editorial to calling for the neutralisation of Korea 
(12.8.1900). The editorial began by describing the proposal of Japanese Minister to Korea Hayashi 
for the establishment of Japanese communication infrastructure in Incheon and the stationing of a 
Japanese military contingent in Korea in case a major incident broke out along the Sino-Korean 
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border. Although Hayashi claimed to have received Gojong’s approval for the dispatch of Japanese 
troops to Korea, the Yomiuri shimbun urged moderation, reminding its readers of the Russo-
Japanese agreement that required Japan to inform Russia before taking any military action. It also 
illustrated the Russian position on the Korean peninsula and in Manchuria, expressing its fear about 
the growing Russian intrusion around the Korean border. 
Moreover, this editorial wondered whether Russia would inform Japan in advance if Russian 
forces were to be stationed in Korea and feared a repetition of 1894 when the presence of Chinese 
and Japanese troops in Korea triggered war. This is not to suggest that war was imminent between 
Japan and Russia. No hostility existed between them after the bilateral commercial treaty (1894) 
that was revised two years later in Tianjin, and relations between both countries were mostly 
amicable. Although now could be the right moment for major countries having stakes in Korea to 
jointly formulate a new plan there, the future of Korea remained uncertain without any definite 
measures to protect its current status; Korea’s small land mass, its weak military, and its strategic 
location between Japan and Russia made it vulnerable to attack under a variety of circumstances, 
even if the Russo-Japanese War were avoidable.  
However, were Japan and Russia to enter into a conflict, its effects could spread, disrupting 
stability worldwide. For this reason, the Yomiuri shimbun contended that Korea should adopt either 
a Belgian- or Swiss-style permanent neutrality. With the permanent neutrality of Korea having 
already been discussed within Japan as the only viable option for Asian peace, the newspaper made 
its case before major powers, in the wake of the Boxer Uprising in China, were to hold a meeting on 
the future of China, suggesting the issue of Korea’s fate could be added to the agenda. The editorial 
thus urged Japan to make a case for permanent neutrality of Korea to the major European powers, 
arguing as well that more discussions should take place within Japan on this issue.100  
Unfortunately, this proposal did not seem to have been adopted since there was no evidence 
that the Japanese government took up the newspaper’s suggestion. This was understandable 
considering Russia’s unwillingness to cede Korea to Japanese control. Nevertheless, the 
neutralisation proposal was a worthwhile strategy for Japan to pursue because, as the Yomiuri 
shimbun aptly pointed out, Korea was at the centre of Asian stability. Ironically, despite its 
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awareness of Korea’s weak military, the Yomiuri shimbun did not seem to believe that this 
undermined Korea’s neutralisation prospects—the very same reason that later led Konoe to reject 
Jo’s coming neutralisation offer.  
Earlier, although the signing of the Rosen-Nishi Protocol heralded the relative decline of 
Russian influence over Korea, the Russian government had been reluctant to sanction any changes 
that would involve other major powers. Instead, Russia preferred to resolve any lingering problems 
surrounding the Korean peninsula by negotiating with Japan.101 Russia’s stance could not have sat 
well with Korea, however, since in addition to the protocol, pro-Russia official Kim Hongnyuk 
attempted to assassinate Gojong.102 This forced Korea to seek a third country, and France, despite 
its close alliance with Russia, became an attractive option as mentioned above. This undoubtedly 
influenced Yi Beomjin’s appointment as Korean Minister to Russia, France, and Austria 
(20.3.1899) and Korea’s participation in the Exposition Universelle held at Paris in April 1900.103               
Korea’s growing ties with France also contributed to the neutralisation drive of Alphonse 
Tremule, who first came to Seoul in December 1899 to look for art pieces to be displayed at the 
upcoming world’s fair in Paris. The death of his sponsor, however, unexpectedly prolonged his stay 
in Korea, which gave Tremule the chance to drum up business with the Korean government. 
Tremule struck a deal with the government, which signed on with him to purchase 10,000 rifles 
from France, but the sale stalled due to Korean government ministers’ opposition.104 In response, 
Tremule, who by then was serving as a mining engineer at the Imperial Household Department, 
approached Jo Byeongsik regarding another arms deal. Tremule made his sales pitch in response to 
Korea’s obvious need for greater military capability in its drive toward neutralisation.  
Later, thanks to Jo’s recommendation, Tremule was allowed to attend a meeting at the palace, 
held during the evening to escape Japanese surveillance, at which he called on Gojong to suggest 
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neutralisation to Japan105 for preserving stability in the Far East. This seemed to strike a chord with 
Gojong, who, favouring a new direction in Korean neutralisation, dispatched Jo to Tokyo to obtain 
consent from major powers for Korean neutralisation. Tremule’s plans never hatched, however, 
because Jo could not convince any major powers to back them.106 Even though Pavloff disparaged 
Korea’s neutralisation attempt by depicting it as a means for Tremule’s personal profit, he should 
have realised that the measure was a new path being taken by Korea to prevent Japanese 
colonisation.107 This was manifested clearly when Jo, as part of his mission to Japan, sought consent 
for Korean neutralisation from Aoki.  
Jo’s appointment as minister to execute diplomatic missions was also part of Gojong’s hope 
to accommodate the pro- and anti-U.S. factions which were contesting for control of Korean foreign 
policy; while the pro-Japan faction showed little enthusiasm in Korean neutralisation as members 
like Pak Jesun maintained close links with Japanese ministers in Korea, a pro-U.S. faction member 
like Yi Hayeong regarded the U.S. as a country with no territorial ambitions in Korea.108 Gojong, 
despite his previous disappointments with the U.S., still put great stock in the perceived U.S. 
goodwill towards Korea and now tried to pursue neutrality diplomacy through Allen, who, he 
assumed, could influence the U.S. government. Unfortunately, Gojong’s efforts were stymied by 
the Korean political establishment’s alignment with major powers. His response was to make Jo, a 
non-faction member,109 his point-man on neutralisation,110 His appointment demonstrated that 
despite the abolition of the old social status system, yangban scholar-officials continued to occupy 
the majority of high-profile foreign policy-related positions in Korea. Not only could he not speak 
any foreign language, he also possessed limited knowledge about Japan, though he served as 
foreign minister before the Sino-Japanese War.111 
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But Gojong’s appointment of Jo as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to 
Japan to win favour of Japan and the U.S. regarding neutralisation (7.8.1900) was less than 
straightforward.112 For one, the editor of the Japanese newspaper Kanjō shinhō Kikuchi Kenzo had 
persuaded Gu Wanseo, a special attendant to Gojong, to recommend Jo to Gojong.113 Omiwa 
Zoube, too, during an audience with Gojong, pressed for the dispatch of a Korean envoy to Japan 
and eventually accompanied Jo to Tokyo.114 While behind the scenes, Hayashi worked to ensure 
that Jo would be appointed, regardless of his anti-Japan views, and played a critical role in shaping 
Korean neutralisation policy to Japan’s advantage. When Gojong was despondent about the failure 
of Sands’ aforesaid neutralisation proposal to gain a hearing, Hayashi suggested Gojong have a 
high-level government official attend a major powers’ envoy session in Tokyo to obtain Korean 
neutrality and independence with Japanese and British assistance.115  
Though Allen reckoned that Hayashi recommended Jo to Gojong to strengthen Japanese 
influence over the Korean court,116 he missed his tip; Hayashi’s real interest lay in the Japan-Korea 
military alliance. Covertly assisting Kikuchi and Omiwa’s activities in Seoul, he reported to his 
superiors that Gojong was contemplating a military alliance with Japan in exchange for Korean 
political exiles currently in Japan.117 Hayashi calculated that once Jo was in Japan, he could 
outmanoeuvre Jo so that his reports to Gojong would influence the emperor to agree to the military 
alliance.118 
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While Japan readied itself for the prospects of such an alliance, the Korean government set its 
sights on implementing neutralisation. Once the Boxer Uprising in China opened up the possibility 
of major powers’ dispatching forces to Korea, Gojong instructed Jo to suggest an international 
agreement to the Japanese government and foreign diplomatic representatives in Japan.119 Jo told 
Prince Konoe that he was appointed solely to advance Korean neutralisation and that a military 
alliance between Korea and Japan was inconceivable (29.8.1900).120 Konoe responded that to 
become a neutral state, Korea had to possess sufficient self-defence capabilities and had to obtain 
recognition of independence from Russia and Japan, since both had a substantial stake in Korea, 
regardless of other powers’ interest in Korean concessions such as railroads and mining. If not, 
Korean neutralisation was impossible. To secure its independence, Korea should form a military 
alliance with Japan, and concentrate on its internal affairs to build a “wealthy country and powerful 
military”. Jo was unswayed by Konoe’s arguments, arguing that irrespective of a military alliance, 
Japan would send its forces to Korea, and that because he was tasked only with pursuing 
neutralisation he was unable to make any unilateral decisions.121 
Undeterred, Jo sounded out Japanese Foreign Minister Aoki on whether Korea could follow in 
the footsteps of Belgium and Switzerland to realise neutralisation and requested Japan’s assistance 
in doing so (14.9.1900).122 Aoki first explained the economic circumstances and historical 
developments that allowed Belgium and Switzerland to maintain neutrality and preserve their 
independence amongst major powers, and asked Jo whether Korea’s situation was really analogous.  
Jo replied to Aoki that Korea differed from them in certain aspects but thought neutralisation was 
still achievable. Aoki stonewalled Jo, but their neutralisation negotiations were covered in the 
Japanese press and eventually attracted attention from British Chargé d’affaires Whitehead and 
Izvolsky.123 
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The Japanese government refused to support Korean neutralisation since extending its 
dominance over Korea took priority. A prominent politician and member of the Tōa dōbunkai 
東亞同文會 (East Asia Common Culture Society), which pursued a Pan Asian political movement, 
Konoe thought that Russia was behind Jo’s neutralisation proposal, believing that it had instigated it 
to buy time to consolidate its control over Manchuria before expanding into Korea.124 The Japanese 
government therefore made a counterproposal to Jo to advance Korean neutralisation, putting 
forward a bilateral military alliance between Korea and Japan centred on the training of 50,000 
Korean troops under Japanese command. Additionally, the Japanese government was willing to 
loan 10 million yen to Korea for internal reforms.125 
Gojong, inspired by Sands’ neutralisation plan above, which prioritised internal reforms, 
immediately accepted Japan’s proposal, sending his personal letter co-signed by the Imperial 
Household and Foreign Ministers to Jo.126 Subsequently, the Korean government sounded out major 
powers’ intentions to guarantee Korean neutralisation, provided it would build up a modern 
standing army of 50,000 men and nominate two military officials to transform its military.127 But 
before Korea could take these steps, Jo relayed the news that Japan, believing Korea could never 
accomplish the proposed military build-up, had reneged on its proposal.128 Jo ascribed Japan’s 
sudden volte-face to the pro-Japan faction within the court.129 Allen, for one, suspected that Russian 
Minister Pavloff blocked the loan.130 Russia was on Japan’s mind as well; Itō Hirobumi, fearing a 
Japan-Korea alliance could antagonise Russia, demanded the prospective cabinet reject the loan 
proposal.131 
After the efforts for a Japanese-led neutralisation proposal, military alliance, and loan 
agreement all failed, Gojong instructed Jo to return to Korea, who instead started another round of 
neutralisation negotiations. In late September 1900, fearing that conflict between Japan and Russia 
was imminent and that Japan was seeking to annex Korea, Jo requested U.S. Minister to Japan Buck 
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have the U.S. lead Korean neutralisation.132 Referring to Switzerland’s success, Jo called for the 
U.S. to cooperate with other major powers to achieve an international guarantee of Korean 
independence and neutrality. Buck, however, refused Jo’s request, explaining that it was improper 
for him to call for neutralisation and that the Korean minister in the U.S. should appeal directly to 
the U.S. government.133 
Jo, for whatever reasons—overenthusiasm, inexperience, or cultural barriers—misconstrued 
Buck’s intentions and reported to Gojong that the guarantee of Korean neutralisation could not be 
resolved through Japan and would be better served if the U.S. proposed it to other powers, and that 
Buck would suggest neutralisation to the U.S. president on returning home. Overjoyed at Jo’s 
report, the Korean court presumed that the U.S. was now extending a helping hand, though in fact 
as Buck wrote to Allen, no such promise was ever made to Jo: 
No assurance that I would take the matter up with the State Department and while 
expressing my kind feeling and that of the United States toward Korea, I gave him to 
understand that it would not be proper for me to do so: suggesting that, if the Korean 
Government desired to accomplish the ends he had in view, it could approach my 
Government on the subject through its representative in Washington.134 
 
Undaunted, Gojong resolved to instruct Jo to pursue neutralisation together with the U.S. minister 
in Japan.135 
After receiving Buck’s account of his meeting with Jo, Allen worked to dampen Korea’s 
enthusiasm for a U.S.-led Korean neutralisation, sharing Buck’s telegram with Gojong to convince 
him that the court’s reliance on U.S. backing was misguided.136 Allen’s actions were not 
unexpected; due to the U.S.’s traditional neutralism and hands-off policy, McKinley and Hay had 
already refused the guarantee of Korean territorial integrity and neutralisation Gojong requested in 
his handwritten letter as they did not wish to entangle the U.S. in Korea’s political conflicts.137 
Although pro-U.S. faction leader Min Sangho had tipped Allen off about the court’s interest in 
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neutralisation, Allen seemed to suspect that Pavloff was instrumental in persuading Jo to keep Allen 
in the dark about his dealings with Buck. Allen, however, discovered that through frequent 
audiences with Gojong, Pavloff had assured Gojong that Russia was Korea’s only friend and would 
always work to protect it. Gojong also acknowledged that Japan had proposed neutralisation as a 
means to weaken Korea and that the U.S. was siding with Japan to oppose Korea.138 
Having found out about Pavloff’s assurances to Gojong, Allen assumed Russia favoured Jo’s 
neutralisation proposal, but contrary to his assumptions, Russia's opposition to the proposal was just 
as adamant as the U.S.'s. In fact, Pavloff and Izvolsky were collaborating to stymie the Korean 
government.139 According to Japanese intelligence, Pavloff, during his audience with Gojong 
(26.9.1900), told Gojong that the neutralisation proposal was futile since the contemporary Korean 
situation was unsuitable. Izvolsky was also hostile to this proposal, thinking the Korean government 
unable to implement and maintain neutrality.140 After hearing that the Korean court was excited 
over Jo’s meeting with Buck, Pavloff, quoting Izvolsky’s telegram, asked Allen about the U.S. 
position on Korean neutralisation.141 
Allen categorically denied that he or the U.S. was active in Korea neutralisation.142 Relieved 
by this response, Pavloff put the blame on Japan, suspecting that it was masterminding Korean 
neutrality to bring Korea closer through a Japan-Korea defence alliance that involved Japanese 
command of Korean military training under the guise of guaranteeing Korea's territorial integrity.143 
He hence visited Gojong, who by now regarded Russia as a threat rather than as an ally, several 
times to explain Russia's position, warning him that Russia would not accept any political and 
diplomatic agreements between Korea and other powers if Russia were not first consulted.144 British 
Minister to Korea John Newell Jordan added that Pavloff thought Jo’s proposal impractical because, 
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as he had explained to Gojong, the Rosen-Nishi Protocol between Russia and Japan already 
established a certain kind of neutralisation in Korea145 by confirming Korean sovereignty and the 
two countries’ non-interference in Korean affairs. 
Japan in turn pointed its finger at Russia. Not only did the Tōa dōbunkai suspect Russia 
openly, but the Japanese establishment did not get along with Jo, who three years earlier had been 
made a cabinet member under pressure from Russian Chargé d’affaires De Speyer. When Izvolsky 
asked Japanese Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki for his opinion on Jo’s proposal (20.12.1900), 
Japan’s suspicion of Russia grew,146 even though Russia opposed the proposal. Jo’s above 
neutralisation proposals were victims of negative reactions from Japan, U.S., and Russia and their 
mistrust; little wonder then that the Korean government had summoned him home (28.10.1900).147  
· Neutralisation Strategies After the Russian Occupation of Manchuria (1901-1902) 
After occupying China’s Three Eastern Provinces in October 1900, pushing Russia to place 
Manchuria under its control, designed its new Korean policy against Japan, while proceeding with 
negotiations vis-a-vis China. To this end, the Russian emperor’s confidant Witte weighed two 
options: one was to leave it as a bilateral issue between Korea and Japan, and the other was to 
discuss the neutralisation of Korea with major Western powers. He opted for the second, seeing it as 
advantageous in the contemporary East Asian situation.148 Manchuria was central to Witte’s Far 
Eastern policy and to protect Russian interests there the Korean peninsula had to be stabilised. For 
this, the following obstacles to Witte’s Korean policy had to be overcome in advance.  
        Witte had to first deal with the court faction led by Alexsandr Mikhailovich Bezobrazov. 
Having convinced Nicholas II of the need for Russian influence and economic expansion in Korea, 
Bezobrazov’s faction won his approval in March 1898149 and took over a timber concession on the 
shore of the Yalu River from Iu. I. Briner, an original rights holder (23.5.1898).150 They also sought 
a mining concession by sending an expedition to Gojong in June 1898,151 and even tried to set up 
the East Asiatic Development Company to handle concessions in Korea in March 1900.152 
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However, the court faction soon encountered strong opposition from Witte and Foreign Minister 
Muraviev, who wished to take a softer stance towards Japan to reduce tensions. If not, war with 
Japan was possible.153  
The contemplated dispatch of Russian military forces to Korea was another impediment to 
Witte’s Korean policy. In case the Boxer Uprising made inroads into northern Korea, Emperor 
Nicholas II and Army Minister Alexei Kuropatkin considered sending Russian troops into Korea to 
pursue them.154 This led to Pavloff requesting permission from the Korean government for Russian 
troops to cross over into its territory, and to argue that the defence of Korea’s north might be better 
left to the Russian military.155 Once again, the calming influence of Witte, however, gained the 
upper hand as he reminded the military that Russia could not afford to upset its relations with major 
powers over Korea until completing the TSR in Manchuria. Therefore, although Kuropatkin still 
believed that Korea should become a protectorate of Russia, he agreed with Witte to tread carefully 
and consider all ramifications before undertaking any military action.156 
The transformation of the Japanese government’s East Asian strategy added another twist to 
Witte’s Korean strategy. As mentioned above, Aoki contended that if the Russian occupation of 
Manchuria persisted, Japan had no choice but to “protect” Korea; it would be more advantageous 
for both Japan and Russia to trade Korea (Japanese control) and Manchuria (Russian control). 
Komura had a similar view, pointing out to Aoki that if Russia desired an agreement with Japan, 
Japan should have a free hand in Korea similar to that of Russia in Manchuria. Ultimately, Komura 
contacted Witte to explicitly call for the exchange of Korea for Manchuria in October 1900, but 
Witte opposed this move because it would change the status quo in the region and so told Komura 
that Korean independence had to be recognised, and as for Manchuria, Russia’s interests had to be 
respected.157 
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The most serious impediment to Witte’s Korean policy was the Japanese establishment’s 
perception that Russia would occupy Manchuria permanently. In response to Russia’s occupation of 
Manchuria, there were growing calls for the Japanese army and navy to use the Boxer Uprising as a 
justification for invading Korea and making it Japan’s protectorate. This was also insisted upon by 
the anti-Russian Tōa dōbunkai―a pro-expansionist group—which rejected even the consideration 
of the establishment of Russo-Japanese spheres of influence in Korea.158 To safely consolidate its 
position in Manchuria, Russia thus had to first stabilise its periphery, the Korean peninsula. To 
accomplish this in light of Japan’s expansion into Korea, Russia had to find a way to ease the 
Russo-Japanese tensions without colonising Korea, a move Russian Emperor Nicholas II 
opposed.159  
Under these circumstances, one possible way to reduce the tensions between Russia and Japan, 
in Witte’s view, was to have Korea remain neutral. Unlike the Moskovskiye Vedomosti, which 
genuinely committed itself to permanent neutrality, Witte’s neutralisation policy, by his own 
admission, was an ad hoc measure to temporarily protect Korea from Japanese invasion.160 Witte, 
worried about Japan’s possible invasion of Korea, in his letter to Russian Interior Minister Dmitry 
Sergeyevich Sipyagin (1.10.1900) insisted that neutralisation could not only prevent a Japanese 
invasion of Korea but could also be a temporary option for protecting Manchuria and the Korean 
peninsula until Russia completed the TSR and solidified its presence in northern China, when it was 
assumed that Korea would fall into Russian hands.161 
Around the time of Witte’s message to Sipyagin, Poklevski, Russian councillor at the Russian 
legation in Japan, queried the moderates, Itō and Inoue Kaoru about the possibility of transforming 
Korea into a neutral state under the joint protection of Japan and Russia.162 The formal suggestion 
of Korean neutralisation, however, came a few months later, when Lamsdorff instructed Alexander 
Petrovich Izvolsky (1856-1919)163 to suggest Korean neutralisation to the Japanese government.164 
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After receipt of said instructions, Izvolsky first consulted with Itō and Inoue, and then 
formally proposed a guarantee of the permanent neutrality of Korea to the Japanese government 
(7.1.1901). Izvolsky asserted that the Russian government believed the neutralisation of Korea 
under the joint protection of major powers to be a wise policy. Before taking any further steps, 
though, the Russian government, weighing Japan’s interests in Korea and the existing agreements 
between Japan and Russia, preferred to negotiate with its Japanese counterpart under the conditions 
that the neutralisation issue would be discussed confidentially and amicably.165 He then told Foreign 
Minister Katō that Korean neutralisation could eliminate Japan’s anxieties, namely Russia’s 
occupation of Manchuria and the danger of a Russian invasion of Korea. Izvolsky added that 
Russian interests in Korea were passive and political and would not allow for a strong neighbouring 
country (Japan) to remain in Korea.166 In other words, Russia wanted neutralisation of Korea under 
the joint guarantee of major powers while maintaining existing Russo-Japanese interests there.  
Both Itō and Inoue looked favourably upon the proposal, judging it as beneficial for Japan, 
but Katō remained cautious. Katō informed Japanese ministers in Western countries, China, and 
Korea of Izvolsky’s proposal167 and instructed them to prepare countermeasures against it 
(8.1.1901). Japanese Minister to Britain Hayashi Tadasu replied that Russia’s neutralisation 
proposal was an outgrowth of British and German connivance due to their respective interests in 
East Asia and mutual relationship. According to Hayashi, if Germany wanted to survive amidst an 
allied France and Russia, it could ill afford to alienate Britain. Britain, for its part, had to maintain 
close relations with Germany if it wanted to exploit the German-Austrian-Italian structure to its 
advantage.168 
This could explain why, in Hayashi’s view, Germany and Britain would support a Russia-
sponsored Korean neutralisation. If Japan occupied Korea, this could lead to Russian primacy in 
China, forcing Germany to participate in another Triple Intervention, which it bitterly regretted 
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having done. Thus, it would be wise for Germany to remain neutral regarding a Russo-Japanese 
conflict on the Korean peninsula and accept Russia’s neutralisation proposal. Britain had no reason 
to reject it either. Hayashi also opined that for a number of reasons—the close relationship between 
the British and Russian royal families, shared races, customs, religion, and trade—Britain was 
bound to be closer to Russia than to Japan. Practically speaking, Britain’s engagement in the 
Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) in South Africa forced Britain to remain strictly neutral in the 
East Asian conflict and support Russia’s Korean neutralisation plan.169 
Meanwhile, Japanese Chargé d’affaires to Korea Yamaza Enjirō expressed his scepticism of 
Russia’s Korean neutralisation plan, as shown in his report (11.1.1901) to Katō. Yamaza asserted 
that there was no sign of negotiation between Korea and Russia, that relations between the two 
countries appeared less than ideal, and that the Russian government’s proposal seemed to be a 
stalling tactic. Pavloff described Korea’s real situation as hopeless, which, if accurate, ensured that 
the Russian neutralisation proposal, mentioned in the previous telegraph by Katō, would be 
impossible to implement.170 
On the same day, Japanese Minister to China Komura delivered his thoughts on Korean 
neutralisation to Katō. Komura reckoned Russia’s plan would pose serious obstacles. First, Korean 
neutralisation could keep Russia bottled up in Manchuria and would rob Japan of its present 
position in Korea. Second, the proposal would greatly impact Japan’s determination and ability to 
retain maximum benefits, both politically and economically, in Korea. Since the Russian proposal 
was based on the presumption that Russia would retain freedom of manoeuvre in Manchuria, the 
Korean problem, if it was not inextricably linked with the Manchuria issue, could not be solved 
satisfactorily. Unless Russia agreed to designate Manchuria a neutral zone, the Japanese 
government would not, under any circumstances, condone the Russian plan to neutralise Korea. In 
that situation, Japan would have no choice but to push for a division of spheres of influence; Korea 
would become the Japanese sphere of influence and Manchuria would be Russia’s.171 
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The noteworthy aspect of Komura’s report to Katō was his attempt to deal with the Korean 
problem by linking it with the Manchuria issue. This marked a radical departure from the strategy 
adopted by former Japanese Foreign Minister Aoki, who wanted to solve the Manchuria and Korea 
issues separately. Though it was the first time that a member of the Japanese diplomatic corps 
raised this scheme, Komura’s thoughts may have subsequently induced Japanese diplomats to 
regard Manchuria and Korea as inseparable issues. As a part of the solution, Komura called for the 
simultaneous neutralisation of Manchuria and Korea, but he also suggested an exchange of 
Manchuria and Korea as a second alternative.172  
Meanwhile, civic groups such as the Tōa dōbunkai and Kokumin dōmeikai 國民同盟會 
(National League) opposed Russia’s Korean neutralisation proposal, claiming that the current 
situation in Manchuria was endangering the status quo in China, a precondition to a successful 
Korean neutralisation.173 Katō also opposed the Russian proposal because he believed the 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria must take precedence. More to the point, Japan’s 
participation in the Anglo-German Agreement (16.10.1900) between British Foreign Secretary 
Marquess of Salisbury and German Ambassador to Britain Count von Hatzfeldt, which stipulated 
the open door policy and territorial integrity of China, clearly showed Japanese intentions to counter 
Russia in Manchuria. Moreover, if Japan accepted Russia’s proposal for Korean neutralisation, it 
would create the impression that Japan planned to approve the Sino-Russian agreement on 
Manchuria.174 Since both Komura and Katō were dead set against a Korean neutralisation that 
might solidify the status quo in Manchuria, which would put Russia in the catbird seat, Izvolsky’s 
proposal seemed doomed to fail. 
Katō then had to persuade people like Itō, who were receptive to the Russian proposal, that it 
was untenable. After borrowing Komura’s idea, Katō sent a telegraph to Japanese Minister to 
Russia Chinda Sutemi as part of the official response of the Japanese government to Russia’s 
Korean neutralisation proposal (17.1.1901). In its reply, the Japanese government began by 
reminding its Russian counterpart about Russia’s right of usage to parts of the Liaodong peninsula. 
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Stressing that this was only temporary and applied to an area removed from Korea, Japan argued 
that Russia’s Liaodong concession did not necessarily conflict with the spirit of the second article of 
the Triple Intervention, in which Russia, France and Germany opposed Japan’s possession of 
Liaodong on the grounds that it permanently threatened Beijing, the capital of China, and rendered 
illusive the independence of Korea. This was why Japan did not hesitate in entering the Rosen-Nishi 
Protocol with Russia, but Russia’s current actions in Manchuria did little to reassure major powers. 
The only consolation was Russia’s previous announcement that it would withdraw its troops from 
Manchuria. Since Japan still viewed the protocol as binding, it, in Japan’s view, should apply to the 
current issue. In this situation, to avoid any conjectures and arguments about Korean neutralisation, 
the Japanese government wanted to return to the previous state of affairs, a Manchuria not 
dominated by Russia, and to delay the discussion of this neutralisation plan until it could be 
reviewed freely without outside distractions.175  
On the same day the Japanese government’s message reached the Russian government, Katō 
met with Izvolsky to explain Japan’s position on Korean neutralisation and exchange views on 
Manchuria. Katō told Izvolsky that since the Russian government had announced its retreat from 
Manchuria several times, it must be true to its word. Once Russia withdrew from Manchuria, there 
would still be plenty of time to discuss the neutrality of Korea. Izvolsky did not buy into Katō’s 
argument, asserting that Manchuria and Korea were two different matters, but Katō contended that 
they were related and inseparable, saying that if Japan and Russia reached a consensus on extending 
the guarantee of neutrality to Manchuria or if they divided the spheres of influence, only then could 
Izvolsky’s proposal be contemplated by Japan.176 
Meanwhile, Chinda forwarded Katō’s message to Lamsdorff (22.1.1900). Two days later 
Lamsdorff personally communicated Russia’s position on Katō’s telegraph to Chinda, indicating 
that Russia was satisfied with the existing Russo-Japanese negotiations and did not see any reason 
why a third power should intervene. Lamsdorff added that Russia had proposed Korean 
neutralisation without any hidden intentions because it felt that, as Komura had earlier stated, Japan 
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seemed unhappy with the current status of Korea. In this sense, Korean neutrality did not reflect 
Russia’s own aspirations but was done out of goodwill for Japan. Therefore, if Japan was ready to 
exchange friendly opinions with Russia on the Korean issue, Russia was willing to take up the task 
immediately.177 
When Chinda checked with Lamsdorff on whether Russia’s favourable opinion involved 
other remaining issues besides Korean neutralisation, Lamsdorff assured him that Russia’s 
neutralisation proposal was presented as a mere example of a negotiable issue. Still suspicious of 
Russia’s true intentions, Chinda again asked whether Lamsdorff could explain the nature of the 
Russian government’s instructions to Izvolsky on Korean neutralisation. Lamsdorff stayed on 
message, insisting that amicable opinions had to be exchanged. For this reason, “Korean 
neutralisation under the guarantee of major powers” might be a subject corresponding to Japan’s 
expectations (about decreasing Russian influence in Korea) without doing Japan a disservice. As 
Lamsdorff grew more evasive, Chinda suspected whether Izvolsky’s statements exceeded the 
instructions he had received.178 However, no further progress was made because Japan requested 
Russia delay the discussion of its Korean neutralisation proposal. That Russia accepted this demand 
showed that its support for the neutralisation proposal was just a trial balloon sent up to confirm the 
possibility of a Russo-Japanese negotiation to maintain stability in Korea with the endgame of 
protecting Manchuria.  
Izvolsky observed that his neutralisation plan failed partly because Russia appeared to be in a 
hurry; he reported to his superiors that he had prepared more than six months in advance to create 
an environment conducive for talks with Japanese officials on neutralisation. Nonetheless, he was 
still blindsided by the sudden deterioration in Japan’s public opinion, Japanese officials’ decision to 
cloak their strategy, and the false information they provided during neutralisation negotiations with 
Russia. Izvolsky acknowledged his missteps and claimed full responsibility for his failure. 
Concurrently, he was displeased with Itō’s double-dealing and faulted Katō’s aggressive and hostile 
attitude. He, however, concluded that, for Japan to provide its guarantee of security in Manchuria to 
Russia, it should receive in return whatever it might demand, as long as major powers did not 
disapprove. Though Japan did not name this quid pro quo, the object was Korea.179 
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Though Izvolsky’s proposal foundered, Witte continued the Russian quest for Korean 
neutralisation. After the failure of Russia’s secret negotiations with China and Japan over 
Manchuria heightened the crisis in spring 1901, Witte’s neutralisation policy reflected his change in 
direction in regards to bartering Manchuria and Korea. This demonstrated that Russia’s position on 
Manchuria was waning in response to Izvolsky’s report that the Japanese government regarded 
Manchuria and Korea as inseparable.180 Witte’s change of heart stemmed from Komura’s 
suggestion to him about the need for a new agreement based on exchanging Manchuria and Korea 
in October 1900, which he had earlier rejected since it would damage Korean independence.181 
The outline of Witte’s new Manchurian-Korean policy became evident in June 1901 when he 
replied to Lamsdorff’s query about Russia’s preparedness for a potential war with Japan. According 
to Witte, Russia would abandon its political designs on Manchuria and instead enable a private 
company to defend Russian interests related to the Chinese Eastern Railway. Even if Japan would 
move to annex Korea, Russia should only raise its objection internationally and would not consider 
it a casus belli for a Russo-Japanese war. Witte calculated that this way Russia could still secure its 
real interests, albeit privately, in Manchuria, withdraw Russian troops there, and internationally 
appeal to public opinion about the issue of Korean neutralisation. To facilitate these moves, Russian 
troops were to evacuate in three phases, but before the first evacuation from the Manchurian 
territory west of the Liao River, he hoped to obtain China’s promise on the railroad concession 
stretching from the Great Wall to Beijing and the non-cession of Manchuria. Such a measure could 
prevent a major power’s intrusion into Manchuria after Russian evacuation and ease a Russian 
advance into Beijing after the completion of the Chinese Eastern Railway.182 
To achieve these purposes and prevent the progress of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,183 Witte 
suggested to Chinda that Korea should remain a neutral area (25.7.1901), but that Japan could put in 
place its own administrative and financial advisers there and take charge of policing the peninsula, 
in return accepting the Russian supremacy in Manchuria. Hayashi Tadasu informed German Chargé 
d’affaires to Britain Hermann von Eckardstein that the Japanese government rejected Witte’s 
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proposal because it was not made in good faith and believed that Korea could not govern itself.184 
Besides, considering that the Japanese, once the Katsura Tarō cabinet was established (2.6.1901), 
had been moving swiftly to sign an alliance treaty with Britain185 and that Li Hongzhang had 
approached A. M. Pozdneev, the Russo-Chinese Bank representative in Beijing, to come to terms 
with Russia on Manchuria,186 Witte’s neutralisation proposal for Korea seemed to be heading 
towards an abyss.  
Nevertheless, Witte again suggested Korean neutralisation to Itō, who visited St. Petersburg in 
order to persuade Russia to acknowledge that Japan should hold dominion over Korea.187 In his 
meeting with Lamsdorff (2.12.1901), Itō pointed out that the Japanese people felt that Russia was 
trying to occupy Korea, which would endanger Japanese independence. To avoid such a scenario, 
Japan desired to eliminate another power’s influence over Korea, wanted to aid and advise the 
Korean government, and hoped to assist it militarily if Korea faced internal disorder or war with 
another country. Citing the Lobanov-Yamagata Protocol that accorded Russia the right to send an 
equal number of soldiers to Korea, Lamsdorff refused Japan’s absolute right to intervene militarily 
since this could alter the situation on the Korean peninsula. For his part, Itō stated that Russia 
should not have to worry about Japanese resistance in China and that if Russia yielded Korea to 
Japan, Russia’s freedom of manoeuvre in Manchuria and its railroad construction right there would 
be respected.188  
The next day Itō told Witte that if Russia accepted universal Japanese influence over Korea, 
Japan would consent to a Russian occupation of the Kwantung area and the construction of the 
South Manchuria Railway towards Port Arthur. Itō stated, however, that Russian troops, except for 
railroad guards, had to be withdrawn from Manchuria and that the Open Door Policy there had to be 
observed. In response, both Witte and Lamsdorff recognised Japanese superiority in Korea as long 
as it did not use Korean territory strategically. Itō then submitted his draft agreement (mutual 
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guarantee of Korean independence, mutual guarantee of the non-use of Korean territory for strategic 
purposes, mutual guarantee that no military installation that could threaten the free passage of the 
Korea Strait would be established on the Korean coast, Russian recognition of Japan’s free hand in 
political and commercial manoeuvre in Korea and Japanese control of advising and assisting Korea) 
to Russia and left for Berlin, telling Lamsdorff that he would wait for Russia’s response.189 
Lamsdorff asked Finance, Army, and Navy ministers’ opinions for amendments and riders to 
Itō’s draft. Army Minister Alexei Kuropatkin was the first to offer an amendment (10.12.1901). In 
his counteroffer, Kuropatkin argued that while it would be difficult for Japan to find a reason to 
start a war with Russia once it had withdrawn from Manchuria, there would be a price to pay if 
Russia were to completely yield Korea to Japan. He also added that because a rupture in relations 
would be made more likely if Japanese forces were stationed in Korea, Russia had to block their 
permanent presence there through whatever means and ensure that the northern part of Korea 
remained free from Japanese forces. Furthermore, Kuropatkin insisted that Japan should only 
dispatch a limited number of troops to Korea, would have to withdraw them immediately once the 
situation they responded to was eliminated, and must not intrude upon the boundary line already 
agreed upon along the Russo-Korean border. Most importantly, article five of his amendments 
contained a neutral area within the Korean peninsula.190 Among the above conditions, two points 
(no complete abandonment of Korea by Russia and neutralisation of the northern part of Korea) 
coincided with the informal line taken by Bezobrazov, who supported Russia’s active advancement 
into Korea.191  
Witte believed a war with Japan over Korea was not desirable until pending issues such as the 
completion of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the settlement of Russian subjects in the Far East, and 
the consolidation of Port Arthur were resolved. Russia’s revised proposal in which Witte made 
allowances for these issues and changed the “mutual responsibilities” mentioned in Itō’s draft 
agreements to “Japan’s responsibilities” was soon delivered to Itō (17.12.1901). Russia drew up its 
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proposal to limit Japan’s activities within Korea.192 Therefore, Witte’s amendments, which included 
Kuropatkin’s counter-offer, were no strategic use of the Korean peninsula by Japan, Japan’s 
guarantee of Russia’s free passage along the Korea Strait, the exclusion of Japan’s political rights 
within Korea, and neutralisation of the area in the Russo-Korean border. Itō, however, rejected 
Russia’s revised proposal, stating that Japan opposed any prior consultation with Russia in case of 
the dispatch of its troops or its advice on Korean issues, opposed creation of a neutral area where 
Korea and Russia shared a common border, opposed any restrictions on Japan’s free hand over 
Korea, and opposed universal acknowledgement of Russian control over Manchuria. This situation 
reflected the strong stance of a Japanese government that was expecting the imminent conclusion of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Therefore, Witte’s suggestions failed.193       
Meanwhile, during the Russo-Japanese negotiations over Korea and Manchuria, Gojong 
continued his neutrality diplomacy to shore up Korea’s fragile independence. In mid-January 1901, 
Gojong instructed Jo’s successor Seong Giun to approach the U.S., French, and Russian ministers in 
Japan to revive the neutralisation process, though it is unclear whether the order was carried out.194 
After Seong’s return to Korea, the post of Korean minister to Japan was vacant. Gojong later named 
ex-Foreign Minister Pak Jesun the new Korean minister and asked him to propose Korean 
neutralisation to Japan under a joint guarantee of major powers or a multilateral military alliance in 
November 1901. As a former high-ranking member of the Korean government, Pak carried 
symbolic weight in Japan. Yet his efforts to win Japanese support for neutralisation, like those of Jo 
before him, failed to yield any results.195 Gojong’s short-sighted decision to rely on the pro-
Japanese Pak for advancing neutralisation was costly,196 as it played into the hands of Japan which 
looked unkindly on neutralisation under a hard-line Katsura cabinet that considered Japanese 
control of Korea a non-negotiable issue. Instead, Japan strengthened its position by taking 
advantage of British and American concerns about Russian encroachment in Manchuria.197 
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On the other hand, as the rumour that Japan and Russia would exchange Korea for Manchuria 
resurfaced in mid-1901, Gojong hoped Belgium would guarantee Korean neutralisation and then 
suggested it to Russia, Japan, Britain, and France.198 Gojong had a reason to seek Belgium’s 
assistance for Korean neutrality at that time. After establishing diplomatic relations with Belgium 
(1901), Gojong tried to become versed in Belgian-style neutrality and join Belgium-based 
international organisations that might aid Korean neutralisation. Coincidentally, a leading 
conservative daily newspaper, the Hwangseong sinmun, happened to be viewing Belgium 
positively; Belgium constructed schools and railroads nationally, established political, legal, 
educational, and military systems based on strong finances, and was proudly self-reliant among 
major powers.199 Belgium’s experience appealed to Gojong, who sensed that Korea could not 
achieve a self-armed neutrality like Switzerland, though he wished to overcome Korea’s economic 
and military vulnerabilities. He also expected Belgium’s cooperation on Korea’s membership in the 
First Hague Peace Conference (1899), which could provide Korea a chance to obtain good offices 
from major powers during a conflict. Furthermore, he was well aware that to neutralise, Korea 
might have to emulate a well-armed Belgium by introducing conscription.200 
A more pressing reason drove Gojong into considering Belgian-style neutrality: the above-
mentioned rumour regarding the exchange of Korea and Manchuria prompted the emperor to 
discuss its impact on neutralisation with U.S Minister Allen frequently.201 Gojong tried to build 
close relations with the Belgian, French, and German legations in Seoul as well, thinking that Korea 
could not count on the U.S. alone for neutralisation. This led Gojong to send his personal letter to 
Belgian king Leopold II in January 1902 to explain his own neutralisation plan and acquire 
Leopold’s consent. Encouraged by the Belgian monarch’s assent to Korea adopting a Belgian-style 
permanent neutrality, Gojong turned to France, Germany, Italy, and the U.S. for their support of 
Korean neutralisation. Gojong’s overture to these powers showed that he was willing to reach out to 
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major powers other than Japan and Russia, which had direct interests in the peninsula, to pursue 
Korean neutralisation.202 
As Gojong’s energies were geared towards attracting Western support for Korean 
neutralisation, he had to correspondingly contend with a seismic shift in the Far East. Although 
Russia attempted to use Korea as a means to protect its control over Manchuria through 
negotiations with Japan, it failed. Fearful of Russian ambitions in Korea and Manchuria, Japan 
opted to sign the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance (30.1.1902) with Britain, which was duly perceived 
as a marriage between two maritime powers. Rejecting Britain’s wish to extend the scope of their 
alliance to India, Japan successfully steered the alliance to focus on only China and Korea.203 Article 
1 of the Alliance, “a powerful factor in shaping the course of events in the Extreme East”, according 
to The Japan Times,204 stipulated that Japan had a special stake in Korean politics and economy and 
had the right to intervene in Korea if Japanese interests were threatened.205 This provision could tip 
the balance in Japan’s favour and damage prospects for Korean neutrality since it created the 
impression that Japan had acquired a license from Britain to challenge Russian support for Korean 
independence in the name of securing Japanese interests in Korea. Besides, as French Minister to 
Korea De Plancy indicated, this alliance bolstered Japan’s prestige in Korea, where all officials 
except those from Gojong’s immediate circle ended up toeing the line of the Japanese legation in 
Seoul.206 
While some Korean officials thought the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could protect the territorial 
integrity of Korea and secure the Korean Imperial Household, others insisted that Korea had to 
approach a third power such as France to protect its security. (In fact, Korea had been doing so.) 
Nonetheless, as Russia and Japan intervened in Korean affairs heavily, the Korean government had 
to implement a neutral diplomacy by appointing a new cabinet composed of pro-U.S. faction 
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members like Yi Yunyong, Pak Jeongyang, and Yi Wanyong,207 who could maintain Korea’s 
equidistance between Japan and Russia. Furthermore, the poor status of the Oebu 外部 (Ministry of 
the Foreign Affairs)208 had Gojong dispatch special envoys to Europe and the U.S., instead of 
communicating through Japanese and Western legations in Seoul, to suggest neutralisation 
proposals directly.209  
To this end, Sands was to be included in the delegation the Korean government dispatched to 
London for the coronation (9.8.1902) of the British monarch Edward VII. Before his departure, 
Sands, with Gojong's permission, sent telegrams to Korean ministers in Europe, advising them of 
the steps they must undertake to support his neutralisation efforts in England.210 Unfortunately, 
Jordan, having already detected Sands’ scheme, opposed Sands’ visit to Britain, and his proposed 
diplomatic mission was aborted. Rubbing salt in this wound to Korea’s major power diplomacy, the 
Japanese government released deliberately distorted contents of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
agreement,211 inducing Gojong to believe that the Korean issue had been treated as a central subject 
in it and thus leading him to wrongly conclude that Korean neutrality was realised.212 This brought 
the reform programmes that Sands had pursued to a stop while Korean government officials lost 
interest in neutralisation as they became preoccupied with court issues: The elevation of the status 
of Imperial Concubine Eom and the protection of Crown Prince Yi Cheok.213  
Despite these adverse circumstances, Sands dabbled with his second neutralisation proposal in 
early 1902, meeting with Itō, who was visiting Korea regarding a military alliance between Korea 
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and Japan, but receiving no definitive answer from him.214 Sands’ involvement in neutralisation 
diminished as the pro-U.S. faction’s influence declined215 and finally ended when Gojong appointed 
the Belgian adviser Adhémar Delcoigne to handle neutralisation policy in July 1903.216 Most 
importantly, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance posed a major obstruction to any neutralisation proposal. 
In fact, given Britain's commitment to its alliance with Japan, under which Britain agreed to 
Japanese predominance on the Korean peninsula, it was highly unlikely that Britain would endorse 
Korean neutrality.  
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance also spurred France on to review its Far Eastern policy, and it in 
turn proclaimed the Franco-Russian Declaration (16.3.1902) with Russia. The Russian Foreign 
Ministry calculated that this diplomatic counteraction could help preserve stability and peace in the 
Far East and potentially receive the support of major powers like Germany and the U.S.217 French 
Foreign Minister Delcassé was equally enthusiastic, asserting that the U.S. had to be included as a 
joint participant.218 For Korea’s neutralisation advocates, this declaration could have provided the 
opportunity they were waiting for. Gojong thus hoped that the advent of the First Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance and the Franco-Russian Declaration would enable Korea to accelerate the process of 
neutrality diplomacy.219 
Meanwhile, after the failure of indirect negotiations through the dispatch of a special envoy to 
Japan, Gojong tried to implement Korean neutrality diplomacy directly with European major 
powers, utilising France as a mediator, which dovetailed with France’s revitalisation in the Far East. 
France had been adopting a friendly and energetic policy toward Korea since acquiring the 
Gyeongui railroad concession in July 1896. French Minister De Plancy’s positive approach since 
1897 to Gojong, who thus recognised France as Korea’s protector from a neutral point of view, led 
to Gojong’s dispatch of Min Yeongwhan to France for concluding a secret agreement as a hedge 
against the rumour of a Korean partition (3.8.1897). After the Rosen-Nishi Protocol, France’s 
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Korean policy was more actively developed to seizing the opportunity provided by Japan and 
Russia promising not to intervene in Korean domestic affairs.220 
For these reasons, interactions between France and Korea picked up after 1900. The Korean 
government hired legal adviser Laurent Crémazy221 to consult with Gojong on the issue of 
international law for neutralising Korea in May 1900 and concluded a Ұ5 million Unnam syndicate 
French loan with Auguste Cazalis to reduce Korea’s financial dependence on Japan's Dai-Ichi Bank 
and neutralise fears of Japanese intrusion on Korean diplomatic sovereignty (19.4.1901).222 French 
Foreign Minister Delcassé elevated De Plancy223 to Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
from Chargé d’affaires and dispatched French Minister to China M. S. Pichon to Korea to advise 
Gojong on foreign affairs in May 1901.224  
Separately, at the urging of De Plancy and his lieutenant, Commissaire Lefèvre,225 the Korean 
government appointed several French advisers to key posts and granted concessions to France in 
September 1900. For example, two French technicians (J. de Lapeyrière and E. Bourdaret) were 
named to serve in the Northwestern Railroad Department under the earlier 1896 Gyeongui railroad 
concession agreement with the French company Fives-Lille, which stipulated that technical 
manpower and construction materials would be imported from France,226 two French officers (G. 
Payeur and L. Louis) were appointed advisers to the Korean military,227 and Gojong gave the 
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French trader Pierre Marie Saltarel the rights to the Changseong gold mine (10.8.1901).228 In 
addition, French language teacher Martel investigated the status of the Boxers in Tianjin at the 
request of the Korean government and was actively involved in Korean neutralisation policy.229 
Even after the above developments, Japan still remained a formidable player in Korea, and 
France, a close Russian ally, was compelled to intervene. France thus participated in the Franco-
Russian Declaration after the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Though British Ambassador to France Sir 
Edmund Monson reported that Delcassé took no real offence to the alliance, Monson may have 
misread Delclassé, who issued a veiled criticism of it when he asserted that like other great powers, 
Britain and Japan were obliged not to interfere with the status quo in the Far East.230 Concern for 
stability in the Far East and its long-standing rivalry with Germany in continental Europe might 
explain why France sided with Russia while Germany and the U.S. responded favourably to the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Despite its continued support for Russia, France earnestly wished that a 
Russo-Japanese war would be avoided. If Russia lost, France feared that it could be placed in a 
disadvantageous position in any confrontation with Germany in Europe and that French Indochina 
could be threatened by Japan.231 
To avoid such a scenario, it was imperative for France to convince Russia to peacefully 
compromise with Japan over Far Eastern issues so that it could turn its attention to Europe. 
Consequently, during his visit to Russia in May 1902, French President Émile François Loubet tried 
to persuade the Russian emperor to agree to a settlement with Japan over Korea.232 If Korea were 
neutralised successfully by major powers’ guarantee, including Japan and Russia, the situation in 
the Far East would be stabilised, which would be beneficial to French interests in Indochina and 
Europe.   
Around that time, France’s Korean policy was geared towards supporting Korea’s neutrality 
diplomacy directly and indirectly, domestically and internationally, protecting its interests there and  
in French Indochina and Europe from Japan and Germany by maintaining the balance of power in 
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the Far East. For these reasons, despite its alliance with Russia, France had to maintain a relatively 
prudent stance in Korea, preferring to concentrate on obtaining concessions there. Thus, rather than 
promising to side with Russia in the event of war, France tried to convince Russia that the peaceful 
settlement of the Korean issue could help secure stability in the Far East. Therefore, France’s 
Korean policy corresponded to both French and Korean desires; the maintenance of the status quo 
in Korea would protect not just French interests in Indochina and Europe but would also contribute 
to the preservation of Korean independence by ensuring that the Korean peninsula remained free 
from conflict. 
Besides the proposals by Izvolsky and Witte, there was a joint proposal from three Russian 
diplomats which could be traced back to September 1901 when Komura took office as Japan’s 
Foreign Minister. According to his analysis of the regional situation based on “An Opinion of Ten- 
Year Plan on Domestic and Foreign Affairs”, it was high time that East Asia became an arena for 
imperial competition between major powers and that their intensified political and economic 
activities could be expected to disturb the regional peace.233 As part of his hard-line policy, Komura 
suggested Japan use its control of the main railroads in Korea as a means to expand its sphere of 
influence. To claim its right of military dispatch to guard these railroads in emergency and to 
eventually achieve comprehensive control in the East, Japan needed to accelerate its military build-
up. The Japanese acquisition of the Gyeongui Railway concession, if successful, could then pose a 
serious threat to Russia since the railway travelled through the north of Korea and ended at 
Manchuria—areas Russia considered its sphere of influence.234  
Japan also contemplated extending a loan to Korea235 to assist the country in constructing 
railroads on its own. Through such assistance, Japan could finally seize control of the Korean 
economy by asking for the concessions of the Gyeongui Railway and maritime customs revenue in 
return.236 To acquire the Gyeongui Railway concession, Japan would try to link it to the 
consummations of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the secret offensive and defensive alliance with 
Korea. Because if they were concluded, the former could secure British power to back Japan’s play 
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in Korea and the latter could mollify Korea’s opposition and justify the dispatch of Japanese forces 
into Korea in case of emergency.237 
With the successful conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Komura’s hard-line Korean 
policy gained strength, which led to the pro-Japan faction in the Korean establishment superseding 
the waning pro-Russia faction. In addition, Yi Yongik, though not a member of the pro-Russia 
faction, had been sidelined by Korean cabinet ministers due to his inability to implement the Unnam 
syndicate loan deal with France in April 1901.238 After the conservative faction member Han 
Gyuseol formed a new cabinet (15.2.1902),239 Minister of Finance Sim Sanghoon, with the blessing 
of Gojong and backed by pro-Japan faction members Yi Jiyong and Pak Jesun, quickly requested a 
Japanese loan through Hayashi.240 In favour of the said loan, Komura submitted “a new demand 
about business expenses in Korea and China” to the Japanese cabinet council (29.9.1902).241 It 
passed, and he was able to reinforce Japan’s imperialistic policy.  
As Komura’s Korean policy acquired strength, Russia was at risk of losing its influence over 
Korea. Furthermore, the plausible acceleration of the open door in Manchuria with the signing of 
the Russo-Chinese Convention on the evacuation of Manchuria (8.4.1902) and possible American 
alignment with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance camp would make it difficult for Russia to maintain its 
influence in Manchuria.242 To enable Russia to escape these dangers, Pavloff consulted with 
Izvolsky and Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Arthur P. N. Cassini (1836-1913) to mull over the 
neutralisation of Korea in September 1902.243 Pavloff devised a scheme after his regular audiences 
with Gojong, and Pavloff and Izvolsky agreed in Tokyo that the only solution for the Korean 
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problem was its neutralisation under the joint guarantee of Russia, Japan, and the U.S (31.7.1902). 
In early September, Pavloff headed to Paris to discuss Korean neutralisation with Cassini,244 and the 
three Russian diplomats agreed that to execute their plan, it was necessary for the Russian 
government to first approach the U.S. government.245 
By inviting American intervention, this plan differed from Izvolsky’s. Whereas Izvolsky’s 
called for neutralisation under the joint guarantee of major powers, this proposal would include only 
Russia, Japan, and the U.S. as potential guarantors.246 Pavloff and his Russian colleagues might 
have sought to involve the U.S. because its economic interests in Korea were the second largest 
after Japan's, as well as the appreciable presence of the pro-U.S. faction there. In addition, the 
purported inclination of the U.S to favourably recognise Russia’s special interests in Manchuria 
might have convinced them that the U.S. would accept Russia’s Korean policy as well.247 This was 
because Cassini reported to his government that Hay had told him that as long as freedom of U.S. 
commerce and enterprises were guaranteed in Manchuria, the U.S. government would not interrupt 
Russian activities there.248 
Once Buck tipped Komura off about the Russian diplomats’ scheme for Korean 
neutralisation, the Japanese government responded immediately. With reference to the said scheme, 
Komura wired Japanese Minister to Russia Kurino Shin’ichiro to inform him of its current progress 
(19.9.1902). In his telegraph, Komura asked Buck to relay his hopes to the U.S. government that if 
it was approached by Russia about Korean neutralisation, it would consult with the Japanese 
government before taking any steps regarding the issue. In the same telegraph, he also declared that 
Japan would not accept any move to change its current position in Korea and that the Russian 
diplomats’ plan could threaten Japan’s superior position in Korea and hinder Japan from countering 
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Russia’s activities in Manchuria.249 The next day, he instructed Kurino to forward the contents of 
his message to other foreign ministers in France and the U.S., and ordered Japanese Minister to the 
U.S. Takahira Kogorō to keep an eye on Cassini and monitor the U.S. attitude towards the Russian 
proposition if it received the offer.250 
Komura also divulged the Russian diplomats’ neutralisation plan to Hayashi (22.9.1902) and 
expressed his concern about Weber's upcoming visit to Korea. Even though Lamsdorff assured 
Kurino that Weber’s visit had nothing to do with Korean neutralisation,251 Komura dreaded the 
possibility of having the neutralisation debate reinvigorated. To avoid this, Katō exploited the three 
Russian diplomats’ plan in the Russo-Japanese negotiations to Japan’s advantage, anticipating 
Russia’s approval of the secret offensive and defensive alliance between Japan and Korea.252 
Aware of the Japanese government’s anxiety over Korean neutralisation, Takahira queried 
Hay about the U.S. government’s stance towards it and was told by him that the U.S. had not 
received any request from Russia to consider Korean neutralisation (6.10.1902). In order to head off 
any chances of the U.S. and Russia discussing the issue, Takahira met with Hay three times to 
disrupt Russia's designs (9.10, 15.10, and 20.11.1902). From his meetings with Hay, Takahira 
learned that the U.S. had neither considered participating in the joint guarantee of Korea nor 
received a Korean neutrality proposal from either Cassini or Pavloff. Even if such a proposal were 
suggested, Takahira trusted that the U.S. government would reject it.253 Finally, Takahira once again 
spoke to Hay about the Russian neutralisation proposal and came away convinced that the proposal 
had not been suggested to the U.S (2.9.1903).254  
Meanwhile, in Korea, in his report to Komura in October 1902, Hayashi speculated about a 
possible neutralisation discourse between Korea and Russia coinciding with Weber’s visit to Korea 
as Russia’s special envoy to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of Gojong’s accession to the 
throne. Unaware of Lamsdorff’s instruction (i.e. no discussion of neutralisation during Weber’s 
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visit), Hayashi conjectured that Weber might team up with some pro-Russian faction members255 
who wanted to recover their influence within the Korean government to raise the issue, but his 
suspicions were unfounded.  
At that time, Hayashi was asked by Allen whether he had received any information about the 
three Russian diplomats’ neutralisation proposal from Japan and, if he had, for his opinion on it. 
Hayashi acknowledged he knew of it, but said that Japan did not support it because the Russian 
government’s intent (i.e. Witte’s Korean neutralisation scheme in October 1900) was to secure its 
freedom of manoeuvre in Manchuria. On another occasion, he told Allen that since the Russian 
diplomats’ proposal violated the open door policy that the U.S. and Japan unanimously insisted on 
in Manchuria and northern China and that the Russian proposal was in effect an end run around that 
policy, Japan would not accept it. He added that if the U.S. government agreed, it should approve of 
Japan’s decision. Allen agreed with Hayashi’s analysis.256  
All things taken together, it seemed that the U.S. government never received any formal 
suggestion from the Russian government. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the three Russian 
diplomats, sensing a serious crisis due to Komura’s new Korean policy and the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, formulated a joint proposal with the benefaction of the Russian government.257 As for 
Russia, the proposal was a passive response to Japan’s bolstering its position in the Far East under 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.258 Yet, Japan tried to utilise it to conclude an offensive and defensive 
alliance with Korea as part of its preparations for the Russo-Japanese negotiation. But Japan’s 
intention was not realised; Nicholas II’s trip to Crimea and Witte’s inspection of Manchuria from 
August to October 1902 made any preliminary talks between Japan and Russia impossible.259 After 
his return, Witte ended up recommending non-confrontation with Japan over Korea (9.11.1902),260 
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and on the same day the Korean issues never came up at a Yalta conference of four Russian 
ministers.261  
On the contrary, assuming that the Russian government had formally proposed Korean 
neutralisation to both the U.S. and Japan, the result may well have been negative. Since “Japan’s 
special interests in Korea” had been already confirmed by the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance,262 it 
moved to dominate Korean completely and, holding the upper hand in its negotiations with Russia, 
would have rejected Russia’s neutralisation proposal. Considering that Japanese Minister Kurino 
suggested the guarantee of Russia’s railroad concession in Manchuria and wanted to confirm 
Japan’s free hand in Korea in return (4.8.1902),263 Japan had no reason to accept the proposal. As 
the U.S. wanted to maintain its open door policy in Manchuria and northern China and had 
vigorously protested Russia’s delay in evacuating its troops from the area,264 it might also be 
opposed the proposal, as Allen conceded to Hayashi that Korea should not be a neutral area.265 
Besides, due to its traditional stance to maintain neutrality (i.e. the Monroe Doctrine), it was highly 
likely that the U.S. would have responded to the proposal unfavourably.266 Distressingly, Korea was 
completely sidelined from the discussion process regarding this proposal since it originated from 
Russia’s desire to cement its position in Manchuria while protecting its flank (Korea) from Japan.     
         Emboldened by its close collaboration with Britain through the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
Japan persistently opposed a rapprochement between Russia and the U.S. The U.S., as a third-party 
guarantor, neither stood with Russia nor agreed to a treaty to guarantee Korean neutrality, in line 
with its stated principles. As France swung its support to Russia, the Far Eastern geopolitical 
situation seemed balanced between continental (Russia, France) and maritime (Japan, Britain) 
powers, but Japan had actually gained an upper hand in Korea. As Allen observed, “Japan and 
England, since the recent alliance was announced, are in a much better position in Korea.”267 
Though the Franco-Russian Declaration was highly appropriate to counter the Anglo-Japanese 
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Alliance,268 Loubet’s suggestion to Nicholas II demonstrated that Korea could be used as a mere 
bargaining chip in Russia’s negotiations with Japan in the name of preserving stability in the Far 
East. In other words, the degree of solidarity differed significantly between the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance and the Franco-Russian Declaration; whereas the former was a strong alliance secured by 
British military assistance, the latter was, lacking French military backing, little more than words on 
paper.269 Finally, the contemporary unbalance of power between Japan and Russia in Korea spoiled 
this proposal. Still, had the proposal succeeded, the result could have reduced the Russo-Japanese 
tension in the Far East and strengthened Korea’s geopolitical standing.        
Considering that the three Russian diplomats’ proposal was designed from their desire to keep 
the U.S. from joining the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, that Japan persistently headed off the 
rapprochement between Russia and the U.S. in regard to the joint proposal, and that Witte’s 
Manchuria inspection report (9.11.1902) included Korean neutralisation policy, the joint proposal 
could also be treated as an extension of Witte’s prior neutralisation policy.270 At a special 
conference for Russia’s Far Eastern policy (7.2.1903), Witte again suggested “neutralisation of 
Korea”,271 but Kuropatkin and Admiral Tyrtov opposed it because Japan had already agreed not to 
use any Korean territory militarily or strategically and because Russia could not use Masanpo as a 
temporary naval station.272 After Russian troops began their withdrawal from Manchuria, Russia’s 
Korean policy gradually moved from Witte’s neutralisation policy, which alluded to abandoning 
Korea temporarily to avoid a war with Japan, to Kuropatkin’s policy insisting on never giving up 
Korea and Bezobrazov’s policy advocating aggressively advancing into the Yalu River basin.273 
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Chapter VII. Neutralisation Attempts in the Second Half of the Korean Empire Era (1903-
1907) 
The fierce competition between Japan and Russia over Korea and Manchuria led to the 
Russo-Japanese War, in which Japanese victory broke the balance of power on the Korean 
peninsula, thus driving Korea into becoming Japan’s protectorate. This chapter shows how the 
wartime neutrality efforts both in Korea and abroad progressed to protect Korean independence and 
major powers’ interests from the Yongampo Incident to the Russo-Japanese War and how the 
permanent neutrality efforts in Korea were relaunched to safeguard Korea’s independence around 
the time of the Second Hague Peace Conference.     
· Neutralisation Efforts From the Yongampo Incident to the Russo-Japanese War (1903-1905)                                                       
As the conflict between Japan and Russia deepened, the discord between the dominant pro-
Japan and pro-Russia factions within the Korean Empire forced Gojong to seek alternate means to 
protect Korean independence. Specifically, he relied on special envoys and overseas Korean 
diplomats who lobbied Japanese and Western governments. In this process, the secret intelligence 
agency Jeguk ingmunsa was utilised to collect, analyse, and explore information from major 
powers,1 which eventually allowed Korea to pursue wartime neutrality diplomacy.  
In the spring of 1903, the suspension of the scheduled second-round withdrawal of Russian 
troops from Manchuria (8.4.1903), the suggestion of seven conditions for their withdrawal 
(18.4.1903), the Russian occupation of Yongampo (21.4.1903), and its construction of a strategic 
post there under the guise of logging (4.5.1903)2 not only threatened the status quo in Korea, but 
brought about the possibility of a full-scale war between Japan and Russia. The Japanese 
government considered these moves part and parcel of Russia’s expansionist policy3 to grab both 
Manchuria and Korea. The Korean government, ascertaining that the goodwill of Japan or Russia 
alone was inadequate to secure its independence, initiated a diplomatic offensive to lure other major 
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powers into counterbalancing Japan and Russia. This marked the beginning of the Korean Empire’s 
wartime neutrality diplomacy.  
Amidst the escalating Russo-Japanese tension, Gojong laboured to win support for Korean 
neutralisation from as many countries as possible. Though Italy maintained diplomatic relations 
with Korea, it had neither advisers nor concessions on the peninsula, leaving little impact on Korean 
politics. Nevertheless, persistent Gojong4 turned to it for diplomatic assistance; he sent a personal 
letter to the king of Italy Victor Emmanuel III to ask for his support for Korean neutrality in the 
event of a Russo-Japanese war (8.5.1903).5 Reversing the earlier trend of major powers’ rejections 
(see later), the Italian king, through his letter to Gojong (28.2.1904), approved of Korea’s decision 
to adopt neutrality prior to the Russo-Japanese War.6 Gojong’s decision to solicit Italian cooperation 
with his neutralisation proposal was ill-timed, however, since the Italian king’s answer came after 
Japanese forces had entered Korean territory (8.2.1904)7 and the Korea-Japan Protocol (23.2.1904), 
which gave Japan an immense advantage in Korea (see later). Given that Italy had a relatively low 
profile in East Asia,8 its support, even if requested and received earlier, may well have done little to 
improve Korean fortunes. 
After the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance, British Minister Jordan in Seoul and his Japanese 
counterpart Hayashi Gonsuke, utilising Chief Commissioner of Customs John McLeavy Brown,9 
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pressured Gojong into declaring the opening of the Yalu River to trade.10 Of course, Russia was not 
exactly standing still; Bezobrazov argued (22.5.1903) that Japanese influence must not be extended 
into northern Korea and that Russia should receive concessions corresponding to Japan’s 
construction rights for the Gyeongbu and Gyeongui railways and the construction rights for the 
telegraph line between Seoul and Uiju.11 Six days later, having judged that Brown was acting as a 
conduit for Britain and Japan, Pavloff reported to his government that the commissioner was 
working with the Japanese minister to have the Korean government proclaim Yongampo an open 
port.12 
By sheer coincidence, in May 1903, a report by the Japanese military attaché in Korea delved 
into the Yongampo issue, which induced the Japanese government to contemplate war with Russia. 
While top Japanese navy figures such as Admiral Yamamoto Gonnogyoe remained cautious, their 
army counterparts disagreed. Buoyed by perceived weaknesses of the Russian military, an army 
report from the Japanese Army Chief of Staff Ōyama Iwao judged that now was the time to settle 
the Korean problem, regarding Japan and Russia as being on an equal footing.13 
For this, Japan had to bring Korea over to its side to prevent it from aligning with Russia, 
especially during wartime. There were two options to keep Korea under Japan’s control: send in 
Japanese troops immediately once the war broke out to establish Japanese superiority in Seoul and 
sign an offensive and defensive alliance or a protectorate treaty with Korea. Favouring the first 
option, the army persuaded the Foreign Ministry to suggest to the genrō dispatching a large and 
powerful force to Korea before Russia followed suit since whoever reached Seoul first would be 
able to control Gojong and his government. At the genrō conference (9.6.1903), Yamagata 
suggested the immediate dispatch of two army divisions to Seoul before Russia reduced its military 
presence in Manchuria, but Yamamoto opposed his idea since this would provoke other major 
powers and damage international confidence in Japan amidst its negotiations with Russia.14 
The second option was by no means easy either since the Korean government was likely to 
oppose it. Committed to independence, Gojong had already announced the institution of a 
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conscription system in March 1903,15 and four months later Korea’s war minister proposed the 
establishment of a navy.16 Constrained by deep fiscal problems, however, the Korean government 
found it difficult to arm itself sufficiently for self-defence17 and thus regarded wartime neutrality as 
the only alternative in the event of a war between Japan and Russia. 
The friction between Japan and Russia over the above concessions worsened the hostile 
relations between them, but also gave Gojong a chance to exploit the situation. For example, the 
Russian lease of Yongampo requested by Pavloff had been at first opposed by Yi Yongik, a leading 
figure of the pro-neutralisation faction,18 for it could damage Korea’s neutralisation policy by 
justifying Japan’s expansion into Korea.19 However, the contrary was to be supposed later. Gojong, 
who by now reversed his previous fear about Russian intentions in Korea, decided to have faith in 
Russia, hoping that its troops in Manchuria could check the advance of the Japanese military into 
Korea.20 Gojong thus sent Jo Seonghyeop to Yongampo to sign a pact leasing it to Russia 
(20.7.1903).21 That decision might have had to do with Gojong’s desire to strengthen diplomacy 
with Russia in response to increased Japanese pressure on Korea due to the circulation of Japan’s 
Dai-Ichi Bank notes.22 
The Yongampo issue also prompted Japan and Russia to reignite negotiations to resolve their 
differences over Korea and Manchuria. After having decided on war with Russia at a council in the 
Royal presence (23.6.1903) and having obtained the British government’s consent on the Russo-
                                                 
15 Hyeon Gwangho, “Daehan Jegug ui daeoe jeongchaek”, 237. 
16 Duus, 178. 
17 Nevertheless, at the urging of Lefèvre, the Korean government could purchase 10,000 guns and 30,000 rounds of 
ammunition (Hyeon Gwangho, “Daehan Jegug ui daeoe jeongchaek”, 246) and 12,000 pistol sets (Hwangseong sinmun, 
1902.11.8; 1903.2.28, http://www.koreanhistory.or.kr/. 
18 ChuKan Nihon koshikan kiroku 21, No.128, 1903.5.14, http://db.history.go.kr/. Yi Yongik felt that Korea had to 
rebuff major powers’ designs in Korea to maintain a neutral stance. In 1902, concerned about the economic impact of 
bonds from the Japanese Dai-Ichi Bank on Korean independence, Yi mobilised pedlars and merchant guilds to prevent 
their circulation. Nasawa Yuko, “Chungsukgong Yi Yongig ui daeoe insik yeongu—jungnip noseon ui hyeongseong 
gwajeong eul jungsim euro [A Study of Foreign Perception of Chungsukgong Yi Yongik—Focusing on the Neutral 
Line Formation Process]” (MA diss., Korea University, 1998), 48-49. However, in early 1903, he also opposed the 
Russian lease of Masanpo. ChuKan Nihon koshikan kiroku 21, No.53, 1903.2.12, http://db.history.go.kr/. 
19 Hyeon Gwangho, “Daehan Jeguk gwa Reosia geurigo Ilbon”, 216.  
20 Ibid., 217. 
21 ChuKan Nihon koshikan kiroku 19, No.24, 1903.7.20, http://db.history.go.kr/. In response, Japanese Foreign Minister 
Komura mentioned “The Theory of East Asian Peace” and thus requested that the Korean government resist Russian 
tyranny, pointing out that Korean independence would guarantee East Asian peace. Goryeo daehakgyo, ed., Gu Hanguk 
oegyo munseo 6: Ilan 舊韓國外交文書: 日案 [Old Korean Diplomatic Documents: Pertaining to Japan] 6, No.7463 
(Seoul: Goryeo daehakgyo, 1969), 415-416. 
22 Hyeon Gwangho, “Daehan Jeguk gwa Reosia geurigo Ilbon”, 217. 
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Japanese negotiations (28.7.1903), Japan passed its negotiation agenda through Kurino to 
Lamsdorff (12.8.1903).23 The proposal encompassed the independence and territorial integrity of 
China and Korea, mutual recognition of Japanese interests in Korea and Russia’s railway interests 
in Manchuria, non-interference in both Japan and Russia’s commercial and industrial activities in 
Korea and Manchuria respectively, mutual commitment to military activities, and Russia’s 
acceptance of Japan’s exclusive rights in Korea.24 Japan intended to place Korea under its exclusive 
influence, countering Russian designs to exploit Korea and Manchuria. 
On the same day, Admiral Yevgeni Ivanovich Alexeyev was appointed Russian Governor 
General of the Far East, and Russia began to take a hard-line stance in its Far Eastern policy. Thus, 
Lamsdorff unilaterally requested that Japan change the location for Russo-Japanese negotiations to 
Tokyo (23.8.1903). After Komura and Baron Roman R. Rosen were designated as their respective 
countries’ representatives for negotiations (23.9.1903), Rosen submitted Russian terms25 to Japan 
(3.10.1903). The same month, to prepare an offensive and defensive alliance in Korea, Hayashi 
Gonsuke tried to bribe the Korean government with loans and key Korean government officials 
with direct payments and increased the Japanese garrison in Seoul.26  
Despite his doubts, Komura, sat through a series of talks with Russia and sent Rosen and 
Lamsdorff Japan’s revised proposal (30.10.1903), which designated a neutral zone on both sides 
(50km) of the Manchuria-Korean border and requested a guarantee on Japan’s status in Manchuria 
based on an existing treaty. Japan’s counter-proposal demonstrated its wish to avoid immediate war 
with Russia, though there was no quick response from the Russian government.27 While Russo-
Japanese negotiations were making little headway, the Japanese government approached Korea 
directly to increase its leverage there; Komura instructed Hayashi Gonsuke to discreetly float a 
                                                 
23 Gang Seonghak, Siberia hoengdan yeolcha wa samurai: ReoIl jeonjaeng ui oegyo wa gunsa jeollyak [The Trans-
Siberian Trains and the Samurai: The Diplomacy and Military Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War] (Seoul: Goryeo 
daehakgyo chulpanbu, 1999), 284. 
24 Ibid., 284-285. 
25 Russia did not want any part of Korean territory to be used for military purposes, desired free passage in 
the Korea Strait, called for accepting a neutral zone north of the 39th parallel of the Korean peninsula in 
return for recognising the Japanese position in southern Korea, and deemed that Manchuria and the coastal 
and insular areas lie outside Japan’s line of advantage. Nihon gaikō bunsho 36(1), No.25, 22-23, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/mokuji.html. 
26 Duus, 179. 
27 Nihon gaikō bunsho 36(1), No.28-31, 25-28, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/mokuji.html. 
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secret alliance to Gojong through Ōmiwa Chōbei (20.11.1903).28 After much delay, Russia sent its 
counter-proposal (11.12.1903), which did not address the Manchurian issue and only reiterated the 
Russian government’s previous call for a neutral zone in Korea.29  
By now, Japan considered that an exchange of Manchuria for Korea was rejected 
categorically, which made any peaceful resolution of the Manchurian and Korean issues appear far 
out of reach.30 Japan was right to be sceptical of Russia’s true intentions; Alexeyev had urged the 
Russian Foreign Ministry not to accept Japanese demands since this could turn Korea into Japan’s 
protectorate and endanger Russian security.31 Once again, Japan submitted its new proposal 
(21.12.1903) and Russia replied to it (6.1.1904), but each was only looking for a way to put the 
blame on the other. 
Pending the secret negotiations between Japan and Russia as above, Gojong received the 
news by telegram (4.7.1903) from Korean Minister in Japan Go Yeonghui that Japan had decided to 
declare war against Russia.32 Taken aback by the prospect of war commencing earlier than he had 
anticipated, Gojong dispatched his aides–Hyeon Yeongun33 to Japan (3.8.1903),34 and Hyeon 
Sanggeon35 to Europe (21.8.1903)–to earnestly probe the possibility of wartime neutrality,36 which 
led to the reactivation of Korean wartime neutrality diplomacy. Hyeon Sanggeon also carried 
Gojong’s personal letter asking the Russian emperor for Russo-Korean cooperation to prevent a 
Japanese invasion in the event of the war.37  
                                                 
28 Duus, 179. 
29 Hyeon Gwangho, “Daehan Jeguk gwa Reosia geurigo Ilbon”, 213. 
30 Gang Seonghak, 287. 
31 Pak Hyojong, ed., 278. 
32 Hyeon Gwangho, “Daehan Jeguk gwa Reosia geurigo Ilbon”, 220. 
33 Hyeon Yeongun was fluent in Japanese after studying there and was considered close to Japan because of his 
regular visits to the Japanese legation in Seoul. Seo Yeonghui, “ReoIl jeonjaenggi Daehan Jeguk jipgwon seryeog ui 
siguk daeeung”, 185. 
34 He also carried a secret letter (presumably from Gojong) to query Itō and Komura about the recent state of affairs, and 
Hyeon was tasked to accurately gauge the Japanese government’s decision on Manchuria and to detect Japanese views 
on Korea as well. Nihon gaikō bunsho 36(1), No.129, 740-742, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/mokuji.html. 
35 Even before this mission, Hyeon Sanggeon, a well-known pro-neutralisation faction member, was entrusted by 
Gojong to carry out an important mission; in early 1902, he was instructed by Gojong to visit foreign legations in Seoul 
to find out the meaning of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, while working as an attendant at the Imperial Household 
Department. Hyeon Gwangho, “Daehan Jegug ui daeoe jeongchaek”, 58. 
36 Hwangseong sinmun, 1903.7.3, http://www.kinds.or.kr/. 
37 Seo Yeonghui, “ReoIl jeonjaenggi Daehan Jeguk jipgwon seryeog ui siguk daeeung”, 188. 
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However, Gojong had to rely on his abovementioned emissaries to send and receive 
diplomatic messages related to neutralisation as Korea’s telegraph network (Diagram 2) was never 
free from Japanese surveillance.38 Japan had been unwilling to relinquish its operation of the 
Korean telegraph cables, using them to its advantage both in Korea and Japan (though experiencing 
an occasional hiccup).39 For example, while Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff was engaging in 
negotiations with his Japanese counterpart Komura concerning Korea and Manchuria, Russia's 
representatives in Japan and Korea were having trouble communicating via telegraph cables. The 
Russian diplomat in Japan Gagarin said that it had become almost customary for Japan to 
deliberately destroy Russia’s secret telegraphic messages.40 Since Korea counted on Russian 
support for its neutralisation policy, their inability to communicate due to Japanese interference 
could be a critical failing. 
For these reasons, whereas Hyeon Yeongun’s mission restricted him to lobbying for Korean 
neutrality in Japan, Hyeon Sanggeon’s European endeavour involved ascertaining French and 
Russian views on Korean neutralisation and obtaining mediation from international organisations.41 
Upon his arrival in France, Hyeon tried but could not meet with French Foreign Minister Délcassé, 
and left Gojong’s secret message regarding neutrality in the hands of Min Yeongchan, the Korean 
minister in France.42 In the Netherlands, Hyeon sought to attend the International Peace Conference 
and visit the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, but the conference did not convene and 
the court was adjourned. Failing to make any meaningful inroads there, he travelled to St. 
Petersburg where he conferred with Korean Minister to Russia Yi Beomjin about neutrality and met 
with former Russian Chargé d’affaires to Korea Weber. On his way back to Korea, Hyeon travelled 
to Lüshun, where he spoke with the Russian governor of the Far East.43 However, Hyeon failed to 
win any qualitative support for Korean neutrality as Russia did not respond, major powers adopted a 
wait-and-see attitude, and support from the International Peace Conference was unavailable as it 
                                                 
38 Pak Jonghyo, ed., 363. 
39 In early 1900, Japanese Minister in Seoul Hayashi sought but failed to convince Korean Foreign Minister Pak Jesun 
to allow Japan to construct a telegraph office on the coast of Korea, ostensibly to communicate with ships at sea.  
Peurangseu oemubu munseo 9, Daehan Jeguk II · 1899-1901, 68. 
40 Pak Jonghyo, ed., 311. 
41 ChuKan Nihon koshikan kiroku 21, No.247, 1903.8.19, http://db.history.go.kr/. 
42 Min later appealed to the French government to induce Russia to help realise Korean neutrality. Hyeon Gwangho, 
“Daehan Jegug ui daeoe jeongchaek”, 119. 
43 Hwangseong sinmun, 1903.8.20; 1903.9.12, http://www.kinds.or.kr/; Tokyo asahi shimbun, 1904.1.24.  
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had been in recess in 1899.44 Japan also would not cooperate with Hyeon Yeongun; Komura tried to 
use the Korean overture to push a bilateral alliance between Korea and Japan.45  
After Hyeon Yeongun departed for Japan, Gojong instructed Korean ministers to Japan and 
Russia (18.8.1903) to promptly obtain guarantees from the Japanese and Russian governments that 
neither country would violate Korean neutrality and infringe upon Korean territory in the event of 
war.46 Accordingly, Korean Minister to Japan Go Yeonghui (1849-1916) submitted an enquiry letter 
under the name of Korean Foreign Minister Yi Dojae to Japanese Foreign Minister Komura 
(3.9.1903).47 After much delay, Komura rejected Go’s request on the premise that neutralisation 
could not be claimed on the basis of unfounded rumour. He suggested that if Korea wanted to ease 
growing hostilities between Russia and Japan, it should not grant Russia the Yongampo concession. 
Komura further advised Go that to become a neutral state, Korea needed to be able to defend and 
support itself. After demonstrating how unrealistic Korean prospects for neutralisation were, 
Komura offered to defend the permanent existence of the Korean imperial family and assist its 
finances and military.48 Additionally, Japanese Minister to Russia Kurino indicated that Japanese 
public opinion was against Korean neutralisation and that the U.S. Chargé d’affaires to Russia had 
observed that his government would not support a Korean neutralisation that might wound Japanese 
susceptibilities.49  
Korean Minister to Russia Yi Beomjin (1852-1911)50 also explored the possibility of the 
Russian government guaranteeing Korean neutrality.51 Despite his strong reservations,52 Yi 
                                                 
44 Hyeon Gwangho, “Daehan Jegug ui daeoe jeongchaek”, 120. Hyeon Sanggeon pursued Korean neutralisation under 
the guarantee of major powers and by international organisations, such as the Red Cross, the International Peace 
Conference, and the International Court of Justice. Tokyo asahi shimbun, 1904.1.24. 
45 Duus, 179. 
46 The drafts of Gojong’s instructions to both Korean ministers were authored by Brown. ChuKan Nihon koshikan 
kiroku 21, No.268, 1903.8.26, http://db.history.go.kr/. 
47 Nihon gaikō bunsho 36, Confidential No.1, 1903.9.3, 723,  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/mokuji.html. 
48 ChuKan Nihon koshikan kiroku 19, No.134, 1903.9.30; ChuKan Nihon koshikan kiroku 20, Confidential No.77, 
1903.10.6, http://db.history.go.kr/; Nihon gaikō bunsho 36(1), No.700, Confidential Tel. No.7, 724-725; No.701, 
Confidential No.77, 725-726, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/mokuji.html. 
49 Foreign Office and Predecessor: Political and Other Departments: General Correspondence Before 1906, Russian 
Empire: FO 65/1661, Rice to Lansdowne, No.305, 1903.9.30, 241. 
50 Yi, born to a high-ranking military family, began to rise up the ranks after protecting Queen Min during the Gapsin 
Coup and supported the Russian-friendly foreign policy of Gojong and Queen Min throughout the mid-1880s. Yi’s 
stature as a prominent pro-Russia figure grew after the Triple Intervention and enabled him to serve as Acting Minister 
of the Imperial Household and Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. With help from the pro-U.S. faction, he played a 
pivotal role in Gojong’s escape to the Russian legation and after the Korean Empire was established, worked as Korean 
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submitted a written application on neutralisation to Prince Obolensky at the Russian Foreign 
Ministry. But Obolensky rebuffed the suggestion, claiming there was no risk of war between Russia 
and Japan.53 
While Gojong's envoys Hyeon Yeongun and Hyeon Sanggeon and Korean ministers Go and 
Yi sought support for neutrality in Japan and Europe, Yi Geuntaek and his Russia-aligned faction 
plotted to enter a secret agreement with Russia to counter Japanese incursions into Korea. 
Following the advice of Weber, Yi Geuntaek tried to request additional Russian troops in Korea 
from the Russian governor of the Far East. Pro-neutralisation faction member Yi Yongik,54 who 
was recently appointed a provost marshal, vigorously opposed this move, stating that the Russo-
Japanese confrontation was entirely about China and did not involve Korea. He therefore stressed 
that it was natural for Korea to maintain its neutral stance55 and recommended that Gojong seek 
refuge at the French or other foreign legations in time of emergency.56 Accepting Yi’s opinion,57 the 
Korean government declared to all countries that if war were to break out between Japan and 
Russia, Korea would maintain neutrality (23.11.1903),58 thus laying the basis for its wartime 
neutrality declaration later.  
As the Russo-Japanese negotiations over Korea and Manchuria were nearing an end, Japan 
began active military activities to retain its strategic footholds in Korea by increasing its military 
                                                                                                                                                                  
minister in Washington and St. Petersburg to carry out Gojong’s anti-Japan and pro-Russia diplomatic activities. Oh 
Yeongseop, “Eulmi sabyeon ijeon Yi Beomjin ui jeongchi hwaldong [Political Activities of Yi Beomjin Before the 
Eulmi Incident]”, Hanguk dongnip undongsa yeongu 25 (December 2005): 31-32. 
51 ChuKan Nihon koshikan kiroku 21, No.268, 1903.8.26, http://db.history.go.kr/. 
52 Involved in the process of negotiating a secret agreement between Korea and Russia, Yi, just like pro-
Japan faction members, was against neutralisation. ChuKan Nihon koshikan kiroku 18, Confidential No.49, 
1904.5.7, http://db.history.go.kr/. In his report to Yi Dojae, Yi Beomjin reminded him that Korea could 
neither prevent the invasion of foreign troops during the Sino-Japanese War nor refuse foreign demands. He 
argued this proved that Korea did not have the ability to abide by neutrality and was concerned that even 
after Korea declared neutrality, if Korea did not or could not adhere to the rules of neutrality, neighbouring 
countries could interrogate Korea about its responsibilities based on international law (JuA raegeoan 
駐俄來去案 [Reports to and from the Korean Legation in Russia], No.18062 1903.11.28; Nihon gaikō 
bunsho 37(1), No.365, 327-328, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/mokuji.html). 
53 Moriyama, 193. 
54 Though the contemporary press reports described him as either pro-Russia or pro-France, Japanese Minister to Korea 
Hayashi Gonsuke disputed this view, noting that Yi was approaching many foreign powers to provide loans to Korea. 
ChuKan Nihon koshikan kiroku 16, Confidential No. 97, 1901.9.10, http://db.history.go.kr/. 
55 Tokyo asahi shimbun, 1903.10.24; ChuKan Nihon koshikan kiroku 18, Confidential No. 171, 1903.10.30, 
http://db.history.go.kr/. 
56 ChuKan Nihon koshikan kiroku 18, Confidential No. 171, 1903.10.30, http://db.history.go.kr/. 
57 Hyeon Gwangho, “Daehan Jegug ui daeoe jeongchaek”, 120. 
58 Gojong Sillok, 1903.11.23, http://sillok.history.go.kr; “向各國宣言 將來日俄開戰時, 本國局外中立.” 
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presence there,59 though it put forward a new proposal to Russia (21.12.1903). Exposing Japan’s 
growing exasperation at Russia’s persistent refusals, Komura remarked in his telegram to Takahira: 
[Japan] finds it impossible to acquiesce in an exceedingly abnormal and precarious 
condition which would inevitably result from Russia’s remaining indefinitely on the flank 
of Korea.60 
    
Even so, Japan still had to tread carefully since Britain favoured it agree to Russia’s terms. 
Faced with the possibility of involvement in war with Russia, British leaders were now much less 
enthusiastic for the alliance with Japan. Eight days after Japan’s above proposal, Hayashi Tadasu 
sounded out Lansdowne on what support Britain might extend to Japan, but Britain offered no 
encouragement whatsoever. British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour had already decided, “Britain 
should do nothing to aid Japan except under the letter of the treaty.”61 Britain’s cautious stance 
seemed to suggest that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be useful militarily only in preventing 
another power from entering a possible Russo-Japanese War on the side of Russia.62  
In Korea, Hayashi Gonsuke was devoting himself to concluding a secret Japanese-Korean 
agreement after Komura’s instruction (29.9.1903) to use Korea as an advance base in case of a 
Russo-Japanese war.63 To achieve this, Hayashi, on the one hand, urged Komura to dispatch 
Japanese troops to Seoul if the Korean government did not respond favourably to Japan’s 
overture,64 but on the other, gathered his supporters within the court and the Korean government. 
After securing several high-ranking officials’ support, Hayashi submitted a draft of a secret 
agreement to Gojong through Yi Jiyong, which stated that Japan would settle Korean political 
refugees65 and assist in securing the safety of the Korean imperial household and Korean 
                                                 
59 Japan stepped up its military presence in Korea as dozens of Japanese troops repeatedly landed at Busan and Incheon 
for a variety of purposes ranging from relieving military police (Nihon gaikō bunsho 36(1), No.120, 771, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/mokuji.html) to guarding telegraph lines (Pak Hyojong, ed., 
278). 
60 United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1903, Komura to 
Takahira, telegrams, 1903.12.21; 12.23, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), 619-621. 
61 George W. Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900-1917 (London: T. Nelson and sons, 1963), 
147-153. 
62 Raymond A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), 20.  
63 Seo Yeonghui, “ReoIl jeonjaenggi Daehan Jeguk jipgwon seryeog ui siguk daeung”, 162-163. 
64 ChuKan Nihon koshikan kiroku 18, No.204, 1903.12.27, http://db.history.go.kr/.  
65 Hayashi was adhering to his government’s determination to use the thorny issue of Korean refugees in Japan to bring 
the Korean government to the negotiating table (Hyeon Gwangho, “Daehan Jeguk gwa Reosia geurigo Ilbon”, 277) so 
that Gojong would support a secret agreement (1903.12.27) (Nihon gaikō bunsho 37(1), No.339, 314-316; No.368-370, 
333-337), http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/mokuji.html).  
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independence (30.12.1903).66 (On the same day, the Japanese cabinet entered Japan into a state of 
war and soon decided to keep Korea under its influence through an offensive and defensive alliance 
or an agreement with Korea for its protection as a stratagem to get Japanese boots on the ground 
there.)67 Gojong, however, believed that Japan would soon forcibly occupy Korea and thus tapped 
Pavloff’s thoughts on escaping to the Russian legation in case of a crisis.68 
At this critical moment, there was a specially designed wartime neutrality attempt at the 
Korean legation in London. Established in 1901, the legation, first managed by Min Yeongdon, was 
one of the ways for Gojong to showcase Korea’s commitment to independence before the eyes of 
major powers.69 Unfortunately, Min’s tenure in London was cut short when he abruptly returned to 
Korea. Though Pak Yeonghwa was supposed to succeed Min in his post,70 Pak did not take the 
position, and the Korean legation was now headed by Chargé d’affaires Yi Haneung (1874-1905), 
who had been posted to Britain as third secretary at the Korean legation in London in 1901.71 
Despite his young age, Yi seemed well qualified for the job. Concerned about the future of his 
country, Yi enrolled at the government-run Western-style school where he was schooled in English, 
history, and politics. After passing his civil examination in 1894, he worked as an official at the 
Hanseong Department and later became an officer at the government-sponsored English School. 
Possessing linguistic expertise and the appropriate knowledge to astutely analyse international 
affairs, Yi, by closely monitoring British media reports related to the Far East, suggested Korean 
neutralisation to the British Foreign Office on his own initiative.72            
Yi first submitted a long memorandum concerning the current situation on the Korean 
peninsula to Britain’s Foreign Office along with a note (13.1.1904). Six days later, he sent two 
additional memoranda to the Foreign Office to explain his previous one. Yi’s note comprehensively 
described the positions of the Korean government on its internal circumstances and external 
relations. He stressed that conditions in the Far East were changing rapidly and requested that the 
                                                 
66 Seo Yeonghui, “ReoIl jeonjaenggi Daehan Jeguk jipgwon seryeog ui siguk daeung”, 168-169. 
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69 Gu Daeyeol, 498. 
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British government focus on matters there, especially the Korean peninsula problem. Yi predicted 
that if war broke out between Japan and Russia, the regional situation after the war would be 
completely different from that of before the war.  
In his note, Yi demanded the British government provide a fresh guarantee of Korean 
independence, sovereignty, territory and special rights through a major powers compromise 
irrespective of the results of the war. He listed five tasks Britain should undertake: guarantee 
Korean independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; 
prevent any attempts by any country to dominate Korea by means fair or foul; forbid the dispatch of 
military forces into Korea by any aggressive country, even if there was a disturbance that could 
endanger the lives of foreigners and their property in Korea; reserve the right of the Korean 
government to exercise its sovereignty first if any disturbance or riot occurred in Korea; and in case 
of a Russo-Japanese war, the British government, irrespective of the results of the war, would strive 
to preserve Korean independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, with understanding from 
other major powers.73 
Included in Yi's additional memoranda were several diagrams linking the politics of the Far 
East with the balance of power worldwide and proving, in his view, that Korean independence was 
indispensable not just for the Far East, but for world peace as well. As Diagram 6-1 in the appendix 
shows, he likened the world structure to a quadrangle. In the West (Europe), Britain and France 
constituted an axis of balance of power, and as they were increasingly tilting towards cooperation, 
both countries were meeting halfway. However, on the right-hand side of the diagram, Japan and 
Russia, the major powers determining the balance of power in the Far East, were allied with Britain 
and France respectively. Therefore, if the equilibrium in the East were to shift, the West's 
equilibrium could be disturbed, and the balance in both parts of the world would ultimately 
collapse. 
The snag was that since Japan and Russia, emerging as world powers, were competing against 
each other in the Far East—especially in Manchuria and Korea—equilibrium in the East was 
fragile. If the balance of power were splintered through war between Japan and Russia, China and 
Korea could come under pressure and Britain and France could be engulfed in conflict. Besides, 
                                                 
73 Foreign Office: Political and Other Departments: General Correspondence before 1906, China: FO 17/1662, Yi 
Haneung to Foreign Office, 1904.1.13; 1904.1.19. 
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there were two third powers (one in the East and another one in the West) at work, seeking to 
promote their interests by encouraging the destruction of balance of power in both regions. Though 
Yi did not specifically mention these two third forces in Far East politics, it seems that he might 
have been referring to the U.S. and Germany. Therefore, to protect their positions in the Far East 
and world peace, he thought Britain and France should agree to cooperate.  
If Britain and France formed an alliance in Europe (Actually, they signed the Entente Cordiale 
on 8 April 1904.), world politics could change, as seen in Diagram 6-2 in the appendix, where the 
balance of power in the West is focused into a single dot, but the distance in the East would grow 
due to the strife between Japan and Russia, making the quadrangle of Diagram 6-1 a triangle. In this 
arrangement, China and Korea would maintain their independence and Britain’s position in the Far 
East would be strengthened, but the third powers in Europe and East Asia would be unable to 
pursue their interests in the Far East. As a power of the first rank, France would be involved in both 
Europe and the Far East in the case of war, so cooperation with Britain would be beneficial for it.  
The problem was that while in the West, Britain and France could cooperate to form a single 
political entity, in the East, Japan and Russia were moving further apart. As Diagram 6-3 in the 
appendix demonstrates, the base of the triangle formed by Japan and Russia was inherently weak, 
which led to a weak triangle system. Since Japan and Russia were in constant motion, causing 
disharmony, this part could easily collapse. Accordingly, the British interests in the Far East 
(Manchuria, Korea, and China) which formed the middle bottom of the triangle could crumble 
despite the Anglo-French cooperation in Europe, which meant destruction of the global balance of 
power. To avoid this, the Russo-Japanese base of Diagram 6-3 should be reinforced. However, the 
discord between these two countries rendered the Russo-Japanese side of the triangle temporary.  
Moreover, as any room for compromise between Japan and Russia had recently disappeared, if the 
situation in the Far East were to be resolved, it would require the cooperation of Britain and France. 
Yi thus proposed using the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Franco-Russian alliance to 
reinforce the structure's base by additionally inserting an Anglo-French side alongside the 
vulnerable Russo-Japanese side, as shown in Diagrams 6-4 and 6-5 in the appendix. In this way, 
Britain and France could act as arbiters of any Russo-Japanese conflict in Manchuria or Korea, 
thereby strengthening the fragile Japan-Russia base and preserving the political balance of power 
system of the Far East. Furthermore, Yi offered a specific plan to qualify Britain and France as 
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arbiters, suggesting that they join Japan and Russia to sign a quadruple treaty. Since neither the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance nor the Franco-Russian alliance was permanent, to resolve the looming Far 
Eastern problem and avoid any spillover into Europe, now was the best moment for Britain and 
France to take the lead in such a treaty.   
By signing such a quadruple treaty, Britain and France could play a dual role in current world 
politics; in completing a cooperative system between two countries in Europe, Britain and France 
could turn their attention to East Asia and solidify the power system of the Far East, constraining 
Russo-Japanese relations. As Diagram 6-6 in the appendix illustrates, the balance of power between 
Britain and France on the one hand and Japan and Russia on the other form respectively one axis, 
which could enable Britain and France to preserve stability by counteracting any shifts in the 
balance of power in the Far East. 
Yi considered Britain and France as conservative forces intent on maintaining the existing 
world order, but regarded Japan and Russia as competing forces out to eliminate each other. Korea 
and China were seeking protection and two third powers were inciting a war between Japan and 
Russia in the Far East, hoping that Britain and France would become embroiled in such a war as 
well. Yi contended that Britain and France, by resolving suspicion and discord between the two 
rivals—Japan and Russia—peacefully and satisfactorily through a quadruple treaty, could protect 
Manchuria, Korea, and China, eliminate any danger of war in the near future, and solve world peace 
and the Far East issue together.  
If the new order were to be configured like this, it would be a splendid achievement. Two up 
until now confrontational alliances would be replaced by one peaceful accord for the first time in 
world history (in Yi’s opinion), and also would be recorded, from Britain’s historical perspective, as 
a glorious chapter in the name of British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Lansdowne’s 
Far East policy. If a quadruple treaty were incompatible with British government policy, it, as the 
second-best option, was hoped that Britain and France would maintain the present Anglo-Japanese 
and Franco-Russian alliances. In this plan, Yi insisted that to preserve peace in the Far East, Korean 
independence and sovereignty, which were the key to Far Eastern politics from a geopolitical 
perspective, were indispensable necessities.  
Although Yi’s memorandum was reviewed thoroughly at the Far Eastern Department of the 
British Foreign Office, Superintending Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Francis 
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Campbell and Senior Clerk Walter Langley commented that the memorandum was not very clear. 
They assumed Yi was asking for “something like a guarantee of independence”, but figured Britain 
was unable to take measures to aid Korea. Moreover, Campbell argued that Britain could not make 
a decision to guarantee Korean independence, especially considering war had not broken out 
between Japan and Russia. Campbell and Langley recommended giving only a verbal response to 
Yi’s memorandum on his next visit to the Foreign Office, and Lansdowne concurred with this view. 
Judging that the memorandum was in effect requesting British assistance in protecting Korea from 
Japan and Russia, he made it clear that British policy in the Far East was based on the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, and that under the current situation, Britain could not take any measures to 
satisfy Yi’s request.74 
Yi requested another meeting with Campbell to deliver the Korean government’s opinion 
regarding the situation on the Korean peninsula (15.1.1904).75 The British Foreign Office accepted 
the request, and on his visit, Yi presented a second note, quite similar to the first one, stating that 
Gojong had instructed him to deliver the information in the first memorandum to the British 
government.76 A third note including the same information as the second note followed (20.1.1904), 
and two days later, a fourth note was delivered, emphasizing that Korea would maintain strict 
neutrality, irrespective of the results of negotiations between Japan and Russia.  
During their 19 January meeting, Yi told Campbell about the inflow of Japanese troops 
disguised as merchants into the Korean interior, which implied that a Russo-Japanese war was 
imminent. Yi informed Campbell that the Korean government would not transfer the rights to 
construct the Gyeongui Railway to either Russia or Japan and would itself start construction of the 
railroad. He then sounded out Campbell on the possibility of obtaining a loan from Britain for said 
construction.77 Though Campbell informed Yi that Britain, as stated in the First Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, supported Korean independence and the preservation of Korea’s territorial integrity, it 
would not offer Korea a loan. Britain hoped Japan would, to carry out its imperialistic push, 
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75 Ibid., Yi Haneung to Campbell, 1904.1.15. 
76 Ibid., Yi Haneung to Foreign Office, 1904.1.19. 
77 Ibid., Lansdowne to Yi Haneung, 1904.1.28. 
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construct the Gyeongui Railway with its capital and maintain the right of railway control. Yi’s 
diplomatic activity continued until he committed suicide (12.5.1904).78 
Yi Beomjin and Yi Haneung’s diplomatic activities for wartime neutrality failed for quite 
different reasons. In Yi Beomjin’s case, Gojong’s mistake was to dispatch a pro-Russia faction 
member as Korean minister to Russia. Yi Beomjin would not willingly support Korean neutrality, 
opting to maintain good relations with Russia and asserting that Korea was not yet ready to secure 
its neutrality in the event of conflict since its weak military could not defend itself against Japan’s 
professional, well-equipped forces. In contrast, Yi Haneung’s neutralisation plan was based on 
signing a quadruple treaty using Britain and France as guarantors, since neither had grand territorial 
ambitions in Korea, to create a balance of power but was hampered by Britain’s Far Eastern policy, 
which closely aligned Britain with Japan under the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance and recognised 
Japanese pre-eminence in Korea. Nonetheless, unlike other foreign-based Korean diplomats, Yi 
Haneung should be credited for voluntarily floating a creative neutralisation proposal which showed 
his wide understanding of the international situation.  
Meanwhile, by early 1904, the situation had grown even more dangerous for Korea as the 
prospects for the Russo-Japanese War drew closer. Accordingly, despite the Korean Foreign 
Ministry’s request to stop the increase of military forces, Allen79 had U.S. troops enter Korea in the 
name of protecting the U.S. legation and Americans (5.1.1904), and the British, French, Italian, and 
German legations followed suit.80 This caused a commotion in Korea’s political world and serious 
disturbance of public sentiment, reflected in the rocketing inflation that hit Seoul.81 In Japan, 
Japanese leaders met at the residence of Prime Minister Katsura Tarō (11.1.1904) to discuss the 
Russian proposal delivered five days earlier, which insisted upon a neutral zone north of the 39th 
parallel in Korea and refused to recognise China’s territorial integrity with respect to Manchuria. 
                                                 
78 It is highly questionable whether his action endeared him to Britain since Jordan later advised Foreign Secretary 
Lansdowne to ignore Korea’s protest against the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Foreign Office: Political and Other 
Departments: General Correspondence before 1906, China: FO 17/1692, Jordan to Lansdowne, 1905.10.17. 
79 By this time, even Allen had become pessimistic about Korea’s ability to protect its independence. As he explained to 
U.S. Secretary of State William Woodville Rockhill: “These people [Koreans] cannot govern themselves. They must 
have an overlord as they have had for all time…Let Japan have Korea outright if she can get it.” Allen, Allen to 
Rockhill, 1904.1.4, 829. 
80 Seo Yeonghui, Daehan Jeguk jeongchisa yeongu [A Study of the Political History of the Korean Empire] (Seoul: 
Seoul daehakgyo chulpanbu, 2003), 179. 
81 Ibid., 180. 
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While Komura wanted Japan to call off the negotiations with Russia and enter war, the navy argued 
that it needed more time.82 Therefore, Japan decided to submit one more proposal repeating its 
position to Russia.83  
On 13 January, Komura presented Japan’s final proposal to Rosen, an ultimatum declaring 
that Japan could neither accept any compromise in Manchuria nor Russia’s proposal of the 
establishment of a limited zone north of the 39th parallel in Korea. Upon learning this, British 
Minister to Japan Sir Claude Maxwell MacDonald remarked that unless Russia quickly made 
concessions, a Russo-Japanese war was almost certain.84 Komura also showed a copy of the 
communication to U.S. Minister to Japan Lloyd Carpenter Griscom, saying that if Russia did not 
reply in a reasonable time, Japan would “decide what measures it may have to take to protect its 
rights and interests”.85 Griscom understood Komura’s meaning and reported to Hay: 
It is no exaggeration to say that if there was no war it will be a severe disappointment to 
the Japanese individual of every walk of life…Nothing but the complete backdown by 
the Russian government will satisfy the public feeling…it would require the most 
skilful handling on the part of the Japanese Government to mollify the war spirit which 
is now rampant.86  
 
As Japan stepped closer to war, there was a growing sense of unease among the Korean 
establishment. On his return to Korea (11.1.1904), Hyeon Sanggeon brought a letter from the 
French foreign minister, who advised that Korea rely on Russia and France, which prompted 
Gojong to vacillate regarding entering an alliance with Japan.87 However, knowing that Korean 
ministers at the state council were displeased with close associates of Gojong who were intimately 
involved in government administration and in response were on the verge of breaking with current 
Korean policy, Hayashi consulted with Min Yeongcheol and Yi Jiyong and coerced the previously 
pro-Russia Yi Geuntaek to enlist in the pro-Japan faction. Having taken these measures, Hayashi 
reported confidently to Komura that the three officials were busy bringing Gojong over to Japan’s 
                                                 
82 Esthus, 20. 
83 Takeuchi Tatsuji, War and diplomacy in the Japanese empire (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1936), 142. 
84 Correspondance Politique et Commerciale/Nouvelle Série 1897-1917 Japon [Political and Commercial 
Correspondence/New Series 1897-1917 Japan], Tel. No.37, 1904.1.14, 84.   
85 Despatches from the United States Ministers to Japan, 1855-1906, M133, Griscom to Hay, telegram, 1904.1.13. 
86 Ibid., Griscom to Hay, 1904.1.21. 
87 Hyeon Gwangho, “Daehan Jeguk gwa Reosia geurigo Ilbon”, 282. 
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side.88 With the secret agreement not yet ready and Hayashi fearing that a Russian protest to Gojong 
could nix it, he reported to Komura that a Korean draft of the secret agreement would be first signed 
by Yi Jiyong and Hayashi around 22 January, and that he expected further revisions to include 
Japan’s claims.89 However, Yi Yongik strongly opposed this, stressing to Gojong that cooperation 
between the two countries would infuriate Russia and threaten Korean independence, and warned 
Yi Jiyong.90       
Moving forward on the secret agreement, Hayashi also spied on Korea’s pro-neutralisation 
faction to discover whether they were working with the Korean court and government and with 
Pavloff to realise neutralisation, but neither predicted the Korean government’s wartime neutrality 
declaration nor procured any information about it.91 But Gojong and the pro-neutralisation faction 
led by Yi Yongik had already been secretly planning to declare neutrality and to win over friendly 
powers for Korean neutrality. Ergo, Gojong and his aides maintained links with Russia and France. 
Hyeon Sanggeon informed Pavloff that Gojong felt relieved by Nicholas II’s personal letter and 
expected the emperor’s goodwill to result in a Russian guarantee of Korean independence 
(14.1.1904). Hyeon let Pavloff read Gojong’s statement of his intentions to proclaim Korea’s strict 
neutrality in the event of a Russo-Japanese war92 and requested his cooperation in sending it via 
telegram, which would have to go through Shanghai to avoid the Japanese-controlled telegraph 
office. 
Pavloff told Hyeon to wait until he had received instructions from his government and hinted 
that Shanghai was not a viable option for transmitting the telegram since no passenger ship was 
leaving for Shanghai until four days later. Fifth-ranked Russian official M. de Plancon telegrammed 
Pavloff and confirmed Pavloff’s scepticism of the Shanghai option (17.1.1904). De Plancon advised 
that Gojong’s telegram should be sent to the French consulate in Shanghai via the French legation 
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in Seoul. The next day, Pavloff telegraphed the Russian foreign minister, reporting that Korea’s 
neutrality declaration would be announced from the French Consulate in Chefoo, China, by French 
Consul A. Guérin,93 who had been serving as acting Korean consul since 1901. Pavloff also insisted 
that Gojong’s neutrality declaration meant he had refused to sign a military alliance or protectorate 
treaty with Japan.94 
France played a pivotal role in Korea’s declaration of wartime neutrality. Working in concert 
with Yi Yongik, Gang Seokho, Yi Hakgyun, Hyeon Sanggeon, and Yi Yinyeong, Martel 
participated in key diplomatic negotiations and maintained contacts with Sands, Yi Hakgyun and 
others closely involved in neutrality policy.95 Most importantly, French Chargé d’affaires Fontenay 
would later compose Korea’s neutrality declaration and engineer its transmission abroad, as 
described below. 
In his report (2.2.1904) to Delcassé, Fontenay wrote that he met with Pavloff in Seoul. 
Fontenay pointed out how the neutralisation of Korea, if it could be guaranteed by major powers, 
would help to defuse the ongoing tension between Japan and Russia and preserve peace in the Far 
East. While agreeing with Fontenay, Pavloff feared that Japan would oppose such a move, but his 
position soon changed; during his visit (14.1.1904) to Fontenay, Pavloff told him that with the 
Russian government’s blessing, he was endeavouring to persuade Gojong to proclaim a declaration 
of neutrality. Pavloff believed that this would put an end to Japan’s solicitations for Gojong to 
surrender to their demands. Following this meeting, Fontenay drafted a declaration of Korean 
neutrality to be sent to eleven countries that had signed treaties with Korea and to seven Korean 
ministers who were accredited abroad. The text of Fontenay’s neutrality declaration statement was 
communicated to Gojong for his approval. However, the Russian government opposed transmitting 
the telegrams from the Russian-controlled Port Arthur because the Russian cabinet feared this could 
diminish the declaration's value by depriving it of the appearance of spontaneity. Furthermore, there 
was no question of entrusting these telegrams to the Japanese-controlled telegraph office. Thus, 
                                                 
93 Referred to as a vice-consul in the French diplomatic document. 
94 Pak Hyojong, ed., 430. 
95 Hwangseong sinmun, 1902.9.30, http://www.kinds.or.kr/. 
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Fontenay, remembering that French Consul Guérin in Chefoo was also serving as the consul of 
Korea, thought he could act on behalf of the Korean government to transmit its messages abroad.96 
Despite this positive development, much was left to overcome. Instead of uniting behind the 
cause of wartime neutrality, in early January of 1904 the Korean court was still debating the need 
for Gojong to take refuge at a foreign legation. Yi Geuntaek of the pro-Russia camp reported to 
Gojong that since Russia would win in the event of the Russo-Japanese War, Gojong should escape 
to the nearby Russian legation. In contrast, pro-neutralisation faction members Yi Yongik and Gil 
Yeongsoo advised Gojong to seek refuge at the French legation. Hayashi reported that the French 
minister proposed to Yi Yongik that all Korean capital be withdrawn from Japanese banks and 
stored at the French legation.97 Considering the Korean government’s structural dependence on the 
Dai-Ichi Bank loans, this was a radical proposal that, if carried out, could weaken Japan’s influence 
in Korea. 
Their bickering notwithstanding, Gojong’s closest aides—with the exception of Yi Geuntaek, 
who now aligned himself with Japan instead of Russia—turned their attention to the declaration of 
wartime neutrality. As Russian and French diplomatic documents demonstrated, neutralisation 
advocates could not freely communicate their intentions to declare neutrality via telegraph cable. 
Neither could neutralisation be discussed openly; high-ranking Korean officials like Foreign 
Minister Yi Jiyong98 were known to hold pro-Japanese sentiments. Moreover, the presence of 
Japanese spies was so omnipresent that even the inner court was not immune from Japanese 
surveillance. To ensure Korea’s plan for wartime neutrality was not leaked to Japan, it was secretly 
prepared under the direction of Yi Yongik and involved only a select number of Korean officials. 
                                                 
96 Up until now, scholars have relied solely on Japanese documents to hypothesize about French Chargé d’affaires 
Fontenay’s role in the declaration of Korean wartime neutrality. However, this unpublished French diplomatic 
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97 Nihon gaikō bunsho 37(1), No.519, 440, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/archives/mokuji.html. 
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Série 1897-1910 Corée: Politique extériure Étrangers en Corée III, 1902-1904, No.205, 1904.1.28, 192), and thus was 
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Within the Korean court,99 Gojong’s palace aides—Hyeon Sanggeon, Gang Seokho, Yi 
Hakggyun, and Yi Yinyeong—worked with Martel and Delcoigne to prepare the neutrality 
declaration. Fontenay translated this into French and an interpreter at the Korean Foreign Ministry, 
Yi Geonchun, was reportedly sent to Chefoo to deliver the text and have the French vice-consul 
facilitate the declaration on behalf of the Korean government.100 Under the name of Foreign 
Minister Yi Jiyong, the wartime neutrality of Korea was declared at Chefoo (21.1.1904), and 
telegrams announcing the declaration soon reached foreign capitals.101 The contents of the telegram 
on wartime neutrality declaration, written in French, were as follows: 
In view of the complications which have sprung up between Russia and Japan and in 
view of the difficulties which negotiations seem to encounter in bringing about a pacific 
solution, the Corean Gov. by order of H. M. the emperor, declares that it has taken the 
firm resolution of observing the most strict neutrality whatever may be the result of the 
pourparlers actually engaged between the two powers.102 
 
The declaration of wartime neutrality by the Korean government took Japan by surprise. Yi 
Jiyong, who was exerting himself to conclude the secret agreement between Korea and Japan, did 
not realise that his name was used without his approval. But the next day he had to sign and stamp 
wartime neutrality declaration under the order of Gojong, who told him that a person would be 
immediately sent to Chefoo.103 Komura thus instructed Hayashi to find out who had sent the 
telegram proclaiming Korea’s wartime neutrality to major powers. Japan at first suspected Hyeon 
Sanggeon and Yi Hakggyun, but after confirming their absence from Chefoo, Japanese officials 
shifted their focus on responding to the neutrality declaration. Since Japan’s primary concern lay in 
severing the close relationship between Korea and Russia, Japanese officials refused to recognise 
Korean neutrality if Korea tolerated Russian military activity at the Yalu River basin, predicting 
                                                 
99 Allen wrote that in his guess the preparation for Korean neutrality took place at the Russian legation, where Korean 
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that the activities of the pro-neutralisation faction would be only a temporary distraction104 and 
concluding that Japan did not need to acknowledge Korean neutrality.105 
As expected, Russia willingly accepted Korean neutrality since its cabinet believed the 
declaration could stop Japan from imposing a protectorate on Korea,106 and thus De Plancon 
ordered Pavloff to inform Gojong that the Russian government completely sympathised with 
Korea’s neutrality declaration.107 Russia’s positive reactions rendered the Japanese assertion that 
Russia’s responses varied108 highly questionable. Japan’s ally, Britain, responding to Korea’s 
wartime neutrality declaration through its minister in Seoul (22.1.1904),109 refused to endorse 
Korean neutrality, and just as it had with Yi Haneung’s request in London, merely acknowledged 
it.110 Following his government’s instructions, Italian Minister to Korea replied with only an 
acknowledgement (27.1.1904),111 notwithstanding his king’s subsequent support for Korean 
neutrality. 
The U.S., however, never responded to the Korean neutrality declaration, even though Allen 
wondered whether the U.S. government had: 
There is a rumour today from the palace that you have so replied. I trust this is not 
correct. It tends to discredit your representative here when you reply direct to messages 
from the Korean Government, instead of doing so through your representative here.112 
 
Considering Roosevelt’s pro-Japan sentiments,113 American possession of the Philippines, and its 
open door policy in China, that the U.S. had already declared Japan-friendly neutrality in the event 
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of a Russo-Japanese war114 was small wonder. While Hay instructed U.S. Ministers to China and 
Japan Conger and Griscom and U.S. Ambassador to Russia Robert S. McCormick to convey 
America’s earnest wish that “the neutrality of China and her administrative entity” be respected by 
both Japan and Russia,115 he excluded Korea, which had already declared its neutrality. This 
symbolised the U.S. government’s current stance.116 Cassini criticised Hay, saying: why would it 
not remonstrate with Japan over Korea, while the U.S. would try to deprive Russia of Manchuria? 
And why did the U.S. omit Korea from the list of those it would support, though Korea had also 
declared its neutrality as China had done?117 
To make matters worse, while no foreign powers except Russia formally supported its 
neutrality, the Korean government interpreted their acknowledgements of the receipt of Korea’s 
wartime neutrality declaration as their endorsement.118 As Allen stated: 
You will see from this telegram that the mere acknowledgement, by the Foreign 
Powers, of the receipt of this announcement, is having an effect that must be quite 
contrary to that intended by those powers.119 
 
Allen’s finding could also apply to the case of Yi Yongik, who misunderstood the process of 
neutralisation and thus wrongly believed that Korea had become a neutral state;120 when British 
journalist Frederick Arthur Mackenzie asked him about the fate of Korea in the event of a Russo-
Japanese war, Yi, demonstrating his limited grasp of international law, replied that the Korean 
government’s declaration of wartime neutrality would protect Korea because major powers would 
uphold Korean neutrality.121 
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Though Korea’s cautiously planned wartime neutrality was declared after secret negotiations 
with Russia and discreet advice and cooperation from French representatives, the results were quite 
limited. While most major powers did not mention why they would not endorse Korea’s neutrality, 
its military weaknesses122 might have been one of the reasons. To be sure, if they were ever to 
successfully defend Korea from external threats, Korean soldiers had to be tested in real combat. 
Unfortunately, the Korean military’s combat experience was restricted to quelling internal 
uprisings, battling against the remnants of the Boxers, and engaging in skirmishes with Chinese 
forces in Manchuria.123 Quantitatively, despite making undeniable progress, the Korean military 
still remained small even in 1904 (25,200),124 and could not match other major powers’ far bigger 
forces. Compare Japan. Having initiated a massive defence-strengthening programme in 1895, it 
boasted an 180,000-man army and a formidable navy composed mainly of British state-of-the-art 
cruisers and destroyers by 1903. The Russian army in turn fielded more than one million men, and 
its navy ranked fourth in the world in terms of total tonnage.125  
Before simply acknowledging Korea’s wartime neutrality declaration, Germany and France 
had tried to neutralise geopolitically important areas within Korea to safeguard their interests in the 
region. As a passive mediator in the rivalry between Japan and Russia,126 Germany, through 
German Minister to Japan Arco, urged Russia not to compromise with Japan and encouraged Japan 
to resist Russian imperialism in Manchuria and Korea in the autumn of 1901.127 While its East 
Asian policy seemed opportunistic, Germany still retained an interest in Korea, raising its 
representative in Seoul to the rank of minister resident in January 1903 and appointing highly-
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experienced Conrad von Saldern to the post.128 As France, Russia’s ally since the 1890’s, had 
become Russia’s main creditor (1904),129 it worried about the financial ramifications of a Russo-
Japanese conflict. Since such hostilities could also endanger its interests in Korea and Indochina 
through possible Japanese intrusion,130 France actively collaborated with Britain to prevent war 
between their respective allies.131 Although Russia proposed neutralisation of an area within Korea 
to protect Manchuria against Japanese intrusion, the country, showing an active interest in wartime 
neutrality,132 later supported Korea’s neutrality declaration.  
Though their Far Eastern strategies differed markedly, the three countries ended up suggesting 
wartime neutrality for specific areas within Korea. The Shanghai-based Chinese language 
newspaper Shēn bào (22.1.1904) reported that both Germany and France proposed that Seoul and 
Incheon be declared “neutral zones”.133 The next day, according to the Shēn bào report, Russia also 
requested the Korean government designate a northern frontier area of the Korean peninsula a 
neutral zone.134 However, other major powers did not show any interest in the German and French 
proposal, and Korea did not respond to Russia’s proposal.  
Meanwhile, believing that Korea’s wartime neutrality declaration had been successful, 
Gojong wanted to utilise it to declare permanent neutrality. He summoned Fontenay to discuss the 
necessary process for this measure and instructed Min Yeongchan to discuss rights and duties for 
neutrality with Louis Renaut.135 Gojong’s optimism was also shared by Yi Yongik, who judged that 
the neutrality declaration could protect Korea from the dangers of war.136 Moreover, some pro-
Korea Westerners seemed to think Korea’s security could also be secured by concessions 
diplomacy among major powers; in late January Delcoigne was working on a plan to divide Korean 
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mines into zones to be assigned to foreigners as concessions for attracting the interest of major 
powers to Korea.137  
Nevertheless, the geopolitical situation still tilted against Korea; by late January, Japanese 
preparations for war were completed, and its government was determined to avoid further delay that 
would be detrimental to its cause.138 Russia also adopted a tough policy at a council in the Royal 
presence (28.1.1904), thus preparing for war with Japan. Accordingly, Komura instructed Kurino 
(3.2.1904) to stop seeking a Russian reply to the Japanese counter-proposal, and the next day, a 
secret council in the Royal presence decided to go to war (4.2.1904).139 Even then, France still 
hoped to find peaceful solutions to resolve the potential regional crisis, with Delcassé stressing the 
importance of the preservation of peace in the Far East (5.2.1904).140 Finally, after Japan notified 
Lamsdorff via Kurino of the severance of diplomatic relations (6.2.1904), its navy launched a 
surprise attack on the Russian ships at Port Arthur, thus triggering the Russo-Japanese War 
(8.2.1904).141 
Under these circumstances, the Korean government had to consider a more realistic measure. 
According to Hayashi’s report (8.2.1904) to Komura, Hyeon Sanggeon frequently visited the 
French legation in Seoul, possibly in order to effectuate the neutrality of Seoul under the approval 
of various countries, a matter recently on the agenda for a meeting at the palace. In fact, Hyeon 
received orders from Gojong to convince Fontenay to propose the neutrality of Seoul, or failing 
that, have him request Pavloff do so. Both representatives, however, were reluctant to call for the 
neutrality of Seoul and make their stands known. Nevertheless, Gojong gave Yi Guentaek the 
authority to help make this happen,142 which seemed to be short-sighted considering Yi’s pro-Japan 
sentiment. Since Britain, U.S., and Japan had all rebuffed its neutrality declaration, Korea was 
making a desperate effort to realise at least Seoul’s neutrality, pinning its faint hopes on the Franco-
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Russian Alliance. But Hyeon’s attempt progressed no further due to the circumspect stance taken by 
the French and Russian ministers and Japan’s expansionist policy towards Korea.143 
While Korea was making little headway in its wartime neutrality, the Japanese victory in the 
naval battle of Incheon (9.2.1904) led to Japanese troops entering and occupying Seoul and to 
Pavloff’s decision to leave the capital. The next day, Japanese adviser Katō Matsuo and Ōmiwa 
Chōbei had an audience with Gojong and pushed him to retract his neutrality declaration, saying 
that it could not prevent Russo-Japanese forces from entering Korea since no country’s response 
would be strong enough to affect the actual situation on the ground.144 Seoul being occupied, 
Gojong, having no choice but to give up his neutralisation policy, reluctantly decided to enter an 
alliance with Japan, ordering Yi Jiyong, Yi Yongik, and Ōmiwa to parley (17.2.1904).145 
Korea’s diplomatic isolation also played a part in forcing Gojong to consider the said alliance; 
on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese Consul in Busan Shidehara Kijurō ordered 
Japanese consular policemen to prevent the Korean post office staff from sending a Russian 
diplomatic report about the start of hostilities and afterwards cut the Korean government-owned 
Busan-Seoul telegraph line. Japanese Minister in Seoul Hayashi also ordered all telegraph lines out 
of the Korean capital except Japanese-owned ones be put out of commission for three days. By 
imposing a “communication blackout” on Russia,146 Japan stopped communications between Seoul 
and St. Petersburg and was able to pressure the Korean government to align itself with Japan at this 
critical moment. 
Ultimately, in the teeth of fierce opposition from some officials like Yi Yongik, Hayashi 
managed to cajole acting Foreign Minister Yi Jiyong into signing the Korea-Japan Protocol 
(23.2.1904),147 giving Japan the right to intervene in Korean foreign policy, granting permission for 
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the Japanese military to seize Korean land, and prohibiting both governments from signing any 
agreement that violated the terms of this protocol.148 By allowing Japanese forces to use Korean soil 
for military purposes, Korea violated its duty as a neutral country—prevent the use of a neutral 
state’s territory as a military base for a belligerent—and thus its neutrality declaration ran 
aground.149 To cap it all, Japan forced Korea to publish the secret protocol in Korea’s official 
gazette. The formal announcement severely restricted Korea’s latitude internationally.150 Later, 
Japan forced Gojong to issue an edict renouncing all treaties and conventions between Korea and 
Russia (18.5.1904), but he would retract the edict at the first opportunity.151   
Meanwhile, troubled by the course of the war, Carl Wolter, a German member of the 
Committee of the International Settlement in Incheon, proposed wartime neutrality for the 
international settlement there to Japanese Consul in Incheon Katō Motokunio (2.3.1904). Wolter 
sought to secure Katō’s assent to his proposal, arguing that the Korea-Japan Protocol had made 
Korea an ally of Japan. Thus, given the direction of the Russo-Japanese War, the status of the 
international settlements for various countries in Incheon had to follow the example set by the ones 
in Shanghai during the Sino-Japanese War. Wolter pointed out that once this step was taken, the 
lives and property of foreign and Japanese nationals in Incheon’s international settlement could be 
protected.152 
Wolter’s proposal, however, failed to gain the sympathy of Japan for the following reasons: 
First, Japanese officials asserted that it was opposed to the national interests of both Korea and 
Japan by international law and was unaccompanied by any tangible benefits. Second, if the Russian 
military abided by international law, it would not shell or invade an undefended area (Incheon). If 
Russia disregarded international law, there was no way to prevent Russian forces from bombarding 
and invading Incheon. Third, since the international settlements bordered the Sino-Japanese 
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settlement, even if they were declared a neutral zone, they would still be endangered.153 Moreover, 
the German chargé d’affaires, vice-consuls of various countries in Incheon, and the American 
resident W. D. Townsend all opposed Wolter’s idea.154 
Meanwhile, Japan benefited from Roosevelt’s pro-Japan stance. Though the U.S. declared 
strict neutrality, he strongly supported Japan. Takahira, seeking Roosevelt’s goodwill, willingly 
replied to Russian accusations that Japan had committed acts in Korea which were illegal under 
international law in a telegram to Hay (8.3.1904):  
The maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Corea being one of the  
objects of the present war, the dispatch of troops to the menaced territory was a matter 
of right and necessity and in taking this action the Imperial government have had the 
distinct consent of the Corean government.155 
During a visit from Japanese envoy Kaneko Kentarō, Roosevelt expressed his confidence that Japan 
would win the war (26.3.1904), and at a lunch meeting with Kaneko and Takahira, he said he hoped 
that, as for Japan and its future role in the Far East, it would take its place as a great nation with “a 
paramount interest in what surrounds the Yellow Sea, just as the United States has a paramount 
interest in what surrounds the Caribbean” (6.6.1904).156 He further patronised Japan in his letter to 
Hay: “The Japs have played our game of the civilised mankind…We may be of genuine service, if 
Japan wins out, in preventing interference to rob her of the fruits of her victory” (26.7.1904).157 
Appreciating Roosevelt’s views, Japan felt it was of “the utmost importance to have the 
goodwill and sympathy of the United States”.158 Relying on American support, Hayashi coerced Yi 
Hayeong into appointing financial and diplomatic advisers recommended by Japan (6.8.1904),159 
which enabled Japan to dominate Korea without any interference. While Japan maintained amicable 
relations with France, despite the latter’s alliance with Russia, Germany had an obvious partiality 
for Russia in the early months of the war, leading to Japanese fears that Germany would intervene 
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in the war or in the peace process.160 Roosevelt once again came to Japan’s rescue, telling German 
Ambassador to the U.S. Speck von Sternberg that a coalition of powers must not be formed to 
deprive Japan of the fruits of her victory (9.8.1904).161 To Japan’s relief, the German government 
replied that it would not interfere (14.8.1904) and acknowledged that if Russia were defeated, 
Korea would become Japan’s possession (27.9.1904).162 
After Port Arthur fell to Japanese forces (2.1.1905), the German government contemplated a 
peace settlement for the Russo-Japanese War.163 Russia, however, would not take up this option as 
of yet, as some like Cassini asserted they should continue fighting.164 Even so, Roosevelt wanted to 
maintain balance of power on the continent of Asia by preventing a lop-sided victory for either 
Japan or Russia165 and outlined peace conditions to George von L. Meyer, the soon-to-be-appointed 
U.S. Ambassador to Russia (6.2.1905): 
Of course the military mechanism may alter, but if peace should come now, Japan ought 
to have a protectorate over Korea (which has shown its utter inability to stand by itself) 
and ought to succeed to Russia’s rights in and around Port Arthur, while I should hope 
to see Manchuria restored to China.166 
 
Roosevelt’s peace terms seemed to be in line with those of the Japanese government. Moreover, 
Japan soon had another reason to sue for peace as its victory from the Battle of Mukden (10.3.1905) 
had stretched its material and financial resources to the limit.167 
           In April, the momentum for peace picked up as first Delcassé168 and later Roosevelt favoured 
direct negotiations between Japan and Russia to end the war, demanding Japan remain committed to 
the open door policy in Manchuria and the restoration of it in China.169 Emboldened by this 
development, the Katsura cabinet formally decided to sign a protectorate treaty giving Japan full 
control over Korea’s external relations and placing domestic affairs under the supervision of a 
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Japanese resident.170 Afterwards, taking advantage of its victory at the Battle of Tsushima 
(28.5.1905), Japan requested that Roosevelt “directly and entirely on his own motion and initiative” 
invite Russia and Japan to open direct negotiations.171 Accordingly, Roosevelt formally urged both 
countries to enter negotiations to end the war (8.6.1905).172 Eventually, the Russian emperor 
accepted Roosevelt’s recommendation to hold peace talks with Japan (11.6.1905),173 but Russia was 
still unwilling to yield completely to Japan; the Russian Foreign Ministry ordered its representative 
at the upcoming Russo-Japanese conference to mention how Japan had violated international law to 
occupy Korea without permission and had simultaneously contravened various treaties that 
guaranteed its independence and non-aggression (11.7.1905).174 
While Russian officials were grappling with strategies for the forthcoming talks, the Japanese 
government secretly plotted to strengthen its bargaining position during the conference; Japan 
concluded the Taft-Katsura Memorandum (27.7.1905), which came after U.S. Secretary of War 
William Howard Taft suggested to Japanese Prime Minister Katsura Tarō that Korea should be 
prohibited from entering into foreign treaties without Japan’s consent, saying that this would 
contribute to permanent peace in the Far East.175 The accord also reflected Katsura’s view that the 
U.S. East Asian policy should conform to British and Japanese designs there, and by agreeing to it, 
Taft accepted Japan’s exercise of diplomatic control over Korea at the end of the Russo-Japanese 
War.176 In return, Japan disavowed any aggressive intentions towards the U.S. colony the 
Philippines.177 This marked the end of U.S. support for Korean neutralisation. No longer could 
Korea officially count on the U.S. for its assistance through good offices to mediate Korea’s 
disputes with Japan. In the absence of any desire on the part of the U.S. to restrain Japan from 
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pursuing its objective in Korea (establishing a protectorate), engagement with Russia was the only 
realistic option for Korean neutralisation. 
Japan’s position was further bolstered when the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance went into 
force (12.8.1905). Like the first alliance, this renewed alliance was aimed at winning the “goodwill 
and support of all the Powers in endeavouring to maintain peace in East Asia”.178 Through this 
agreement, Britain could also extend the scope of the alliance to include India.179 More importantly, 
this agreement recognised Japan’s paramount position in Korea, allowing Japan to pursue its 
political, military, and economic interests in Korea.180 Unlike the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the 
Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance did not include any provisions guaranteeing Korean 
independence.181 This agreement could not have come at a better time for Japan because the first 
alliance was seen as “a most inconvenient stumbling block” for Japan’s effort to establish a 
protectorate over Korea.182 Finally, since this alliance committed both parties to come to each 
other’s assistance in case any of its interests, as specified by the treaty, were attacked by a third 
power, this ensured that Japan would be spared from another war with Russia.183 
Basking in Anglo-American support, Komura, Japan’s chief delegate, came to the conference 
(9.8.1905) with three conditions that were absolutely imperative for Japan: a free hand in Korea, 
withdrawal of the Russian army from Manchuria, and the transfer to Japan of the Liaotung lease 
and the railway line linking Harbin to Port Arthur. As for additional conditions that were not 
considered absolutely necessary, he was told to pursue the surrender of Russian warships in neutral 
ports, fishing rights along the coast of the Maritime Province, the cession of Sakhalin, and 
indemnity payments to Japan.184 While Russian representative Witte was willing to concede all 
three of Japan’s non-negotiable demands, he would not compromise on cessation of land and 
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payment of indemnities to Japan.185 Within a week, both sides had agreed on many of the terms, and 
Russia had recognised Japan’s paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea.186 
As the peace conference between Russia and Japan progressed, Admiral Biriley at the Russian 
Navy Ministry put forward a new Korean neutrality proposal. Biriley commented to Lamsdorff that 
Korea’s recent accord with Japan meant that Korea would soon be annexed by Japan, creating a 
Russo-Japanese border adjacent to Vladivostok. Biriley therefore suggested that during negotiations 
with Japan, Russia should persuade it to move the current Korean border further south. If Japan 
would not accept this idea, Biriley proposed turning the southern zone of the Korean border into 
neutral territory. To Biriley’s disappointment, this suggestion seemed not to have been picked up on 
by Witte, whose subsequent telegram to the Foreign Ministry never mentioned it (3.9.1905).187 
Given that the Russian government had already proposed neutrality in the northern Korean frontier 
area, Biriley must have expected Lamsdorff’s support. But even if the proposal were presented to 
Japan, with both Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour having already agreed that 
Japan should remain in control of Korea,188 Russia was looking down not one but three diplomatic 
barrels. 
· Neutralisation Efforts Around the Time of the Second Hague Peace Conference (1907) 
The Treaty of Portsmouth eventually went into force (5.9.1905). However, Russia clung to the 
belief that Korean independence was valid. In this treaty, Japan asked Russia to acknowledge its 
stake in the politics, military, and economy of Korea and its right to treat Korea essentially as a 
protectorate.189 Russia accepted Japan’s predominance in Korean politics and economy, but 
believed that Korea had not lost its independence.190 Accordingly, at the special conference held at 
Witte’s home by imperial edict it was confirmed that the Russian government would acknowledge 
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Korea’s independence, and the Foreign Ministry was tasked with sounding out other major powers’ 
views on it (4.10.1905).191 Accordingly, Lamsdorff informed the Russian legations at Paris, Berlin, 
and Washington that Russia would never contemplate yielding Korea’s independence to Japan 
because it would undercut Russia’s Far Eastern policy and ordered them to determine whether 
France, Germany, and the U.S. would acknowledge Korea’s international status and maintain their 
diplomatic positions as before (17.10.1905).192 Of course, Korea also felt that Russia could support 
Korean independence, relying on its ally to win major powers’ sympathy for its neutralisation. 
Thus, despite this treaty, Gojong and his associates counted on major powers to assist Korean 
independence and for a time it seemed Russia could come to Korea’s rescue. Siding with Korea by 
inviting it to the Second Hague Peace Conference (3.10.1905), Russia tried to abet a Korean appeal 
for major powers’ understanding of its independence. 
Regardless of Russia’s views on Korean independence, the Japanese government, having 
already obtained an Anglo-American understanding on its designs to establish a protectorate over 
Korea, pushed through the Protectorate Treaty (17.11.1905) with Korea, undeniably bringing 
Korea’s long arduous journey for survival to a dark end. Despite Gojong’s pleas, Itō presented him 
with Japan’s five demands (15.11.1905), which included the abolition of Korea’s Foreign Ministry 
and the instalment of the residency in Seoul. However, Gojong felt compelled to protest to Itō that 
if Korea were to lose its diplomatic rights, the country would end up becoming like Hungary, which 
was annexed by Austria, or Africa, which was colonised by major powers. He also insisted that 
since this was an important matter, he had to consult government ministers and his subjects before 
making a decision. Itō refused such a request because the fact that Gojong, as an absolute monarch, 
was gauging people’s views on this matter was in effect provoking the public to resist Japan. 
Instead, Itō allowed Gojong to talk with his ministers on Japan’s proposed treaty with Korea.193 
Although Japan used the Protectorate Treaty to justify its control over Korea to major powers, 
the treaty, according to assertions by recent Korean scholarship, was legally flawed in several 
respects. The treaty had no commission of full powers and ratification instrument, which were 
required in every international treaty. Moreover, this treaty was not “a convention” but “an 
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agreement”. The appellation “a convention” could be used formally in protectorate treaties between 
Western major powers and weak countries, but the appellation “an agreement” was legally less 
regarded for a formal diplomatic document. Although Japanese scholarship claims otherwise, 
Gojong, unwilling to consent to the treaty, refused to sign it. The treaty was concluded perfunctorily 
and under duress by only a few Korean cabinet ministers, without the inclusion of Gojong’s formal 
name, signature, and the seal of the state.194 
Gojong asked the U.S. to use its good offices for Korea since the treaty had been signed under 
duress,195 but the U.S. would not. On the very day Japan announced the conclusion of the treaty, 
U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root telegraphed U.S. Minister in Seoul Edwin V. Morgan to close 
the U.S legation (24.11.1905),196 which he duly complied with four days later.197 Moreover, in 
response to a Russian enquiry, Root replied that the treaty had not harmed U.S. interests in any way 
(29.12.1905).198 Gojong also sent personal letters to German Emperor Wilhelm II199 and French 
President Loubet,200 condemning the Japanese infringement of Korean sovereignty and asking for 
their support. Germany’s response was highly disappointing, considering that it had recognised the 
importance of an independent Korea and had confirmed that it would maintain the rank of its 
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representative in Seoul (20.10.1905).201 But, after the treaty, Germany, regarding Korea as Japan’s 
dependency,202 opted not to station the same ranking diplomat in Seoul.203 
Having held a negative view of Japan’s ambitions in Korea during the Russo-Japanese War, 
France considered prompting another Triple Intervention involving European powers to stop the 
Japanese advance in Northeast Asia. Eventually though, France, not wanting to get bogged down in 
a competition amongst major powers, chose not to intervene.204 Still, in a reply to Russian 
Ambassador Aleksandr Nelidov, French Foreign Minister Maurice Rouvier said that France would 
not downgrade its legation in Korea, but Rouvier was flustered when Korean Minister Min 
Yeongchan informed him that the treaty was illegal (26.11.1905).205 However, no follow-up on this 
issue was taken. In the end, unable to ignore the shifting geopolitics, France became the last major 
power to close its legation in Seoul (26.12.1905).206  
Russia was the only power still in Korea’s corner. It regarded the Protectorate Treaty as 
illegal, and the Russian Foreign Ministry ordered Russian Ambassador to U.S. Rosen to sound out 
the U.S.’s present Korean policy.207 The ministry also instructed Russian ministers in London, 
Vienna, Rome, Berlin, and Paris to explain to their host governments that the Protectorate Treaty 
was signed illegally under duress and to ascertain if and how they would support Korea’s claims 
(22.11, 24.11, 25.11, and 27.11.1905).208 Later, Lamsdorff and the Russian emperor agreed to meet 
Yi Yongik, who would attempt to use Russian assistance to steer European opinions in Korea’s 
favour for securing its independence (11.12.1905).209 
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By late 1905, no major power except Russia was taking an active interest in Korean 
independence. Furthermore, according to the Protectorate Treaty, Japan had established a Japanese 
Residency-General of Korea in Seoul (20.12.1905).210 This grim situation led most Western 
observers to concede that Korea had effectively become Japan’s colony, but some Westerners still 
supported Gojong’s efforts to safeguard Korean independence. British journalist Douglas Story 
eluded Japanese surveillance and conveyed a letter from Gojong calling for major powers to guide 
Korean foreign policy for five years under their joint protection to British Minister in Beijing Ernest 
Satow in January 1906.211  
Another British journalist, Ernest Bethell, launched two newspapers, the Daehan maeil sinbo 
and its sister publication the Korea Daily News, to press the case for Korea’s independence. His 
efforts did not stop at publishing anti-Japanese articles; according to the Ōsaka mainichi shimbun, 
sometime in March or April 1907 Bethell had an audience with Gojong and advised him to adopt a 
Belgian-style neutrality under the guarantee of major powers. The newspaper did not report how 
Gojong responded to Bethell’s proposal. Instead, the newspaper quoted a telegram from Seoul 
saying that three Korean envoys were secretly dispatched by Gojong to join the Second Hague 
Peace Conference, expressing its embarrassment about this and labelling their presence in The 
Hague a farce.212 However, the newspaper’s opinions cannot diminish Bethell’s courage in standing 
up for an independent Korea, a trait that Gojong shared,213 even after the Protectorate Treaty had 
stripped Korea of its diplomatic sovereignty. 
Realising that the case for Korean independence could be better presented at a major forum 
under international law, Gojong eagerly awaited the Second Hague Peace Conference, to which 
Korea had been invited by Russia to state the inviolability of its sovereignty.214 Russia eventually 
realised, though, that its support for Korean independence was without substance due to no mention 
of Korean independence in the Portsmouth Treaty,215 and unbeknownst to Gojong, was skillfully 
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lobbied by the Japanese government to bar Korea from attending the conference (13.6.1906).216 
Moreover, Japanese Minister in Paris Kurino Shin’ichiro and French Foreign Minister Stéphen 
Pichon concluded the Franco-Japanese Convention (10.6.1907). According to De Plancon, the 
illegality of the Protectorate Treaty made Japan conclude this new agreement to legitimise its 
control over Korea.217 France in return wanted to use this convention to trade its sphere of influence 
in Indochina and southern China for Japan’s sphere of influence in Korea, Manchuria, and 
Fukien.218 France, after Russia, was the most active player in Korean neutralisation diplomacy, as it 
mediated Russo-Japanese disputes during Gojong’s flight to the Russian legation and assisted 
Korea’s wartime neutrality declaration. With the Franco-Japanese Convention, France, though it 
was the last major power to recall its minister from Korea, finally acted as a true practitioner of 
realpolitik, subordinating Korean independence to its colonial interests. Around the same time, 
Russia too shifted course after the appointment of Foreign Minister Izvolsky (12.5.1906) and was 
preparing to use Korea as a sacrificial lamb to restore its working relationship with Japan.219 
Such was the adversity that Yi Jun, Yi Sangseol (1871-1917),220 and Yi Wijong (1887-?)221 
faced when they arrived at the Second Hague Peace Conference (15.6-18.10.1907) to appeal to 
major powers’ political consciences (25.6.1907). Giving them diplomatic carte blanche with his 
personal letter, Gojong hoped they would convince major powers that the Protectorate Treaty was 
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illegal and that Korea was still an independent state.222 Unfortunately for Korea, international 
opinion remained indifferent towards Korea as the conference focused on major powers’ efforts to 
pursue a balance of power through arms control amidst the escalating Anglo-German naval arms 
race.223  
In particular, Russia’s reaction turned out to be a sore point with Korea. Though the issue of 
neutrality was considered one of the most important subjects at the conference,224 De Plancon had 
told Yun Taekyeong in late April 1907 that the timing was not right to discuss the Korean issue 
since major powers’ interests lay elsewhere. Though De Plancon confirmed the Russian emperor’s 
affection towards Korea, he counselled Korea to be patient.225 Russia rewarded Korea’s patience 
with betrayal when it put its interests first,226 and Izvolsky, so as to appease Japan, telegrammed the 
president of the conference Aleksandr Nelidov requesting Yi Jun and Yi Sangseol not be recognised 
as official representatives at The Hague (11.6.1907).227 Not surprisingly, when the Korean envoys 
called on Nelidov, he refused to meet them, informing them that representatives who were not 
invited by the Dutch government could not attend the conference (29.6.1907).228 
On top of everything else, the Russo-Japanese Agreement was concluded (30.7.1907), which 
signalled Russia’s withdrawal of its support for Korean independence, making a political scapegoat 
of Korea for its interests. The origin of the agreement can be traced back to mid-1906, when Russia 
and Japan began negotiations on the settlement of the Russian sphere of influence in Manchuria and 
the Japanese sphere of influence in Korea.229 In exchange for relinquishing its support for Korean 
independence, Russia secured its sphere of influence in northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. 
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Japan, in return, officially won Russian approval of Japan’s control of Korea and sphere of 
influence in southern Manchuria.230 
Against Korea’s expectations, the U.S. was also indifferent to its envoys. By early 1907, 
Japan’s attempts at military and economic supremacy in Manchuria and the tensions surrounding 
Japanese immigration into the American West hurt U.S.-Japan relations.231 The U.S. continued to 
give Korea the cold shoulder, however; the U.S., lacking overwhelming naval strength, would not 
upset Japan by intervening on behalf of Korea.232 Nevertheless, the Korean envoys still retained 
pro-U.S. sentiments and attempted to capitalise on the anti-Japan immigration mood in the U.S. Yet 
they were unable to arrange a meeting with the U.S. representative John W. Foster and were told by 
his colleague Joseph H. Choate that the U.S. could no longer do anything for Korea (29.6.1907).233 
Even though Hulbert had been trying to gain U.S. sympathy for Korea’s plight through his 
newspaper interviews,234 the U.S. government dismissed him as an agitator (24.7.1907).235 
France might have been the only power left which might show at least some interest in 
Korean independence before the Franco-Japanese Convention was concluded. When push came to 
shove, however, France chose to side with Japan rather than to assist Korea. When Gojong’s 
American adviser Hulbert asked French consul to Korea Belin for its good offices to aid Korean 
envoys at the Hague Conference, the consul not only rejected this request, but informed Itō about it 
as well in May 1907.236 Hulbert could not have possibly known that the French Foreign Ministry 
had already instructed Belin not to assist in any activity that the country (Korea) under protection 
would undertake against the country (Japan) that protected it.237 The French representative joined 
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his counterparts from the U.S., Britain, and Germany in not recognising Gojong’s envoys at The 
Hague.238  
Noting that Gojong had been pursuing anti-Japan activities abroad for the last year,239 the 
Japanese government instructed Japanese Minister to the Netherlands Sato Aimaro to monitor 
Hulbert’s activities in The Hague, wrongly assuming that he was Gojong’s secret envoy to the 
conference in May 1907.240 Japan feared that Korea could obtain the right to designate a judge at 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a right conferred by the Convention for the Pacific Settlement 
of International Disputes (29.7.1899), which granted good offices and mediation to signatory 
countries.241 Thus, once Japan learned of Gojong’s involvement in The Hague, it moved swiftly to 
consolidate its control over Korea—Resident Itō, who had assumed Japan’s first resident-
generalship (2.3.1906), cabled Foreign Minister Hayashi Tadasu that this was a good opportunity to 
seize Korea’s finance, military, and jurisdiction (3.7.1907).242 Later, Itō told Gojong that the 
dispatch of envoys was a clear violation of the treaty between Korea and Japan (17.7.1907)243 and 
that the Korean monarch had no choice but to abdicate (20.7.1907).244 Adding insult to injury, 
under pressure from Itō, a new protectorate agreement was signed, giving the resident-general 
administrative control in Korea (24.7.1907). Add to this the disbanding of Korea’s military 
(1.8.1907), thereby boosting righteous army movements throughout the country. 
Despite being barred from attending the conference, Yi Sangseol, to execute the 
aforementioned missions Gojong had assigned to him, urged major powers to support Korean 
independence, condemned Japanese aggression toward Korea, and stressed the illegality and the 
violent nature of the Protectorate Treaty between Japan and Korea. Furthermore, he explained that 
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in the interest of permanent peace in the Far East, Korea should become a neutral state like the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium.245 
Emphasising the importance of an international guarantee of Korean neutrality, Yi Wijong 
contended that only by becoming neutral under international guarantee could Korea be liberated 
from Japanese tyranny and have its independence restored.246 Fearing neither assassination nor the 
death sentence handed down by Japan, Yi voiced his opposition to Japan's colonisation of Korea. 
During an interview (2.8.1907) with the New York Times in the U.S., Yi, emphasising that Korea’s 
Hague envoys had received credentials from Gojong, insisted that Korea’s Protectorate Treaty with 
Japan was signed without Gojong’s consent and that the Korean delegation had succeeded in 
obtaining the world’s sympathy for Korea’s plight, reckoning that the U.S., Britain, France, and 
Germany were on Korea’s side. He then added: “Korea, with the hand of Japan at her throat, sent us 
to The Hague in the hope that the strong nations would protect the weak one, and that Korea would 
be made a neutral country like Switzerland.”247 After his return to The Hague, Yi addressed 
reporters covering the conference, and argued that the process of making Korea a neutral state like 
the Netherlands and Switzerland to save itself from Japanese tyranny and exploitation had already 
begun (5.9.1907). He then took direct aim at the common European perception that Korean 
independence was just a pipe dream.248 
Though Yi Sangseol and Yi Wijong made their proposals by specifically including the Dutch 
model along with Swiss- and Belgian ones to rouse the world’s attention, they were met instead 
with indifference. Their idealistic dependence on and belief in international law were no match for 
Japan’s skillful realpolitik.249 No major power was willing to raise objections to Japan’s domination 
over Korea by supporting these proposals during the imperialistic period when might outweighed 
legality. Thus, their neutralisation attempts quietly came to an end. 
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Chapter VIII. Review and Conclusion 
The confrontation between continental and maritime powers in the Far East engendered 
circumstances, both internal and external, which directly and indirectly influenced Korea’s potential 
neutralisation. Taking all the affecting factors into consideration and looking at the longer period, 
we can identify one realistic opportunity for Korean neutralisation: Rosebery’s proposal (14.4.1886) 
during the British Geomundo occupation. This proposal had a high possibility of success to 
neutralise Korea owing to the balance of power between Britain and Russia, with the support of 
contemporary proposals by several countries and the connivance of China. However, Korea’s 
inability to defend itself, Britain’s unwillingness to assert itself, China’s dominance in Korea, and 
the lack of an international consensus made it impossible for this proposal to be materialised. 
Nonetheless, to newly situate Korean neutralisation in Far Eastern history, it is necessary to review 
its historical significance and comparisons between European and Korean neutrality before 
concluding.  
· European and Korean Neutrality Compared 
         The overview of neutralisation’s historical applications in Europe and research of 
neutralisation attempts in Korea show that the socioeconomic, political, and geopolitical factors that 
shaped neutrality in Switzerland and Belgium, and that enabled Bulgaria to act as a buffer zone, 
were quite different from those affecting Korea. For one thing, those countries received greater 
support from major powers than did Korea, and for another, they possessed several advantages that 
Korea did not, as mentioned in Chapter II. 
Both the major international forums for Switzerland and Belgium and the international treaty 
for Bulgaria allowed major powers to put aside their differences and support those countries’ 
neutrality and autonomy. In Korea's case, not a single major forum was held to discuss its 
neutrality, thereby demonstrating that Korea, from major powers’ perspective, did not hold the 
geopolitical importance European countries did.  
Moreover, Switzerland and Belgium’s success in having Britain, the world’s superpower, as 
the ultimate guarantor of their neutrality, differed markedly from Korea, where no major power was 
ready to defend Korean neutrality, which was suggested by countries looking to defend their 
interests in the Far East. While Bulgaria’s autonomy was sealed through an international treaty with 
backing from Russia, China, hanging onto Korea as its one remaining dependency, would not 
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accept Korea’s independence, Britain occupied Geomundo, Japan started a war to sever Korea’s 
tributary ties with China, and Russia competed with Japan to dominate both Manchuria and Korea 
and later to protect Manchuria, exploiting Korea as its bargaining chip in the Russo-Japanese 
negotiations. 
In addition, there were quite substantial differences between European countries and Korea in 
the economic and military fields. While Switzerland’s thriving economy, free from foreign 
interference, bolstered its neutrality, Korea’s economic development was severely hampered by 
major powers’ self-interests. The struggling nation became an unintentional victim of concession 
diplomacy when major powers tried to exploit its valuable resources and key infrastructure to 
maximise their interests there.  
Whereas Switzerland and Belgium maintained sizeable and well-trained military forces to 
defend their territories, a woefully unequipped and untrained Korean military had major powers 
distrust Korea’s ability to preserve its territory and neutrality. A fractious, splintered Korean ruling 
class also made Korean neutralisation impossible. Both the Swiss and Belgians managed to reach a 
consensus on neutralisation, but in Korea, only Gojong and a handful of his cohorts advocated 
neutralisation against the opposition of most Korean officials.   
As a result, though contemporary Korean neutralisation attempts were clearly inspired by the 
success of Switzerland, Belgium, and to a lesser extent, Bulgaria, Gojong and his associates failed 
to replicate the conditions wherein a similar neutrality could take root.  
. The Historical Significance of Korean Neutralisation 
Korean neutralisation was attempted as a survival strategy to preserve the nation’s 
sovereignty against the imperialistic actions or policies of major powers who viewed the Korean 
peninsula as merely a stepping stone on their paths to power during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. In that sense, it, though having failed, drew keen international attention as a multivalent 
tactic in the Far Eastern diplomatic history.  
Given its setbacks, Korean neutralisation might be dismissed as a subject unfit for further 
discussion, but it deserves to be treated as a useful precedent for weak countries considering 
neutralisation. Looking back on contemporary mistakes is necessary to recognise exactly what is 
required for successful neutralisation:  internal unity and power with international support. Today, 
for any country seeking to pull itself out of major powers’ utilitarian orbit, appreciating Korean 
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neutralisation attempts can serve as a timely reminder regarding the potential benefits of becoming 
a neutral state. 
. Conclusion 
Having considered Korea an independent country since the Treaty of Gangwha, maritime 
power Japan initially maintained an active policy toward Korea, but after the Imo Mutiny, its 
Korean policy turned passive as continental power China reinforced its suzerainty over Korea 
through its military presence and the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade Between 
Chinese and Korean Subjects. In response, Japanese proponents initiated Korean neutrality as their 
passive tactic for refuting the transformed Sino-centric tributary system and alienating Korea from 
China during the Sino-French War, notwithstanding Korea’s apathy towards neutralisation.  
However, Boissonade, acutely mindful of possible Russian aggression toward Korea, also suggested 
his own neutralisation idea without the Japanese government’s backing. 
  After Korea concluded treaties with Western major powers, its geopolitical drama moved to 
a multipolar setting. Specifically, the Treaty of Commerce and Amity Between Korea and Russia 
led Korea, having been disappointed with the U.S.’s disinterest, to approach Russia with foreign 
adviser’s assistance to secure its independence under the Sino-Japanese rivalry. In this changed 
situation, Westerners, diversely perceiving Russia, Japan, and China as potential threats which 
could upset the region’s balance of power, proposed permanent neutrality around the time of the 
Gapsin Coup. Despite their efforts, however, no government wanted to challenge the status quo 
through neutralisation. 
Maritime power Britain’s Far Eastern strategy to block continental power Russia’s military 
power in the Pacific Ocean and, to a certain extent, the rumour of the Russo-Korean secret 
agreement, induced it to occupy Geomundo, making Korea the object of the geopolitical attention 
of major powers and an actor in the Anglo-Russian rivalry. Especially, the incident had Koreans 
and Chinese question the tributary system in regard to Korean security and prompted some Koreans 
to harbour suspicions regarding a Russian expansion into Korea. Accordingly, as counter-strategies 
to the incident, permanent neutrality was proposed for the first time in Korea and China. In 
particular, while Kim Yunsik blazed a trail in Korean neutrality by becoming the first official to 
advocate it, Yu Giljun approached it theoretically. Kang Youwei used it as China’s trump card in 
Korea to maintain its primacy. Conversely, Rosebery suggested permanent neutrality as Britain’s 
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exit strategy to end its occupation of Geomundo on a high note and sustain its strategy to counter 
Russia in the Far East. Considering that other contemporary proposals preceded it, this scheme 
could have succeeded if major powers had actively managed to accommodate each other’s interests 
in the region.   
The Tianjin Convention and China’s leadership role in the resolution of the Geomundo 
Incident strengthened China’s suzerainty over Korea, sparking a renewed Sino-Japanese rivalry. 
Moreover, the Russo-Korean Overland Trade Convention and construction plans for the TSR 
unleashed the Russo-Japanese rivalry again. This led multinational proponents to employ permanent 
neutrality with different strategies. During 1889-1891, Westerners looked to preserve Korea’s 
territorial integrity or to counter Russia and protect Britain’s interests in the Far East, but Japan’s 
strategy was mainly to check Russia and conceal evidence of Japanese preparations for the Sino-
Japanese War. Alternatively, Korea approached the U.S. for its neutralisation to counter Chinese 
and Japanese threats. Amidst the increasing tensions in the region, no proposal could be realised 
due to competing strategies.  
As the prospect for a Sino-Japanese conflict drew closer, interest in neutralisation picked up. 
In 1894, the Donghak Uprising heightened the vague dread of a Russian military presence in Korea, 
which compelled Yu Giljun with his comrades to propose permanent neutrality to counter Russia 
since they felt more intimidated by Russia than Japan. By the time the Sino-Japanese War began, 
Fox and Wilkinson had proposed wartime neutrality of the Incheon port to block Japan’s military 
from landing there and to protect Britain’s commercial interests in China. During the war, Mutsu, 
with a long-term perspective, suggested Korean neutralisation to consolidate Japan’s post-war 
position there. 
China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War ended its suzerainty over Korea, but Russia, filling 
China’s strategic vacuum, exerted its influence there in earnest due to Japan’s interference in 
Korea’s domestic affairs, the assassination of Queen Min, and Gojong’s stay at the Russian 
legation. Under these circumstances, neutralisation attempts were designed to extricate Japan from 
its diplomatic discomfiture after the assassination of Queen Min, to counter the increased Russian 
influence in Korea, and to maintain stability in the Far East on the strength of the Weber-Komura 
Memorandum.  
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In the Korean Empire era, after Russia’s recall of its financial adviser and military instructors 
due to increased anti-Russian sentiment in Korea, Japan, driven to reassert itself in Korea after the 
Triple Intervention, concluded the Rosen-Nishi Protocol with Russia, which provided a temporary 
respite from the Russo-Japanese competition over Korea and allowed Korea to diversify its 
diplomacy with major powers. This ushered in a new phase in Korean neutralisation. In Korea, 
amidst a major powers’ scramble for Korean concessions and the Russo-Japanese rivalry, the 
Independence Club first called for neutrality diplomacy to secure Korean independence. Their call 
was echoed in the permanent neutrality proposals from Korea to safeguard Korean independence 
from the machinations of Japan and Russia around the time of the Boxer Uprising. In the vortex of 
secret Russo-Japanese discussions surrounding the partitioning of Korea, the Russian threat to 
Korea arising from the Boxer Uprising prompted the Yomiuri shimbun to propose permanent 
neutrality to maintain Japanese influence in Korea regardless of Japan’s official policy.   
After ending its occupation of China’s Three Eastern Provinces, Russia exploited Korean 
neutralisation under the leadership of Witte as a temporary measure to protect Manchuria from 
Japan’s advance until completing the TSR. But Japan, its spine stiffened by the impending Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, opted for a hard-line policy towards Russia, insisting that Korea and Manchuria 
should be Japanese and Russian spheres of influence respectively or dealt with as one issue after the 
crisis in March 1901: Japan refused Izvolsky’s proposal to discuss neutralisation after the 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria; Witte’s first proposal, designed for countering the 
development of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to strengthen Japan’s position in the Far East, and his 
second one, suggested as an alternative to Itō’s private offer, were also rejected by Japan; the three 
Russian diplomats’ proposal, designed for possible American alignment with the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance camp with the Russian government’s tacit backing, was met by a neutral U.S.’s disinterest. 
Nonetheless, during 1901-1902, more proponents in Korea pursued Korean neutralisation to secure 
its independence.  
After the spring of 1903, both wartime and permanent neutrality were floated at long 
intervals. Before the Russo-Japanese War, the intensified Russo-Japanese rivalry caused by the 
Yongampo Incident culminated in wartime neutrality proposals: Gojong sought the assistance of 
Italy, a third-power country with limited ambitions in the Far East; Hyeon Yeongwun and Hyeon 
Sanggeon tried to win major powers’ support in Japan and Europe as Gojong looked to special 
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envoy diplomacy that bypassed official diplomatic channels; Yi Haneung submitted several notes 
and memoranda, aiming to win British support as a benign hegemon for hapless Korea; and 
believing it the only realistic option, the Korean government declared wartime neutrality at the 
French consulate in Chefoo, China, thus displaying Korea’s blind faith in an international system 
dominated by major powers’ realpolitik. Though international reception to Korea’s wartime 
neutrality declaration was noticeably cool, France, Germany, and Russia suggested wartime 
neutrality in certain areas of Korea to preserve their colonial interests against Japanese ambitions.  
As the Russo-Japanese War loomed on the horizon, Hyeon Sanggeon, misreading France and 
Russia’s ambivalent stances towards Korea, enlisted their ministers’ backing for the wartime 
neutrality of Seoul. During the war, German citizen Wolter requested wartime neutrality to protect 
international settlements in Incheon, displaying Western anxiety about their Korean commercial 
interests being jeopardized. Hoping to compensate for Russia’s loss of influence on the Korean 
peninsula, Russian Admiral Biriley envisaged a strategic neutrality of the southern zone of the 
Korean border.  
Coming after the Protectorate Treaty, Bethell’s permanent neutrality was meaningful since it 
showed that he still regarded Korea as independent and thus capable of neutralisation. However, 
possibilities for Korean neutrality decreased because Japan had already concluded diplomatic 
arrangements with Britain and the U.S., and the pro-Japan faction was dominating Korean politics. 
Undaunted, Gojong, still laying his hopes on international law, dispatched three special envoys to 
the Second Hague Peace Conference to appeal to major powers’ consciences about Japan’s 
infringement of Korean sovereignty, but their mission failed due to major powers’ disinterest and 
Japan’s interference. Accordingly, like Yi Haneung, Yi Sangseol and Yi Wijong independently 
proposed neutralisation to secure Korean independence and maintain peace in the Far East by 
convincingly drawing on European cases of neutrality.  
Overall, Korean neutralisation attempts were proffered by eight countries encompassing all 
major powers, as Tables 7 and 8 in the appendix indicate. All the proposals, even the one which, 
had fate smiled at all, could have been successfully implemented, failed due to the omission of 
subjective (before the Geomundo Incident) and international requirements and for objective 
reasons, such as the transformed tributary system, major power rivalries, breakdown of a balance of 
power, and Korea’s various internal problems. Unlike neutral European countries, Korea could 
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muster up neither major powers’ support through international consensus nor the domestic 
wherewithal to make neutralisation possible.  
· Epilogue 
As history often turns back on itself, neutralisation discourse has resurfaced. The necessity of 
neutralisation is used even today in foreign policy discourse. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
has suggested that to establish stability in Afghanistan, the U.S. should consider turning this 
conflict-prone country into a Belgian-style buffer state to avoid it being used as an arena for 
rivalries.1 Given the dynamics between countries in and around Northeast Asia, neutralisation in 
Korea has also regained some interest2 as the means to a peaceful reunification through the 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Korean neutralisation might have to be implemented 
through a strategic compromise between South and North Korea and major regional powers like 
China, Japan, Russia, and the U.S. that would transform a unified Korea into a buffer zone. In this 
way, the path towards a future Korean neutralisation may contribute to regional stability as well. 
 
                                                 
1 Financial Times, “Washington aims to turn Afghanistan into neutral buffer zone for stability”, 2011.6.28, 8. 
2 Pressian, 2011.5.22, http://www.pressian.com/article/article.asp?article_num=10110522094329&Section=05 
(accessed July 23, 2011); Hangyeore 21, 2003.2.22, http://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/COLUMN/33/7203.html (accessed July 
23, 2011). 
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Appendices 
 
<Table> 
 
Table 1: The Korean Military Expenditure (1897~1904) 
                                                            (unit: won) 
Year Annual 
revenue 
Total 
expenditures 
Military 
expenditures 
Military 
expenditures/ 
Total 
expenditures 
Budget balance 
1897 4,191,192 4,190,427 979, 597 23.4% 765 
1898 4,527,476 4,525,530 1,251,745 27.7% 1,946 
1899 6,473,222 6,471,132 1,447,351 22.4% 2,090 
1900 6,162,796 6,161,871 1,636,704 26.6% 925 
1901 9,079,456 9,078,681 3,594,911 39.6% 775 
1902 7,586,530 7,585,877 2,786,290 36.7% 653 
1903 10,766,115 10,765,491 4,123,582 38.3% 624 
1904 14,214,573 14,214,298 5,180,614 36.4% 275 
Source: Kim Daejun, Gojong sidae ui jeajeong yeongu- geundaejeok yesan jedo surip gwa  
byeoncheon (Seoul: Taehaksa, 2004). 
 
Table 2: The Military Strength of Nine Countries 
Country Army (number of soldiers) Navy (number of ships/total 
tonnage, in thousands) 
Britain 120,000 84/738 
China 40,000 17/80 
France 534,000 26/223 
Germany 502,000 33/153 
Italy 255,000 26/223 
Japan 63,000 11/57 
Korea 10,000 None 
Russia 844,000 46/304 
U.S. 28,000 27/127 
Sources: B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics Europe 1750~1980 (New York: Stockton, 1992);  
International Historical Statistics The Americas 1750~1988 (New York: Stockton, 1993);  
International Historical Statistics Africa, Asia & Oceania 1750~1988 (New York: Stockton, 1995);- 
Mikhail, A. Poggio, Reosia oegyogwan i barabon geundae Hanguk (Features of Korea) trans. Yi  
Jaehoon (Seoul: Dongbuga yeoksa jaedan, 2010).  
Note  1:  Army and naval strengths as of the early 1890s. 
2:  Korea’s number is only an approximate estimate, since there is no reliable figure. 
 
Table 3: Key Foreign Advisers in Korea 
Name Nationality Responsibility Appointment period 
Paul von Möllendorff Germany Foreign policy  12.1882~9.1885 
Owen N. Denny U.S. Foreign policy 5.1886~2.1890 
Charles W. LeGendre U.S. Law 4.1890~10.1899 
Clarence R. Greathouse  U.S. Foreign policy, law, 
communications 
8.1890~10.1899 
John McLeavy Brown Britain Customs and finance 12.1894~8.1905 
Karl Alexeiff Russia Finance 12.1897~4.1898 
William F. Sands U.S. Foreign policy and 
domestic reforms 
11.1899~1.1904 
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Laurent Crémazy France International law 5.1900~8.1905 
Adhémar Delcoigne Belgium Foreign policy 7.1903~1.1905 
Note: Only includes advisers that had a direct impact on Korean neutralisation attempts. 
 
Table 4: Foreign Advisers and their Contract Conditions 
 
Name 
(Employment 
period) 
Official Duties Positions Salary Korean 
Contractors 
Contract 
Period 
Dismissal Clause 
Paul von 
Möllendorff 
(12/1882-9/1885) 
Treaty 
negotiations, 
domestic reforms, 
and customs 
Vice-Minister 
of the Foreign 
Office 
300 taels Foreign Office 
President Jo 
Yeongha  
Not stated Inform three 
months in advance 
(dismissal at will) 
Clarence R. 
Greathouse (1) 
(4/1890-1894; 
1895-10/1899) 
Foreign legal 
issues 
Official at the 
Legal Ministry 
600 Mexican 
dollars 
(monthly) 
Unknown 2 years None 
Clarence R. 
Greathouse (2) 
(8/1890- 1894; 
1/1895-10/1899) 
Foreign affairs Adviser at the 
Foreign 
Ministry 
300 Mexican 
dollars 
(monthly) 
Foreign Minister 
Kim Yunsik 
None Inform three 
months in advance 
(dismissal at will) 
Karl Alexeiev 
(12/1897-4/1898) 
Monitor 
government 
expenditures, 
reduce budget 
deficit, and reform 
the customs 
Adviser at the 
Finance 
Ministry and 
the Inspector 
General of the 
Customs 
3000 won 
(yearly)  
Foreign Minister 
Jo Byeongsik 
Unlimited Korea and Russia 
would discuss his 
dismissal first  
William 
Franklin Sands 
(11/1899-1/1904) 
Future foreign 
advisers should 
consult with Sands 
and report directly 
to Gojong 
Adviser at the 
Imperial 
Household 
Department 
300 yen Imperial 
Household 
Minister Yi 
Geonha 
5 years Not stated 
Laurent 
Crémazy 
(5/1900-8/1905) 
Advise Minister of 
Justice and Vice 
Minister of Justice 
Legal adviser 
at the Ministry 
of Justice 
500 won 
[silver] 
(monthly) 
1000 won 
[silver] for 
return to 
France 
Director of Legal 
Affairs Seo 
Sangryong and 
the Director of 
Negotiations at 
the Foreign 
Ministry  
1 year Minister of Justice 
would notify to 
French Minister 
Adhémar 
Delcoigne 
(7/1903-1/1905) 
 Work under the 
supervision of 
Minister of 
Interior 
Adviser at the 
Interior 
Ministry 
500 yen and 
500 yen for 
trips, holiday, 
and return to 
Belgium   
Minister of 
Interior and the 
Acting Foreign 
Minister 
2 years If he failed to return 
from Belgium due 
to incident in two 
months 
Source: Kim Hyeonsuk, “Hanguk gundae seoyangin gomungwan yeongu (1882~1904)” (PhD diss.,  
       Ihwa University, 1999), 292~293. 
Note: Information based on official contracts only. 
 
Table 5: Korea’s Gold Export to China and Japan 
                                                           (unit: yen) 
Year Gold Export to China Gold Export to Japan 
1897 1,086,543 947,536 
1898 1,183,137 1,192,538 
1899 883,905 2,049,477 
1900 567,670 3,065,380 
1901 136,150 4,857,201 
1902 59,805 5,004,300 
1903 210 5,456,187 
1904 10,950 4,998,646 
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Source: Danguk daehakgyo dongyanghak yeonguso, ed., Gaehwagi daeoe mingan munhwa gyoryu 
chongseo VII: Gaehwagi Hanguk gwallyeon Gumi muyeok bogoseo jaryojip (Seoul: JNC, 2006). 
Table 6: Korean Concessions to Major Powers (1883-1904) 
Country Year Concessions Country Year Concessions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1883 Submarine cable in Busan  
 
U.S. 
 
 
1896 Gyeongin railroad 
1885 Telegraph line between Busan and 
Incheon 
1896 Unsan gold mine 
1886 Busan Jeolyeong Island coaling station 1898 Tram, electricity, and 
water supply in Seoul 
1888 Fishing right on the coast  
 
Britain 
1896 Right to send financial 
adviser and supervise 
customs 
1891 Incheon Wolmi Island coaling station 1898 Eunsan goldmine 
1891 Fishing right on the coast of the 
Gyeonsang province 
 
 
 France 
 
1896 Gyeongui railroad 
1898 Gyeonbu railroad 1901 
 
Changseong goldmine 
 1899 Gyeongin railroad (took over from the 
U.S.) 
1900 Jiksan goldmine Germany 1897 Geumseong 
danghyeon gold mine 
1900 Fishing right on the coast of the 
Gyeonggi province 
   
1901 Exclusive right to export ginseng 
1904 Fishing rights on  the coast of 
Chungcheong, Hwanghae, and 
Pyeongan provinces 
1904 Gyeongui railroad (extorted by Japan) 
 
 
 
 
 
Russia 
 
 
1896 Gyeongwon and Jonseong goldmines 
1896 Jongseong coal mine 
1896 Incheon Wolmi Island coaling station 
1897 Right to dispatch financial adviser and 
supervise customs 
1897 Busan Jeolyeong Island coaling station 
1898 Russo-Korean Bank 
1899 Whaling right on the east coast of 
Korea 
Source: Yu Myeongchol, “Hanguk jungniphwaron yeongu,” (PhD diss., Gyeongbuk University, 1989), 120. 
 
Table 7: Korean Neutralisation Proposals 
                                                             (10/9/1882~11/12/1907) 
Proponent 
(dates & sources) 
Background 
(a) related affair  
(b) affecting factors  
(c) rivalry 
Details 
(d) motives/purposes 
(e) guarantors 
(f) causes of failure 
Remarks 
(g) models  
(h) feature  
 
1) The Imo Mutiny-post-Gapsin Coup 
(10/9/1882~2/1885) 
 
Tokyo yokohama 
mainichi shimbun 
(10/9 &17/9/1882) 
 
(a) Imo Mutiny  
(b) Japan’s challenge  
   to tributary system 
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Deny China’s vassal theory 
(e) China/US/Britain 
(f) Tributary system and Japanese 
   government’s disinterest 
(g) Bulgarian style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
  
    
Inoue Kowashi 
(17/9 & 23/9/1882) 
 
(a) Imo mutiny 
(b) Japan’s challenge 
   to tributary system    
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Refute China’s vassal theory and 
check Russia 
(e) Japan/China/US/Britain/Germany 
(f) Tributary system and Japanese  
   government’s disinterest 
(g) Belgian/Swiss style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
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Yūbin hōchi shimbun 
(20/9/1882) 
(a) Imo mutiny 
(b) Japan’s challenge  
   to tributary system 
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Treat Korea as an independent 
country, free from Chinese  
influence 
(e) China/US/Britain/Germany/ 
France 
(f) Tributary system and Japanese  
   government’s disinterest  
(g) Belgian/Swiss style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
 
 
Gustave E. 
Boissonade de 
Fontarable 
(22/9 & 29/10/1882)  
 
(a) Imo Mutiny 
(b) View of Korea as 
   an independent  
   country  
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Contain Russia 
(e) China/Japan/Russia 
(f) Not match to Japanese strategy and  
   Kowashi’s opposition  
(g)1st : Belgian/Swiss/ 
   Luxembourgian style 
   2nd:1st styles + Serbian 
   style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Inoue Kaoru 
(1/12/1882) 
(a) Imo Munity 
(b) Japan’s challenge to 
tributary system  
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Refute China’s vassal theory 
(e) European powers 
(f) Tributary system and Western  
   governments’ disinterest 
(g) Swiss/Belgian style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
 
Enomoto Takeaki 
(28/12/1882)  
(a) Imo Mutiny 
(b) Chinese military  
presence & unclear  
Chinese policy in  
Korea 
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Challenge Chinese policy in Korea 
(e) Britain/Germany/Russia/France/U. 
S./Japan 
(f) Tributary system and Western  
governments’ disinterest 
 
(g)Belgian/Luxembourg- 
ish style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
 
Inoue Kowashi 
(*/5, */6, & */7/1883) 
 
(a) Sino-French  
tension/Ryukyu  
issue 
(b) Attempt to shift  
   Japanese public  
   attention to abroad, 
   Chinese  
   intervention in 
   Korea 
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Counter Chinese suzerainty over 
Korea 
(e) China 
(f) Tributary system and pro-China  
faction’s domination in Korea 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
 
 
Tanabe Taichi 
(16/8/1883)  
(a) Sino-French tension   
(b) Japan’s challenge to 
   Chinese suzerainty  
over Korea   
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Joint protection of Korea 
according to int. law 
(e) China/Japan/U.S. 
(f) Tributary system 
 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
 
Takezoe Shinichirō 
(2/11/1884)  
(a) Sino-French War 
(b) Yuan Shikai’s  
intervention in  
Korea 
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Protect Korea from the potential 
Sino-French War 
(e) None  
(f) Gojong and pro-China faction’s  
hostilities, tributary system  
(h) Wartime neutrality 
 
Moskovskiye 
Vedomosti 
(29/12/1884) 
(Russian State Naval 
Archive)  
 
(a) Gapsin Coup 
(b) The expansion of  
the U.S., British,  
and Germany’s  
influence in Korea  
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Counter other Western powers/ 
   Sino-centric tributary system and  
strengthen Russian influence in 
   Korea 
(e) None  
(f) Russia’s wait and see policy in 
   Korea 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
 
Paul von Möllendorff 
(*1885) 
 
(a) Gapsin Coup 
(b) Chinese suzerainty  
over Korea &  
Japanese challenge  
to the tributary  
system 
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Prevent Chinese intervention &  
check Japanese ambition in 
   Korea  
(e) China/Japan/Russia (Russia-led) 
(f) Difficulty of consent from China  
and Russia. 
(g) Belgian style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
 
Herman Budler 
(7/2/ & */2/1885) 
(a) Gapsin Coup 
(b) Korea’s geopolitical     
(d) Pursue German ascendancy in  
   Korea, protect Korea from external  
(g) Swiss style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
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    vulnerability 
(c) China vs. Japan 
   aggression, and deter Chinese 
   interventions 
(e) China/Japan/Russia 
(f) Kim Yunsik and Li Hongzhang’s 
   opposition  
 
Nicholas R. O’Conor 
(*/2/1885)  
(a) Treaty of Commerce 
   and Amity between 
   Korea and Russia  
(b) Concern about China’s  
   poor control over 
   Korea  
(c) China vs. Japan  
   Britain vs. Russia 
(d) Check Russian expansion into  
Korea 
(e) China/Japan 
(f) Chinese suzerainty over Korea  
(h) Joint-protection and 
later Swiss/Belgian 
Permanent neutrality 
 
2) Geomundo Incident (25/6/1885~14/11/1886)  
Kim Yunsik 
(25/6/1885) 
(a) Geomundo Incident 
(b) Unreliability of the  
tributary system 
(c) Britain vs. Russia 
(d) Protect Korea from Anglo- 
Russian rivalry 
(e) Treaty powers 
(f) Tributary system and Western  
   powers’ disinterest 
(g) Belgian style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Enomoto Takeaki 
(2nd---9/8/1885)  
(a) Geomundo Incident 
(b) Russian expansion  
into Korea 
(c) Britain vs. Russia    
(d) Counter Russia with China 
(e) Major powers 
(f) Possible objection from China 
    
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Yu Giljun 
(*/12/1885) 
(a) Geomundo Incident 
(b) Yuan Shikai’s  
   interventionist  
   Korean policy 
(c) Britain vs. Russia 
    
(d) Korean independence and check 
Russia 
(e) China (China led)/Britain/France/ 
   Japan/Russia 
(f) Possible objection of pro-China  
faction, tributary system 
(g) Belgian and 
Bulgarian-style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Kang Youwei 
(*/*/1886) 
(Kāng Yǒuwéi yígǎo) 
(a) Geomundo Incident 
(b) Weakening Chinese  
   influence in Korea  
(c) Britain vs. Russia    
(d) Prevent Korea from foreign  
   incursions  
(e) China/other powers 
(f) Antithesis to Chinese policy  
(g) Belgian-style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Earl of Rosebery 
(Archibald P. 
Primrose) 
(14/4/1886) 
(a) Geomundo Incident 
(b) Russian advance  
into the Far East 
(c) Britain vs. Russia    
(d) Counter Russia and sustain British  
strategy in the Far East 
(e) Russia/other powers 
(f) Chinese disinterest  
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Kim Okgyun 
(*/7/1886)  
(a) Geomundo Incident 
(b) Tianjin convention 
   side effects, Anglo- 
   Russian rivalry,  
(c) Britain vs. Russia    
(d) Korean independence 
(e) China (China-led)/other powers 
(f) China’s upholding tributary system  
 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Owen N. Denny 
(14/11/1886) 
(a) Geomundo Incident 
(b) British withdrawal  
from Geomundo  
(c) Britain vs. Russia    
(d) Territorial integrity of Korea 
(e) China/major powers 
(f) Denny’s activity against Chinese  
interests in Korea 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
3) The Post-Geomundo Incident-the Pre-
Korean Empire (6/3/1889~11/6/1896) 
 
Chinese Times 
(6/3/1889) 
(French Diplomatic 
Document) 
 
(a) Shēn Bào Article 
(b) Information on  
   Chinese military  
   troops’ landing in 
   Korea 
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Preserve peace and the territorial 
   integrity of Korea 
(e) Russia, China, Japan, Britain  
(f) Major power’s disinterest  
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Chesney Duncan 
(16/3/1889) 
(a) Russo-Korean 
Overland Trade 
Convention 
(b) Growing penetration  
(d) Oppose Russian expansion and  
   protect Britain’s interest in Far East 
(e) None 
(f) No neighbouring power willing to 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
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of Russian  
influence in Korea  
(c) Britain vs. Russia 
   China vs. Japan    
   abandon its Far Eastern strategy to 
   guarantee Korean independence 
Yamagata Aritomo 
(*/3/1890) 
(a) Construction plan of 
   The TSR  
(b) Russian threat to Korea 
(c) China vs. Japan vs. 
   Russia 
(d) Check Russia and conceal Japan’s  
war preparation 
(e) Britain/Germany/Japan/China 
(f) Lack of major powers’ interest  
(g) Swiss, Belgian, 
Serbian, and 
Luxembourgian- 
style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Kim Gajin 
(*/11/1890) 
(a) Chinese predominance  
in Korea 
(b) Tributary system  
and Russian territorial 
ambition in Korea  
(c) China vs. Japan vs. 
   Russia 
(d) Counter Chinese and Russian  
threats 
(e) U.S (U.S. led)/France/Italy/ 
   Germany/Japan/China/Russia 
   /Britain 
(f) Limited U.S. interests in Korea and 
  the U.S.’s non-interventionist policy  
  there   
(g) Swiss-style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Gojong  
(3/6/1891) 
(a) Chinese predominance  
in Korea 
(b) Chinese consolidation 
   of its suzerainty over  
Korea 
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Korean independence 
(e) Major powers 
(f) Adamant opposition of China 
(g) Swiss-style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Yu Giljun and his 
comrades 
(*/6/1894) 
(a) Donghak Uprising 
(b) Fear of dispatch of 
   Russian troops to  
   Korea caused by  
   dispatch of Chinese 
   troops to Korea 
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Prevent Russian military presence  
in Korea 
(e) China (sponsor)/Britain  
(f) Transformation of tributary system,  
   opposition of Gojong and pro- 
   China faction  
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Harry H. Fox & 
William H. Wilkinson 
(*/7 & 16/7/1894) 
(a) Sino-Japanese War 
(b) Block Japan’s military 
   landing to Incheon  
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Protect Britain’s market share in  
Asia & counter Japan  
(e) Treaty powers  
(f) Major powers’ mixed reception 
   (opposition of Japan/Russia,  
   disinterest of U.S., acceptance by 
   France/Germany)  
(h) Wartime neutrality 
of Incheon port 
Mutsu Munemitsu 
(17/8/1894) 
(a) Sino-Japanese War 
(b) The consolidation of  
Japanese position in  
Korea after the 
Sino-Japanese War 
(c) China vs. Japan 
(d) Secure Japanese interests in Korea 
(e) China/Japan/Western powers 
(f) Japanese cabinet’s refusal to 
   endorse the proposal 
(g) Swiss or Belgian- 
style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Japan Daily 
(14/10/1895) 
(Diplomatic Reports 
of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire) 
 
 
(a) Assassination of Queen 
   Min  
(b) Worries of the 
   possibility of  
   Russian occupation 
   of Korea 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Resist Western pressure towards  
Japan 
(e) Japan/Western powers 
(f) Western powers’ suspicion of  
Japanese true intentions in Korea 
 
 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Itō Hirobumi 
(21/10/1895) 
(a) Assassination of Queen 
Min 
(b) Russia as a new  
challenger to  
Japan in Korea 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Extricate Japan from diplomatic 
 quagmire in Korea 
(e) Japan/Russia/Britain/France/ 
Germany/U.S. 
(f) Russia’s growing diplomatic clout  
in Korea 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
British government 
(1/5/1896) 
(a) Gojong’s escape 
to the Russian legation 
(d) Counter Russian influence in Korea  
(e) Britain/other major powers 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
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(b) British fear of  
increasing Russian  
influence in Korea 
(c) Japan vs. Russia  
(f) Britain’s status as a third power 
   with limited interest in Korea and 
   no Japanese and Russian support 
British and American 
ambassadors in St. 
Petersburg  
(9/6 & 11/6/1896) 
(Kobe Chronicle & 
Dongnip sinmun) 
(a) Gojong’s escape 
to the Russian legation 
(b) Weber-Komura 
   Memorandum 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Balance of power in the Far East 
(e) Russia/Japan 
(f) No Japanese and Russian interest  
in Korean neutrality 
 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
4) The 1st half Korean Empire 
(1/1/1899~*/9/1902) 
 
Jeon Byeonghun 
(1/1/1899) 
(a) Russo-Japanese 
   competition 
(b) Major power threat  
to Korean sovereignty 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Korean independence 
(e) None 
(f) No support within the Korean 
   bureaucracy as a former official 
(g) Swiss or Belgian- 
Style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Horace Newton Allen   
( Spring 1899) 
(a) Rosen-Nishi Protocol    
(b) A temporary respite 
   of Russo-Japanese  
   competition over  
   Korea 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Korean independence 
(e) U.S. 
(f) U.S. President McKinley’s  
   opposition 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
William Franklin 
Sands 
(*/1/1900) 
(a) Russo-Japanese 
   competition  
(b) Threat of 
   Russo-Japanese war 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
d) Stop further encroachment of 
  Russo-Japanese influence in Korea 
(e) Major powers 
(f) Korea’s economic vulnerability,  
   1st Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
   Agreement 
(g) Swiss or Belgian-style  
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Yomiuri shimbun 
(12/8/1900) 
(a) Boxer Uprising 
(b) Rising Japanese  
concern on Russian  
influence in Korea 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Preserve Japanese influence and 
counter Russia 
(e) Japan 
(f) No Japanese consensus on Korean  
neutrality  
(g) Belgian or Swiss-Style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Alphonse Tremule 
(*/*/1900) 
 
(a) Boxer Uprising  
(b) Possible dispatch of  
Japanese troops and  
perceived Russian  
threat to Korea  
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Stability in the Far East 
(e) Major powers 
(f) Jo Byeongsik’s failure to get  
   approval from major power in  
   Tokyo due to major powers’  
   Disinterest 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Jo Byeongsik  
(29/8/1900)  
 
(a) Boxer Uprising 
(b) The possible dispatch 
of foreign military  
forces to Korea 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Korean independence 
(e) Japan/other powers 
(f) Konoe’s opposition, Korea’s weak  
Military, and major powers  
disinterest in Korea except Japan  
and Russia  
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Jo Byeongsik 
(14/9/1900)  
(a) Boxer Uprising 
(b) The possible dispatch 
of foreign military 
forces to Korea 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Korean independence 
(e) Japan 
(f) Aoki’s scepticism of the feasibility  
of Korean neutrality and no  
resemblance between Korea and  
Belgium or Switzerland   
(g) Belgian or Swiss- 
   style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Jo Byeongsik  
(*/9/1900) 
 
 
(a) Boxer Uprising  
(b) The possible dispatch 
of foreign military  
forces to Korea 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Korean independence 
(e) U.S./other powers 
(f) U.S. reluctance to be entangled in  
   Korean affairs and Pavloff’s doubts  
   on Jo’s neutralisation proposal 
(g) Swiss-style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Sergei Witte (a) Russian occupation (d) Preserve Russian influence in (h) Permanent neutrality 
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(*/10/1900) of Manchuria 
(b) Confrontation with 
   Japan over Manchuria 
   And Korea 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
Manchuria and Korea and prevent  
the Japanese invasion of Korea 
(e) Western powers 
(f) Komura’s call for Russian  
   acceptance of Korea as Japanese 
   sphere of influence 
Alexander Petrovich 
Izvolsky 
(7/1/1901) 
(a) Russian occupation of 
Manchuria 
(b) Russia’s adoption of 
   conciliatory tone  
   towards Japan on 
   Korea 
(c) Japan. Vs. Russia 
(d) Counter Japan  
(e) Major powers 
(f) Foreign Minister Kato and Japanese  
   ministers’ opposition 
 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Sergei Witte  
(25/7 & 17/12/1901) 
(a) Russo-Japanese 
negotiations 
(b) Confrontation with 
   Japan over Manchuria 
   and Korea 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Arrange neutral zone along the  
border between Korea and  
Manchuria  
(e) Japan/Russia 
(f) Japanese government’s opposition 
 
(h) Permanent neutrality  
(Neutral zone in the  
 border between  
    Korea and Russia) 
Park Jesun 
(*/11/1901) 
(a) Russo-Japanese 
negotiations 
(b) Shaky foundation of  
Korean independence 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Korean independence 
(e) Major powers 
(f) No interest from Japan 
 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
William Franklin 
Sands 
(early 1902) 
 
(a) Korea-Japan military 
   alliance negotiation  
(b) Relaunch Korea’s  
neutralisation 
diplomacy     
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Korean independence 
(e) Major powers 
(f) No response from Itō 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
A. Pavloff, Alexander 
Petrovich Izvolsky, 
and Arturo P. N. 
Cassini 
(*/9/1902) 
(a) Anglo-Japanese 
alliance 
(b) Japan’s dominance  
   in Korea due to  
   Komura’s new 
   Korean policy  
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Preserve Russian interests in 
Manchuria and counter Japanese 
influence in Korea 
(e) Russia/Japan/U.S. 
(f) Japan’s opposition and the U.S.  
apathy of Korean neutralisation 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
5) The 2nd half Korean Empire 
(8/5/1903~11/12/1907) 
 
Gojong  
(8/5/1903) 
(a) Increase of Russo- 
   Japanese rivalry 
(b) Gojong’s desire to  
receive international  
guarantee of Korean  
neutralisation   
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Protect Korea in the event of the 
Russo-Japanese War 
(e) Italy 
(f) Late response from Italian king  
   (Japanese military presence in  
   Korea and Korea-Japan Protocol)  
  
(h) Wartime neutrality 
Hyeon Yeongwun and 
Hyeon Sanggeon 
(*/8/1903) 
(a) Japan’s decision to 
enter war with 
Russia 
(b) Threat to Korean  
independence due to 
the possibility of 
Japan’s declaration 
of war with Russia 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Protect Korean independence 
(e) Japan/France/Russia/international  
   organisation 
(f) Japanese and Russian reluctance,  
French caution, the deferral of the  
Hague Peace Conference and the  
adjournment of the Permanent  
Court of Arbitration  
 
(h) Wartime neutrality 
Go Yeonghui 
(3/9/1903) 
(a) Yongampo Incident 
(b) The prevention of  
possible violation of  
(d) Korean territorial integrity 
(e) Japan/Russia 
(f) Komura’s objection, Japanese  
(h) Wartime neutrality 
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the Korean border  
by Japan or Russia 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
concern of possible Russian  
concession at Yongampo, and  
inability of Korea to defend itself 
Yi Beomjin 
(*/10/1903) 
(a) Russo-Japanese 
negotiations 
(b) To preserve Korean  
independence 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Preserve Korean independence 
(e) Russia 
(f) Russian official Obolensky’s  
Opposition 
(h) Wartime neutrality 
Korean government 
(23/11/1903) 
(a) Russo-Japanese 
negotiations 
(b) The increased  
military presence of 
Japanese and  
Russian forces in  
Korea  
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Protect Korea in the event of the 
Russo-Japanese War 
(e) Major powers 
(f) No response from major powers  
   and Korea’s weak military 
(h) Wartime neutrality 
Yi Haneung 
(*/1/1904) 
(a) Imminent war 
between Japan 
and Russia 
(b) Deteriorating Far  
Eastern geopolitics 
around Korea 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Korean independence 
(e) Britain/France/Japan/Russia 
(f) Campbell and Langley’s cool  
reception, Lansdowne’s pro-Japan 
sentiment, and Britain’s disinterest  
towards Korea  
(h) Wartime neutrality 
Korean government 
(21/1/1904) 
(a) Imminent war 
between Japan 
and Russia 
(b) Concern about 
   Korea’s unsafe 
   territorial integrity 
   and sovereign 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Korea’s territorial integrity and 
independence 
(e) Major powers 
(f) Passive international response  
   (Support from Italy & Russia,  
   Acknowledgement from Britain,  
   France, Germany, & U.S., No  
   acknowledgement from Japan) and  
   Korea’s weak military   
(h) Wartime neutrality 
Germany and France 
(22/1/1904)  
(Shēn bào) 
(a) Imminent war 
between Japan 
and Russia 
(b) Possible regional war  
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Stability in the Far East and  
safeguard their interests in China  
and Indochina 
(e) France and Germany 
(f) No reactions from other powers 
(h) Wartime neutrality 
(Seoul and Incheon) 
Russia (23/1/1904) 
(Shēn bào) 
(a) Imminent war between 
Japan and Russia 
(b) Japanese penetration  
Into Korea 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Stability in the Far East and  
safeguard Russian interests in  
Manchuria 
(e) None 
(f) No response from Korea 
(h) Wartime neutrality 
   (Northern Korean  
   frontier area) 
Hyeon Sanggeon 
(*/2/1904) 
(a) Imminent war between 
Japan and Russia 
(b) Potential foreign  
invasion of Korea 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Secure Seoul from foreign  
aggression 
(e) France and Russia 
(f) Fontenay and Pavloff’s reluctance 
   to back neutrality  
(h) Wartime neutrality 
Of Seoul 
Carl Wolter 
(2/3/1904) 
(a) Russo-Japanese War 
(b) The unchecked  
   Japanese domination 
   over Korea  
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Safeguard foreign commercial 
interests in Korea 
(e) Major powers 
(f) Opposition from the Japanese  
   government, German Chargé 
d'Affaires, vice-consuls from other 
powers, and Townsend, no tangible 
Japanese benefits  
(h) Wartime neutrality 
(international 
settlement in Incheon) 
Admiral Biriley 
(*/*/1905) 
(Russian National 
(a) Korea-Japan Protocol  
   
(b) The Japanese intrusion 
(d) Protect Russian interests in  
Manchuria 
(e) Russia 
(h) (Southern zone of the  
Korean border) 
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Archives) 
 
of Russian border 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(f) No response from Russian Foreign  
Minister 
Ernest Bethell 
(*/3 or 4/1907) 
(Ōsaka mainichi 
shimbun) 
(a) Protectorate Treaty   
(b) Erosion of Korea’s  
diplomatic sovereignty,  
Protectorate Treaty 
(c) Japan vs. Russia 
(d) Korean independence 
(e) Major powers 
(f) No response from Gojong  
 
(g) Belgian-style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Yi Sangseol 
(27/7, 3/8, & 
11/12/1907) 
(Daehan maeil shinbo) 
(a) Hague Peace 
Conference 
(b) Erosion of Korea’s  
diplomatic sovereignty, 
Russo-Japanese  
agreement 
(c) None 
(d) Korean independence and  
permanent peace in the Far East 
(e) Major powers 
(f) No interest from any major power 
(g) Dutch, Swiss, or 
Belgian-style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Yi Wijong  
(2/8/1907) 
(New York Times) 
(a) Hague Peace 
Conference 
(b) Erosion of Korea’s  
diplomatic  
sovereignty, Russo- 
Japanese agreement 
(c) None 
(d) Korean independence 
(e) Major powers 
(f) No interest from any major power 
(g) Swiss-style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
Yi Wijong  
(5/9/1907) 
(Het Vader Land) 
(a) Hague Peace 
Conference 
(b) Erosion of Korea’s  
diplomatic sovereignty, 
Russo-Japanese 
agreement 
(c) None 
(d) Korean independence 
(e) Major powers 
(f) No interest from any major power 
(g) Dutch or Swiss-style 
(h) Permanent neutrality 
 
 
Table 8: Neutralisation Proponents’ Nationalities 
                                                                 (10/9/1882~11/12/1907) 
Stage 
(period) 
Korea Japan China Britain France Russia U.S. Germ. Western 
Press 
Joint 
proposal 
Total 
Imo Mutiny-Post-Gapsin Coup   
(10/9/1882~*/2/1885) 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
1 
 
1  
 
1  2 
 
  12 
 
Geomundo Incident 
(25/6/1885~14/11/1886) 
3 1 1 1   1    7 
Post-Geomudo-Pre-Korean 
Empire Era (6/3/1889~11/6/1896) 
3 4 
 
 
 
3 
 
       1(a1) 
 
1(a2) 
 
12 
 
1st Half Korean Empire Era 
(18/11/1897~*/9/1902) 
3 
 
1 
 
  1 
 
3  
 
2  
 
   10 
 
2nd Half Korean Empire Era 
(8/5/1903-11/12/1907) 
9 
  
  1 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 1(a3) 
 
14 
 
Total  18 
 
13 
 
1 
 
6 
 
2 
 
6 
 
3 
 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
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Notes: a1 = The British-run newspaper Chinese Times in Tianjin; 6 March, 1889, Source from the  
 French Diplomatic Document  
      a2 = British & American ambassador in St. Petersburg; 9 & 11 June 1896, the Kobe Chronicle & 
          Dongnip sinmun  
      a3 = German & French governments; 22 Jan. 1904, Source from the Shēn bào, Chinese newspaper  
 in Shanghai  
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<Diagram> 
 
Diagram 1: Neutralisation Attempts in the Age of Imperialism 
 
 
Note: This map illustrates neutralisation attempts around the globe and is author’s own creation. 
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Diagram 2: Korean Telegraph System (1900) 
 
                           Wi Ju                               Kyeng Song  
  
                      Anju           Woonsan              
  
                                                          Song Chin 
Chinnampo             Ping Yang          Unsan 
                                       Gwendoline             Puk Chong        
 
 
                      Hai Ju              Kai Song or Song Do                  Ham Hung                  
`                                                                       
 
 
    Chemulpo           Seoul           Kim Song            Wonsan                                                     
                   
 
                            
Kung Ju 
    Kun San 
    
Chun Ju 
                               
                    Tai Gu 
 
    Mok Po 
 
               Masampo    
                                            Fu San    
 
Note: All Korean names are based on British-style transcription. 
Source: Danguk daehakgyo dongyanghak yeonguso, ed., Gaehwagi daeoe mingan munhwa gyoryu  
       chongseo VII: Gaehwagi Hanguk gwallyeon gumi muyeok bogoseo jaryojip (Seoul: JNC, 2006), 349. 
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Diagram 3: Telegraph and Postal Networks of Korea (1905) 
 
 
 
Note: This map depicts all telegraph and postal networks of Korea as of 1905.   
Source: 
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=103&oid=001&aid=0003350094    
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Diagram 4: Major Railroads in Korea (1905) 
 
 
 
Note: This map illustrates two major railroads, Gyeongin Railroad (Seoul to Incheon) and Gyeongbu  
     Railroad (Seoul to Busan). 
Source: Gogung bakmulgwan, ed., Baeknyeon jeon ui gieok, Daehan Jeguk (Seoul: Graphicnet, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gyeongin 
Railroad 
Gyeongbu 
Railroad 
Busan 
Seoul 
Incheon 
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Diagram 5: Major Railroads in Korea (1905) 
 
 
 
Note: This map shows two major railroads, Gyeongui Railroad, linking Seoul to Uiju and Gyeongwon  
     Railroad, spanning from Seoul to Wonsan. 
Source: Gogung bakmulgwan, ed., Baeknyeon jeon ui gieok, Daehan Jeguk (Seoul: Graphicnet, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gyeongui 
Railroad 
Gyeongwon 
Railroad 
Seoul 
Uiju 
Wonsan 
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Diagram 6-1: Yi Haneung’s Korean Neutralisation Diagram 
 
 
      Great Britain                                         Russia   This side tries   
                                                                               to come 
                                                                               down       
Half way of        Anglo- 
meeting of 
Great Britain and 
France                                             Russian string     
                                                                               This side tries  
                                                                  to go up to      
                                               Japanese string       meet Russia,  
and 
                                                                                          Manchuria   
                              Franco-                                                    and Korea    
                                                                                          pressed  
                                                                                          between 
   France                                          Japan 
 
                                               Frame   
 
Source: F.O.17/1662, Yi Haneung to Foreign Office, 1904.1.13. 
 
Diagram 6-2: Yi Haneung’s Korean Neutralisation Diagram 
 
 
                                        Russia 
 
 
                                    
Manchuria 
Anglo-French agreement 
in Europe                                  Korea             This side being wide open by 
the Anglo-French agreement in                                                          
                                                     Europe and it is necessary to put  
                                   China             something to make the triangle  
                                   British interests     machine strong 
 
 
 
                Frame                        Japan 
                            
Source: F.O.17/1662, Yi Haneung to Foreign Office, 1904.1.13. 
 
 
 
 
 
             
       
Frame 
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Diagram 6-3: Yi Haneung’s Korean Neutralisation Diagram 
 
                                                                 
                                                         Russia 
 
 
                                                      Manchuria 
 
 
                                                      Korea          Russo-Japanese stick 
Anglo-French agreement 
in Europe 
                                             China 
                                             British interest 
 
Frame 
 
Japan 
 
Source: F.O.17/1662, Yi Haneung to Foreign Office, 1904.1.13. 
 
Diagram 6-4: Yi Haneung’s Korean Neutralisation Diagram 
 
                                                         Russia   
 
 
                                                Manchuria 
                                       Korea   
 
 
Anglo-French agreement                                                       Russo-Japanese 
in Europe                                                                   stick 
                                             China                                     
Anglo-French 
                                               interests 
Frame 
 
                                             
Japan 
Anglo-French stick 
 
 
Source: F.O.17/1662, Yi Haneung to Foreign Office, 1904.1.13. 
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Diagram 6-5: Yi Haneung’s Korean Neutralisation Diagram 
 
                                                    Russia 
 
 
                                Manchuria  
                                            Korea 
      Anglo-French agreement                                             R- 
      in Europe                                                            Russo-Japanese  
                                                               China               stick 
                                        British and      
                                      French interests 
                      Frame                               J 
                                                           
                                
Anglo-French stick      Japan     
 
Source: F.O.17/1662, Yi Haneung to Foreign Office, 1904.1.19. 
 
Diagram 6-6: Yi Haneung’s Korean Neutralisation Diagram 
 
 
Russia                                                                             Japan 
 
 
 
 
                               
                                 Anglo-French weight 
 
Source: F.O.17/1662, Yi Haneung to Foreign Office, 1904.1.19. 
Note: All diagrams shown above were reproduced based on original illustrations in British Foreign  
Office files. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A- 
F                     
J 
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